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This thesis examines China’s contemporary global cultural footprints through its recent 
development of cultural diplomacy and its global expansion of the Confucius Institute, 
whose prominent features are investigated by exploring the four specific research 
questions of ‘why’ China wants to launch cultural diplomacy and the CI, ‘what’ is the 
vehicle, ‘who’ is the agent, and ‘how’ it is carried out in the field. The thesis challenges 
the adequacy of the mainstream concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’ that are 
most commonly cited in the current literature, and argued for an alternative analytical 
framework that goes beyond and beneath these Western-defined concepts. After 
deciphering the multiple contexts, Gramsci’s concepts of cultural hegemony and 
ideology and Said’s critique of Orientalism are adopted to frame a different 
understanding of the historical and international contexts, while the double-edged role 
played by nationalism is analysed to deepen our understanding of the domestic context.  
  
The proposed new perspectives are then applied to chart the global cultural terrain of 
struggle, where the cultural encounters in the shifting global power relations between 
China’s long-held image as the “cultural other” and the ‘ideological other’ and its self-
representations are examined. A comparative case study of the CIs, one of the most 
visible and controversial manifestations of China’s cultural diplomacy, is carried out to 
answer the main research question of why China’s similar efforts in promoting its culture 
were perceived and received differently to other Western countries and encountered 
unexpected controversies. The answers outline the unique challenges faced by China’s 
cultural diplomacy in both the cultural encounters and the interactions between its 
internal articulations and external communications. Primary data were collected from 25 
interviews with staff from nine CIs in five different countries and one Goethe Institute in 
Beijing. The dynamics between these interweaving contexts elaborate the complexity of 
China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project, whose prominent features are presented 
as the major research findings of this thesis, while what will make it a truly ‘great leap 
outward’ is also discussed. 
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Introduction    
 
0.1 Background and the contexts 
 
China, the oldest continuous civilisation on earth, has survived 4000 years’ history with 
a rich cultural heritage, and re-emerged as the second largest economy in the world 
since 2010 (The Economist, 2010). However, since the perception of Chinese civilisation 
in the rest of the world shifted from admiration in the 17th and 18th centuries, when ancient 
China was introduced to the West as the model of a secular and humane civilisation by 
Matteo Ricci (1615) and Voltaire (1756), to growing contempt in the 19th century, when 
China was defeated in the two Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), China’s image 
has been misrepresented in many Western countries since this negative downturn until 
today: from ‘yellow peril’ to ‘red threat’, the transformation brought by China’s modern 
development seems to have only changed the colour code, from race to regime.  
 
If seen through theoretical lenses, we will be able to see two images of ‘otherness’ here. 
Firstly, the dichotomy of East and West as cultural entities was dissected by Said’s (1978) 
critique of Orientalism, in which the Orient was rendered as being the ‘inferior other’ for 
the Occident to define its own superior identity; in a way, an Orientalist perception of the 
world is ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall, 1992:185), with ‘the West’ at the centre and ‘the 
Rest’ as the inferior. In history, although China had mostly been held as a civilised 
Confucian utopia until the 18th century, it became a rotten Oriental empire towards the 
end of the Qing Dynasty that had its cultural identity subject to ‘otherness’. 
 
Secondly, this historical legacy was carried onto modern times, when China’s 
authoritarian regime evolved its image from being ‘the cultural other’ to being ‘the 
ideological other’.  Despite the moving of the dynamic hub of the world economy from 
the developed Western countries led by the US and Europe to the developing Asian 
nations led by China and India, the traditional equation of the West with modernity and 
the Orient with the exotic past remains to be challenged, and has continued to be a 
particular obstacle to the Chinese attempt at establishing its political identity. As long as 
China maintains that the values of its political system are fundamentally different from 
the leading Western countries, China is still considered as the ‘other’ if seen through the 
framework of hegemony and ideology constructed by Gramsci (1971). Moreover, in the 
discourse of nationalism proposed by Ozirimli (2005), China again falls into the camps 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These polarised ‘other’ representations uphold each other, and 
become dual forces of Western domination over China’s power of discourse when they 





It should be noted at this point that the word ‘West’ has different connotations: the shift 
of economic dynamic hub from the West to the East mainly refers to the geographical 
domain, while the ‘equation of the West with modernity’ is a shorthand narrative for a 
political and cultural concept. Hall (1992:186) has remarkably deconstructed the concept 
of ‘the West’ as “a historical, not a geographical construct”; it is “a tool to think with”, “an 
ideology”, and “a system of representation”. Despite the diverse variations among the 
Western nations, the concept of ‘the West’ becomes a means by which such a non-
generalisable identity is imagined as “a standard or model of comparison” (Hall, 
1992:186), and to a large extent, Chinese scholars, Chinese state media and even 
government rhetoric have all helped perpetuate the East-West dichotomy in establishing 
a binary opposition between China and ‘the West’ when they use the term, or more 
recently, the ‘Western counterforce’ (“西方敌对势力”, xifang didui shili), as if it were a 
monolith entity: the West wanted this, or the West did that. In this thesis, ‘the West’ is 
only used, when necessary, as a comparative frame of reference suggested by Hall, or 
in critical comments on quotations that used the term uncritically. 
 
Another important annotation is needed for Orientalism, which “was the product of a 
particular moment in the history of European colonialism, and as a result changes and 
falters with the fate of imperialism” (Dabashi, 2015: 17). Indeed, the whole topography 
of domination and resistance is changing, the world structure has now shifted from being 
bipolar during the Cold War era to a unipolar one after the collapse of the former USSR, 
and then to an emerging multi-polar world today. In this process, miraculous economic 
development has endowed China with a favourable shift of wealth and power. What is at 
stake today is not so much the ‘end of history’ as once argued by Fukuyama’s (1989) 
assumption of the US dominance in the ‘New World Order’ as the logical and necessary 
culmination of history itself, but the end of West-centrism. Many of the world’s leading 
powers were negatively affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, while China 
continued to achieve rapid growth, the direction of moving to a world that no longer rests 
upon Western hegemony has generated a sense of crisis for those in the dominating 
positions. This has provided breeding grounds for the perception of the rising China as 
a ‘threat’, which has evolved into so many different versions since it became topical in 
the early 90s: seeing China as a military and economic threat (Roy, 1996; Broomfiled, 
2003), ideological threat (Yee & Storey, 2002; Yang & Liu, 2012), development model 
threat (Peerenboom, 2007), environmental threat (Bingman, 2010), spy threat (Newman, 
2011), energy consumption threat (Richardson, 2014), and intellectual property right 
threat (Roper, 2014).  
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In response, the Chinese government believed launching a campaign of cultural 
diplomacy as a “strategic communication” would help it “get the right message to the 
right audience through the right medium at the right time” (Anderson, 2009:36). Chinese 
scholar Guo (2004:30) also argued for the right timing in that: 
 
The international interest in, and recognition of, China’s role in the global 
economy and international politics appear to coincide with a Chinese 
government’s rethink of the image of China as a world power in tune with its 
reputation as an ancient civilisation. 
 
This shows both an internal and external dimension: internally, China needs to construct 
a coherent view of its national identity at home that is commensurate with its people’s 
expectation of China’s rightful place in the wider world; externally, China wishes to 
communicate with the world the message of Confucius’s belief in ‘harmony with diversity’, 
and to re-establish its significance as a major power and culture in today’s world, which 
is marked with economic globalisation, political multi-polarisation and cultural 
diversification. In Lampton’s words (2008:27), “as China’s power has grown, it has 
wanted to make itself more charming, more effective, to limit counter-reactions”. 
Therefore, cultural diplomacy is expected to serve the dual aims of countering the China 
threat argument and advocating cultural pluralism at the same time, corresponding to 
the afore-mentioned two images of ‘otherness’.  
 
As the term suggests, cultural diplomacy involves both a dimension of ‘culture’ and 
‘diplomacy’, and this new strategy demonstrates changes in China on both fronts. While 
Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy introduced in 1978 has propelled China to global 
prominence in recent decades through its economic might, on the diplomatic front, 
Deng’s strategy was ‘keeping a low profile’. A generally more ‘assertive’ stance of 
China’s foreign policy in the post-Deng era has been observed and articulated by a 
number of scholars (Unger, 1996; Shambaugh, 2013a), or in the Chinese discourse, it is 
geared towards ‘striving for achievements’ (Yan, 2014). Meanwhile, at the government 
level, culture was declared to be the third pillar of China’s diplomacy after politics and 
economy in 2004, and Sun Jiazheng, the then Chinese Cultural Minister (1998-2013), 
pledged to reverse the “huge deficits in the trading of cultural products” (cited in Lai & 
Lu, 2012:86). Some milestone events in the last decade or so have marked the fledgling 
of China’s cultural diplomacy: from the debut of the ‘Year of Chinese Culture’ series in 
France, Italy, Russia, and Australia in 2003, to the opening up of the Confucius Institutes 
(CIs) all across the globe since 2004; from launching 24-hour cable news channels 
overseas (CCTV News, CNC) and newspapers (China Daily Asia Weekly and European 
Weekly) in 2010, to staging the Chinese image advertisement in New York Time Square 
4 
 
in 2011. The government rhetoric has also shown no ambiguity in its intention to 
“augment the soft power of Chinese culture and further elevate our national image” (Li 
Changchun1, cited in Lam, 2009: n.p.). Wang Chen, who currently heads the Communist 
Party’s overseas propaganda division (中共中央对外宣传办公室), added that media and 
cultural units should enhance their “capacity to broadcast, to positively influence 
international public opinion and to establish a good image for our nation” (cited in Lam, 
2009: n.p.).  
 
After significant investments in various high-profile initiatives and projects, including 
establishing three national bases for international cultural trade, and the one in Beijing 
claims to be the ‘largest in scale and most comprehensive in scope’ in the world, the 
numbers released by the Chinese government seem to suggest early success: cultural 
products and services export grew by 2.8 and 8.7 folds respectively from 2001 to 2010 
(Zhu, 2012), and the CIs rapidly expanded to 500 all over the world by the end of 
December 2015 (Hanban, 2015). However, these numbers were not translated into the 
desired policy result of “elevating the national image” as quoted above. Rather, the 
Chinese government was baffled to find China’s image ranking slip down across a 
number of international polls, which was reflected in a People’s Daily editorial asking 
‘How can we make the world like us?’. It started with the question of “Has China's 
ascending status brought the nation the admiration and the acceptance of other 
countries?”, the discussion below showed the frustration that when ‘admiration’ is 
expected, even ‘acceptance’ is not achieved (People’s Daily, 2010):  
 
While China continues to exert a more confident image, it is also meeting some 
resistance from the world, even from its old friends. From the snooty coverage 
by overseas media outlets to various polls of public perception in foreign 
countries, these suggest that China is facing a challenge to improve its image. 
 
Although there is no direct evidence to suggest a causal relation between the 
ineffectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy and the decline of favourable values on 
China, these poll results at least indicate the challenge faced by it. Such polls include 
The Gallup World Poll, whose rates of ‘very favourable’ and ‘mostly favourable’ views 
toward China decreased from 18% and 46% respectively in 1979 when the poll began, 
to 8% and 36% respectively in 2016 (Gallup, 2016); the BBC World Service Country 
Rating Poll also saw the negative rating of China increase from 32% when the Poll began 
in 2005 to 40% in 2009 after the Beijing Olympics, and further shot up to the highest level 
                                                             
1 Li Changchun was the Director of China’s Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical 
Progress (中央精神文明建设指导委员会主任) from 2002 to 2012, whose main mandate was 
controlling ideology and propaganda. 
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of 49% in 2014 (BBC, 2014); in the Pew Global Attitude Survey, favourable views of 
China’s image also continued to tumble in the US and the UK, going down from 50% and 
52% in 2009, to 38% and 45% in 2015 respectively (Pew Global, 2015). Manzenreiter’s 
research (2010:39) offered a more insightful and detailed reading of these statistics in 
pointing that since the BBC rating samples include most OECD countries:  
 
It may come closer to represent the “West” than the Gallup World Poll. Most 
countries in Europe and North America tend to evaluate China’s influence more 
negatively than the world average, which is outbalanced by more positive 
appreciation in Central America, Africa and Asia (with the exception of Japan, down 
from 22% to 8%). 
 
This seems to be consistent with the more negative receptions the CIs received in 
Europe and North America since they rolled out all over the world in 2004. A series of 
shockwaves have been sent from the North America and Europe against this ‘flagship’ 
of China’s cultural diplomacy: first from the US State Department against visa renewals 
for CI teachers in May 2012 (Fischer, 2012), then from the Lyon Confucius Institute in 
France and McMaster University in Canada, announcing the closing downs of the CIs 
there in 2013 (Ching, 2013), further followed by Chicago University, Pennsylvanian State 
University and Stockholm University, who all decided not to renew their CI agreements 
in 2014 (Volodzko, 2015). These incidents raised a series of questions that made the 
researcher ponder: when the closing down of the CI was interpreted as “heading for a 
‘soft power’ war with the West” (Volodzko, 2015: n.p.), and the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games was considered to provide “a platform for an ideological battle, between the 
normative Western forces of a self-defined global consensus and a nation state claiming 
status as a leader of an alternative to that so-called consensus” (Finlay & Xin, 2010: 895), 
is cultural diplomacy really a non-menacing platform to showcase China’s peaceful rise, 
or actually starting a new battlefield? Why China’s similar efforts in promoting its culture 
were perceived and received differently to other Western countries and encountered 
unexpected controversies? If cultural diplomacy is a ‘prescription’ to treat China’s image 
problem, what ingredients in this recipe could potentially generate side effects? And how 
can we improve the ‘prescription’ to make sure it does not just treat the symptoms but 
also address the root cause? 
 
Set within the analytical framework of the above debates, this thesis aims to examine 
the trajectory of China’s contemporary global cultural footprints made through its recent 
development of cultural diplomacy and global expansion of Confucius Institute, and 
investigate its distinctive features shown during the simultaneous multi-level interactions: 
the cultural encounters between China and the rest of the world in the context of shifting 
global power relations on the one hand; and the interactions between China’s internal 
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articulation and external communication of its cultural diplomacy on the other hand.  
 
0.2 What is in a title? 
 
History is always the preface to the current chapter being written. If we look back at the 
first two generations of Chinese leaders since the Communist Party came to power in 
1949, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, we can see the former paid more attention to 
military and ideological power, while the latter placed more emphasis on economic power. 
Although China has practiced cultural diplomacy for many decades, from the famous 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the early 1970s to Panda Diplomacy in the 1980s, it is fair to 
argue that it only appeared on the agenda of the third generation leaders as a means to 
build soft power. Though it is a new mission, the way it is handled at the government 
level is still heavily influenced by the first two strong leaders. 
 
The Great Leap Forward started by Mao Zedong in 1958 turned out to be such a calamity 
for the Chinese people and their economy, traditional culture and values, that it was 
criticised as The “Great Leap Backward” (Bettelheim, 1978) in modern Chinese history. 
Nearly sixty years have passed and China has made big strides in social and economic 
changes, yet the imprint left by the Great Leap Forward is so indelible and far-reaching 
that even today the state-run system that features concentrated state power, national 
investment and mobilisation is still in place: at the word of government command, 
national level support and resources are allocated in a campaigning style to create a 
sensational effect, and it is the number that is used as measurement to show the 
implementer’s political achievements - from the Olympic medals to China’s GDP growth. 
The CI as the flagship project of China’s new cultural strategy is just another example. 
Barr (2015: 187) has commented on “the extent to which it attempts to overtly quantify 
its culture power” as a feature of China’s approach to cultural diplomacy. 
 
Although Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy was acclaimed as the “Great Leap Outward” 
in 1979 (Cheng, 1979), it was not fully applicable to the diplomatic front during his time. 
As discussed earlier, it is only in the post-Deng era that the stance of “keeping a low 
profile” has gradually evolved into “striving for achievements” (Yan, 2014: 154), and Xi 
Jinping formally presented the latter as the new strategy in his speech at the foreign 
affairs conference in October 2013. This change of discourse mirrors the shifts in China’s 
self-identity and foreign policies. However, in the new book entitled China’s Great Leap 
Outward: Hard and Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power (Scobell & Mantas, eds, 2014), 




Since the induction of the national strategy of ‘Going Global’ (“走出去”, zou chu qu) in 
the 10th Five-Year-Plan in 2001, the cultural front quickly followed up with The 
Implementing Regulations of the Going Global Strategy of Radio, Film and Television 
was published by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television in the same 
year. A decade later, both the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration of Press 
and Publication have published their own 12th Five-Year-Plan of implementing the ‘Going 
Global’ strategy (Zhu, 2012), ushering in the age of a ‘great cultural leap outward’.  
 
The phrase ‘with Chinese characteristics’ was Deng Xiaoping’s invention to define 
socialism in the Chinese context in the early 1980s, with a view to putting ideological 
contention between capitalism and socialism on the backburner and focusing on 
economic development. This term was then used to explain the ‘uniqueness’ of Chinese 
conditions in almost everything that has the same name but different nature or practice 
in China. This thesis argues that the changing power position and unchanging power 
struggle explains the purpose and the timing for China to be engaged in cultural 
diplomacy. When carrying the shadows of ‘otherness’ and delivered in a trademark state-
run method, coupled with its long established party-state and propaganda system and 
its vastly different political values compared with the dominant Western model, it would 
only make this classic suffix of ‘Chinese characteristics’ indispensable for an accurate 
understanding and interpreting of China’s cultural diplomacy and its flagship project of 
the CI. The thesis will also discuss which measurement will make this cultural ‘leap 
outward’ truly ‘great’, and how not to repeat the mistakes made by Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward when the meaning of ‘great’ was translated into blind pursuit of speed and scale 
in practice. 
 
0.3 Overview of the thesis 
 
In searching for answers to the questions outlined in section 0.1, five chapters have been 
laid out in making this thesis:  
 
Chapter One is the Literature Review. To set out the theoretical premises for the research, 
the thesis argues the necessity to look through multiple lenses of the historical, 
international and domestic contexts in which China is endeavouring to reshape its image. 
It approaches the subject by first discussing the limitations of the mainstream concepts 
of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’ in the current literature explaining the purpose of 
China’s cultural diplomacy, and argues that we must look beyond and beneath these 
Western-defined concepts to examine the complex and intertwined contexts before a 
broader and deeper understanding of China’s cultural diplomacy can be achieved; the 
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chapter then deciphers the multiple contexts in which the new theoretical framework is 
developed by adopting Gramsci’s concepts of cultural hegemony and ideology and 
Said’s critique of Orientalism to frame a different understanding of the historical and 
international contexts. Following that, the double-edged role played by nationalism is 
examined to deepen the understanding of the domestic context. These new theoretical 
perspectives are hence applied to discussing the vehicle and agent of China’s cultural 
diplomacy, laying down the theoretical foundations to the answering of the main thesis 
research question: why China’s similar efforts in launching Confucius Institute are 
perceived and received differently to its Western counterparts? The answers to this main 
research question lead to four layers that actually constitute the Chinese characteristics 
of the CI: its purpose, vehicle, agent and actual practice in the field.  
 
Chapter Two discusses the research methodology, justifying and mapping out the 
research design, with multiple triangulations to enhance its validity, including 
methodological triangulation, data triangulation, investigator triangulation and theoretical 
triangulation. A coding system is also explained in handling the primary data collected 
from a total of 25 interviews carried out with nine CIs in four different continents and one 
Goethe Institute in Beijing.  
 
Chapters Three to Five unfold data presentation and analysis along different lines: 
Chapter Three charts the global cultural terrain of struggle for the CI in four steps by 
applying the new theoretical framework: from framing the broader context to giving a full 
representation of the various actors at play in the terrain, then charting the terrain into 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides before examining the interactions among 
various players at different hierarchies; it also captures two snapshots of interactions 
among the multiple players and stakeholders to showcase the actual dynamics and 
intricacies in the field.  
 
Chapter Four moves from the macro level to the micro level by following the same layers 
of the research questions in giving a comprehensive analytical comparison between the 
CI and its Western counterparts, with a view to highlighting the different challenges 
associated with their different positions in the global cultural terrain, revealing a much 
deeper reading into the differences than what the existing studies have suggested so far, 
which has only focused on the CI’s government connections and different operating 
models. Apart from the primary data collected by the researcher’s first-hand interviews 
and four copies of CI agreements, secondary data is also drawn on to drive the analysis 
from the micro level further down to the specific case of the CI at the University of 





Chapter Five moves back to the macro level of the global cultural terrain by combining 
the cultural boundary theory with nationalism traits to contrast the terrain conditions in 
the East and West blocs to avoid the risk of generalising CI’s features. These three 
chapters elaborate the complexity of China’s culture diplomacy and its CI project with 
evidence and theoretical discussions from different angles. They built on each other to 
reach the four distinctive features of the CI, whose implications are then spelled out by 
following the same four layers of the research questions. 
 
Finally, the overall thesis conclusion offers an overview of all the five chapters, 
summarises the key findings and considers what will make the CI project a truly “Great 
Leap Outward”. 
 
These five chapters inform the logical flow of the whole thesis. Both the new perspectives 
of examining the subject, the new framework for analysing it, and the different output 
pictures it will reveal represent the originality of this research in making both conceptual 
and empirical contributions to building a more complete view of what shapes and 



























The purpose of this chapter is to trace the contours of prevailing research of cultural 
diplomacy and China’s undertakings. Recognising that cultural diplomacy is an 
inherently interdisciplinary research area transgressing traditional disciplinary 
boundaries of culture, international relations, and communications, and that there is a 
rich and complex body of literature, a critical review is carried out by identifying the key 
themes that inform this area of research and exploring them in depth. This will serve as 
the bedrock for the understanding of the research subject, and to identify areas that are 
open to more questionings and further explorations, based on which research questions 
for this thesis will be formulated, and an alternative analytical framework will be proposed 
where different elements are juxtaposed. 
 
To help sketch the outlines, four angles are taken to form a comprehensive review: the 
purpose of cultural diplomacy (the ‘why’); its vehicle (the ‘what’); agent (the ‘who’); and 
the actual practice in the field (the ‘how’). Therefore, this chapter is divided into the 
following five parts:  
 
The first part unpacks the key concept of cultural diplomacy with a focus on its purpose, 
followed by a review of the current research examining the purpose of China’s cultural 
diplomacy. Then a different analytical framework is proposed to take account of more 
hidden factors at play in shaping the historical, international and domestic contexts in 
which China’s cultural diplomacy campaign is launched. The second part focuses on the 
vehicle of cultural diplomacy by staging the contending views of sources of Chinese soft 
power, and the ensued dilemma Chinese government is facing; it also exposes the 
defects of the current analytical framework. The third part investigates the agent in 
cultural diplomacy by comparing theoretical debates with the Chinese practice; it also 
examines the inherent drawbacks of the government-led approach by pitching it against 
the backdrop of the Chinese propaganda system. The fourth part looks at the current 
implementation strategies in the field and proposes new ideas, which also represents a 
potential contribution this study can make to the policy-making process. The last part 
synthesises the previous discussions of the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ of cultural diplomacy 
into a critical literature review related to the CI, the most watched effort of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the most controversial one as well, with a view to justifying its relevance 




1.1 What is cultural diplomacy and its purpose?  
 
1.1.1 Unpacking the key concept of cultural diplomacy 
 
The hybrid term ‘cultural diplomacy’ does not have a particularly long history. It first 
appeared in the 1934 Oxford English Dictionary, as a laudatory reference for English 
language teaching abroad, but the concept did not gain much currency until the term 
‘public diplomacy’ was coined during the days of the Cold War, which was more than a 
simple military confrontation and economic wrangling between the two camps, but also 
a battle of world views and ideologies. It was against this historical background that the 
concept of ‘public diplomacy’ was proposed in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University when he established the 
Edward R. Murrow Centre of Public Diplomacy (Centre on Public Diplomacy, 2006). It 
then appeared across a range of discourses, including academic, journalistic, and 
governmental. Gullion suggested that public diplomacy is connected with all aspects that 
fall outside of traditional diplomacy, with an aim to influence citizens of other countries to 
achieve a positive attitude towards a particular country (Melissen, 2005). Ham’s 
summary (2001: 4) offered a more discerning insight to this contrast: “traditional 
diplomacy is focusing on problems whereas public diplomacy on values”.  
 
The end of the Cold War marked the change from a world of geopolitics and power to a 
post-modernist world of images and influence. Many scholars (Huntington, 1998; Ding, 
2008) contend that cultural factors have now emerged as the force majeure in 
international relations, often superseding diplomatic norms and realpolitik. A more recent 
definition of public diplomacy that is commonly cited was given by M. McClellan (2004: 
n.p.): the “active, planned use of cultural, educational and informational programming to 
create a desired result that is directly related to a government’s foreign policy objectives”. 
As for how to achieve this, a more detailed description was offered by the U.S. 
Department of State in its Dictionary of International Relations Terms (1987:85): "public 
diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence 
public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, 
cultural exchanges, radio and television".  
 
From the above definitions, it is not hard to understand why many researchers treat 
cultural diplomacy as a core element of public diplomacy. In other words, public 
diplomacy often assumes the form of cultural diplomacy, as publications, films, cultural 
exchanges, radio and television, as well as sports, are all broadly classified as culture. 
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However, the concept of culture per se is infamously difficult to define. As a most elusive 
term, its definitions abound and range from the very complex ones to the very simple. 
Geertz (1973: 5) noted sarcastically that in some twenty-seven pages of Kluckhohn’s 
chapter on the concept, he managed to define culture in turn as . . . [what follows is 11 
different definitions]; and “turning, perhaps in desperation, to similes, as a map, as a 
sieve, and as a matrix”. According to The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity adopted by the 31st session of the General Conference of UNESCO in 
November 2001, culture is a “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group and that it encompasses, in addition to 
art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” 
(UESCO, 2001). As pointed out by Robertson (1991), culture has become a globally 
authoritative paradigm for explaining differences, a means for locating ‘the Other’.  
 
To build on this, Bhabha (1994) highlighted an important difference between ‘cultural 
difference’ and ‘cultural diversity’, contending that the latter is static and concerns 
knowledge, while the former stress on the dynamic process and concerns interaction, 
during which an ‘Other’ culture was involved and a difference was produced between 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’. In other words, ‘inter-culture’ is conceptualised as a process that 
focuses on the ways that flows of people, ideas, practices, and ideologies across time 
and space produce an imagined ‘multi-culture’. Multiculturalism thus addresses the 
process of mutual recognition, generation, and transformation in this interaction with 
other cultures, particularly between conflicting cultures, and reveals the contradiction of 
a dominating culture trying to establish and maintain its authority as well as the tensions 
and exclusions involved in the process. This distinguished cultural pluralism from the 
simple fact of cultural diversity; it is “a political response to the injustice done to members 
of formerly oppressed culture” (Sabbagh, 2005: 100).  
 
From the above we can see ‘cultural difference’ underpins the ultimate goal of cultural 
diplomacy as defined by Cummings (2009: 1): “the exchange of ideas, information, 
values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of culture, with the intention of 
fostering mutual understanding” [emphasis added]. The definition given in the Cultural 
Diplomacy Dictionary echoes this: “the essential idea is to allow people access to 
different cultures and perspectives, and in this way, foster mutual understanding and 
dialogue” (Chakraborty, 2013:30). Such exchange implies communication and respect 
between the cultures involved, which leads on to a sounder understanding of respective 
values and a reduced susceptibility to stereotypes. This is of paramount importance to 
China as in both Chinese scholarly and official discourse, a common belief is that China 
has often been either misunderstood or misrepresented by the rest of the world, 
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especially in the mainstream Western media; or there is simply a lack of understanding 
(Yang 2011; Zhang, 2012b; Zhu, 2012; Wang, 2014; Hartig, 2016). The then Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011: n.p.) used quite explicit wording of “putting an end 
to misunderstanding, prejudice and suspicion toward China in the international 
community” as one of the aims of China's public diplomacy.   
 
The review so far reveals the fine line between the concepts of public diplomacy and 
cultural diplomacy: whereas public diplomacy is mostly one-dimensional and puts 
emphasis on policy as it “involves the cultivation of public opinion to achieve the desired 
geopolitical aims of the sponsor” (Osgood & Etheridge, 2010: 5), cultural diplomacy on 
the other hand, adopts a multidimensional approach and focuses on mutual 
understanding and mutual interest, which are the pre-requisites for its effective results. 
It was also made clear by the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy that it “is not a promotion 
of its own culture, but rather of understanding and reconciling, as well as learning from 
each other” (Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report 2011, n.p.).  
 
However, this essential point was sometimes missing from the Chinese discourse, 
instead, it often uses the phrase of “letting Chinese culture walk out” (Zhao 2012; Zhang, 
2012b), “telling our story to the world” (Peng, 2008; Xinhua, 2011), or “projecting soft 
power” (Lai, 2012; Dai, 2013) that suggests ‘one-way traffic’ to describe its purpose. 
Other scholars, such as Bian (2009), even described its purpose as fighting against 
‘cultural imperialism’ that Western cultural diplomacy was producing. On the one hand, 
such rhetoric may be driven by the Chinese feeling that its culture has been either 
misunderstood or suffers from a lack of understanding as discussed earlier, but on the 
other hand, it also raised a legitimate question: can the stated purpose of ‘fostering 
mutual understanding’ be achieved in a real sense when cultural difference is actually 
tied to different power positions in the global cultural terrain? This uneven position may 
entail the mirror mind-set of ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ on both sides, conveying an image of a 
‘battle field’ when phrases such as ‘fighting against cultural hegemony’ and ‘cultural 
resistance’ are used, even the understanding of cultural diplomacy as an ‘international 
competition’ (Guo, 2004; Zhang, 2012b) runs contrary to the very purpose of the 
‘reconciliation’ of cultural diplomacy.  
 
The next section will contextualise China’s aim in launching its campaign of cultural 
diplomacy by taking a dual perspective from the international and domestic contexts, as 
the inextricable connections between the two dimensions form one of the characteristics 
of China’s cultural diplomacy. Due to this interconnectedness, it is worth noting that the 
compartmentalisation of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ context is only meaningful on a 
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theoretical and analytical level, but not in practice. It is also worth noting that both 
contexts have a historical dimension as well, which will also be explored as historical 
conditions are the bedrock of today’s global cultural terrain.  
 
1.1.2 Understanding the international context: soft power and image building, or 
power struggle for cultural hegemony? 
 
This part will first look at the evolving theories and prevalent perspectives that have been 
taken to explain the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy to this day, followed by a 
critical review that exposes the limitations of applying those Western-defined narratives 
in examining China’s cultural diplomacy. After challenging the adequacy and even 
appropriateness of the mainstream analytical concepts in use, a new framework of 
analysis will be presented to help form a deeper understanding of the international 
context. 
 
i) Soft power 
 
Coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term ‘soft power’ means “the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2004: x). The 
definition was expanded by adding the word ‘persuasion’ when he explained the new 
concept of ‘smart power’, a strategy that describes a successful “combination of the hard 
power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” 
[emphasis added] (Nye, 2011: xiii). Again, in another article Nye published in 2012 about 
soft power in China, he referred to soft power as “the ability to get what one wants by 
attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2012, n.p.). It was also 
stated in this article that with soft power, "the best propaganda is not propaganda". This 
is an ideal situation when ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ merge seamlessly, but the inherent 
tension existing between the two, whereby the former draws on intrinsic values while the 
latter depends on extrinsic aids, was never discussed, although it has huge implications 
on how to build soft power in practice, especially for an authoritarian ‘hard state’ like 
China (Barr, Feklyunina & Theys, 2015).  
 
According to Li (2009:31), soft power in China is “primarily utilised to refute the ‘China 
Threat’ thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic social-economic 
reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise”. However, a 
question worth pondering is: will state-led persuasion campaign increase or decrease 
the attraction of a country’s culture, political values and foreign policy, the three sources 
of soft power defined by Nye (2004)? Nye’s answer to this question was quite blunt in 
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that Beijing is “trying its hands at attraction, and failing – miserably”, with the explanation 
being that China “made the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument 
of soft power” (Nye, 2013:n.p.). Yet, ironically, the concept of ‘soft power’ was probably 
more enthusiastically embraced by the Chinese government than anywhere else, even 
to the extent of obsession according to Shambaugh (2013b) and Tao (2015).  
 
The concept was first introduced to China in 1993 by Wang Huning, then a professor of 
International Politics from Fudan University, but who was soon recruited to be the head 
of the political section of the Central Policy Research Centre of the CCP Central 
Committee, or China’s brain trust. Wang has been the Director of the Centre since 2002 
and the policy adviser and speechwriter to three successive presidents: Jiang Zemin, Hu 
Jintao, and now Xi Jinping. Despite the academic and foreign policy debates it has 
induced at home in the US, the concept of ‘soft power’ has gained considerable currency 
in both official and scholarly discourse in China, particularly after 2007 when it was 
adopted into the official lexicon: Chinese president Hu Jintao made it clear at the 17th 
National Congress that “cultural soft power” has become “a factor of growing significance 
in the competition in overall national strength” (Hu, 2007, n. p.), and ‘building cultural soft 
power’ was listed on the agenda in the 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-2015). When Xi Jinping 
took over in 2012, he not only continued to endorse this concept, but linked it with the 
new vision of the China Dream in a speech: “enhancing national cultural soft power is 
crucial to the realisation of the two ‘centennial goals’ and the China Dream of national 
rejuvenation” (Xi, 2013, n.p.). Cultural renaissance is considered a key part of the 
Chinese national rejuvenation, while traditional culture is considered to be what the 
Chinese cultural soft power is nourished by and rooted in. 
 
Possibly because of its frequent appearance in official rhetoric, there was not much 
scholarly debate on the concept’s relevance to China but extensive elaborations on its 
importance for China, almost as a timely cure found for China’s image problem that the 
government is facing after China’s economic and military rise. Therefore, of the myriad 
literature about China’s cultural diplomacy, the great majority has attributed its purpose 
to ‘building soft power’ (Chey, 2008; Fan, 2008; Li, eds, 2009; Glaser & Murphy, 2009; 
Gil, 2009; d’Hooghe, 2011, Wang, 2011; Lai & Lu, eds, 2012; Zhang, 2012a; Hartig, 
2012b; Pan, 2013; Hubbert, 2014;) and ‘reshaping China’s image’ (Wang, 2003; Guo, 
2004; Barr, 2012; Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy 2011-2012). 
 
To chime with the narrative of cultural renaissance in China, many scholars (Ding, 2008; 
Li, 2009; Glaser and Murphy, 2009) have pointed that the theory of ‘soft power’ is not a 
recent concept but has much deeper roots in China’s ancient philosophies. For example, 
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Laozi, the founder of Daoism, used the famous metaphor of water dripping through a 
rock to say ‘what is soft is strong’; Mozi, the founder of Mohism and the advocate of the 
doctrine of non-offense, argued that offensive uses of forces would sow the seeds of 
long-standing conflicts like theft and murder; and Sunzi, the ancient Chinese strategist, 
put forward the best strategy as ‘winning a battle without a fight’; Confucianism, which 
had been China’s dominant ideology for more than 2000 years, advocated that a state 
should obtain its leadership status by setting a moral example, and win the allegiance of 
people through virtue, not by force or imposition of one’s values on others; Mencius, 
another great Confucian thinker, was known to elaborate on the value of non-coercion 
and the necessity for a ruler to cultivate his own virtue to attract others: 
 
There is a way to gain the whole world. It is to gain the people, and having gained 
them one gains the whole world. There is a way to gain the people. Gain their hearts, 
and then you gain them…. When you are correct in your person, the whole world 
will turn to you (cited in Bell, 2006:25). 
 
Even in the U.S., Joseph Nye is only considered the inventor of the term ‘soft power’, but 
not the idea. In the classic book A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organization: on 
Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates (first published in 1961), Amitai Etzioni (1961) 
already noted that power differs according to the means employed to make the subject 
comply. These means may be physical, material, or symbolic, or what Etzioni 
respectively called coercive, remunerative, and normative power. Coercive power relies 
on inflicting physical or psychological pain or deprivation. Remunerative power is the 
realm of material inducement; normative power relies on the capacity to motivate through 
the force of ideas and win compliance through creating group norms which individual 
wishes to identify. Then in another book first published in 1974, Power: A Radical View, 
Lukes (1974:23) also called it “the supreme exercise of power to get another or others 
to have the desires you want them to have – that is, secure their compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires”.  
 
Nye made use of these ideas and coined the new term of soft power in the late 1980s. 
This notion of cultural power as an alternative to military and economic might has quickly 
gained popularity around the world and bred a whole new range of vocabulary with ‘soft’, 
such as ‘soft strategy’ and ‘soft balancing’. It was also warmly embraced by the Chinese 
government that aims at having a ‘soft rise’ (Wang, 2008: 258). In this sense, cultural 
diplomacy is expected to be the lubricant to transform China’s rise from a hard rise to a 





True, if affluence were to lead to influence, the hard power of economic and military might 
need to be combined with cultural and values attraction to make the influence positive. 
Although many scholars have argued that increases in hard economic and military power 
will produce enhanced soft power (Huntington, 1998), and “economic clout serves as a 
bedrock for a nation’s soft power” (Lai, 2012:12), this expected synchronised growth 
between hard power and soft power did not happen in China. Although the Chinese 
government has been using the indigenous discourse of ‘comprehensive national power’ 
since the 1980s, a term which encompasses all sources of material and ideational power, 
it does not claim to be the Chinese version of ‘smart power’, as the biggest difference 
lies in that ‘smart power’ stresses on the right mix or correct ingredients of soft power (by 
using culture, political values and foreign policy to attract) and hard power (by using 
military and/or economic resources to coerce). If D’Hooghe’s (2011) comment on the 
enormous gap between Chinese political values and the Western prevailing norms can 
be considered as one of the intrinsic hindrances for China to achieve this balanced mix, 
its quickly expanding spending on both military and cultural diplomacy may become an 
extrinsic constraint with an overdose of material power. As Joffe (2006) argued, too much 
hard power may end up breeding not submission but resistance, likewise, too many 
financial resources used do not necessarily strengthen soft power but may only make it 
‘hard’, which explains why the solution offered by the Chinese government to enhance 
its soft power could turn into part of the cause of the problem. 
 
Actually, if we trace Nye’s writings about China’s soft power, we can see a notable 
change in his views evidently shown in the titles, from The Rise of China's Soft Power in 
2005, to Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for Chinese Soft 
Power in 2009 and China's Soft Power Deficit in 2012, from What China and Russia 
Don’t Get About Soft Power, Beijing and Moscow are trying their hands at attraction, and 
failing – miserably in 2013, to The Limits of Chinese Soft Power in 2015. He likes to 
quote changing positions in the opinion polls as an indicator of how successful one’s soft 
power strategy is (Nye, 2004, 2005, 2012, 2013, 2015), which encourages a common 
view of seeing soft power as a “competition between great powers” (Guo, 2004:20). 
Although Nye himself claimed that “soft power need not be a zero sum game” (2013, 
n.p.), the way he pitched China’s soft power growth in 2005 as “at America’s expense” 
(2005: n.p.) actually says it is. Wang Jisi’s research (Nye and Wang, 2009b: 21) also 
found that “most of these (American) views assume a zero-sum game perspective and 
cast a more negative rather than positive light on China’s soft power growth”.  
 
If we remember the purpose of cultural diplomacy as ‘fostering mutual understanding’, 
we can see why this defies the validity of ‘soft power’ as being the underpinning theory 
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for cultural diplomacy that clearly does not aim at one side winning over the other but 
focusing on a notion of a plus sum game. The soft power approach is still a binary one 
in essence and projects different cultural and value systems as representing identities 
that are rivals to each other. As the two separate sources of ‘soft power’ identified in 
Nye’s definition (2004), ‘culture’ and ‘political values’ are becoming increasingly 
overlapping today, to the effect that the blurred boundary between the two has 
complicated conceptualisations of Chinese soft power and become a potential barrier for 
the focus of China’s cultural diplomacy on cultural promotion, which tends to be 
interpreted as steeped in political value promotion. By the same token, alongside the 
political value divide between China and most Western countries, the cultural dimension 
was considered an extra layer of China’s non-Western identity.  
 
Also, since the concept of ‘soft power’ is affixed vis-a-vis China’s rising hard power, which 
is already causing great concerns internationally, this approach tends to picture China’s 
cultural diplomacy as a softening agent of the China Threat. It may be useful in analysing 
the gap between the soft and hard powers of China and exploring why China’s soft power 
growth does not synchronise with its economic rise, but it is too narrow a lens through 
which to both view the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy and to evaluate its effects, 
as it tends to apply the same lens to look at China as the U.S. and fails to recognise the 
unequal power positions associated with culture and ideology. Rather, the difference it 
shows is China’s drive is stronger in the soft power competition to match its recent rise 
in hard power, thus receiving more attention and funding from the central government. 
This lens has only put China in the limelight as the projecting side that launches a ‘charm 
offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007) while detaching it from the background of the global cultural 
terrain, which is far from being a level playing field. The ‘soft power’ concept has not 
engaged with any historical analysis of the legacies of cultural hegemony, knowledge-
power nexus and Orientalism, which shaped national imaginaries and political 
discourses while underpinning the foundation of the current global cultural terrain. Nor 
did it address nationalism as the domestic driving force for China to launch cultural 
diplomacy to communicate its fresh self-perception, which is also connected to and 
regenerated from its own deep-seated historical past. The remnants of the historical 
contexts, both internationally and domestically, continued to permeate life in China today. 
If the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of 
‘building soft power’, it has only scratched the surface. 
 
In short, the current literature shows a lack of questioning on the appropriateness of 
adopting this West-centric narrative of ‘soft power’ as the main analytical framework for 
China’s cultural diplomacy, nor does it provide enough guidance to manage the tension 
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between the two means of ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ that the effects of soft power hinge 
on. Rather, ‘nation branding’ has become the other topical theme to go side by side with 
‘soft power’ in the current research about China’s cultural diplomacy.  
 
ii) Nation branding  
 
Fan (2010:101) came up with the following definition after a review of the origins and 
interpretations of the concept: “Nation branding is a process by which a nation’s images 
can be created, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to improve or 
enhance the country’s reputation among a target international audience”. In other words, 
it concerns how a nation as a whole presents and represents itself to other nations, 
stressing the mobilisation of all of a nation’s forces that can contribute to the promotion 
of its image abroad. Ramo (2007:12) has argued that:  
 
China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image...Its problem is more 
complex than whether or not its national image is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but hinges on a 
more difficult puzzle: China’s image of herself and other nations’ views of her are out 
of alignment.  
 
The Chinese government seems to attribute its nonaligned image problem to ‘distorted 
overseas reports about China’, which was reflected in the four policy aims of China’s 
public diplomacy: 
 
1. Form a desirable image of the state; 
2. Issue rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China; 
3. Improve the international environment surrounding China; 2 
4. Influence the policy decisions of foreign countries. (d’Hooghe, 2007) 
 
On the one hand, these policy aims fit Cull’s (2008a:12) description of cultural diplomacy 
as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by making its cultural 
resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission 
abroad”, at least they can make use of communication channels to provide information 
to foreign publics who might otherwise be “denied access to balanced information” (Cull, 
2008b: 117). On the other hand however, it also revealed the challenge in achieving 
these aims when a ‘desirable image needs to be formed’, ‘rebuttals need to be issued’ 
and ‘international environment needs to be improved’. China acted by vigorously 
launching an image campaign in full scale, first through internationalisation of the 
Chinese state media: Xinhua news agency, CCTV and China Daily all received vast 
                                                             
2 About the international environment, Qu Xing, Vice president of Foreign Affairs University has 




sums of money to ‘go out’ and explain China’s point of view to the world (Zhang, 2012b). 
Perhaps China’s best known branding exercise, or the most watched effort, is the 
Confucius Institute that has been rolled out at an incredible speed to 125 countries by 
December 2015 since its first inauguration in 2004 (Hanban.org). Xu Lin herself as the 
Director of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, has taken pride in calling the CI “the 
brightest brand for China’s soft power” (cited in Xinhua, 2007: n.p.). However, despite 
these impressive figures in input and output, the effects are less satisfactory so far if 
measured by the major poll results, including the Gallop, BBC World Service Country 
Ratings Poll, Future Brand Poll, The Soft Power 30, and the most systematic and 
comprehensive data from the Pew Global Attitude Survey (PGAS).  
 
The Gallup World Poll claims to deliver survey data that are representative of 95% of the 
world’s adult population, making use of its vast network of local branches in 150 countries 
(Manzenreiter, 2010:37). If we take a glance at the Gallup option poll (table1.1), which 
traces American overall opinions of China from 1979 to 2016, despite the fluctuations in 
between, a quick comparison at the two ends show a decrease in ‘very favourable’ and 
‘mostly favourable’ opinions from 18% and 44% to 8% and 36% respectively; while the 
‘mostly unfavourable’ and ‘very unfavourable’ opinions increased from 18% and 7% to 
34% and 18% respectively. That is a dramatic shift from 1979, the first year Gallup asked 
this question when China's GDP was not even one-tenth of the US GDP, while in 2016, 
it is over 60% of the US GDP as the world’s second largest economy (World GDP ranking 
2016). A similar fall can be observed in China’s position in both the annual Country 
Ratings Poll for the BBC World Service and the Future Brand Poll: it plummeted to the 
lowest level in 2014 in the BBC World Service Country ratings Poll since it began in 2005; 
and in the Future Brand poll, it also came down from 48th in 2009 to 66th in 2012, despite 
the fact that China has been rated No. 1 since the 2008 Gallup World Poll in the question 
of ‘who do you think is the leading economic power in the world today’. This fall could 
perhaps be seen as a signal to Beijing that having the second largest GDP in the world 
may not automatically push up its national image, instead, the quickly expanding GDP 






Table 1.1 Favourable and unfavourable perceptions of China.  
Source: Gallup, 2016 
 
PGAS is a survey cited by Nye himself to assess America’s soft power. It has tracked 
China’s positive image in Africa and many Muslim countries from 2002 to 2016, 
meanwhile, also tracked continuing, and in some cases, increasingly negative images of 
China in other parts of the world, for example, China’s ratings in the US, Western Europe 
and Japan have dropped markedly in this time frame. This can be seen from the table 




Views of China (% Favourable) 
 02 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
U.S. -- 43 52 42 39 50 49 51 40 37 35 38 37 
Britain --   65 65 49 47 52 46 59 49 48 47 45 37 
France -- 58 60 47 28 41 41 51 40 42 47 50 33 
Germany -- 46   56 34 26 29 30 34 29 28 28 34 28 
Spain -- 57 45 39 31 40 47 55 49 48 39 41 28 
Russia 71 60 63 60 60 58 60 63 62 62 64 79 -- 
Turkey -- 40 33 25 24 16 20 18 22 27 21 18 -- 
Egypt -- --   63 65 59 52    52 57 52 45 46 -- -- 
Jordan -- 43 49 46 44 50 53 44 47 40 35 33 -- 
Lebanon -- 66 --   46 50 53 56 59 59 56 53 52 -- 
Pakistan -- 79 69 79 76 84 85 82 85 81 78 82 -- 
Japan 55 -- 27 29 14 26 26 34 15 5 7 9 11 
Table 1.2 Views of China, created by combing data from the following two sources: 
Sources: data from 2002-2012 were available from: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-U.S.-Image-Report-
FINAL-June-13-2012.pdf (p42); data from 2013- 2016 were available from 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/ 
 
The marked downturn of China’s rating captured the subtitle in the 2012 PGAS survey 
report which reads: ‘China’s Ratings Down in U.S., Western Europe, Japan’. The biggest 
drop in ratings for China over the last year occurred in Japan, where the percentage of 
respondents with a positive view plummeted from 34% to 15%, then further down to rock 
bottom of 5% in 2013. China’s image has also further declined in the U.S.: only 37% of 
Americans in 2016 expressed a positive opinion of China, compared with 52% a decade 
ago in 2006. This echoes the result from the BBC 2013 World Service Poll mentioned 
earlier, also highlighting China in the title of its report: ‘Views of China and India Slide 
While UK’s Ratings Climb: Global Poll’. Within the report, views of China from its 
neighbours to the east were shown to have sharply deteriorated:  
 
Only 23% of South Koreans hold favourable views, down ten points since last year. 
Japanese responses are the most negative in the region, with 64% holding 
unfavourable views (up 14 points) and 5% holding positive ones, down five points, 
yielding the lowest rating of China’s influence in the survey (BBC, 2013:8).  
Another specific soft power ranking, The Soft Power 30, was described as the ‘clearest 
picture of soft power to date’ by Nye. The report provides detailed insights into country’s 
soft power resources and how they are leveraged by using Nye’s three pillars of soft 
power: political values, culture, and foreign policy. China was rated at the bottom position 




These snapshots of opinion polls may provide a revealing picture of China’s 
contemporary international image, but when these figures were cited to explain the 
mission of China’s cultural diplomacy to reshape China’s image, they were simply 
adopted as a benchmark without questioning the background of who was constructing 
these polls. They are all organisations based in the US or the UK: from leading consulting 
company like Gallup to McCann Group, a major American advertising agency that 
conducts the Future Brand Poll; from research centre at the University of Maryland that 
produces the BBC poll, to Portland Communications, a political consultancy and public 
relations agency based in London that produces The Soft Power 30 report; and the Pew 
Research Centre is a nonpartisan fact tank based in Washington D.C.. True, as Ramo 
(2007:12) argues, “in the end, what China thought about itself did not matter so much. 
What mattered was what the world thought of China”, but two questions must be asked: 
first, what determining factors are shaping the world’s perception of China? Second, 
when we talk about the world’s perception, how much influence does the Western world’s, 
in particular the US’s, perception of China have in shaping China’s international image?  
 
Let us explore the first question first. According to Anholt (2006), ‘nation branding’ is the 
umbrella concept whereas public diplomacy is considered a subset that focuses on the 
political brand of a nation. It can be inferred that cultural diplomacy is the subset that 
focuses on the cultural brand of a nation. However, a nation’s brand and image hinges 
on the overall, or the sum across six areas of national competence. As shown by the 
national brand hexagon proposed by Anholt (2000, figure 1.3), it visualises and construes 
the contribution of each of the six scores to the overall ranking, namely perceptions of a 
nation’s cultural, political, commercial and human assets, investment potential and 
tourist appeal.  
 
Figure 1.3 The Nation Brands Hexagon,  








Figure 1.4 Brand China compared with the UK and South Korea, 2005, created by 
combining the hexagons available from the following two sources: 
Source: China Hexagon was adopted from: http://felten.yi.org/nbi.pdf; the UK and South 
Korea hexagons were adopted from: http://www.inthekzone.com/report-ranking-images-
pdfs/nbi_q1_2005__Anholt-GMI.pdf 
 
It is clear to see that China showed a strong ranking for cultural and heritage, however, 
this is the only brand dimension where China shines. China was ranked in the bottom 
for governance and exports, almost the opposite to its Asian neighbour, South Korea; 
while the national brand of the UK is much better proportioned. It shows culture is only 
one section within a larger repository of images that constitute the world’s perceptions 
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of China, cultural diplomacy alone does not possess the power to transform China’s 
national image. However, it is also important to note that both the economic and political 
brands have been subject to analysis and review, but the ‘people’ dimension in the 
hexagon has been a relatively neglected factor, it is actually the second highest score 
China got next to ‘culture’. This is a potential area cultural diplomacy can play a bigger 
role, which will be further discussed in section 1.3 of this chapter.  
 
This hexagon also shows that the formation of a national brand is a complex 
communication process involving different information sources, which relates to the 
second question raised earlier. As pointed out by Crocker Snow (2005), Acting Director 
of Edward R. Murrow Centre, public diplomacy has expanded today - by accident and 
design - beyond the realm of governments to include the media, multinational 
corporations, NGOs and faith-based organizations as active participants in the field. 
They actively participate through propagating their views. Yang, Shin, Lee and Wrigley 
(2008) reviewed previous studies and divided the routes of national image formation into 
two types of individual experiences: personal and second-hand. Second-hand 
experience refers to word-of-mouth communications, and information about a country 
received from other communication channels, including the mass media. 
 
Bhabha (1994:19) has argued that, “economic and political domination has a profound 
hegemonic influence on the information orders of the Western world, its popular media 
and its specialized institutions and academics”. As listed above, all the major polls were 
organised by Western institutions, which is a reflection of such ‘hegemonic influence’. 
This means national image is much more about power and knowledge, and it is this 
perspective that is lacking in understanding why China suffers from a negative image. 
Actually, I argue that this is the ‘root cause’ for China’s image problem that must be 
treated, while those poll results are no more than symptoms that cannot be relied on to 
form any effective diagnosis.  
 
In summary, the literature about China’s cultural diplomacy so far, including the 
government rhetoric concerning China’s policy aims, is very much based on the two 
Western-defined concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’. However, just employing 
them to understand the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy would be problematic in 
three ways: firstly, both concepts put China in the same league as other Western 
countries and fail to recognise the unequal power positions embedded in knowledge 
production; secondly, both constructs only reveal the symptoms of a weak ‘soft power’ 
and a bad ‘national image’, but did not capture and address the ‘root cause’ to these 
symptoms. Last but not least, both lack a historical perspective to understanding China’s 
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cultural diplomacy. As Foucault argued (1983b: 209): “We have to know the historical 
conditions which motivate our conceptualisation. We need a historical awareness of our 
present circumstance”. Without a historical frame of reference, it can only show a 
lopsided view and seriously undermine the complexities that China’s cultural diplomacy 
is placed in, therefore, we must look both beyond and beneath these Western-defined 
concepts for a broader and deeper understanding. A more sophisticated theoretical 
framework is needed to reveal the actual patterns underlying the ‘power struggles’ going 
on in this global cultural terrain that was shaped by history.  
 
iii) Cultural hegemony, power relations, and Orientalism 
 
The new theoretical framework to better understand the international and historical 
contexts that this research proposes is underpinned by Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural 
hegemony’, Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’ and Said’s critique of ‘Orientalism’ and 
‘cultural imperialism’. What follows is an overview of these key concepts and their 
relevance in constructing the alternative framework for analysis.  
 
A good place to start with is the concept of culture hegemony, which was first formally 
put forward by Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s as “intellectual and moral leadership whose 
principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion” (Fontana, 1993:140). 
According to the definition in The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought Third 
Edition, “cultural hegemony is the domination of a culturally diverse society by the ruling 
class who manipulate the culture of that society – the beliefs, explanations, perceptions, 
values, and mores - so that their imposed, ruling-class worldview becomes the accepted 
cultural norm” (Bullock and Trombley, 1999: p387-88). The significance of this notion is 
that it revealed the ‘super-political veil’ of the traditional concept of culture. 
 
Here, ideology is another important concept as Gramsci contrasted the functions of 
‘domination’ (direct physical coercion) with those of ‘direction’ (consent) in defining 
hegemony as “a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives 
which will be brought about through the intermediary of ideology” (cited in Mouffe, 
1979:181). An enlightening definition was given by Fallers (1961:677): ideology is “that 
part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns 
of belief and value”. These two terms of ‘establishment’ and ‘defence’ captured the 
essence in this process: it aims at creating something new to cope with the cultural 
threats posed by the ‘other’, but it is also a defence of ‘our’ culture. Gramsci (1971) 
argued that when the current hegemonic side holds more power over ‘the others’, it can 
wield its power to ‘manufacture consent’. This manufacturing process was further 
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elaborated by Foucault (1982), who pointed out incisively that discourse is created and 
perpetuated by those who have the power and means of communication, and power is 
constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, which are reinforced and redefined 
constantly through the education system, the media, and the flux of political and 
economic ideologies. Gramsci was visionary enough to take the conventional Marxist 
theory beyond class struggle to the fight for cultural hegemony as a more significant 
battle, and Foucault’s (1980) elaboration of power relations revealed how this battle is 
constant and pervasive in nature. 
 
There is a rich and complex body of literature on ‘power’ through the writings of diverse 
social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986). Indeed, as 
Giddens (1984: 256-7) pointed out, this “conflictual model of power underlies virtually all 
major traditions of western social and political theory, from the left to the right”. However, 
Foucault’s biggest contribution is not to define power, but to lead away from the analysis 
of actors who use power as an instrument of coercion, to shaping the understanding 
towards the nature of power and the manner in which it functions - the means by which 
it controls knowledge and vice versa. This is consistent with Gramsci’s notion that 
hegemony implies the creation of a particular structure of knowledge and a particular 
system of values: “hegemony establishes a direct and intimate connection between 
knowledge and the subject to which it is addressed” (Fontana, 1993:160). Their theories 
suggests analysis to be enmeshed in complex dynamics among truth, knowledge and 
power (Rowan & Shore, 2009).  
 
It is based on Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ and Foucault’s theory of 
‘knowledge is power’ that Said developed his critique of Orientalism by arguing from a 
different dichotomy of Occident and Orient, which is not about knowledge but about 
power: Said dislocated the ‘familiar’ concept of the Orient to expose how the Other helps 
define the West via contrasting languages, experiences and images in a “Western style 
for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1978: 3). He 
established that power and knowledge are inseparable components of the intellectual 
binary relationship with which Occidentals claim ‘knowledge of the Orient’. Actually, 
Dabashi (2015:15) pinpointed that “the critique of Orientalism was a critique of a mode 
of knowledge production”. 
 
In the years since its initial publication (1978), Said’s path-breaking study of Orientalism 
has transformed our understanding of the relations between the ‘West and the Rest’: the 
study of the Orient by the Occident is not to achieve a truthful knowledge and perception, 
but to define the relationship between the two, with Western power standing at its very 
28 
 
core. In short, Orientalism established the West’s cultural hegemony over the East, which 
allowed Occidentals to re-define, and thereby control the Oriental. Under Western 
domination, the East has lost its power or even the right of discourse to the West. This 
was best summarised by the famous quote of Karl Marx in the first page of Orientalism: 
“they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented” (Said, 1978: 1). 
Madhavan (1993:183) has used the word ‘canonical’ to describe Orientalism, as it is a 
‘style of thought’, and still is one of the most powerful analytical concepts today as the 
globalisation of knowledge and the Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s view 
of itself as the centre of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as knowledge 
and the source of ‘civilised knowledge’ (Tchen & Yeats, 2014). 
 
A word of explanation must be entered here again regarding the East and West as ‘binary 
oppositions’, which makes them appear unified and homogeneous, essentially with one 
view about the other. Of course, this is not the case, both the East and West are terms 
covering enormous historical, cultural and economic distinctions; they are used as short 
hand generalisations here to make a point of the dialectic relationship. Hall (1992: 187) 
has pointed out insightfully that ‘the West’ has become “the organising factor in a system 
of global power relations”, and ‘the East’ that covers disparate cultures from the far East 
to middle East and near East has become a pan-Asian stereotypes that Orientalism is 
intended to debunk.  
 
Said further claimed that Western representations of the ‘Orient’ amounted to a form of 
cultural imperialism. One meaning of the term is that representations that claim to be 
objective and universal, to be statements about the way things are, in fact are the 
products of undisclosed relations of power. Huntington (1998:184) elaborated this in one 
sentence: “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest”. But there is a 
fundamental difference here: Huntington insisted on the salience of culture in global 
politics, arguing that in the post-Cold War international system, the fundamental source 
of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic but cultural. For 
Huntington, the source of conflict is different values represented by different cultures, 
while Said’s theory is about how the Orient shall be considered a ‘cultural contestant’. 
He “challenged the notion that difference implies hostility,” and called for “a new way of 
conceiving the separations and conflicts that have stimulated generations of hostility, war, 
and imperial control” in his 1994 Afterword to Orientalism (1994:352), however, in his 
2003 Preface to the new print of Orientalism, Said still lamented that we were imprisoned 
in “labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather 




Despite this repeated call for new ways of viewing the Other as different but equal, China 
found itself haunted by another antiquated view. Apart from being considered part of the 
inferior Orient, China was also a representation of the ‘yellow peril’, a psychological fear 
that was projected mainly on East Asia. It is interesting to observe that the phrase ‘foreign 
devil’ was used in both the East and West against each other. In modern days, the rise 
of a communist China has activated this embedded fear when the new term ‘red threat’ 
resonated the continued fear as a recurrent pattern. In Tchen & Yeats’s words (2014: 16), 
it “becomes part of the politics of a people. It becomes ideology and faith”. The evolution 
of China’s image from being the ‘yellow peril’ to ‘red threat’ suggests a system of othering. 
In a way, if we can argue for a de-Orientalised cultural China in the modern world, this 
new vision of ‘ideological otherness’ is to re-Orientalise China: the inheritance of being 
the ‘cultural other’ has revived itself into being the demonised ‘ideological other’. 
 
To a certain extent, Gramsci’s ‘cultural hegemony’, Foucault’s knowledge-power nexus, 
Said’s ‘cultural imperialism’ and Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ have all partially 
explained the coercive use of cultural power in international relations. Culture has always 
been a weapon of the powerful, and cultural resistance is therefore an eternal theme. 
According to Wallerstein (1991:100), “cultural resistance today is very often organized 
resistance – not spontaneous resistance, but planned resistance”. Cabral already 
pointed out in 1973 that cultural resistance may take on new forms (political, economic, 
armed) in order to fully contest foreign domination.  
 
Thus, under this theoretical framework, cultural diplomacy can be considered as a new 
form of cultural resistance for emerging powers like China, which has been held as the 
cultural and ideological ‘other’ and put under the Western hegemonic influence despite 
the shifts in global economic relations. If taken from Said’s and Gramsci’s perspectives, 
the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy would be counter-hegemonic, giving it an 
active defensive edge, completely different from the commonly accepted synonym of 
launching a ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007). The mission is not just to ‘issue 
rebuttals’ and ‘form a desirable image’, but to shift the power relations underpinning 
those misperceptions, which have the ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ ideology embedded in cultural 
hegemony. This mission is simply not achievable by treating China’s image problem with 
a ‘charm offensive’, which can at the best relieve some symptoms.  
 
After analysing the historical legacies in the international context, we must 
simultaneously take note of the domestic context, which is an integral part in 
understanding the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, especially concerning the 
timing: why do it now? If we go back to the first concept of ‘soft power’, we can see many 
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scholars (Li, ed, 2009; Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Wang, 2011; Barr, 2012) have argued 
that its role is not limited to international image building, but applicable to the domestic 
agenda as well. Actually, it was stated in Hu Jintao’s report to the National Congress that 
“culture as part of the soft power of our country has become a more and more important 
source of national cohesion” (Hu, 2007, n.p.). Indeed, some scholars even argued that 
“soft power is primarily an issue of domestic politics – determining China’s future 
direction – and only secondarily about international politics” (Callahan, 2015a:219). The 
Chinese government has always been a firm believer of Lenin’s famous statement that 
diplomacy is the extension of domestic affairs, and building soft power is indeed 
communicated a lot to domestic audiences to generate national identity, build national 
cohesion and safeguard regime legitimacy (Edney, 2015; Callahan, 2015a; Barr 2012; 
Li, 2009), but there is another domestic dimension that was inadequately addressed in 
the current literature related to China’s cultural diplomacy: the role played by nationalism 
as an important driving force. The subject of Chinese nationalism is not under-
researched, but more in the sphere of national sovereignty, security and international 
relations, with its double-edged role in both driving and limiting China’s cultural 
diplomacy yet to be explored. 
 
1.1.3 Understanding the domestic context: nationalism and national identity  
 
The significance of looking at the domestic context has special bearings on 
understanding why cultural diplomacy is now considered a priority on the government 
agenda. In the last three decades, China went through unprecedented transformation in 
history both in terms of scale and speed – cultural, economic, social and political. When 
the astonishing developments are shaping up a new China, the old ideology 
underpinning the regime legitimacy is being shaken. As argued by Hroch (1985), 
nationalism becomes a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society. 
Many scholars have argued that in today’s China, nationalism is considered to be one of 
the two pillars that the national coherence and regime legitimacy rests on: ‘rapid 
economic growth’ and ‘vigorous defence of nationalist values’. The perception of state-
sponsored nationalism as a strategic means to popular legitimacy is common in 
academic treatments of Chinese nationalism (Unger, 1996; Zheng, 1999, Mitter, 2004; 
Saich, 2004). This seems to support a generalisation made by Guibernau (1996) that 
nationalism can be associated with authoritarian regimes that place the interest of their 
nation above everything. Saich (2004: 347) has observed that “we see the strident 
appeals to nationalism and patriotism and the fascination with neo-Confucianism”, while 
Zhao (2000: 20) explained that the Party has effectively “equated patriotism with support 
for the government and its policies” after 1989. There is a blurred boundary between the 
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concepts of nationalism and patriotism in China, therefore, in order to get a better grasp 
of the views just canvassed, we need to clarify the meaning of the term employed.  
 
Of the myriad and competing definitions of nationalism, I found the one offered by 
Guibernau (1996: 43) most applicable to China. In his view, “nationalism is a sentiment 
that has to do with attachment to a homeland, a common language, ideals, values and 
traditions, and also with the identification of a group with symbols which define it as 
‘different’ from others”. The strength of nationalism derives above all from its ability to 
create a sense of identity. Hall (1991: 21) has famously pointed that identity is always a 
structured representation which has to go through the eye of the needle of the ‘other’ 
before it can construct itself. “Only when there is an Other can you know who you are… 
and there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the other” (1996: 344). 
This coincides with Ozirimli’s (2005) view that the discourse of nationalism divides the 
world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and shows a tendency to perceive the world in terms of ‘friends’ 
and ‘enemies’.  
 
This tendency of perception entails cultural resistance according to Guibernau (1996), 
who argued for the two fundamental attributes of nationalism: the political character of 
nationalism as an ideology, and its capacity to be a provider of identity for individuals 
conscious of forming a group based upon a common culture, past, project for the future 
and attachment to a concrete territory. These dual attributes were sometimes referred to 
as ‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘political nationalism’ (Yoshino, 1992:1), which combined in 
the creation of an ideology that serves to celebrate and emphasise the nation as the 
preeminent collective identity of a people. Smith (1991: 91-92) shared this view in talking 
about nationalism as both a “style of politics” and a “form of culture”, while Ozikirimli 
(2005) believes nationalism ultimately turns the language of national identity into a 
language of morality, and renders it the very horizon of a political discourse. He pointed 
that like other discourses, the nationalism discourse is also about power and domination, 
and what gives nationalism its power is its ability to bring the cultural and the political 
attributes together.  
 
If we apply Orientalism and the theory of cultural hegemony in looking at these two 
attributes of nationalism in relation to China, we can see the deeply and widely 
embedded pride in Chinese culture was turned into a strong desire to rise against 
Western domination, and the political character gives the government a sense of mission 
that goes beyond the cultural scope. These two attributes are reflected in the 
categorisation of Chinese nationalism made by He and Guo (2000): state and popular. 
State nationalism refers to any doctrine, ideology or discourse in which the Chinese 
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party-sate strives to identify itself as the nation, while popular nationalism comes from 
below and represents unsystematic, popular national sentiments. During the Cold War 
era, nationalist emotions were used to carry out an ideological war against the enemy 
camp, while China today has shifted out of the party’s ideological control, ‘counter 
hegemony’ remains the main theme and has infiltrated deeper down in today’s stronger 
China, where ‘patriotic nationalism’ has taken root outside the state itself. Increasingly, 
identity and public memory are negotiated in popular culture where nationalism is not 
imposed by the state so much as it resonated with people’s feelings. As an ancient and 
continuous civilisation, what gives unity to the Chinese nation is people’s deepest 
attachment to pre-existing characteristics, culture and traditions. Actually, the emotional 
investment of individuals in the elements of Chinese culture is a key factor exploited by 
nationalism, and is easily amplified in a country like China that is highly centralised and 
always seeks to unify people’s mind. In this sense, cultural diplomacy in China naturally 
converges state nationalism with popular nationalism, which is passionate about 
achieving an international status commensurate with Chinese people’s conception of 
their country’s rightful place in the world.  
 
Another version of popular nationalism He and Guo (2000) identified is cultural 
nationalism that sees the Chinese nation and Chinese people as being rooted in 
Confucian tradition and philosophy, and emphasizes the ideological function of traditional 
Chinese culture in maintaining political order. This shows the particular blending feature 
between the cultural and political attributes in the Chinese context. Based on this, they 
summarised the several contending views of Chinese national identity today by 
producing the table 1.5 below (2000:7), of course with the footnote that the fuzzy borders 
among the four manifestations in reality always defy such a systematic intellectual 
definition, and national identity should be seen as an ongoing process rather than a fixed 
set of boundaries, developed and constantly redeveloped through the interactions of 
domestic factors and international events. 
 
       Sources of National identity 
            Traditional              Modern 
The Strengths      Weak 
of  






Table 1.5 Sources of Chinese National Identity 
Source: He & Guo (2000:7), Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation in China 
 
Han national identity Socialist national identity 
Confucian cultural 
national identities  




Unger’s comments (1996: xvii) can be used as an annotation to further explain this table: 
China’s nationalism comprises an “inter-stitching of state-inculcated patriotic political 
appeals, Han ethnic identification, and cultural pride; a confusion of aspirations for 
national greatness alongside growing sub-national assertions of regional identity; open-
minded optimism and anti-foreign resentment.” To understand this complexity, we must 
explore the historical context by tracing the driving forces of social changes in China that 
has always prided itself as a historically powerful nation with a distinguished civilisation. 
 
China’s name itself, ‘the Middle Kingdom’, suggests its ancient belief of being the centre 
of ‘tianxia’, which is more than a geographical term. Surrounded by much smaller 
neighbouring countries throughout history, the tributary system developed after the Han 
Dynasty gave the Middle Kingdom a strong sense of cultural superiority that the world 
revolves around China. Therefore, the series of defeats by foreign gunboats in the late 
Qing Dynasty - the two Opium Wars and the first Sino-Japanese War that were later 
taught at school as the ‘century of humiliations’ - have ripped apart China’s cultural 
superiority and also triggered widespread attempts to reform the country. A principal 
theme of Joseph Levinson’s trilogy of Confucian China and its Modern Fate (1968) was 
the argument that the key transition to modernity in China was the move from culturalism, 
defined as loyalty to Chinese culture and refusal to look elsewhere for models, to 
nationalism as the legitimate basis for organized political life. This is evidenced from Dr. 
Sun Yatsen’s revolution to establish a republican and reinstate the Han ruling by 
overthrowing the Manchurian Qing Dynasty, to Mao Zedong’s consolidation of 
communist regime by winning the Anti-Japanese war and rising against American 
imperialism; from Deng Xiaoping’s re-adaptation of the common aspiration to 
economically develop China and negotiated for Hong Kong and Macao to be returned to 
China; to the transitional generation Hu Jintao, who put soft power and cultural diplomacy 
onto the top of the government agenda for the first time and rolled out Confucius 
Institutes to implement the strategy; eventually to the current government led by Xi 
Jinping, whose ambition is best summarised in the new vision of ‘realising the dream of 
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’ We can easily see the national vision of 
the China dream is more of a collective ambition than individual aspiration compared 
with the American dream, and the other contrast being that the China dream is not 
building something brand new, but a future with the memory of 4000 years of history. 
Therefore, it is only after a historical review can we fully understand Townsend’s 
comments (1992:97): 
 
The waters of nationalism steadily engulf all that stand in their path - imperial, 
republican, and Communist institutions, elite and popular classes, coastal and 
interior regions, reformist and conservative factions, Chinese at home and abroad. 
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Other movements and ideologies wax and wane, but nationalism permeates them 
all.  
 
To a considerable extent, China’s ancient historical grandeur and the deep scar inflicted 
in its modern history is ingrained in China’s national psyche. This drive to regain glory 
and dignity, the deeply held and long-standing aspirations for restoring China’s position 
as a great power in the world is behind both China’s domestic and foreign policies, as 
summarised by He and Guo (2000: 2): “the core goal of Chinese nationalism is not only 
to promote and protect the national interests of China, but also to restore its ‘greatness’, 
or to reassert China’s role in international politics”. However, Chinese nationalism was 
claimed to be a negative energy, or “No. 1 factor limiting China’s soft power” according 
to Nye (2015: n.p.). Why is that? 
 
Because the dual characters of nationalism could often render culturally sustained 
boundaries and identities the subject of political conflicts, leaving the government 
between a rock and a hard place, as the nationalistic discourse involves a strong sense 
of morality and can be volatile in nature: while it can be a prop strengthening the 
legitimacy of a regime, it can also become a spear that the populace aims at leaders who 
are perceived to be weak in the face of external challenges. It is like a double-edged 
sword that could muster people together, give unity to the nation by joining the 
disintegrating fractions of the right and the left, as well as polarised social classes of the 
rich and the poor, but at the same time, “what the Chinese leaders fear most is a national 
movement that fuses various discontented groups, such as unemployed workers, 
farmers, and students, under the banner of nationalism” (Shirk, 2007:62). As argued by 
Zhao (2013:540): 
 
Seeking status, acceptance and respect on the world stage, popular nationalists 
routinely charged the communist state as neither confident enough or competent 
enough in safeguarding China’s vital national interests and too chummy with Japan 
and soft in dealing with the United States.  
 
Modern Chinese history provides numerous examples of this, the recent incidents such 
as the anti-US protests in May 1999, anti-Japanese protests that erupted across China 
in September 2012, and popular reactions to China’s territorial disputes with its Asian 
neighbours in 2015 raised particular concerns and courted worries that enhanced 
Chinese capabilities will produce new goals to act upon old grievances. For example, 
scholars like Unger (1996: xii) worry that China’s growing presence in the world economy 
and its ever prominent role on the world political stage has begun to “feed Chinese pride, 
and potentially invites thoughts of Great Power muscle flexing…making it of special 
importance today whether Chinese nationalism remains relatively benign or becomes 
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jingoistically assertive.” This ‘whether or not’ discussion soon evolved to a given argued 
by other scholars such as White (2013: 47), who simply stated that “no wonder Chinese 
patriotism often shades into nationalism and even jingoism – just as patriotism in other 
countries often does”. Shambaugh (2013a: 58) also observed more assertive 
nationalism from what primarily emerges out of the current domestic discourse on 
China’s global identities. “This means that however moderate or pragmatic the 
government seeks to be in its diplomacy, there are powerful domestic forces and voices 
that call for a more muscular foreign policy”.  
 
A delicate change in such domestic voices among the state media was pointed by Zhao 
(2013:544) in “a dangerously stunted version of a free press, in which a Chinese 
commentator may more safely criticise government policy from a hawkish, nationalist 
direction than from a moderate, internationalist one.” Given the interlinkage between the 
domestic and international contexts discussed earlier, we can see while nationalism is 
filling the vacuum of ideology domestically, it is also fuelling the China threat argument 
internationally at the same time. If China’s non-Western ideology is the breeding ground 
for the China threat perception, rising nationalism at home is like an undercurrent that 
supplies water to its life. This can be dangerous in two ways if not kept under control as 
Chu (2013) explained: on the one hand, the nationalist movement’s historic connection 
with the champions of political reform made the authority fear anti-Japanese 
demonstration could spill over into demands for regime change; on the other hand, they 
are wary of the rise of popular nationalist zeal might influence China’s image and other 
nations’ perception about its rising. That is why when Nye (2005: n.p.) was commenting 
on the increase of China’s soft power in 2005, he already mentioned the “undercurrent 
nationalism as a potential roadblock”. It seems that the more prominent of China’s rise 
on the world stage, the more salient is the double-edged nature of Chinese nationalism. 
The conclusion Nye gave in the 2015 article was: “as long as China fans the flames of 
nationalism and holds tight the reins of party control, its soft power will always remain 
limited”.  
 
On the other hand, however, it is important to notice the implicit changes in the Chinese 
nationalism domestically as it is not monolithic as argued by Whiting and Chen (cited in 
Lampton, 2008: 147), who identified three types of nationalism: affirmative nationalism 
“fosters patriotism and targets attitude”, it centres exclusively on ‘us”. Here we see an 
essentially constructive patriotism directed toward inward change and constructive 
international participation. This reflects the completion of the first stage of building a 
national identity. The second type, aggressive nationalism, “arouses anger and mobilised 
behaviour’. According to Whiting, “this is the form of national feeling that most concerns 
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China’s neighbours as it is focused on ‘them’” (cited in Lampton, 2008: 147) and Callahan 
(2006) argued that since 1989, national humiliation discourse has aimed to maintain and 
contain the Chinese nation by focusing on the external Other. Finally, assertive 
nationalism has the potential to become either affirmative or aggressive nationalism 
because it “adds ‘them’ as a negative out-group referent to the ‘us’ of affirmative 
nationalism”. Once mainly internal in orientation, Chinese nationalism today shows an 
implicit dynamic shifting from being ‘affirmative’ to swinging between ‘aggressive’ and 
‘assertive’, which has profound implications for its foreign policy. This is exactly where 
cultural diplomacy can play its subtle role. 
 
However, despite the rich literature regarding nationalism in China, very few have linked 
it to China’s undertaking of cultural diplomacy. I argue that at least in China’s case, we 
have to fully acknowledge the interplay between the two: on the one hand, nationalism 
as one of the major sources of identity formation gives driving force for China to launch 
cultural diplomacy: the desire to elevate China’s cultural position and counter cultural 
hegemony informs the party-state’s decision making, while the popular nationalism gives 
the state moral support and even a sense of urgency to pursue cultural diplomacy; on 
the other hand, cultural diplomacy can play a dual role in balancing the ‘double-edged’ 
nature of Chinese nationalism: when an observable change in its external dimension is 
showing an increasingly zero-sum approach in China’s foreign policy, cultural diplomacy 
can help rein it in with its plus-sum approach; and when its internal dimension was 
criticised to “represent a backward-looking ideology, keeping an eye on the past and 
obsessed with China’s historical and cultural superiority” (Lei, 2005:495), cultural 
diplomacy can change this ‘backward-looking’ ideology into a ‘forward-looking strategy, 
and draw on the cultural confidence produced by the stronger domestic development to 
turn China from inward-looking to outward-looking.  
 
At the same time, from the inherent attributes of nationalism and the interactions between 
state and popular nationalism in China, we can see the tight rope between international 
and domestic contexts. Therefore, viewing China’s cultural diplomacy through only one 
lens, be it domestic or international, misses the critical ways in which it actually works 
and will only lead to misinterpret or mischaracterise it. The best cultural diplomacy 
strategy must seek a balance between internal and external forces: both have historical 
legacies deeply ingrained, making it absolutely essential to be aware of the complex 
nature of China’s cultural diplomacy. 
 
Understanding a subject of a complex nature requires a complex approach. If the 
purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of ‘building 
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soft power’ and forming a positive national image through ‘nation branding’, it has only 
scratched the surface. Therefore, a central contention of this thesis is that the soft power 
approach is insufficient, or even to the extent of inappropriate, to understanding China’s 
cultural diplomacy as it neglected crucial processes through which hegemony has been 
produced and maintained. A three dimensional analytical framework constructed on 
historical, international and domestic dimensions, and drawing on the tripartite theories 
of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, and nationalism (see figure 1.6 below) is needed to 
offer a more comprehensive perspective to answer the thesis research question: why 
China’s similar efforts in launching the CI are perceived and received differently and 
encounter unexpected controversies? What prominent features are behind this 
conundrum?  
 
                                 Historical  
                               (Orientalism) 
 
 
                 
               
         
        International                                     domestic                  
 (cultural hegemony)                                      (nationalism) 
  
                                  
Figure 1.6 A Three-Dimensional Theoretical Framework                                                
 
As Foucault (1982:793) pointed out, every relationship between forces is a power 
relation, thus all the arrows in the above diagram represents a power relationship. The 
answers to the research questions would constitute the Chinese characteristics which 
will be examined at three sublevels of the vehicle and agent of the CI as well as its 
practice in the field. Relevant literature reviews will ensue in the following sections. 
 
1.2 Vehicle of cultural diplomacy: a theoretical discussion 
 
As shown in the literature review above, China’s cultural diplomacy is mostly understood, 
both in the academic community and the government sphere, as an endeavour to build 
and project soft power, which draws on three resources of “culture, political values and 
foreign policy” according to Nye (2004: 11). Since cultural diplomacy represents aspects 









on the debates about which of the first two aspects should be the main vehicle of China’s 
cultural diplomacy: culture or political values. The following section will unfold such 
debates as a theoretical discussion; the actual tension caused by such debates in 
practice will be fleshed out in the ensuing Chapters of Three, Four and Five.   
 
1.2.1 The two ‘wheels’ of the vehicle 
 
Currently, there are two positions in China contending against each other regarding the 
vehicle of China’s cultural diplomacy. One is the cultural denomination, believing that 
‘culture’ should indisputably be the core of cultural diplomacy, and China is rich in its 
cultural heritage. Two of the leading proponents are Yu Xintian (2008), director emeritus 
of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, and Li Haijuan (2004), professor of 
Shanghai Jiaotong University, arguing that the competition of cultural power is the core 
of soft power contention in direct confrontation to Yan Xuetong (2007a), who argues 
political values as the core. In the cultural school, another scholar Hu (2008) further 
divides culture resources into three sets: political culture, spiritual culture and popular 
culture. Hu believes that as the current political culture in China is vastly different to the 
Western political culture, which still dominates the international community, it would be 
a more uphill struggle on this front, therefore, a wise choice is to focus China’s cultural 
diplomacy on the other two aspects: spiritual and popular culture. This position can be 
considered as ‘one wheel’ of the vehicle to serve the purpose of reshaping China’s image 
from being the ‘cultural other’.  
 
However, a dilemma in this element of ‘culture’ is revealed in its breakdown into 
traditional and contemporary cultures. Young (2008) summarised the two broad and 
interrelated issues that have preoccupied China: first, whether and how far to break with 
the past, and whether to reaffirm and stand by its traditions and values. Here, the 
nationalism factor discussed in 1.1.3 created an underlying dialectical tension between 
a political nationalism that emphasises a revolutionary break with the past, and a cultural 
nationalism that constantly refers to China’s past. The second issue is how much to 
borrow from overseas, which particularly concerns contemporary culture.  
 
As argued by Guibernau (1996), the extension of global cultural interrelatedness leads 
to persistent cultural interaction and exchange which produce both cultural integration 
and disintegration, this has posed a challenge for contemporary Chinese culture. Many 
scholars have argued that contemporary popular culture is actually a soft belly for 
mainland China. In a 2008 survey on soft power in Asia conducted by the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs (Whitney & Shambaugh, 2008), China’s historical and cultural 
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links are the strongest and would presumably have the greatest impact, but China’s 
cultural soft power was only rated as “middling” and continued to trail behind not only the 
United States, but also Japan and South Korea - both countries have traditional cultures 
closely related to China’s, but both have their own distinct popular cultures represented 
abroad by such phenomena as manga and anime in Japan, and hallyu or the Korean 
Wave in South Korea. However, China has no such readily accessible point of 
identification, or a point of convergence between its culture and the rest of the world as 
argued by Ren (2010).  
 
This may help explain why China’s current focus is on promoting the traditional aspects 
of China’s culture, because they represent the ‘Chineseness’, while the contemporary 
popular culture is etched with all sorts of foreign influence, and lacks a clear cultural 
symbol. Therefore, the contemporary cultural dimension inherits both the imperative to 
be a world culture and the requirement of a more specific nationalism, with the two often 
in tension, especially when the contemporary ‘Chineseness’ was tinted with ideology. As 
Liu and Lin (2003) argued, the ‘official version’ of Chinese national culture that the 
government is attempting to create embodies inherently contradictory elements such as 
Confucianism, Maoism, socialism, capitalism, modernism and globalism. This 
contradictory entity is a true reflection of China’s historical legacies in shaping its current 
identity. Although it is fair to argue that all cultures are fragmentary in their own ways, 
perhaps no other culture faces the challenge to the extent of such complexity as China 
because of the history it carries, and the two ‘otherness’ it was held at the same time. 
Young’s conclusion (2008: 15) was thus disillusive: “China is somehow trapped in itself”.  
 
As mentioned above, the leading figure of the other position of value denomination is 
Yan Xuetong, one of the most prominent scholars from the Tsinghua University and the 
Editor-in-Chief of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, who argued that “the 
central point of soft power is not cultural strength, but political strength” (Yan, 2007a:5). 
This argument may be more convincing as a general statement about soft power, and 
more applicable to the United States that he used as an example, but Yan believed good 
governance and China’s political norms of non-Western origin should be the main source 
of ‘attraction and persuasion’ of Chinese soft power, though in his later work (Yan, 2011), 
ancient Chinese thoughts were emphasised as the foundation that sustains the modern 
Chinese power.  
 
Another flag-bearer for this position is Zhang Zhizhou (2012b), a senior researcher at 
the Centre For Public Diplomacy Studies, who also demarcated culture into three sets: 
material culture, spiritual culture and ideational culture or values: ‘material culture’ are 
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tangible and in physical existence, such as architecture, chinaware, silk and terracotta 
worriers; ‘spiritual culture’ is manifested in intangible forms such as religions, traditions 
and customs, art and literature; while ‘ideational culture’ refers to the segment including 
ethics, morals, social norms, and ideologies, etc. He further argued that although the 
three sets construct the richness of a nation’s cultural image, only values however, is 
directly relevant to the nation’s soft power. That is because for culture to be translated 
into soft power, a prerequisite is its mainstream value affinity. In other words, no matter 
how magnificent its material and spiritual culture may look like, its contribution to building 
soft power would be limited with the void of value identification. Zhang (2012a: 193) 
therefore concluded that “in a way, cultural diplomacy is value diplomacy”, which was 
confirmed in the Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy, 2011-2012. As a policy 
suggestion put forward in this Report, Zhang further explained that given the two 
preconditions for values to be accepted by others - they either accord to the public 
expectations of their existing values, or the value is in the position to lead or persuade 
the target country’s public - in China’s case, the way forward is to aim at more power of 
discourse to redefine the international significance of Chinese values, while the current 
focus of China’s cultural diplomacy is in the material and spiritual cultures, thus less 
satisfactory in generating soft power. This school has taken a clear counter hegemonic 
stance against the domination of Western values, thus representing ‘the other’ wheel of 
the vehicle to serve the purpose of countering the China’s image of being the ‘ideological 
other’. 
 
We can see both denominations accused the other as the reason for the less satisfactory 
effects of China’s cultural diplomacy efforts so far, and a more intriguing observation is 
that they both claim to be the mainstream view embraced by the government, based on 
the same reference to Hu Jintao’s 2007 speech at the 17th National Congress. The 
culture school quoted Hu in saying “enhancing the country’s culture soft power” by 
“creating a thriving cultural market and enhancing the industry’s international 
competitiveness”, while the political value school quoted him saying “building up the 
system of socialist core values and making socialist ideology more attractive and 
cohesive”. Although Glaser and Murphy’s research (2009:16) argued that the “core role 
of culture was clinched” when the term soft power was included in Hu’s report”, thus the 
cultural school “had had the greatest impact on policymaking” (2009:13), Yan and 
Zhang’s political value school is represented by the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies, 
established in 2010 as a direct response to Hu’s speech. I believe the tug-of-war between 
the two schools as the mainstream views very much depend on where to draw the line 
between ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’, and between ‘cultural value’ and ‘political value’, about 





1.2.2 Political values: universalism vs. relativism 
 
It is not hard to see that ideology is the backdrop to many debates on the foreground or 
centre stage, revealing a key question lurking at the crux of the ‘what’ debate in China’s 
cultural diplomacy: are the ‘political values’ specified in Nye’s concept of soft power 
universal, or, like the first element of culture, whose appeal is actually from its 
distinctiveness? The Chinese answers are inclined to base their arguments on relativism, 
frequently stressing the relative nature of culture and ideology, whereas their Western 
counterparts tend to be more absolute in advocating the universal nature of their 
ideologies, social-political systems, beliefs and values, believing that political values 
draw attraction from the universal attributes that can transcend one’s own country and 
appeal to others. If universalism is used to define ‘the political values’, it means China 
faces insurmountable constraints in carrying out its cultural diplomacy, as this notion of 
a unitary and homogeneous model marginalises the distinctive Chinese way: its 
authoritarian political culture is constantly under assault by the Western model of 
democracy. So in terms of universal ‘political value’, which is supposed to be the 
strongest cornerstone of building soft power according to Nye, China seems to have the 
soft belly in place.  
 
However, if we do not hold on to the Western defined construct of soft power building but 
look at the purpose of cultural diplomacy, we will see relativism is more applicable in 
‘fostering mutual understanding’. Some scholars have argued for ‘Chinese 
Exceptionalism’ (Feng Zhang, 2011, 2012), while China’s economic success and political 
values have started the debate between ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘Beijing 
Consensus’. Although these arguments are receiving increasing attentions in scholarly 
debates and the state media, the Chinese government does not assume any offensive 
stance to promote this, partly because China does not believe in universalism, as 
explained by Nye (2005: n.p.):  
 
We come from a tradition of missionaries who believe in our values and want to 
sell them to the rest of the world, the Chinese tradition has been attractive to some 
of the neighbours in East Asia but it has not been a missionary culture. They 
haven’t been selling ideas.  
 
Partly because Beijing worries that it could be used by some Western observers to 
support the China threat arguments. Even Nye himself (2005: n.p.) has cautioned 
against the rapid increase of China’s soft power in Asia, and stated that “it is clear that 
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the rise of China's soft power — at America's expense — is an issue that needs to be 
urgently addressed”. This stance was interpreted by the Chinese scholar Zhang (2006: 
n.p.) as nothing more than a “soft power version of the China threat theory”.  
 
From the perspective of cultural diplomacy, and building on Nye’s contrast of the Western 
missionary culture to China’s not selling ideas, I argue ‘being open-minded’ is what is 
needed in cultural interactions, and the Chinese philosophical concept of Yin and Yang 
could be looked at as an alternative to the binary divisions of ‘Us’ vs. ‘Other’, as well as 
the associated mentality that ‘they are what we are not’, but to think of Eastern and 
Western culture as Yin and Yang that inspire each other, contain a drop of each other, 
complement each other and depend on each other to form a whole. This idea that aims 
at nurturing compatibility and harmony is considered to be one of the major reasons why 
Chinese civilisation stands as the oldest continuous civilisation today, owing to its strong 
ability to embrace and incorporate different cultural and belief systems throughout history: 
from the introduction of Buddhism to China during the Han and Tang Dynasties, to 
Islamism in the Song and Yuan Dynasties, then to Christianity during the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties, Chinese civilisation survived and thrived through all these cultural encounters, 
and still exists as a major cultural system in the East Asia. It has not aimed at 
universalism since its global interactions began, but strengthened and enriched itself 
throughout these encounters.  
 
To sum up, this section also exposed the inadequacy of using ‘soft power’ to examine 
cultural diplomacy as it runs against its very purpose, which is not about building 
universalism but embracing cultural differences. In this sense, the Chinese concept of 
‘harmony with diversity’ explains better the purpose of cultural diplomacy than building 
one’s soft power. Besides, the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘political values’, 
defined as the two sources of soft power by Nye, shows great tension between ‘attraction’ 
and ‘persuasion’ - defined as the two ways how soft power function by Nye. Within the 
construct of soft power, we see the centre of gravity of China’s cultural diplomacy resides 
between ‘one wheel’ where China has abundant cultural heritage and traditions to offer, 
and ‘the other wheel’ where China has non-universal and non-Western values to offer. 
This may reflect the ‘odd paradox’ argued by Shambaugh (2013a): on the one hand, 
China is extraordinarily proud and confident in its historical identity, but on the other hand, 
it shows extreme insecurity. These dual aspects give Chinese cultural diplomacy both a 
defensive and offensive edge. If the two wheels of the vehicle are not heading in the 
same direction, it may end up not going very far. A different perspective beyond the soft 
power framework may help create synergy between the two, but to a large degree, this 
would depend on the driver of the vehicle, or the agent of cultural diplomacy, which will 
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be the focus of the review in the next section.  
 
1.3 Agent of cultural diplomacy – an ongoing debate 
 
Despite all the emerging scholarly debates, the practice of cultural diplomacy has been 
relatively sporadic in China until recently. China has mainly been an exporter of raw 
materials and manufactured goods and an importer of cultural goods since its opening 
up in the late 1970s. Segal’s article (1999) argued that China has had limited cultural 
reach out not only compared to the ‘dominant West’ but also in comparison to Japan, 
that during the last twenty years, the Chinese government has spent more efforts in 
resisting and controlling the domestic impact of external cultural influences than in 
attempting to create any specific external influence of its own: the anti-liberalisation of 
bourgeoisie and the fight against ‘spirit pollution’ were the major anti-Westernisation 
campaigns launched by the Ministry of Culture in the 1980s. It was until quite recently 
that China is observed to have begun systematically promoting Chinese culture abroad 
for “pride, influence and revenue” (Lampton, 2008: 140). 
 
At the government level, culture was made the third pillar in China’s diplomacy next to 
politics and economics in 2004 (People.com). Following president Hu Jintao’s speech 
on building cultural soft power at the 17th National Congress in 2007, a number of new 
task forces have been assembled: an independent, non-governmental think tank, 
Charhar Institute, was founded in 2009 with ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘image building’ listed 
as top priorities in its mission statement. In March 2010, the magazine Public Diplomacy 
Quarterly was launched by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference; in May 2010, a Public Diplomacy Office was 
established in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011) 
referred to engaging in public diplomacy as both a pressing task and a long-term strategy. 
Then in August 2011, the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies, the first one of its kind, 
opened at the Beijing Foreign Studies University. On December 31, 2012, the China 
Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) was established in Beijing as a national non-profit 
social organisation, with the former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing elected Chairman, who 
is also the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's 
Congress. Li (2012) noted in his inaugural speech that the CPDA would contribute to 
strengthening the soft power of China by mobilising, coordinating and organising social 
resources and the public for the promotion of China’s public diplomacy in an inclusive 




This whole host of institutions represent a joint effort from state to academia and social 
organisations, which appears to indicate an emerging pattern of multi-agent in 
implementing public diplomacy. As a specific subset of public diplomacy, does the 
cultural denomination require any special considerations for who should be the leading 
agent for cultural diplomacy: state or non-state actors? If hard power can be built through 
government funding, will state involvement work productively or counterproductively 
when it comes to soft power? The next section will unfold the current debates about the 
agent of cultural diplomacy both internationally and domestically. 
 
1.3.1 The international debate on agent of cultural diplomacy 
 
Before we delve into the sub-level discussion of cultural diplomacy, there are some 
general debates over the agent of public diplomacy, which has mainly sprung from its 
varying definitions. For example, Tuch (1990:3) defined public diplomacy as “a 
government process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about 
understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its 
national goals and current policies”. In contrast, Castells (2008: 91) adopted a clear-cut, 
non-governmental-centred approach to describe public diplomacy as “the diplomacy of 
the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the 
public to harness the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures”, 
while Gonesh and Melissen (2005: 7) emphasised that public diplomacy contained “all 
of the activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and 
promotion of a country’s soft power”. D’Hooghe (2011: 20) also believed that “it is about 
establishing long-term relationships that will build trust, it is also about domestic 
understanding of other cultures and values so that public diplomacy actions by both state 
and non-state actors can be attuned to the local context of the issue at stake”. 
 
In terms of who should be the agent of cultural diplomacy, the above debates are 
reflected in three positions summarised by Gienow-Hecht (2010: 9): one sees cultural 
diplomacy as first and foremost “an instrument of state policy”, lacking the participation 
of private individuals. This was also endorsed by McDowell (2008: 8) in claiming that “for 
it to be diplomacy, it has to entail a role for the state”. It is obvious to see this position 
dwells on the ‘diplomacy’ side of the concept.  
 
Contrary to this, another position looks at cultural diplomacy as a way to act outside of 
politics. This was supported by Ogoura (2006), who argued that scholarship and culture 
should be independent of political power and, in fact, are often a means of resisting 
authority. Leonard et al (2002: 55) made it clear that if a government want its voice to be 
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heard or influence people’s perceptions, it should work “through organisations and 
networks that are separate from, independent of, and even culturally suspicious towards 
government itself”. This position has a clear focus on the ‘culture’ side of the concept, it 
does not address cultural diplomacy as a synonym of public diplomacy, but as a subset 
that has its own distinctive features.  
 
A third group of scholars define cultural diplomacy as a hybrid term in concept that 
requires matching hybrid actions in practice: apart from the state, it also needs 
participation and coordination between government and non–governmental institutions. 
This is endorsed by the definition given in the Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary: “Cultural 
diplomacy is practiced by a range of actors including national governments, public and 
private sector institutions, and civil society” (Chakraborty, 2013:30). This corresponds 
well to the multi-agent view discussed above for public diplomacy.  
 
1.3.2 The domestic debate on agent of cultural diplomacy 
 
Needless to say, all views have their fair share of followers, even have their 
corresponding institutions in China. For example, Li (2005: 24) sounded indisputable in 
his book entitled Cultural Diplomacy that “it is the diplomatic activities through cultural 
means to serve a political or strategic end undertaken by a sovereign state”. His clear 
stress on the role played by government is based on his fundamental understanding that 
cultural diplomacy is, after all, diplomacy, which is of course carried out by the 
government. This was endorsed by Yang in his edited book entitled Diplomacy (2010: 
168), which also defined public diplomacy as a “diplomatic activity organised and 
conducted by a state government directed at the public in foreign countries”. Foreign 
scholars who researched about Chinese public diplomacy such as Hartig (2012) also 
observed that the government-centred approach is the main feature of public diplomacy 
in Chinese understanding. Chinese scholar Bian (2009) even argued that because of 
this, it is only natural for cultural diplomacy to take on a strong political colour in its 
implementation.  
 
For this state-as-agent position, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the leading 
organisation, which established the Division of Public Diplomacy under the Information 
Department in 2004 and then upgraded it to Public Diplomacy Office in 2012. However, 
an important part of its remit was “publicising China’s foreign policies and activities to the 
Chinese public, thus winning their understanding and support” according to the then 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (Li, 2005). This domestic dimension gave it a distinctive 
Chinese characteristic. Then in 2013, the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee 
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declared that public diplomacy should be led by the government; in practice, they are 
implemented by a complex network of state actors including the Ministry of Culture, 
Ministry of Education and the Communist Party’s Publicity Department (Zhang, et al, 
2015).  
 
There is also a representation of the public-as-agent position in China: the Chinese 
People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which interpreted public 
diplomacy as a synonym for people-to-people diplomacy (“人民外交”, renmin waijiao) or 
non-governmental diplomacy (“民间外交 ”, minjian waijiao). However, its mission 
statement is worded as serving the “purposes of enhancing people's friendship, 
furthering international cooperation, safeguarding world peace and promoting common 
development”, which does not mirror the widely acknowledged purpose of public 
diplomacy as discussed earlier, nor the one prescribed in the Annual Report of China’s 
Public diplomacy: “improve China’s international image, safeguard national interest and 
the independence of values” (2012, Preamble). It therefore can be considered as a 
supportive arm to the mixed-agent position, yet a very crucial one as it is about the ‘last 
three feet’, a term coined by Ed Murrow: “the real crucial link in the international 
exchange is the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person talking 
to another” (cited in Clack, 2006: 2). In the case of China, the phenomenal increase of 
people-to-people contact is supported by equally unprecedented growth in the two-way 
traffic: hugely improved international mobility of Chinese citizens, evidenced in the year-
on-year sharp increase of Chinese students, tourists and entrepreneurs venturing 
abroad; reciprocated by substantial increase of numbers of ‘foreigners’ coming to China, 
attracted by its generous offer of scholarships, its booming economy and business 
opportunities, as well as proliferating international forums and conferences. It is only 
reasonable to argue that China is now in a better winning position than ever before to 
close the cultural encounter to the ‘last three feet’. 
 
This adds weight to the mixed-agent position that challenges the mainstream view of the 
government-led approach in China. Hu (2008: 32) has clearly stated that:  
 
Cultural diplomacy is diplomacy carried out by government or non-governmental 
organizations to serve the end of promoting mutual understanding and mutual trust 
between nations and peoples, constructing and elevating a country’s international 
prestige and soft power, through the means of educational and cultural exchanges, 
exchanges of people, arts and performances, and trade of cultural products, etc.  
 
He also pointed out that it is imperative to curb the government role to prevent its attempt 
to ‘score offside’, while more non-state actors should be drawn on in this game, 
especially because most Western countries has an innate and deeply rooted aversion to 
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any government manipulated culture. This will only aggregate the deep-running 
misunderstandings and misconceptions already existing between China and the West 
countries.  
 
Hu’s above argument echoed many western scholars, like d’Hooghe (2011) quoted 
above and Seiichi (2008: 191), who sees the government role as a “network hub”: it 
should focus on low-visibility efforts to create a fertile environment where actors are 
connected to one another horizontally; ideas and culture are freely created by the private 
sector, where the market test of interaction between transmitters and receivers is easily 
conducted, as government involvement is liable to be seen as meddlesome intrusion by 
the authorities into matters of personal taste and beliefs, raising suspicions and reducing 
cultural attractiveness.  
  
Hu’s school has received increasing support in recent years. An important endorsement 
came from Zhao and Zhang in 2010 in an article entitled ‘Reconsideration of China’s 
public diplomacy at the current stage’, making it clear that public diplomacy can be 
performed by any state departments, by the society or even by individuals. This was 
confirmed in the Preamble of the Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy 2011-2012, 
which can be argued to represent a change of understanding at least in the academic 
circle. For this school, the leading official figure is Zhao Qizheng, Chairman of Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
also the editor-in-chief for Public Diplomacy Quarterly launched in 2010. He spelled out 
the different actors’ roles in his book (2012: Preface): “the government is the leading 
party. Non-governmental organizations, social organizations and social elites constitute 
the backbone forces, and the general public is the foundation”. 
 
This thesis argues that Hu’s view not only accords with the international trend, but more 
importantly, it fits better with China’s distinctive features as well. It may be a surprising 
fact that in China, not only all major cultural institutions are state-run, but their directors 
are also party members and state officials. For example, the Palace Museum director 
has the equivalent status of a vice minister of culture, so does the director of the National 
Museum of China. As Goodman (2004) pointed out, it has been the norm for Chinese 
governments during the last one hundred years to equate Chinese state with the specific 
government and even political parties. This was also reflected in the Chinese language: 
there is no clear distinction between the word ‘nation’ and ‘state’. When a national culture 
was promoted through state organs led by party members, it became government 
behaviour, and if the target country holds negative attitudes towards the Chinese 
government, or more specifically, the Communist Party, then government-led cultural 
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diplomacy would have a very limited role to play, if not counterproductive. There is a 
contradiction existing between the cultural goals of the Chinese government and its 
political system’s ability to deliver progress towards those goals: the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) wants to see China acknowledged as a cultural superpower, at the same 
time, the CCP’s role in the determination of cultural production makes this extremely 
unlikely, due to the inherent contradiction between the narrow political nationalism and 
the wider appreciation of Chinese culture, and the divergence in perception between 
China as a polity and China as a civilisation.  
 
Here a relevant concept worth discussing is propaganda, which can be traced back to 
the Reformation, when the spiritual and ecclesiastical unity of Europe was shattered and 
the medieval Roman Catholic Church lost its hold on the northern countries. According 
to Welch (2014: 4), the word ‘propaganda’ was first applied to mean an organisation set 
up for the purpose of spreading a doctrine; then to the doctrine itself; and lastly to the 
methods employed in effectuating the dissemination. It was during the First World War 
that the use of propaganda as an organized weapon of modern warfare transformed it 
into something more sinister, as “what propagandists do is to utilize their own 
interpretation of the truth in order to sell an ideological point of view to their own citizens 
and to the world at large”. Welch (2014:17) also argued that: 
 
Propaganda is most effective when it is less noticeable. In a totalitarian regime - 
indeed any ‘controlled’ society – propaganda is more obvious and visible and largely 
tolerated for the fear of the consequences. In a so-called ‘open’ society propaganda 
is much more problematic when it is hidden and integrated into the political culture. 
 
This telling statement has sharply pointed out two issues of propaganda, being implicit 
and explicit. Propaganda also exists in so-called ‘open societies’, but when it is hidden 
and integrated into the political culture, it shows a similar feature to hegemony, which is 
an invisible power. In a way, it means anything ‘they’ produce is deemed to be 
propaganda, what ‘we’ do is called public diplomacy.  
 
Explicit propaganda has always been integral to the post-1949 Chinese state. There has 
been a dedicated Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee 
for years that took solid control of all forms of media with the aim of utilising them to 
further its ideological objectives and convince its people the benefits of the new society 
that the Party has constructed. It is only after 2009 that the English translation was 
changed to Publicity Department and the old term of ‘external propaganda’, aiming at 
advertising Chinese achievements and selling the country’s image worldwide, was 
gradually replaced by ‘public diplomacy’, but some Western scholars such as Edney 
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(2012) concluded that the propaganda system still shapes the way the Chinese party-
state defines and pursues its cultural diplomacy, as it still largely fits the definition given 
by Nelson in A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States (1996: 115): 
 
a form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, 
attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, 
political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-
sided messages via mass and direct media channels.  
 
As Nye pointed out (2008: 100), “information that appears to be propaganda may turn 
out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s reputation for credibility”. He also 
named China in “making the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument 
of soft power” (2013: n.p.). Dr. Robert Kuhn, a US public intellectual, also a long-time 
adviser to the Chinese government, has used the expression of ‘an instant killer for 
credibility’ to refer to explicit propaganda. This would make the argument for 
government-led approach liable to such danger. As pointed out by Lukes (1974:23), 
“power is at its most effective when least observable”. Cultural diplomacy must remain 
subtle; any attempt to make it a government campaign will reduce its impact. 
 
The intertwining nature of domestic and international contexts discussed earlier was also 
reflected here: when decisions were driven by domestic agenda and made on the ‘tracks’ 
of domestic standard, they sometimes cannot reach the international domain. A common 
phrase in use in China since its opening up is to ‘connect to the international railway’, 
meaning to adapt to the international standard, but in order to do so, it needs 
reengineering and not just repackaging. Otherwise, it is not hard to understand why the 
authoritarian nature of the Chinese Party-state, and the blurred boundary between state 
involvement and the social cultural realm would generate cautions among foreign 
academics who fear the strings of propaganda attached. It seems the dose of 
government defining, planning, funding, and leading is one of the ‘ingredients’ that is 
causing side effects of reducing China’s cultural appeal. This assumption will be further 
explored and tested out in the next stage. 
 
To sum up, there are changing dynamics in China from the mainstream view of seeing 
cultural diplomacy as government-led endeavour to wider acceptance of the multi-agent 
view; China is also learning from its successes and lessons in the actual implementation 
of cultural diplomacy in various fronts. For example, the success story of the CIs that 
have rolled out at an incredible speed to 125 countries by the end of 2015 has been 
accompanied by very mixed receptions, and much criticism is about its top-down 
operation model: that is, they are state-led enterprises, thus triggered many 
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controversies for their being used as propaganda tools. This will be further elaborated in 
section 1.5. In contrast, the most eminent agent of the American cultural diplomacy 
comes not from the government but civil society: everything from Hollywood to Harvard. 
Shambaugh (2013a: 209) articulated well the difference in that soft power is “largely 
about the capacity of a society to attract others, rather than a government to persuade 
others” [emphasis added]. Therefore, it is fair to argue that cultural power per se is not 
necessarily a soft power, it is the soft use of it by the right agent that can work the 
transition. 
 
1.4 New ideas for the new strategy in practice 
 
Although providing us with rich theories, useful insights and analysis, the body of 
literature so far has mostly fallen into the discussions of the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ 
elements of China’s cultural diplomacy, it has offered little to examine the actual practice 
in field or facilitate shaping of a more effective strategy for implementation, which is still 
in its embryonic phase both in terms of research and practice. As d’Hooghe (2011:19) 
pointed out:  
 
The content and conduct of China’s public diplomacy are suffering from structural 
problems that cannot simply be ‘fixed’ by intensifying and expanding current 
activities in the field of soft power projection. Beijing needs to rethink its strategy as 
a whole.  
 
A new strategy can only be formulated by thinking differently. Melissen has raised the 
three crucial questions to consider for an effective strategy in 2005: what messages are 
sent under what circumstances, who received them, and how the messages are 
interpreted. Based on the afore-reviewed debates on the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ of 
China’s cultural diplomacy, more variables are developed through this thesis: I argue 
who sends the messages, and how the messages are sent, along with how these 
messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination also have 
direct bearings on how they are interpreted.  
 
For example, in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games, there were 
performances of 2008 drummers and people acting as movable type printing blocks 
while forming the Chinese character “和” (peace and harmony), however, “the image of 
massive numbers of efficient Chinese performers in perfect rows and columns drumming 
in perfect unison” was commented as “Authorit-awesome” by the Daily Show with Jon 
Steward, and even interpreted as an all-powerful state that would “take over the world” 
and “bring down America” by the character Cartman in the episode of ‘the China Problem’ 
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in South Park3 (cited in Gries, et al, 2010: 231). This is a classic case that the original 
message of China’s peaceful rise being interpreted in the opposite way of China as a 
threat. There are at least two lessons to be learned from this: first is about who sends 
the messages. There is a tendency for top-down approach in China by hosting high-
profile international events or launching state-sponsored projects, while for domestic 
audiences they proudly displayed their national achievements, they may be perceived 
more cynically internationally simply because the government role is so explicit. Cultural 
diplomacy is a very complex and slow undertaking, it requires a bottom-up approach to 
succeed, as ordinary citizens convey much longer-lasting and more accessible images 
of a country than those international events. Government-led approach also tends to 
demonstrate progress by showing what concrete activities have been carried out than 
by measuring the actual effects of what opinions have been influenced. Secondly, it is 
imperative to understand that the messages are not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a 
receptor that was preoccupied or even embedded with pre-perceptions about the ‘other’, 
besides, the receiving destinations are also in a different and changing power relations 
with China in a world of unchanging power struggle. All these dynamics and complexities 
must be taken into account as variables for an effective strategy.  
 
The short-term goal of China’s cultural diplomacy is to increase ‘the two-way traffic’ to 
reverse the huge ‘cultural deficit’, but what really mattered is whether the increased traffic 
generates increased volume of impact in its destinations, and that, to a large degree, 
depends on these variables. In the meantime, the long-term goal of China’s cultural 
diplomacy is to show the world merits of its culture and advocate cultural pluralism, 
believing that no culture is the one culture for the whole of mankind, and no culture is 
only an exporter or importer. But again, what really mattered here is ‘the world’ is one big 
place, if China was the ‘sleeping dragon’, and its waking ‘will shake the world’ as 
Napoleon once predicted, needless to say, this shake would be perceived differently in 
different regions of the world, depending on ‘soft or hard boundaries of culture’ as 
proposed by Duara (1996: 49), who believes that “every cultural practice is a potential 
boundary marking a community. These boundaries may be either soft or hard”. Groups 
with soft boundaries between them are sometimes so unconscious of their differences 
that they do not view mutual boundary breaches as a threat and could eventually even 
amalgamate into one community. Not only do communities with hard boundaries 
privilege their differences, they tend to develop an intolerance and suspicion toward the 
adoption of the other’s practices. So, at the waking of the ‘sleeping dragon’, some 
                                                             
3 See ‘Olympic nightmare: the Opening Ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympics in China 
terrorize Cartman’, clip from Season 12 South Park episode, ‘The China Problem’, available at: 
http://www.southparkstudios. com/clips/187263 (accessed 15 January 2009). 
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communities with hard cultural boundaries may feel more threatened especially if they 
depict the dragon as an evil monster in their own culture; while others may be more 
curious if they only view the dragon as a ‘new’ species of animal; and groups with soft 
boundaries who are more familiar with the dragon may just need to learn how to live with 
it, or even ‘dance with it’. 
 
Duara (1996) also pointed that boundaries between communities exist along a spectrum 
between hard and soft poles and are always in flux: soft boundaries can harden, but hard 
boundaries can soften as well. In this sense, what carves the boundary and drives its 
change is also power. Therefore, I believe the cultural boundary theory has direct 
implications on the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy, which has the potential 
to move boundaries. It also highlights the need to tailor the ‘product’ to each destination 
by gauging the cultural boundaries rather than having one unified model as a fit for all, 
‘localisation’ would be essential for a strategy made by centralised approach to work, as 
the same message sent would be received and perceived differently in the process of 
interacting with different ideologies, varying cultural boundaries and power positions of 
the destination. Therefore, ‘localisation’ and ‘interaction’ should be the key words for the 
new strategy, as commented by Seiichi (2008: 191): “cooperative interaction is what 
distinguished public diplomacy from propaganda”. To put the two together, it is of vital 
importance to localise both the products and practice to interact with the audiences from 
societies that have different cultural boundaries with China.   
 
To sum up, this part of review is also pointing to the need of adopting a new analytical 
framework to examine the ‘how’ to implement cultural diplomacy, by addressing the new 
variables added and taking the agent and the interaction with different target audiences 
into consideration. A comparative case study of the CIs across different continents will 
be conducted to facilitate this, therefore, the last part of the literature review is devoted 
to gaining more in-depth knowledge and understanding of the CI, about which very little 
conceptually-based academic research has been done despite the extensive media 
attention it gets for both its remarkable growth and the debates it has triggered. 
 
1.5 Confucius Institute: its relevance to showcase cultural diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics  
 
Confucius Institutes (CIs) are non-profit public institutions that aim to “develop and 
facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and 
cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities” 
(Constitution and by-laws of the CIs, Hanban website). The first CI was opened in 
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November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. The latest statistics available by December 2015 
indicates there are already 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms 
opened in 125 countries and regions around the world (Hanban website)4. The CIs are 
managed and funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International, known 
as Hanban in Chinese abbreviation. Directly affiliated to the Ministry of Education (MOE), 
Hanban was established in 1987, but a new plaque of ‘Confucius Institute Headquarters’ 
was hung in April 2007 to show its new remit of administration and supervision of the CIs. 
Although the new office building in Beijing only identify itself as the Confucius Institute 
Headquarters, and Hanban is only kept in parentheses after the CI Headquarters as the 
official title of the organisation, it is still the most widely used name in English.  
 
Both the impressive speed of the expansion and global coverage of the CIs, and the 
extension of the starting contract period from three years to five years with Hanban-
guaranteed funding can be seen as evidence for their early successes, gaining them the 
reputation of the ‘flagship’ of China’s cultural diplomacy (Liu, 2012). However, in the short 
time-frame of its rapid expansion, the CI has also received its share of criticisms along 
with applauses, which can be found in a growing body of literature, both in influential 
media outlets and academic journals. This made it a very illustrative case to show both 
the opportunities and challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy and its unique 
Chinese characteristics, thus merits a section of its own to review the related literature. 
In what follows, the subsections shall reveal the controversies it has stimulated layer by 
layer.  
 
1.5.1 Controversy in its name and intension 
 
The well-known Chinese philosopher, Confucius (551– 479 BCE) is the namesake for 
the Institutes. This may show China’s intention to copy the success of Goethe Institute 
and Cervantes Institute as it was made clear on its own website that:  
 
Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their 
national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit 
public institutions which an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign 
countries in 2004: these were given the name the Confucius Institute.  
 
However, the Chinese version met with unexpected mixed responses. From the Chinese 
perspective, choosing Confucius as the namesake is an indicator for the revival of 
traditional Chinese culture, to remind the world that China is not so much ‘rising’ but 
                                                             
4 The latest update with these statistics was 512 CIs and 1073 CCs in 140 countries around the world by 
the end of December 2016 on Hanban website.  
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reasserting its status while reinforcing the peaceful nature of its resurgence. As Professor 
Gosset put it (2013), the name of the organization is a reminder that China’s 
modernization is more about the reinterpretation of the Chinese tradition than a passive 
Westernization. Nakagawa’s article (2011a) entitled ‘Confucius: What’s in a Name?’ 
applauded this name in quoting Starr’s two contentions: first, the decision to use the 
philosopher’s name is almost something that unites the Chinese diasporas as well, it is 
not divisive as a name such as ‘China Foundation’ may be; and secondly, Confucius is 
one of the few global brands the Chinese have. They argue that for many in the West, 
Confucius is usually associated with learning and general wisdom, so it works with the 
institute and its purpose in terms of branding. 
 
However, the trouble is that Confucius is more than just a cultural icon of wisdom and 
learning, actually, the translation of ‘Rujia sixiang’ (“儒家思想”, rujia sixiang) or ‘Rujiao’ 
(“儒教”, rujiao) as Confucianism established a narrow link between Confucius himself 
and the very complex philosophy and value system that was developed over thousands 
of years after him. Confucianism is a complex system of moral, social, political, 
philosophical, ethical and quasi-religious thought that has had tremendous influence on 
the culture and statecraft of China throughout history. Confucian values lie at the very 
core of traditional Chinese culture and was given an ideological function in maintaining 
political order. However, the complexity of Confucianism has often been the victim of 
journalistic simplification, in that the multi-faceted image of Confucianism is often shown 
one profile of representing authoritarian and hierarchical rule. So in a way, the name 
itself is like a label for being the ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ in the eyes of those 
who still see China through the tinted glasses of ‘otherness’. 
 
Furthermore, it is not that long ago when Confucianism and its rigid hierarchical character 
were treated as the personification of China's ‘feudal’ traditions that caused China’s 
backwardness during the New Culture Movement in 1912; then denounced by 
Communist leaders during the 1973 campaign of ‘down with Confucius’ in the Cultural 
Revolution when Confucian teachings were treated as ‘rubbish that should be thrown 
into the ash heap of history’. So, when the sage is recast as the promoter of peace and 
harmony, and rebranded as “a symbol of the new China: educated, orderly, harmonious, 
respectful, unified” (Barr, 2012:91), much of China’s success is attributed to Confucian 
thoughts of discipline, hardworking, ethic of mutual obligation, and the value attached to 
education, it would naturally give rise to the question: how can the same Confucian 
values hold a society back from modernization for hundreds of years and then suddenly 
propel it into unprecedented levels of growth over a few decades? The inherent 
constraint that puts many of the Confucian ideas in conflict with modernity tends to be 
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challenged by some Western scholars, for example, Louie (2011: 78) simply argued that 
“Confucius as ‘brand China’ may be an accurate reflection of an ideologically confused 
country”, therefore, the “naming of the Confucius Institute is not a sound approach in a 
world where national identity is marketed for political spin” (2011: 99). His views were 
succinctly summarised in the paragraph below in his thesis entitled Confucius the 
Chameleon: dubious envoy for ‘Brand China’:  
 
Domestically, the advocacy of Confucianism will in practice lead to the promotion of 
very conservative and inconsistent values. Internationally, if such values are to be 
paraded as the best of “Chinese” essences, China’s contribution to world culture will 
be a confused and regressive one. (Louie, 2011: 100) 
 
True, throughout ancient Chinese history, during the Han, Tang and Song dynasties, 
which were widely considered to have been splendid periods of great cultural, intellectual 
and political achievements, Confucianism was established and enshrined as an essential 
element of the statecraft and education. Conversely, in more recent history when China 
felt the most vulnerable and precarious politically and economically, culture and tradition 
tended to be blamed by radical reformers and advocates for social-political change as 
standing obstacles in the way of building a modern China. However, despite all the 
attempts at its destruction carried out over the past century, either in the name of 
democracy (the New Culture Movement) or revolution (the Cultural Revolution), 
Confucianism continues to be entrenched in Chinese political thinking today, and has 
seen resurgence in popularity in recent years. It is exactly because of the vicissitudes 
Confucianism has experienced that Zaharna (2014) added that the name has conveyed 
an extra goodwill to symbolise the longevity of the Chinese culture, as well as the 
longevity envisioned for the initiative. If longevity is a vertical dimension in time, I argue 
that the constant revival of Confucianism is not only a sign for its compatibility with the 
modern world, but also worthy of a place in the horizontal dimension of space: as a 
counterbalance to the Western values as Yin and Yang elements discussed earlier in 
1.2.2.  
 
Here, an important point often overlooked by Western scholars is that the revival of 
Confucianism is actually more among academics and civil society than government-
sponsored. The government is also reacting to developments outside its control, and 
even inside China domestically, the comeback of Confucianism is not without its 
opposition: in 2011, the mysterious erection and removal of the Confucius statue in 
Tiananmen Square after one hundred days only may be seen as an evidence of this 
divide in opinions among the decision makers. However, when China today needs a 
symbol to fill the ideological void and unify the nation, Confucianism brings the state 
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nationalism, popular nationalism and cultural nationalism altogether and provides the 
basis for the idea of building a ‘harmonious society’ and a ‘harmonious world’, which is 
essentially a Confucian concept and now written into the mission statement of Hanban.  
 
Looking through the historical perspective allows us to see that when China gains 
strength again, for almost the very first time in its modern history, a sense of cultural 
pride ascends. However, this was immediately seen as a challenge to Western 
hegemony in the eyes of some Western scholars, such as Huntington (1998: 93) who 
articulated that “East Asia attributes their dramatic economic development not to their 
import of Western culture but rather to their adherence to their own culture……The revolt 
against the West is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values.” 
We can see the arbitrary equation adopted here between ‘cultural pride’ and ‘value 
superiority’, and a further speculation that the mission of the CI is to promote Confucian 
values, thus a potential revolt against the Western democratic values and a justification 
of China’s authoritarian rule.  
 
When such loaded interpretation of the CI’s intention is combined with the government-
led approach discussed earlier, it has made many scholars worry that if there were to be 
a presence on campus, with a Chinese official link, it would be more difficult for 
academics to maintain their freedom and independence. To address such concerns, 
Hanban has repeatedly clarified that the CI’s mission is language teaching rather than 
value promotion as specified in its Constitution, by-laws, and the template contract for 
partnerships. When the University of Malaya requested to change the name from 
Confucius Institute to the Kongzi Institute for the Teaching of Chinese Language (‘孔子
汉语学院’ Kongzi Hanyu Xueyuan) before it was agreed to be launched in 2009, Hanban 
was quite happy to approve it. This could be a good idea to clarify the mission and 
function of the Confucius Institute, while helping dispel and concerns and speculations. 
 
However, since the CI was lauded as the ‘flagship’ or the “central project of Chinese 
Cultural diplomacy” (Cull, 2009: 12), and most of the research so far has associated its 
intention with projecting soft power (Kurlantzick, 2007; Paradise, 2009; Ren, 2010; Yang, 
2010; Ding & Xing, 2011; Louie, 2011; Yang & Hsiao, 2012a; Hubbert, 2014a; Lo & Pan, 
2014; Lueck, Pipps & Lin, 2014; Hartig, 2014a; Scotton, 2015; Volodzko, 2015), it has 
actually become the very point of attack by some Chinese native scholars, questioning 
why use Confucius as the official name of the entity, but not teach anything related to 
Confucian philosophy? This flashpoint is an example of the inherent tensions existing 
between the two ‘wheels’ of culture and value, as well as between the domestic and 
international contexts discussed earlier. These dual tensions were further complicated 
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by the CI’s position between host and home countries, adding another layer of 
controversy regarding its operation model. 
 
1.5.2 Controversy in its operating model 
 
Almost all discussions of the CI’s operation model focus on that they do not claim to be 
independent from the government, and operate within established universities, colleges, 
and secondary schools around the world, providing funding, teachers and educational 
materials. This has raised a series of concerns over ﬁnance, academic freedom, legal 
issues, ethical issues, relations with the Chinese partner universities, as well as 
ideological concerns about improper inﬂuence over teaching and research (Chey, 2008; 
Golden, 2011; Corrigan, 2012; Guttenplan, 2012; Hubert, 2014b; Hughes, 2014; Sahlins 
2015). As a result of such concerns, administrators at a number of institutions have 
opposed the establishment of a CI on their campuses, including the University of 
Manitoba, the University of British Columbia, the University of Melbourne, the University 
of Copenhagen, Aarhus University, Southern Denmark University, The University of Oslo, 
the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California, Berkeley, Cornell University, 
Harvard University, University of California, San Diego, the University of Wisconsin, 
Tokyo University, Kyoto University, and so on (Sahlins, 2015). Montgomery (2014) also 
mentioned that both Concordia and McGill Universities in Quebec said they had been 
approached by the Chinese government to start a Confucius program, but did not sign up for 
it.  
 
However, 500 universities around the world have opened their doors to the CIs so far 
(Hanban website). Its establishment follows a formal and regular procedure. Though 
there are two other types – those entirely run by the CI Headquarters and those entirely 
run by the host country under license from the CI Headquarters, the third type of a 
partnership between a Chinese home university, an overseas host university and the CI 
Headquarters is by far the most common owing to the advantage of sharing 
establishment and operation costs and the prestige derived from association with host 
universities (Starr, 2009). The latter advantage was particularly stressed by Hughes 
(2014:71) in that “when universities allow the activities of CIs to appear on their websites 
and to use their logos, they provide them with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of 
students and the public who expect such brands to guarantee high standard of academic 
integrity”.  
 
The procedure begins with an application proposal from a foreign organisation (usually 
a university). The proposal must demonstrate firstly, a strong demand for Chinese 
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language instruction in the university and local community; and secondly, the willingness 
of the applicant to contribute (both fiscally and physically) to the establishment and the 
growth of the CI (Starr, 2009). This has often been used by Hanban as the strongest 
counter argument against the accusations of China’s cultural invasion: the CIs are invited 
by their host universities overseas, not imposed upon. But what is not mentioned by 
Hanban is that the overture is often made by them first, especially to prestigious 
universities listed in the first paragraph, which have decided to reject the offer, or 
‘spurned’ invitation from Hanban as reported by Bloomberg News (Golden, 2011). 
 
Once approved, both institutions will receive financial benefits: every Chinese home 
university will receive 200,000 RMB (about £20,000) from Hanban as the supporting 
matching fund per CI set up, and 3000 RMB (about £300) per month per expatriated 
teacher during their service period abroad. The overseas host university will also receive 
generous funding from Hanban, including the start-up fund of US$ 100,000-150,000 and 
an average annual operational fund of US$ 50,000 (Xu, 2011). The startup fund is 100% 
provided by Hanban, with the subsequent annual operation supported by matching funds 
from the host partner organization at a mostly 1:1 ratio. By 2014, as published in the 
Confucius Institute Annual Development Report (Hanban website), the ratio of Hanban 
expenditure to those of host institutions stood at 1:1.5.  
 
Although the host university is nominally requested to match funding, it is generally 
provided in kind, such as campus facilities and office space, as well as administrative 
and accounting services, there is little in the way of out-of-pocket expenses. Because of 
this, some simply questioned if the CI can represent a soft power strategy, as according 
to Nye’s definition, while this model may not rely on coercion, it does rely on payments, 
which “may be attractive for financially stretched educational authorities facing a growing 
demand for Chinese language instruction” (Hughes, 2014). As mentioned in Hughes’s 
statement, there is a growing demand for Chinese language instruction, and Hanban 
sees the role of the CI to meet such ‘growing demand’, actually, it is the starting line of 
the Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs that “Confucius Institutes devote themselves to 
satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who 
learn the Chinese language” (Hanban website), but the controversies come from its 
means to meet the demand as well as the perceived purpose of soft power projection 
that goes beyond meeting the demand.  
 
For example, the CI’s model has raised scepticism and many concerns with strings 
attached, though the “’strings’ associated with accepting money may be fairly loose” as 
argued by Paradise (2009: 662), there are still worries that those who pay the piper may 
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call the tune. The common list of censored topics includes the ‘three Ts’ (Tibet, Taiwan 
and Tiananmen), human rights, China’s military build-up and factional fights inside the 
Chinese leadership (Chey, 2008; Golden, 2011; Mosher 2012; Sahlins 2015). Some 
critics of China such as the US Congressman Rohrabacher (2012, n.p.) has sounded 
alarm at this: “The Chinese Communist Party would like to influence American opinion, 
but if it just buys silence, it is a victory for the Communist regime”. Even inside the US, 
Rohrabacher’s remarks were criticised as ‘shades of McCarthyism all over again’ by 
some American scholars such as Paul Smith, who believe that some of the fears are 
generated by the frustration of the US’s own ability to fund academic projects eroded by 
the economic downturn: “our national power and prestige are under pressure right now, 
and I worry that could fuel unproductive resentments against China” (cited in Redden, 
2012: n.p.). These different voices from the US show different perceptions of China as a 
red threat or a benign rising power: the former is focusing against ‘the Other’; while the 
latter is more introspective about ‘Us’, and more sober-minded about the changing power 
positions between ‘Us’ and ‘Other’. In a way, they represent the affirmative and 
aggressive nationalisms from the US side.   
 
The funding issue is also courting more and more questioning domestically. The criticism 
is mainly about its lack of transparent operations and financial conditions. Some have 
accused the government of misplacing educational resources for overseas institutions 
rather than allocating them to poor school districts in China (Ren, 2012). Insiders have 
revealed that the great majority of the CIs are making financial losses, and have become 
a bottomless financial pit. Although the Chinese government has expended a huge 
amount of effort and money establishing and jointly running this network of CIs, viability 
and sustainability is still a common concern as voiced by Shepherd (2007) in the 
Guardian article: “if the expectation is that the institute will self-fund after three years, 
that is totally unrealistic. The Chinese government has to accept that these institutes will 
require funding for a substantial period of time, 10 to 20 years perhaps”. 
 
To sum up, the various controversies the CI has courted made it an epitome of the 
complexity that China’s cultural diplomacy is marked with, carrying conflict-ridden forces 
from cultural hegemony to nationalism, from ideology to its state-led approach whose 
“scale, speed, resources and strategic thinking” adds to the apprehension (Hughes, 
2014:75). With its counter-hegemonic stance, the CI is fighting a ‘defensive’ battle under 
Western hegemony, but through ‘offensive’ expansion into overseas educational 
institutions; and its representation in the ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ camps divided by both ideology 
and nationalism is like having a label of ‘Other’ imposed on it; its position as the flagship 
project made itself an easy target that attracts mixed responses from applause to 
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speculation, from doubts to fears, and different interpretations. In the following Chapters 
Three and Four, comparative case studies will be unfolded in the global context to 
showcase how the CI’s position in the current global cultural terrain determines the 




Cultural diplomacy is an endeavour spanning over different nations, territories, races, 
development stages, social and political systems and cultural traditions, in many cases, 
it is also over different civilizations in Huntington’s terms. Due to these variances, and 
the constantly evolving power relationships, it is a very complex subject. While inspired 
and stimulated by the growing literature about China’s cultural diplomacy, a significant 
void has been identified in the existing scholarly research that this study has attempted 
to fill. Challenging ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding' as the mainstream theoretical 
frameworks constitutes the point of departure for this thesis. The West-centric concept 
has not engaged with any historical analysis of the role of hegemony and Orientalism in 
shaping the current global cultural terrain, neither was it a good match with the 
fundamental vision of cultural diplomacy, which is not a zero sum game, nor a race to 
win hearts and minds, but a plus sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and 
mutual respect between cultures, it is the means to achieve the ends of building cultural 
pluralism, which echoes the ultimate goals of China’s cultural diplomacy. 
   
After clarifying the definition of cultural diplomacy and analysing the inadequacy of the 
current theoretical framework of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’, this chapter 
proceeded to present an overview of the historical, international and domestic contexts 
specifically for China, where the legacies of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-
knowledge nexus and nationalism were interwoven to create a complex global cultural 
terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy was launched into. At the core of this complex is 
power, which lies at the interface of the new three-dimensional analytical framework 
constructed on the tripartite theories of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and nationalism.  
 
Debates about both the vehicle and agent of China’s cultural diplomacy were then staged, 
where a dual character can be traced as a permeated feature: Western domination over 
the power of discourse has rendered China as being both the ‘ideological other’ and 
‘cultural other’, with the domestic undercurrent of double-edged nationalism at play, 
Chinese cultural diplomacy needs to gain external rapport and internal recognition at the 
same time, thus its purpose must be understood within both the international and 
domestic contexts. An historical perspective is also indispensable where the ‘Occident’ 
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and ‘Orient’ dichotomy; ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ camps divided by ideology and nationalism, as 
well as the ‘two wheels’ contention domestically all underpin the tensions and challenges 
for China to achieve its dual aims of countering the China threat perception and 
advocating cultural pluralism. Traditional Chinese culture and values function as the two 
wheels of the vehicle for cultural diplomacy, which takes an offensive and defensive 
stance respectively. Perhaps no other country’s cultural diplomacy would be etched with 
such a level of complexity.  
 
All the dual characters described above can be found in the CI, the most well-known and 
controversial project of China’s cultural diplomacy. What the CI is expected to do is to 
leverage the attention China’s rise gets and translate the growing influence of China into 
the growing attraction of Chinese language and culture. The question of ‘how’ to improve 
the implementation strategy was discussed by proposing some new variables to consider 
and the new concept of cultural boundary to apply. As the major output of this chapter, a 
new three-dimensional perspective was proposed, which will frame the critical analysis 
of the global cultural terrain that the remainder of this thesis seeks to develop. It will differ 
in significant ways from existing research and tries to define the distinctive features of 
China’s cultural diplomacy and its CI project.  
 
After laying out the theoretical propositions of this thesis, the next chapter will introduce 
the research methodology and explain the research design as the road map for 


















Chapter Two  
 Research Methodology and Research Design 
 
2.0 Introduction  
 
A distinction between the word research ‘methodology’ and ‘method’ is worth making at 
the very start of this chapter. According to Melia and Dingwall (1997:27), the former 
means “the study of method”, and the latter is the design and development of “research 
procedures actually employed”. This chapter will discuss both and the relationship 
between the two: research method is in a profound sense motivated by the 
methodological suppositions, therefore, philosophical bases have to be established first 
as they concern the nature of the subject matter and the rationale of the investigative 
methods employed by the researcher to assert and defend his/her claims to research 
findings. 
 
Having developed and established the new analytical framework to answer my research 
questions in the preceding Literature Review chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to 
describe the research design procedure and methods for data collection and analysis. 
Prior to this, it will commence with a brief overview of the philosophical assumptions and 
the main paradigmatic positions to explain the philosophical stance for this research, 
because “philosophical questions had to be settled in advance of empirical enquiries” 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 2).  The chapter will then proceed to a theoretical 
discussion of ‘multiple triangulation’, followed by its actual implementations in this 
research and detailed explanations of the approach to data handling and data 
presentation. The elements of originality that make this research distinctive and valuable 
will also be highlighted before the chapter closes. 
 
2.1 Philosophical assumptions and research paradigms 
 
Sanders, Lewis & Thornhill (2003: 3) have defined the three characteristics of research: 
“first, data are collected systematically; second, data are interpreted systematically; third, 
there is a clear purpose: to find things out”. This systematic way is best reflected in the 
research paradigm that can be viewed as “a set of basic beliefs based on ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 107). Guba 
and Lincoln believe that it is necessary to understand the following three fundamental 
components before determining which paradigm is to be used in a research:  
 
1. The ontological question: What is the form and nature of reality, and what is there 




2. The epistemological question: What is the nature of the relationship between the 
knower or would-be knower and what can be known?  
 
3. The methodological question: How can the inquirer go about finding out whatever 
he or she believes can be known? (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108) 
 
There are a number of research paradigms that differ from one another in their basic 
beliefs regarding each of the above three questions. For example, positivism believes 
that social sciences should endeavour to emulate natural sciences, which is an empirical 
pursuit with its basis laying in the observation of ‘brute data’: “data which are not the 
result of judgement, interpretation, or other subjective mental operations” (Hughes & 
Sharrock, 1997: 43). Therefore, it advocates “the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:16), and 
assumes an objective relationship to the epistemological question, i.e., that knowledge 
exists external to the researcher, while constructivism believes in a subjective 
relationship.  
 
Constructivists, notably Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), argued against positivists that 
differences between the natural and the social sciences were based on logic, the 
inaccessibility of mental phenomena to direct observation meant that they could not be 
dealt with objectively, thus “human beings could have no knowledge independently of 
what was in their minds” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997:98), and knowledge is co-
constructed socially by people’s interactions with the world. Therefore, findings are co-
created rather than being discovered (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Rickert on the other hand 
(Cohen & Crabytree, 2006), argued that the essential distinction between the natural and 
the social sciences was methodological rather than ontological; natural sciences seek to 
discover general laws, while social sciences are concerned to understand the unique 
combination of elements that represent a culturally significant phenomenon, which 
requires the social scientists to attempt to “reconstruct the subjective experience of social 
actors” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997:101), or “grasp the subjective meaning of social 
actions” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:19).  
 
Both positivism and constructivism paradigms have been criticised for their radical 
stances, many contemporary methodologists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, Hughes & 
Sharrock, 1997) believe that the development of human knowledge has been severely 
limited by the positivism-constructivism dichotomy. Realism proposes itself as a neutral 
position in contrast to the two. On the one hand, it shares the positivism belief that the 
natural and social sciences can and should apply the same kind of approach to data 
collection, but realism argues that the scientist’s conceptualisation is simply one way of 
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knowing that reality; the ideal of objective knowledge requires both methods (Bryman & 
Bell, 2007). On the other hand, both Travers (2001) and Cohen & Crabtree (2006) argue 
that realism involves looking behind appearances to discover laws or mechanisms that 
explain human behaviour, it provides opportunities for discovering emergent knowledge 
as opposed to testing a priori hypotheses, therefore, it is particularly useful for research 
aiming at generating new knowledge emerging from the data, or looking at previously 
researched phenomena from a new perspective. 
 
Since this thesis aims at defining the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy 
and its Confucius Institute, which involves developing a new knowledge or 
conceptualisation that has not been generated before due to the majority of the previous 
research being focused on interpreting China’s activities in this domain, the realism 
paradigm was considered the most appropriate philosophical stance for this research. 
The investigation will be carried out mainly through qualitative methods such as interview, 
observation and text analysis. This brings us back to the third component of the 
philosophical assumptions: while ontology informs what counts as valid 
findings/knowledge, epistemology offers insights into research strategies including 
research design and overall approach, methodology guides the researcher to choose 
the most effective methods.  
 
In their book Qualitative-Quantitative Research Methodology, Newman and Benz (1998) 
have explained that qualitative and quantitative research has philosophical roots in the 
naturalistic and the positivistic philosophies respectively. Guba (1990) further explained 
that a qualitative approach is regarded as being naturalistic, interpretive, constructivist 
and an inquiry from within, while a quantitative approach is considered to be rationalistic, 
functionalist, essentialist, and involving external inquiry. What the researcher must begin 
with is the nature of the research question, as the research question guides what 
methods are to be selected. This is a critical decision that needs to be made from the 
early stages of framing the research questions, since this will influence data collection 
and data analysis throughout the research, all the way to the validity of research findings, 
and even have implications on the next steps of the research. Therefore, this decision-
making should be a thought-through and constantly-reflected process.  
 
In the process of a thorough literature review, my research questions were carefully 
recalibrated and sharpened to answering the questions of why China’s similar efforts in 
launching the CI are perceived and received differently from its Western counterparts, 
which is further translated into more specific questions by looking at why China wants to 
launch the CI; what is the vehicle; who is the agent; and how it is implemented in the 
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field. Therefore, my research questions fall into three levels – from ‘contextual’ to identity 
the position and nature of China’s cultural diplomacy in the global cultural terrain; to 
‘diagnostic’, trying to examine the reasons for China to launch the CI, and the challenges 
it faces in terms of its perception and reception in the rest of the world; then to ‘evaluative’, 
trying to assess the effectiveness of the CI project by looking at how its goals are 
achieved and what barriers exist to its current operation and future improvement, with 
recommendations given for policy making.  
 
These research questions point me to qualitative study as the most suitable research 
method as they are investigative in nature, committed to the interpretive understanding 
of a complex issue, particularly its underlying reasons and motivations, and providing a 
broad base of insight, knowledge and sound rationale for further decision-making or 
recommending course of actions. However, qualitative method does have its limitations. 
The most obvious is the small sample size and difficulty of replicating the research. The 
researcher would have no way of being sure how representative his/her sample is of the 
world at large, and human beings (including researchers) tend to perceive patterns and 
regularities even when they are looking at random data. While Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005:20) simply referred to the concern for the validity of qualitative research as the 
“legitimation crisis”, Newman and Benz (1998) have provided a list of criteria to help 
enhance qualitative design validity, including neutrality, prolonged engagement on-site, 
and triangulation. Against these criteria, the next section will detail the description and 
justification of the research design formulated for this study to mitigate the common 
concerns about qualitative research. With defensible logical connections established 
between the research questions and research methods, and the enhanced validity of 
research findings, they may generate ideas and hypotheses for later quantitative 
research.  
 
2.2 Research design for this thesis 
 
According to Nachmias & Nachmias (1992:77-78), research design is a plan that “guides 
the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting observations. It 
is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning 
causal relations among the variables under investigation”. In other words, it should 
function as a road map leading to the answers to the research questions.  
 
An important concept which needs to be introduced at this stage is ‘multiple triangulation’. 
Denzin (1970) took the term ‘triangulation’ from Webb (1966) and developed this notion 
of ‘multiple triangulation’ which has moved beyond just the use of multiple methods to 
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study the same phenomenon, but refers to a “typology of strategies that can be combined 
in one investigation: methodological triangulation; data triangulation; investigator 
triangulation; and theoretical triangulation” (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 22). Denzin 
described the essence of this triangulation strategy as the “logic of triangulation” 
(1978:28). He argued that by approaching research questions from different angles and 
bringing together a range of different data, the research “has the potential to generate 
new and alternative explanations, ones that better capture the social complexity that the 
fieldwork explores” (Denzin, 1978:28). Goetz and LeCompte (1984) also commented on 
the benefits of ‘multiple triangulation’ as a means of defining, broadening and 
strengthening conceptual linkages.  
 
As an inherently interdisciplinary research area, cultural diplomacy per se is the product 
of moves to unite or transgress traditional disciplinary boundaries, drawing on aspects 
of cultural studies, international relations, and communications. This added layer of 
interdisciplinary complexity requires the researcher to implement ‘multiple triangulation’ 
at the level of overall research design to ensure the quality and validity of the research 
findings. The triangulation shall also aim at producing a compatibility that allows different 
methods to be blended and integrated, rather than simply comprising distinct approaches 
that do not complement each other. The next part will unfold the four specific layers of 
‘multiple triangulation’ embedded in the design of this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Methodological triangulation 
 
i) Multiple comparative case studies 
 
Given the in-depth dimension required by the exploratory research questions, and the 
complexity of the subject area of cultural diplomacy, especially in that it is a contemporary, 
culturally defined phenomenon, case study is thought to be the preferred method to 
investigate and gain analytical insight into the subject. Simon’s definition (2009:21) can 
be quoted here as the best justification for my research:  
 
Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity 
and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a 
‘real life’ context. It is research-based, inclusive of different methods and is 
evidence-led. The primary purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a 
specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy, institution, programme or system 
to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and 
civil or community action. 
 
China’s cultural diplomacy is such a ‘particular project in a real life context’ that is marked 
by both complexity and uniqueness. Bryman and Bell (2007:63) further explained that 
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“with a case study, the case is an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher 
aims to provide an in-depth elucidation of the unique features of the case”. Yin (2014:16) 
also added that case study is a preferred method to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon “especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may 
not be clearly evident”. According to Thomas (2016), case study concentrates on 
experiential knowledge of the case and gives close attention to the influence of its social, 
political, and cultural contexts, as the case to be studied is a complex entity located in a 
milieu of contexts or backgrounds. To sum up, a case study would facilitate an overall 
understanding of the entity as configurations with combinations of characteristics. 
 
The advantages of doing a case study include providing an up-close and in-depth look 
at the cases, providing the possibility of creating a three-dimensional picture, or what 
Foucault called a “polyhedron of intelligibility” (2003: 249) when you have a multiplicity 
of force relations to reckon with. By this he meant that we can only really understand 
something by looking at it from different directions and using different methods. This way 
allows a more rounded and more balanced picture of the subject to be developed. 
Therefore, a case study method fits perfectly well with both the aim and nature of this 
research. It will be used to develop an in-depth and meaningful dialogue between 
theoretical ideas and evidence, to chart the global cultural terrain of struggle with a three-
dimensional view, and to establish the inductive statements about the distinctive features 
of China’s cultural diplomacy.  
 
Like most qualitative research methods, case study also suffers from the major 
disadvantages of lacking generalisability and its limitations to validity. However, Yin 
(2014:40) has made an important distinction between “statistical generalisation” and 
“analytic generalisation”: while case studies are not “sampling units” to generate any 
“statistical generalisation”, they do provide an opportunity to shed empirical light on some 
theoretical concepts that go beyond the setting for the specific case that has been 
studied, as “the theoretical propositions that went into the initial design of the case study, 
as empirically enhanced by your case study’s findings, will have formed the groundwork 
for an analytic generalisation” (Yin, 2014:40). Though not using the same terminology, 
other prominent works have also devoted attention to analytic generalisation in 
distinguishing it from statistical generalisation, such as Mitchell’s (1993) discussion of 
logical inference and statistical inference; Bromley’s (1986) discussion of case inference 
compared with statistical inference, and Bryman and Burgess’s (1994) analytic induction. 
Yin proposed that (2014:68) analytic generalisation “can take the form of a lesson 
learned, working hypothesis, or other principle that is believed to be applicable to other 
situations (not just other ‘like cases’)”, “it consists of a carefully posed theoretical 
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statement, theory, or theoretical proposition”. For this thesis, the lessons learned from 
the case study of CIs are expected to be also applicable for other activities linked to 
China’s cultural diplomacy, and the theoretical statements describing distinctive features 
of the CI should also shed lights on a better understanding of China’s endeavour of 
cultural diplomacy as a whole.  
 
In terms of the specific case study design frame, Stake (2005:443) made a very good 
point: “case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied…… 
by whatever methods we choose to study the case. We would study it analytically or 
holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, 
and by mixed methods”. This research has opted to do multiple comparative case studies 
as a way to generate more compelling findings and make the overall study more robust 
by drawing ‘cross-case’ conclusions. As Swanson put it (1971:15), “thinking without 
comparison is unthinkable”. Therefore, data collected have been linked to research 
themes and literature by placing them into conceptual frameworks, and comparisons are 
made both between different cases, and between empirical findings and the literature 
review findings.  
 
ii) Case selection process 
 
To undertake a successful case study, the first step is to build a reasoned and 
representative case. I chose to study the CI for my thesis based on three considerations. 
Firstly, because it represents the most watched effort of China’s cultural diplomacy and 
a highly controversial one as well: both its impressive speed of the global coverage, and 
the extension of its starting contract terms from three years to five years with Hanban-
guaranteed funding can be seen as evidence for its early success, however, in the short 
time-frame of its rapid expansion, the CI has also received its share of criticism, which 
can be found in a growing body of literature, including both articles in prestigious 
academic journals and influential media outlets. This made it a very illustrative case to 
show both the opportunities and challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy. All the 
dual characters unveiled in the theoretical discussions can be found in the CI, making it 
a revelatory case of cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.  
 
The second reason is that the CI is indeed a complex entity located in a milieu of contexts: 
the case study is undertaken in the historical, cultural, political, and international relation 
contexts, as contextualisation is a necessary step for comparative analysis and for 
appropriate generalisation of results. It enables the researcher to explore issues such as 
the relationship between domestic and international contexts, multiple power 
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relationships between the stakeholders, the complexity of the process of communication 
among the stakeholders and with the overseas audience. None of these topics would 
have been easily addressed by using other methods, reflecting one of the advantages 
of case study method in its “capacity to explore social processes as they unfold in 
organisations” (Finn, Elliott-White & Walton, 2000: 82). 
 
The third reason is that despite the growing interest in the CI reflected in recent studies 
and media reports, only a handful of case studies have been done by academics so far, 
and they only focused on CIs in one country or one continent, such as Germany, Australia 
and South Africa (Hartig, 2012, 2014). No comparative approach or perspective has ever 
been applied yet to examine this ‘global’ effort – both its aim to improve China’s ‘global’ 
image, and the means through ‘global’ coverage make this comparative approach highly 
relevant and valuable. Therefore, this research will serve as a timely and useful effort to 
feed back the international data collected from different target countries to the policy 
process, so that a more effective and responsive strategy can be formulated, and 
cooperative interaction can be created to make cultural diplomacy a truly plus-sum game.  
 
There were altogether 500 CIs operating in 125 countries and regions around the world 
by December 2015 (Hanban website), careful thoughts have been put into making a 
selection of the cases: instead of aiming at a geographical spread, cultural boundaries 
were considered to select four CIs, two with relatively soft cultural boundaries with China 
and two with relatively hard boundaries, so that both intra-country and cross-country 
comparisons are allowed. A pilot study was carried out during the summer of 2013 in 
China, where a total of 11 people from five different CIs were interviewed, covering both 
developed and developing countries from four different continents, and four cultural 
spheres in Huntington’s terms (1998): South Korea in the Confucian cultural sphere of 
Asia; UK and France in the Western civilisation of Europe; Mexico in Latin America, and 
Morocco in the Muslim world of Africa. Though the coverage offers a good spectrum, the 
width may come at the cost of depth, as I do not have enough access to the same 
spectrum of data sources from each continent. Given the special nature of the CI as a 
partnership between home and host institutions, it would be ideal to interview both 
directors sent by the home institutions in China and those hired by the host institutions; 
similarly, it would gather more balanced views if teachers both seconded from the home 
institutions in China and those locally hired by the host institutions were to be interviewed.  
 
Therefore, a major modification of the original research design was made following the 
pilot study: instead of choosing three CIs from three different continents, I decided to 
focus on two continents, Asia and Europe, to keep the contrasting angle between a 
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generally East and West cultural perspective. To compensate for the loss of a ‘tripod’ leg 
from Africa, two CIs were selected and studied from each country (South Korea and the 
UK), making a total of four comparative case studies. Narrowing down to two countries 
made it more manageable while also possible to go into further depth. Studying two 
cases from each country also adds another layer of comparison, making it possible to 
show either similar results or contrasting results to enhance validity.  
 
By focusing on these two countries, I can draw on my strong connections with both South 
Korea and the UK to gain access to four very representative cases: The two CIs sampled 
from South Korea include the very first CI in the world, Seoul Confucius Institute, which 
was approaching its first ten-year anniversary when the interview took place in the 
summer of 2014. However, this CI was not in the usual form of a partnership between 
two universities: it is between Hanban and South Korea-China Cultural Institute; 
therefore, a second case was chosen to offer comparison in its operating model: the CI 
at Woosong University in a smaller city of Daejeon in South Korea, partnered with 
Sichuan University in China. It was also awarded the 2010 Confucius Institute of the Year. 
 
The first CI sampled in the UK is UCLAN CI partnered with Beijing International Studies 
University, and that is because I work at the host institution, therefore can carry out some 
nonparticipant observations; the second CI chosen was the Confucius Institute for 
Business, London, hosted by the London School of Economics and Political Science and 
partnered with Tsinghua University from China. It was selected for the following three 
considerations: 1) it is a CI with a special feature of business, the first one of its kind in 
the world, initiated and supported by five British corporations who also funded some 
locally hired positions; 2) both the host and home institutions are among the most 
prestigious universities in each respective country and the world as a whole; 3) its 
Advisory Council is composed of high profile representatives, including Madam Xu Lin 
herself, Director of Hanban, and the Minister Counsellor for Education from the Chinese 
Embassy in London, as well as representatives from its founding body of British 
Petroleum, Deloitte LLP, HSBC, John Swire and Sons Ltd. and Standard Chartered Bank. 
 
To add yet another important comparative perspective to this thesis, the case study also 
looks at CI’s Western counterparts. Goethe Institute is selected as there is a cooperation 
treaty signed in 2010 between Hanban and Goethe Institute in Beijing, based on 
continuous exchange of new developments in teaching skills and methods. They hold 
regular meetings, and since Goethe Institute plays the role of a consultancy to Hanban, 
its founding Director in Beijing, Kahn-Ackermann, has become an advisor to Hanban 
after he retired in 2011. This layer of comparison will offer particularly important insights 
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to answer the main research question of why ‘why’ China’s similar efforts in launching 
the CI are perceived and received differently and encounter unexpected controversies 
by comparing ‘what’ is the vehicle, ‘who’ is the agent, and ‘how’ it is implemented in the 
field.  
 
Now that the multiple cases are selected for the comparative study, multiple methods 
are also used to collect data, clarify meaning, and “enhance interpretability: one set of 
data gives a handle to understanding another set” (Arksey & Knight, 1999:25). What is 
more, many researchers (Axinn & Pearce 2006, Morse 2010, Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie 
2010) argue that the mixed methods can provide more comprehensive information and 
allow a wider and more complete picture to emerge, especially if the information from 
one approach was not identified in an alternative approach. Specifically, this research 
draws on three methods of text analysis, observation and semi-structured interview to 
serve this purpose. They will be discussed further in the section below. The greatest 
attraction of methodological triangulation is that validity is claimed through 
methodological pluralism because cumulatively it minimises the possibility that the 
findings may be biased to one particular measurement. 
 
2.2.2 Data triangulation 
 
Data for this case study are collected from various sources including documents, reports, 
agreements, observations, and interviews. They cover the three subtypes of data 
triangulation proposed by Denzin (1978: 295) in terms of time, space and person. 
Because data collected by each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, by 
drawing on multiple sources of evidence, data triangulation can provide more information 
and better insights towards a more comprehensive answer to the research question; it 
can also corroborate the findings and help reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation, and 
strengthen the construct validity of my case study.  
 
i) Documents, reports and agreements 
 
As Finn, Elliott-White & Walton (2000:41) noted, logically “secondary data collection 
should always come before primary data collection”. For this research, secondary data 
are mainly collected either from the Hanban and relevant CIs’ websites, or from each of 
the CI director interviewed. They include but not exclusive to the organisational structure 
of Hanban, its mission statement, Constitution and By-Laws of the CI, application 
procedure to have a CI set up, Confucius China Studies Program, Eight-Year CI 
Development Plan 2012-2020 (see Appendix 2), statistical reports that evaluate the 
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success of the CIs during the first ten years, speeches from government officials, 
Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe (Hanban booklet for internal circulation, see 
Appendix 3), case files that describe the ‘CIs of the Year’, materials from the 2011-2014 
Annual Confucius Institute Assembly held in China and executive workshops for CI 
Directors (in the forms of booklets and DVDs, see Appendix 11).  
 
Apart from these documents from Hanban and CI websites, four agreements signed 
between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and XXX University 5  on the 
Establishment of CIs were also collected (see Appendix 7), along with the annual 
monitoring reports of the CIs interviewed. Texts from other academic institutional 
websites, including university statements on terminating their CI agreements, The 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report on Partnerships with 
Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes, as well as relevant information 
from the official websites of the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Cervantes Institute 
and Goethe Institute were also collected. Altogether these secondary data cover a long 
span of time, many events and many settings, to reflect the ‘time, space, person’ 
triangulation discussed earlier. Such documents can be invaluable as sources of 
background knowledge and for cross-checking the data. 
 
All of the above provide a wealth of information and vital text-based evidence that I can 
scrutinise; they will help construct interview questions to collect empirical data from 
directors and teachers of the CIs. Meanwhile, there are also a wealth of secondary data 
from both scholarly literature and media reports about China’s cultural diplomacy and 
Confucius Institutes as soft power tools. Examples are drawn from these as supporting 
evidence, but an important word of warning is given by Smith (1984) that texts become 
crystallised when we treat them as authoritative representations of stable, objective 
realities, and there is a danger of crystallising institutional texts by glossing over the 
various contextual factors associated with the text’s production and use in concrete 
institutional settings. This means when we focus on the analysis of the report and what 
the content means for the issue at hand, we shall not forget to question how the report 
came to be in the first place. Therefore, extreme care is taken in secondary data analysis 
and interpretation, as most of them are produced for specific target readers, and may 
present a deliberately biased version of events, both in what is said and in what is left 
unsaid. These documents are always approached with this questioning frame of mind.  
 
ii) Observation 
                                                             




Observation is a highly important data-collection method frequently used in qualitative 
research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) place the methodology in very high esteem when 
they recommend participant observation as the most comprehensive of all types of 
research strategies. Dingwall (1997:60) also argues that “where interviewers construct 
data, observers find it…...the fundamental virtue of observation is that it enables us to 
document members accounting to each other in natural settings”. He further explained 
that in an interview study, we choose what messages we elicit, “in observation, we have 
no choice but to listen to what the world is telling us” (Dingwall, 1997:64). As there is a 
Confucius Institute operating at the university where I work, and we share a common 
student body, I am able to utilise both ‘participant and nonparticipant observations’ 
informally in many of the events organised by the CI or collaborated with student 
societies. Moreover, I often attend events organised by other CIs in the area, such as 
guest lectures, anniversary celebrations and The CI Day events. This also allows me to 
build in the ‘time, space and person’ factors in triangulation by observing similar events 
organised by different CIs over the years in a variety of settings when different audiences 
are involved.  
 
Despite the increased validity of ‘non-participant observation’ as compared to ‘participant 
observation’, there are still obvious pitfalls in this approach as it tends to reflect the bias 
of the researcher, who is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. The 
observer’s expectations affect what he/she sees and reports, reducing the validity of the 
data. As argued by Newman and Benz (1998), the observer’s understanding of the 
subject’s point of view is a double-edged sword: while it can help capture participants in 
their own terms, it also subjects the observer’s statements to describing only his/her bias, 
especially when the observer becomes increasingly blinded to the peculiarities he/she is 
supposed to observe. However, Becker and Geer (1960:133) argued that “observation 
of some social event, the events which precede and follow it, and explanation of its 
meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after its occurrence gives us 
more information about the event under study than data gathered by any other 
sociological method”.  
 
This is a very convincing statement for observation method to be used in collecting 
primary data, where direct interactions between the CIs and their target audiences are 
unfolding, allowing me to access first-hand responses from the participants in-situ, and 
also their possible comments on the events’ impacts later on. Besides, my mixed role as 
an insider and outsider helps make myself an invisible observer to reduce the ‘reflexivity’, 
one of the weaknesses of direct observation pointed out by Yin (2014:106) as actions 
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may proceed differently because they are being observed. Last but not least, this allows 
me to compare and contrast my direct observations with the reports/event narratives 
submitted to Hanban and released on their website.  
 
iii) Interview  
 
At the same time, interviews are drawn on heavily as a method of primary data collection. 
Qualitative interviewing is considered as a great way to learn detailed information from 
a single individual or small number of individuals. It is very useful when one wants to 
gain expert opinions on the subject or talk to someone knowledgeable about a topic 
(Driscoll & Brizee 2010). Interviews with key players can reveal extensive micro-political 
activity that was not evident from documents or observations.  
 
There are three major types of qualitative interviewing: the structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interview. As Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2003) point out, the semi-
structured interview is used in qualitative research in order to conduct discussions not 
only to reveal and understand the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but also to place more emphasis 
on exploring the ‘why’. It is semi-structured because although it contains a list of key 
questions, they may not be asked in exactly the way outlined on the schedule. Questions 
that are not included in the guide may also be asked as the interviewer may be inspired 
by things said by the interviewees. It allows the interviewer to follow up ideas, probe 
responses and ask for clarification or further elaboration, and similarly, it also allows the 
interviewees to choose what to say about a particular topic and how much. As 
summarised by Arksey and Knight (1999:8), the characteristic of semi-structured 
interview is that “interviewer refers to a guide, which is usually a mix of closed and open 
questions. Interviewer will use judgment to improvise, it is partly interviewer-led, partly 
interviewee-led”.  
 
In this research, semi-structured interviews are adopted to explore and understand the 
perceptions of people directly involved in the practice of cultural diplomacy. As an 
important way to collect primary data for this research, a group of interviewees are 
carefully considered in line with data triangulation. Apart from the four selected CIs as 
case study samples where their Directors and teachers/administrators both hired by the 
host institutions and sent by the home institutions were interviewed in-situ; more 
Directors from other CIs, including both locally-hired by the host institution and those 
sent by the home institutions were also interviewed, making it a total of nine CIs in five 
different countries (three in the United Kingdom, three in the South Korea, one from 
France, one from Morocco, and one from Mexico). The Director of the Goethe Institute 
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in Beijing is also interviewed to facilitate the comparative study of the CI and its western 
counterparts.  
 
Then the next step is the interview question design. Since interview is a means to serve 
the ends of answering the research questions, a sensible design is to translate the 
research questions into specific interview questions in the context of Confucius Institute 
as this is the chosen case study. Therefore, the research questions were divided into 
groups of interview questions addressing the purpose of the CI (why), provision of the 
CI (what), relationship with and interactions between all stakeholders (who and how). 
With these as the main framework, questions were tailored to different roles of the 
interviewees at the CI, i.e. Directors, teachers and administrators. There are also a group 
of questions addressing the differences between the CI and its western counterparts to 
help answer the research question of why China’s cultural diplomacy faces different 
challenges. A distinctive comparative angle is reflected in the interview questions 
bespoke for Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing. All the interview 
questions are included in Appendix 9 of the thesis. 
 
Another important consideration given to interview design is the wording of the questions, 
to avoid leading and assumptive questions. Then a consent form and briefing letter was 
produced following the ethical approval of UCLAN and emailed to interviewees 
beforehand. In a stretch of two years’ time from summer 2013 to summer 2015, a total 
of 25 in-depth interviews were carried out with people working in CIs in five different 
countries, this includes the pilot study carried out during the summer of 2013, when 12 
people were interviewed with a view to testing how well my research design works in 
reality, and refining the procedure of my data collection. At this stage, all interviews were 
recorded, but some were carried out in groups of two or three, so not all of the interviews 
were fully transcribed. Four key people, including two CI directors, one CI teacher 
seconded from the Chinese home university and one CI administrator locally hired by 
the host university, were interviewed again a year later to check for consistency and 
accuracy. All formal interviews carried out following the pilot study, 13 in all, were fully 
transcribed. 
 
The pilot study provided me with rich thoughts on how to handle potential problems. For 
example, I see the point raised by Alvesson (2011) that the interviewee could be the 
source of ‘problems’ as well, he/she may actually be ‘knowing’ but may be unwilling to 
tell, for good or less good reasons. Besides, the low degree of structure for a semi-
structured interview may mean the interviewees could pull in different, and sometimes 
irrelevant and unproductive directions for the research, and that too much interview time 
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is spent drifting in these directions. This is a lesson learnt from my pilot study. As a 
remedy, the interview questions were revised to a few open questions to start with, but 
followed by a set of more focused questions with clearer and more specific wording to 
reduce the chances of steering away from track.   
 
Three group interviews were arranged due to practical considerations when the contact 
person suggests it as a more efficient way to quickly and conveniently collect data from 
several people simultaneously. They were carried out with: 1) three Chinese CI directors 
during the pilot stage; 2) two directors of one of the CIs in South Korea (one was the first 
Director but retired from the role, one is the current Executive Director); 3) two secondees 
working at one of the CIs in South Korea. The advantages and disadvantages of group 
interviews have been addressed by many, including Berg (2009: 165) and Arksey & 
Knight (1999: 76), each came up with two lists, among which I find the following points 
highly relevant to my experience: group interviews permit the gathering of a large amount 
of information in relatively short periods of time and the information obtained may be 
more complete as interviewees fill in each other’s gaps, and more trustworthy as bias in 
one account may counterbalance that in the other. Disadvantages include that dominant 
personalities may overpower and steer the group’s responses, and if the topic is sensitive, 
individuals may not be willing to disclose detailed, honest information in front of others 
and instead provide a more ‘public’ response; it is also easier to digress and make the 
interview prolonged. The facts that the there is no power relations at play among all 
interviewees, and those in the first group are all retired CI directors while those in the 
third group are from different home institutions in China have appeased their concerns 
in speaking out their minds. It is also interesting for the interviewees to exchange views 
based on their own experiences.  
 
As with other qualitative methods, limitations to validity also exist for interview, when the 
subjective bias of the interviewer affects the interpretation of the data in ways that 
misrepresent the subject’s reality. The fact that the researcher is able to probe, use 
follow-up questions and pay attention to nonverbal cues is debated between two 
opposing views of either enhancing the data collected (Newman & Benz, 1998) and 
actually decreasing the validity (Mouly, 1970). To address this concern, all interviewees 
will be sent the draft chapters and any articles to be published for review and comments, 
so as to reduce the likelihood of falsely reporting or misrepresenting a perspective, 
thereby increasing the construct validity.  
 
The above three sections construct the second layer of multiple triangulation: data 
triangulation. These data collected via multiple methods and from different sources may 
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or may not be consistent. The convergences are the most critical part in a comparative 
study: if different kinds of data lead to consistent patterns, they will generate more 
compelling conclusions; if the data pull in opposite directions, then investigating the 
reason for discrepancies will shed light on processes that otherwise might not have been 
recognised. 
 
2.2.3 Investigator triangulation 
 
As an independent PhD research project, there are resource limitations to realise this 
level of ideal triangulation by involving different researchers, interviewers or observers. 
However, ideas of neutrality and prolonged engagement on-site proposed by Newman 
and Benz (1998) are taken on board to reduce any potential bias that could be generated 
by a single researcher. Doing a PhD on a part-time route lends advantage to the 
‘prolonged engagement on-site’ as this is a six-year journey, which allows me to 
complete the observations, interviews, and primary and secondary data collection over 
a long period of time. Neutrality is also maintained carefully for academic integrity. The 
fact that the researcher herself is both an insider and outsider of Chinese culture and 
can read both English and Chinese texts in the original language, and that there is a 
change of supervisory team involving a total of four different experienced academics 
overseeing this project can help mitigate this concern to a certain extent. 
 
2.2.4 Theoretical triangulation 
 
This is a most critical level of triangulation to this research as it distinguishes itself from 
previous researches in approaching the subject matter from alternative and diverse 
perspectives. As discussed in Chapter One, the overview of the historical, international 
and domestic contexts specifically for China to launch its cultural diplomacy reveals that 
it is interwoven with the legacies of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-knowledge 
nexus and nationalism, while ‘soft power’ has been applied as the mainstream theoretical 
framework to examine this subject previously. The soft power concept is initiated by, and 
more often used for dominant powers to reflect on how their cultural diplomacy can play 
bigger roles in maintaining and consolidating their power positions. It has not engaged 
with the historical analysis of the roles played by hegemony and Orientalism in shaping 
the current global cultural terrain that is not a level playing field for all cultures. 
Theoretical triangulation will be applied in both data collection (the design of interview 
questions) and data analysis. Then the research findings produced from this process are 
matched to the four themes of the research questions explored in the Literature Review, 
i.e. ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘how’, to establish how well the data collected fit the 
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descriptions of Chinese characteristics derived from the pilot study, based on which the 
four inductive statements will be adapted and fine-tuned as a working definition of the 
distinctive features of the CI. Both this process and the generated products represent 
the key originality elements of this research project.  
 
The statements below are mostly induced from the Literature Review and preliminary 
data collected from the pilot study as a hypothetical definition of the distinctive features 
of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project:  
 
1. Why - staged with Orientalism at the background and Nationalism at the 
foreground, China’s Cultural Diplomacy takes on a dual mission of countering 
cultural hegemony and China Threat theory at the same time;  
2. What - its content mix is delivered with charm offensive to promote its language 
and traditional culture, while maintaining a defensive stance for its modern 
values;  
3. Who - The government-led approach to implementing cultural diplomacy may 
reduce the effects of soft power by taking on a ‘hard edge’ in its sponsorship and 
censorship;  
4. How - Centralized management with globalised outreach, but localised practice 
with interaction with different target audiences. 
 
Its validity as a working definition will be tested and assessed in the three ensuing 
Chapters of Three, Four and Five against the data collected through multiple 
triangulation and the new theoretical framework proposed, eventually modified to be the 
cross-case conclusions. This concludes the description of research design for this thesis.  
 
Table 2.1 offers a summary of the ‘multiple triangulations’ featured in this research:  
Type of triangulation Specific measures taken 
Methodological 
triangulation 
Multiple comparative case studies 
Semi-structured Interviews  
Observations  
Data triangulation Documentary sources range from government documents, CI 
agreements, CI reports, academic literature, mainstream 
media reports, to information released on Hanban website and 
university websites across three continents;  
Observations of different CI activities in a six-year time span; 
Interviews carried out in a two-year time span to 25 sources 
representing five types of roles involving seven different 
countries; 
Three subtypes of data triangulation was reflected in time, 





Single investigator, with prolonged engagement over a period 
of six year and neutrality supported by the supervisory team to 
reduce potential bias 
Theoretical 
triangulation 
Critical engagement of soft power theory with alternative 
analytical frameworks constructed by Orientalism, cultural 
hegemony, power-knowledge nexus, as well as nationalism. 
 
Table 2.1 Multiple triangulation for this research 
 
2.3 Approach to data analysis 
 
With all the data collected, the development of analytic induction and critical reflection 
through comparative case studies is at the core of data analysis. As Yin (2014:132) 
defined, “data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, or 
otherwise recombining evidence, to produce empirically based findings”. Yin further 
explains that there is no fixed formula and the analytic strategy much depends on a 
researcher’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, along with the sufficient 
presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations. Given 
that a multiple comparative case study is the chosen method for this reserach, the 
‘constant comparative method’ will be adopted in data analysis.  
 
Ragin (1987) suggested three basic steps in following this strategy. First, the investigator 
searches for underlying similarities and differences among the cases; second, the 
similarities and differences identified are shown to be relevant to the phenomenon of 
interest; and third, on the basis of similarities and differences identified, the investigator 
formulates a general explanation. In this process, the initial theoretical notions serve as 
guides in the examination of causally relevant similarities and differences, and the 
comparison provides the key to understanding, explaining and interpreting diverse 
outcomes, therefore, a comparative case-oriented strategy is both holistic and 
interpretative in its approach to analysing data. This process of interpretive inquiry was 
summarised by Taylor and Bogdan (1984:126) as “continually comparing specific 
incidents in the data, the researcher refines these concepts, identifies their properties, 
explores their relationship to one another, and integrates them into coherent explanatory 
model”. According to Thomas (2016:205), “the basic principle governing the process of 
constant comparison is that you emerge with themes that capture or summarise the 
essence of your data”. The next step is ‘theme mapping’ (Thomas, 2016: 207), which 
allows you to present in diagram forms the ways in which themes may interrelate.  
 
This allows me to develop an innovative way to present and analyse the data collected. 
Inspired by Yin’s (2014:135) list of methods of manipulations, including putting 
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information into different arrays; making a matrix of categories and placing the evidence 
within such categories; creating data displays in flow charts and other graphics; and 
juxtaposing the data from different interviews, I have come up with a strategy of first 
charting the global cultural terrain of struggle by following the theoretical propositions of 
cultural hegemony, Orientalism, knowledge and power nexus. It is these theoretical 
propositions that have shaped my research questions and data collection, and they 
therefore also outlined my analytic priorities. Detailed design is delineated in Chapter 
Three, which is the conflated data presentation, analysis and discussions. Chapters Four 
and Five continue to apply these theoretical perspectives in unfolding the comparative 
case studies in two dimensions: Chapter Four will contrast the CI with its western 
counterparts, while Chapter Five will compare the data collected from different CIs 
operating in different parts of the world, from East Asia to Western Europe. Theories of 
nationalism and cultural boundary (Duara, 1996) will also be applied as analytical tools 
in this chapter. 
 
In terms of interview interpretation, Alvesson (2011:61) challenged the mainstream 
paradigm of detailed sorting, codification and categorization. He does not see 
procedures around data collection and processing as the key ingredient in good research, 
instead, he believes “critical questioning and reflection” are basic ingredients of qualified 
interpretation work, as “all interview material calls for critical interpretation and rather 
sophisticated ideas supporting such interpretation”, they shall not be automatically used 
as a solid building block for knowledge production.  
 
While fully acknowledging the points made, I am not entirely convinced that Alvesson’s 
novel approach should override the conventional one to interpreting interview accounts, 
so a balance is struck by combining the two: sifting, synthesizing, sorting, comparing, 
conceptualizing, mapping and categorizing data with an emphasis on being reflective. In 
the whole process, I remain committed to pondering the connections, unravelling 
meanings, relating them to contexts and experience, comparing and contrasting them 
while developing theoretical insights into the field data.  
 
At the technical level, all interviews were audio recorded which allows me to listen to 
them as many times as needed to produce full transcripts in an accurate manner. These 
interviews form the main source of primary data for this research, but they are examined 
bearing in mind that anecdotal evidence should be avoided. In order to protect the 
interviewees’ identities, the following coding system was used: they are grouped by the 




Table 2.2 below lists all the codes and their corresponding roles of the interviewees: 
 
Code Interviewee/group of interviewees represented 
UKD  Interviewees as CI Directors in the UK (4 altogether): 
 
UKD1 CI Director (from the British host university), interviewed in Chinese;  
UKD2 CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;  
UKD3 CI Director (from the British host university), interviewed in English;  
UKD4 CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;  
SKD  Interviewees as CI Directors in South Korea (4 altogether): 
 
SKD1 CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;  
SKD2 CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;  
SKD3 CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;  
SKD4 CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;  
UKSC  Interviewees as secondees to the CI in the UK (5 altogether) 
 
UKSC1 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKSC4 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKSC5 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
SKSC Interviewees as secondees to the CI in the South Korea (3 altogether)  
 
SKSC1 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
SKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
SKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKLH  Interviewees as locally hired by the CI in the UK (4 altogether) 
 
UKLH1 CI administrator locally hired by the host university, interviewed in English;  
UKLH2 CI administrator locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKLH3 CI teacher locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;  
UKLH4  CI teacher locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;  
SKLH  Interviewee as locally hired by the CI in the South Korea (1), interviewed 
in Chinese; 
FRD Interviewee as CI Director in France (1), interviewed in Chinese; 
 
MOD Interviewee as CI Director in Morocco (1), interviewed in Chinese; 
 




Director of Goethe Institute in Beijing, (1), interviewed in English, no code 
needed as he agreed to have his name revealed in the paper. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Codes for interviewees 
 
To bring this chapter to a close, the nine characteristics of qualitative research identified 
by Creswell (2007: 37-39) is used as a benchmark to summarise my research method. 
After careful comparisons, I can confirm this study fits all the characteristics of a 




Stages Characteristics of Qualitative Research This research 
Research 
design 
“emergent design” rather than tightly prefigured design √ 
Data 
collection 
“natural setting”, a source of data for close interaction √ 
“researcher as key instrument” in data collection √ 
“multiple data sources’                                       √ 
Data 
analysis 
“inductive data analysis” √ 
focus on “participants’ meanings”, their perspectives and 
their subjective views 
√ 
framing of human behaviour and belief through a social-
political/historical “contextual or cultural lens” 
√ 
Fundamentally “interpretive inquiry” - researchers 
reflects on his or her role 
√ 
“holistic view” of social phenomena √ 
 
Table 2.3 Characteristics of qualitative research 
Adapted from Table 3.1 Characteristics of Qualitative Research (Creswell, 2007:38) 
 
 
2.4 Originality of this research 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the body of literature and the CI-related research so far 
have offered little to facilitate the shaping of distinctive features of China’s cultural 
diplomacy, which is still in its embryonic phase both in terms of research and practice. 
This leads to the four elements of originality of this research:  
 
1) At the methodological approach level: Orientalism, cultural hegemony and 
nationalism are employed to construct an alternative framework to analyse the 
endeavours of China’s cultural diplomacy (so far it is mostly studied under the 
theoretical framework of soft power); 
 
2) At the research method level: multiple comparative case studies, both between the 
CI and its western counterparts, and between various CIs operating in different parts 
of the world, are used to evaluate this global effort (so far the case studies are mostly 
focused in one country or one region); 
 
3) At the research finding level: the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy 
and the CI project are defined that no one has attempted so far;  
 
4) At the application level: the three questions concerning the practice of public 
diplomacy - what messages are sent under what circumstances, who received them, 
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and how the messages are interpreted (Melissen, 2005), are expanded to also 
considering who send the messages, how the messages are sent, and how these 
messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination, as the 
messages are not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that was preoccupied 
or even embedded with ‘other’ ideologies, and a receptor in a changing power 




This chapter began with a discussion about philosophical assumptions and research 
paradigms to determine the qualitative nature of this research and the rationale of 
adopting qualitative methods, then it moved on to descriptions of formulating a well-
reasoned and carefully-planned research design based on considered utilisation of 
‘multiple triangulations’. Benefits of cross validation are reaped by combining different 
data collection methods and different data sources as the weakness of each can be 
counterbalanced by the strength of other sources. The data profile of this research, 
composing multiple sources of documents, 25 interviewees from five different roles 
sharing their insights and experiences at nine CIs in five different countries, and 
observations carried out over a period of six years, confirms that both the completeness 
and confirmation functions of triangulation are important for this research, which was 
further triangulated by the use of multiple case studies and employment of multiple 
theoretical frameworks.  
 
With the research design in place, the chapter then explained in detail how cases were 
selected, how data were collected, how the new analytical framework was applied to 
data analysis through charting a global cultural terrain of struggle to demonstrate the 
theoretical research findings, and how a comparative study of the CI with its western 
counterparts, as well as a comparative study of various CIs operating in Western Europe 
and East Asia are expected to modify and fine-tune the inductive statements, which will 
function as a definition of the distinctive features of China’s Cultural diplomacy and the 
CI project. To conclude, this chapter drew a road map to delineate the logical flow of the 
research design and its implementation for the whole thesis. The multiple triangulation 
strategy, particularly the application of multiple theoretical frameworks to data analysis, 
and the comparative case studies improve the validity of the cross-case conclusions. 
Meanwhile, the unique research design and the different outputs this thesis will generate 






Charting the Terrain of Struggle for China’s Cultural Diplomacy  




As discussed in the Literature Review, the ‘soft power’ concept is incompatible with the 
very purpose of cultural diplomacy and lacks a historical perspective in locating the ‘root 
cause’ of China’s problems, which is a complication co-produced by vestiges of 
Orientalism, Western cultural hegemony and the power-knowledge nexus; it also fails to 
show a holistic view of the global cultural terrain where China’s cultural diplomacy is 
launched into. Therefore, a more sophisticated approach based on both theoretical 
reflections and empirical investigations is needed to reveal the actual configurations 
underlying the ‘power struggles’ going on in the global cultural terrain. This chapter 
adopts the new analytical framework to contextualise the operations of the CIs by 
focusing on the intercultural interplays between the two sides: the projecting side and 
the receiving side in terms of cultural diplomacy practice; and the hegemonic side and 
counter-hegemonic side in terms of the current terrain conditions. This approach can be 
successfully applied only if we first unpack some of the conceptual apparatus around it, 
including struggle, power, hegemony and war of position.  
 
3.1 Overview: some key concepts and the roadmap 
 
A good starting point would be the core concepts of power and struggle. As Foucault 
(1982:793) pointed out, every relationship between forces is a power relation, with 
resistance to power as part of the exercise of power. But when the currently hegemonic 
side holds more power over ‘the others’, it can wield its power to ‘manufacture consent’ 
in Gramsci’s words (1971), who also argued that although hegemony is formed through 
‘consent’, it is constantly readjusted and re-negotiated, as there will always be a 
counter-hegemonic struggle. Where there is hegemony, there is resistance, and this is 
a two-way process: while the counter-hegemonic side will be engaged in ‘a war of 
position’, another Gramscian term referring to the cultural struggle of much longer 
duration and complexity to gain positions of influence that can develop counter-
hegemony, the hegemonic side will resist any emerging new forces that could challenge 
its position. In the case of the CI, its rapid expansion was quickly identified by the 





Foucault (1982) has further argued that knowledge impregnated in power is no longer 
an objective reflection of truth, but is presented and accepted as truth with power in 
practice, just as Orientalism is about the Occidental using its interpretation as 
knowledge (impregnated in power) to represent the Oriental. In Foucault’s (1982:795) 
eyes, there are three types of struggles: against forms of domination, against forms of 
exploitation, and against forms of subjectivity. This chapter will employ these concepts 
as frameworks, and the abundant triangular data collected as ‘bricks’ to construct a 
three-dimensional view of the ‘terrain of struggle’ where the CI is placed: against 
Western cultural domination, and against subjectivity of the modern day reincarnation 
of Orientalism. It will also use Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of position’ to examine China’s 
movements to develop counter-hegemony in this terrain. To this end, the following four 
steps will be taken:  
 
1) Framing the broader context where all stakeholders can be located; 
 
2) Giving a full representation of the various actors holding different positions in this 
terrain, i.e. Hanban and the Chinese government, the CI directors and staff from both 
the home and host institutions, the China-related scholars (both working with and 
those refusing to work with the CI), media from China and the host country, the 
general public including students of the CI as the direct target audiences of China’s 
cultural diplomacy.  
 
3) Charting the terrain into hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides by employing the 
key concepts from the Literature Review, e.g. Said’s Orientalism, Foucault’s 
knowledge-power nexus, Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ and the constant struggle for 
hegemony, to unpack the positions of all forces, and analyse where their 
perspectives are coming from and grounded; 
 
4) Examining the dynamic interactions among various players in the terrain by placing 
the interactants’ perspectives at the core while analysing the data, with a focus on 
confrontations between the two sides of ‘hegemony’ and ‘counter-hegemony’.  
 
3.2 Step one: Framing the broader context in which the terrain of struggle sets 
 
In the Literature Review, both the international and domestic contexts in which China is 
endeavouring to reshape its image are examined to achieve an in-depth understanding 
of both the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, and the vehicle and agent that it 
employs to achieve this end. To recap the key purposes of public diplomacy, it intends to 
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‘influence citizens of other countries’ (Edmund Gullion, 1965), to ‘create a desired result 
that is directly related to a government’s foreign policy objectives’ (McClellan, 2004), or 
to ‘achieve the desired geopolitical aims of the sponsor’ (Osgood & Etheridge, 2010). As 
a subset of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy focuses on ‘fostering mutual 
understanding’ through communication and respect between the cultures involved, 
based on a sounder understanding of respective values and a reduced susceptibility to 
stereotypes (Cummings, 2003).  
 
From these definitions, we can see that cultural diplomacy in its hybrid nature involves 
interactions between two sides at different levels: one side tries to influence the general 
public of the other side, but because it is meant to serve a geopolitical or foreign policy 
aim in the long run, and particularly when the cultural programmes are government 
sponsored, the receiving side may also get other agents involved such as media and 
academia, who may question, suspect and even resist this kind of influence, or redefine 
this influence with their own interpretations, especially when the cultures and values on 
both sides are not held as compatible equals. While this ‘inequality’ may be the very 
reason for the projecting side to be engaged in cultural diplomacy, it may also be the 
very reason why the receiving side wants to counter that influence - both the hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic sides want to counter the cultural and value influence from the 
‘other side’ before mutual understandings can be reached. Thus we can well imagine the 
practice field of cultural diplomacy is actually a ‘terrain of struggle’ for this influence. 
There are various actors of different levels at play in this terrain from both sides, and to 
add to the complexity is that each group of actors were already influenced, to a different 
extent, by the pre-existing ‘isms’ in their perceptions: Orientalism, Universalism, Cultural 
pluralism, Communism and Nationalism.  
 
Like the natural terrain, the cultural terrain is also historically determined. In the long 
course of history, we have witnessed the shaping and changing positions of different 
civilisations, and China has been the oldest continuous civilisation on earth today. It has 
survived four millennia’s vicissitudes, from being a sophisticated culture enjoying the 
world’s admiration in the 17th and 18th century, to the decline in the 19th century, which 
eventually gave way to the ‘century of humiliations’ (Kaufman, 2010) from the mid-19th 
to the mid-20th century when China was defeated by Western gunboats, its culture was 
also degraded into being the inferior other. However, perhaps a much less recognised 
reversal is when this inferior position was twisted by Orientalism into being opposite to 
the Occidental: the Oriental was deemed to be everything the Occidental is not, while 
the Occidental represents all the universal values. This reversal means Chinese culture 
was considered inferior not because China was defeated, but because it represents all 
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the qualities of a mortal danger to the rest of the world. The growing revulsion Chinese 
culture received culminated in the ‘yellow peril’ stigma, which revealed the hidden logic 
shrouded in Orientalism and its legacy lingering today: being different implies being 
decayed and even evil, and thus grants legitimacy for one side and breeds hostility 
against the other side. I do not think this legacy is going away anytime soon and argue 
that they are hidden as this ‘conversion’ has become a form of ‘knowledge’ that is 
consolidated through power of discourse. This power is invisible when it forms a 
hegemony, which is taken as the normal state, thus the general public do not see any 
injustice in this ‘terrain of struggle’ where the other groups are despised and oppressed.  
 
The unchallenged hegemony of seeing the world as ‘the West and Rest’ means this 
injustice just continued. During the Cold War period that ensued in the mid-20th century, 
this perception of China as the Other was revived into being a ‘red threat’ as China was 
again deemed to be in the opposite camp, that of Communism. The end of the Cold War 
with the collapse of the former Soviet Union seems to have consolidated the Western 
belief of Universalism, as alleged by Fukuyama (1989: 4) that "What we may be 
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of 
post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government". In a sense, if a general Western ‘culture hegemony’ was 
formed in the post-colonial world, a more specific ‘ideology hegemony’ was also formed 
in the post-Cold War era. This modern reincarnation of Orientalism echoes the evolution 
of China’s image from being the ‘cultural other’ into being the ‘ideological other’. 
 
Of course, the world continues to change. In direct response to Fukuyama’s The End of 
History (1989), Samuel P. Huntington wrote a 1993 essay, The Clash of Civilizations, 
which was then expanded into a 1998 book, in which Huntington came up with the notion 
that ‘the clash of civilisations’ would be the new framework in understanding “the 
remaking of world order”, claiming that culture would replace ideology to become the 
new defining factor in global politics, which has “evolved into multipolar and multicultural 
for the first time in human history” (Huntington, 1998: 2). The significance of this ‘new 
world order’ cannot be underestimated, as it made history, yet it is important to note that 
‘multi’ cultural just means more than one, it does not necessarily mean an equal position 
among the ‘multi’ players, actually, it is far from being an equal distribution of power and 
influence among these ‘multi-cultures’ coexisting in this terrain. Therefore, it is important 
to pinpoint that the claim made by cultural pluralism is not just an end to Universalism, 
but a beginning to shift inter-cultural relations from superior-inferior to a counter balance 




However, this can only happen when the counter-hegemonic cultures can gain more 
power. Foucault (1980) explains that in this ‘power cycle’, discourse is created and 
perpetuated by those who have the power, and the discourse created by them will 
constantly reaffirm their position as the centre of power. In other words, the hegemonic 
discourse functions like ‘trenches’: it keeps the hegemon in the powerful position, and 
keeps the others off at the periphery or in inferior positions. They may change the 
‘rhetoric’ to build the trenches as there is a changing wind in the discourse about all ‘isms’: 
when Orientalism is losing ground to the discourse of cultural pluralism in the globalised 
world today, its effects are still lingering and actually revives itself in the discourse of anti-
Communism. While it is not politically correct to dismiss the ideal of cultural pluralism, 
people can still be openly vocal about anti-Communism, and the post-Cold War China is 
still seen as a Communist country, though this is more of an ‘ideological mask’ that the 
West has put over China’s face based on the same binary perceptions: the perpetuated 
polarisation mind-set of defining ideology of the ‘Other’ in relation to ‘Us’.  
 
Therefore, in this uneven terrain, what the hegemon is trying to do is still to consolidate 
the trenches and marginalise the ‘Other’, only under the disguise of a different rhetoric, 
but based on the same Orientalised understanding of the ‘ideological other’, without 
seeing that the Otherness is actually a ‘mask’ painted with their subjectivity and arbitrarily 
imposed on China, not the actual face of the real China that they failed, or rather, refused 
to see. Instead, they used the ‘mask’ to demonise China and used the hegemonic 
position in discourse to turn the ‘mask’ into ‘knowledge impregnated in power’ that 
became accepted as the true face of China over the time. Just as Foucault (1980) argued, 
discourse joins power and knowledge, and its power follows from the general public’s 
casual acceptance of the ‘reality’ with which they are presented: a reality that the 
culturally privileged Western elite produced a discourse of the ‘Other’ to reinforce its own 
power-knowledge equation. When one stays under the ‘mask’ for a long time, the ‘mask’ 
becomes part of one’s identity. Thus, one of the goals of China’s cultural diplomacy is to 
unveil the true face of China to the rest of the world.  
 
From the above we can see the historical movement that has shaped the terrain today, 
and the nature of the current relations and interactions between the two sides need to 
be understood in such historical context. Unlike the natural terrain, the cultural terrain is 
much more dynamic and ever-shifting, driven by all sides’ endeavours of cultural 
diplomacy, which in itself was a product of history when cultural factors were more and 
more recognised and used as a tool to win the war of position, therefore, the cultural 
terrain can be reshaped in a matter of decades, due to the dynamic relationships among 
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various forces at play. Gramsci had highlighted the constant nature of the fight for cultural 
hegemony in the 1930s: for the hegemonic side, the need to keep fighting to maintain its 
hegemonic position is made ever more pressing by the shifting new terrain marked by 
cultural pluralism, in which the counter-hegemonic side is fighting for an equal share of 
influence.  
 
There is also a domestic dimension that needs to be examined in this context frame - 
the role played by nationalism. As argued by Joseph Levinson (1968), the key transition 
to modernity in China was the move from culturalism to nationalism, which has been 
rejuvenated as the new ideology for contemporary China. As discussed in the Literature 
Review, the long-held mission to restore China’s ‘greatness’ since the birth of modern 
China has now been reflected in the domestic media ambience and highlighted in Xi 
Jinping’s new slogan of ‘realizing the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation’, announcing to its own people and the whole world China’s ambition to regain its 
position as a great power in the world. It clearly formed a strong domestic driving force 
for China to implement its cultural diplomacy, but the double-edged nature of nationalism 
also entails cultural resistance according to Guibernau (1996), which works both ways 
between the projecting side and the receiving side, another hidden force adding to the 
tension in this terrain of struggle.  
 
The above by and large describes the historical, international and domestic contexts for 
the current global cultural terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy has been launched into. 
The next section will take a closer look at the actor level for the CI in this terrain: who 
they are, which positions they take, and what roles they play.  
 
3.3 Step two: Giving a full representation of the various actors from different 
positions at play in this terrain 
 
This part will draw on the primary data collected in presenting the specific terrain of 
struggle for the CI by looking at all the stakeholders at play, including:  
 
 The Chinese government and Hanban;  
 The CI directors and staff, a joint force of host and home institution; 
 China-related scholars (both working with and those refusing to work with the CI);  
 The media (both in China and the host country);  
 The general public in host countries including students of the CI. 
 




Hanban, or the CI Headquarters, is registered as a non-profit organisation (NPO) with 
corporate status, but it is the Chinese government that covers all of the expenses for the 
CI headquarters and its work of expanding CI activities overseas, as they are considered 
to serve the national strategy of building cultural soft power. Hanban is just another 
typical example of China’s ‘state-run system’ - a legacy of central planning that is both 
envied and feared abroad. Its top management are all high-ranking government officials: 
the Chairperson of the Council of the CI Headquarters, Madame Liu Yandong, is also 
China’s Vice-Premier; and the Hanban Director, Madame Xu Lin, is also a Counsellor of 
the State Council (with the rank of vice-minister). Therefore, it would be no overstatement 
to describe it in actual fact as a quasi-governmental organisation that strongly reflects 
government views. In addition, according to its official website, Hanban actually 
comprises representatives from 12 state ministries and commissions, including the 
General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the State Press and Publications 
Administration, the State Council Information Office, the State Language Committee, the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and the State Development and 
Reform Commission.  
 
As stated on its official website, Hanban is “committed to providing Chinese language 
and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide, it goes all out in meeting the 
demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of cultural 
pluralism and the building of a harmonious world” (Hanban website). On its tenth 
anniversary, the CI received congratulatory letters from both President Xi Jinping and 
Premier Li Keqiang (2014 Special Issue of Confucius Institute), showing the highest level 
of national endorsement. Xi has commended CI’s contribution to creating “people-to-
people, heart-to-heart communication”, highlighting CI’s role as cultural diplomacy and 
generating soft power to win hearts and minds. Li mentioned the hope that the CI would 
carry forward the Confucian philosophy of ‘harmony without uniformity’, enhance 
civilisational diversity and the harmonious world, reaffirming the aim of China’s cultural 
diplomacy in advocating cultural pluralism.  
 
As discussed in the Literature Review, cultural pluralism is ‘a political response to the 
injustice done to members of formerly oppressed culture’ (Sabbagh, 2005:100), the 
direct guidance from the central government represents such a political response, 
wishing to re-shape the cross-cultural terrain into a more level playing field where they 
felt the Chinese culture has been ‘formerly oppressed’. At least, this represents the grand 
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vision held by the highest level of the Chinese government. Whether this is only 
theoretical or rhetorical is beyond the scope of discussion of this thesis, but what can be 
observed is that at the implementing level of Hanban, this grand vision was translated 
into a specific target of establishing 1,000 Confucius Institutes by 2020: Hanban Director 
Xu Lin confirmed in an interview that the CI aims to overtake the Alliance Francaise, 
which was founded in 1883 and has over 800 establishments all over the world, as large 
as the British Council, Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute combined. What Paris 
has managed to realize in 130 years will be achieved by Beijing in less than two decades. 
This target was announced with pride, as Hanban is confident of achieving it with both 
policy support and ample financial input from the ‘above’.  
 
Again, whether this target is achievable or not is unknowable, but what is clear is that 
even if the numbers are met, it does not mean the grand mission of cultural diplomacy 
would be accomplished. Meanwhile, what is also known is that Hanban is progressing 
well onto hitting the target. The latest statistics available by December 2015 indicated 
there are already 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius classrooms opened in 
134 countries and regions around the world (hanban website). However, this perfectly 
rounded figure is a bit dubious as artificial, or reminiscent of the ‘catch up mentality’ in 
Mao’s 1950s slogan of ‘overtaking the UK in 15 years’, a slogan brimmed with rising 
nationalism but triggered the disastrous Great Leap Forward, which tore up the very 
fabric of Chinese society and economy. 
 
If the competition in terms of steel output during the Great Leap Forward period was an 
indicator of a nation’s hard power, the CI’s competition today against its Western 
counterparts is argued as a race to build a nation’s soft power. When there were 
comments about CIs being exported faster than China’s high speed trains, Madame Liu 
Yandong, Vice-Premier and Chairperson of the Council of the CI Headquarters, simply 
used the new nickname of ‘soul high speed train’ to refer to the CI in her speech for the 
tenth anniversary. This analogy was actually used by Shambaugh (2013a) in criticising 
China’s unsophisticated approach to building soft power as constructing high-speed rail 
- by investing money and expecting to see development. Of course, soft power cannot 
be built this way; it may even hinder soft power. 
 
A historical lesson should be learned from the Great Leap Forward: even economic 
power cannot be measured just by one single dimension of steel output, it is simply 
dilettante to measure soft power by the number of CIs. However, both the Methods of 
Evaluating a Model CI in Europe (see Appendix 3) and CI of the Year set a series of 
numerical thresholds: How many students were enrolled? How many students sat the 
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HSK test? How many people participated in the China Day/CI event? These quantifiable 
measures of outputs tell us nothing about the impact: Does the student enrolled in a 
taster session continue to study Chinese? Does the number of candidates doing HSK 
show their better understanding of China? Does participating in a China Day mean any 
internalised knowledge? Does enjoying Chinese food and the chopsticks activity 
translate into a change of attitude towards contemporary China? Obviously, the answers 
cannot be found in those specious numbers, but as told by UKLH2 during the interview, 
“I think Hanban is still number-driven, they just want to know how many activities have 
been carried out in how many schools” (Appendix 10). UKLH3 admitted that although 
their UKD was awarded an individual prize by Hanban for his outstanding work, “we will 
never be awarded a ‘model CI’, as our student number is not that big” (Appendix 10). 
UKD2 also expressed his concern that the CI tends to go a bit “too far, too fast”, because 
“this suits the taste of the Chinese decision makers: they want to see things happen 
quickly. It is the Chinese speed” (Appendix 10).   
 
This number-driven and speed-proud mentality risks rendering the CI into a kind of vanity 
project. During the interviews, many Chinese Directors (UKD2, UKD4 and SKD1) have 
mentioned it as a ‘box to tick’: the Chinese university wants the CI as a proof of 
‘internationalisation’, as this has become one of the most distinctive indicators for 
university prestige. However, once this box is ticked, little attention is paid to what is 
going on in these CIs, and UKD2 put it more specifically: “The home institution only cares 
about this result to show their achievement and get the ¥200,000 matching fund, but 
does not care much about the process and quality of the end product” (Appendix 10). 
There are also cases of setting up a CI to simply tick the box of ‘Yes, we have one’: in 
China, there is a vertical line of management between the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
and universities, as UKD4 disclosed: “in a way, we were entrusted with such a task by 
the MOE and are obliged to carry it out as a way of supporting the Ministry’s work” 
(Appendix 10). 
 
To sum up, as a key actor in this terrain, the Chinese government has a clear vision and 
ambition to promote cultural pluralism. It is communicated as a national strategy with 
abundant financial support channelled down to the next level, while Hanban as the 
implementer at the forefront, tends to reduce the vision somehow to building more CIs 
as a measurement of its success, counting the number of flags in the world map as 
China’s increased soft power. What needs to be measured more is the impact produced 
by these CIs, whose day-to-day activities are delivered in the target country by a joint 




3.3.2 The CI directors and staff, a joint force of host and home institutions 
 
As explained in 1.5.2, a typical CI’s team is composed of a ‘foreign Director’ appointed 
by the host institution, an office administrator (or two) paid by the host institution, a 
Chinese Co-Director, and a number of tutors sent by the Chinese home institution and 
paid by Hanban. Another important mechanism is that each CI has a Board of Advisors 
with members of the host institution, usually its president and professors as decision 
makers. The Director from the host institution also takes the leadership role in approving 
CI plans, whereas the Chinese Co-Director is mainly responsible for implementing the 
plan and communicating with Hanban. In essence, the CI functions like a joint venture, 
serving a common goal but also different interests vested by the two partner institutions. 
As UKD1 commented, “It is fair to say Yes, both partner institutions have common 
understanding of the CI’s goal in the main, as it was actually written into the agreement 
and it will add to the reputation of both universities, however in reality, each side has its 
own agendas and expectations” (Appendix 10).  
 
For the Chinese home institutions, the CI is often used as a flag or poster for 
internationalisation and an opportunity to travel abroad. One MRD stated quite candidly 
that “the choice of having a CI in Morocco is to respond to the university’s grand strategy 
of internationalisation in different continents, and Morocco is chosen as our presence in 
Africa” (Appendix 10). UKD4 gave a very revealing answer about the three-point 
mandates he was given by the home institution president before he left for the post: 
Number one, do not get into any trouble (political misstep or diplomatic faux pas); 
Number two, nurture a good relationship with the partner institution; Number three, try to 
do a good job for Hanban. This comes as the last point. This is an honest reflection of 
the priorities from the perspectives of the home institution. A common theme in the 
Directors’ pre-departure trainings is the teaching of Zhou Enlai, China’s first premier and 
foreign minister, “there is no small issue in foreign affairs” (“外事无小事”, waishi wu 
xiaoshi). With such admonishments, it is understandable why Chinese directors tend to 
be overcautious and lack initiative in their role.  
 
For the overseas host, a common theme is their expectations of using the CI as a 
platform to establish or expand their connections in various fronts with ‘China’. It is 
interesting to note that all the interviewees have mentioned the whole country of China 
as a subject they want to interact and connect with, not just their partner universities. 
The CI was used in a way as a proof of connections with China and a commitment to 
developing long-term relations. In this sense, having a CI on campus is also a bonus 
point for these host institutions to leverage more benefits beyond the Chinese 
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programme. This is particularly the case for CIs established in a relatively small city. The 
FRD in such a situation mentioned the value of the CI in the eyes of the local city council 
as a platform to build and expand relationships with China, the rising economic power. 
But sometimes, this may mean the CI will only serve a transitional purpose, like at 
Stockholm University, who terminated its contract with Hanban in 2014 because “today 
we have a completely different level of academic exchange with China, which makes this 
collaboration redundant” (Zhang, 2015: n.p.). There are other reasons behind this 
decision, which will be discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter Four.  
 
An interesting observation is the recurring theme among the answers to the question of 
the CI’s mission given by Chinese directors and secondees, they have all addressed the 
question ‘from the state perspective’ first: “to build a bridge for spreading Chinese culture, 
to open the information channel to foreigners who do not have enough understanding of 
China, and reduce the bias from the media” (UKD2); “to play a role as people-to-people 
diplomacy” (UKSC2), (Appendix 10). As explained earlier, Chinese home institutions are 
all directly under the auspices of MOE, which is also Hanban’s immediate superior in the 
hierarchy. The CI is a mission entrusted by MOE to Hanban to be accomplished through 
these home institutions, so in a sense, they are a ‘common interest community’, while 
host institutions and Hanban are ‘non-complete common interests entities’; more 
importantly, the state-run system may be very alien to and incompatible with the host 
institution system: the relationships between universities and governments are starkly 
different in China and most Western countries, where university autonomy is strongly 
upheld. It would be hard to imagine a British university management talking about 
‘serving the national interest’ in institutional partnerships. In this sense, the “interests are 
different in scale and character”, as argued by Sahlins (2013: n.p.): as an instrument of 
the Chinese government, Hanban wants to spread the influence of the Chinese state 
worldwide; by contrast, host institutions are concerned only with their parochial welfare 
as academic institutions.  
 
From the above we can see a gap between the overall mission and specific objectives 
of the CIs, as the mission is set by the government, while the objectives are set by the 
universities, who are self-interested entities. Sometimes, there are mismatches, leaving 
the CI caught in the middle. For example, UKLH1 complained about the two partner 
institutions not “sharing the same understanding about the CI’s goals, as the host 
institution hopes that the CI should contribute to income generation and put a lot of 
pressure on the CI, which has nothing to do with the original intention of setting up a CI” 
(Appendix 10). There are also cases when these ‘inconsistent goals’ have eventually led 
to a CI closure: the story of Penn State University CI will be looked at in more details in 
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section 3.5. The tension caused by different administrative structures and cultures of the 
host and home institutions will also be explored further in section 3.5, which deals with 
the dynamic interactions among the players.  
 
To summarise, as a player stationed in ‘the receiver’s side’, the CI is a joint force of both 
sides, we can see there are common grounds for both partners, but also different angles 
to consider their own individual interests. The common ground is to provide Chinese 
language programme and introduce Chinese culture; the angle from the home institution 
is more for the international face of the university, and gaining work credits for the MOE, 
while for the host institution, it may serve as leverage to better position themselves in 
gaining more from China’s economic rise. Between the two levels of government and 
institutions, we can see a contrast between long-term strategies against relatively short-
term moves. Also, CIs come in many forms: a less prestigious university with a smaller 
budget would see the CI as a good trade-off for serving its own students’ needs while 
recruiting more students from China; while more elite institutions feel they can make a 
deal, as Hanban wants to borrow their prestige to improve the CIs’ credibility. Therefore, 
it is fair to argue that though all CIs serve the same purpose all around the world, that 
common goal is spelt into different specific objectives by the different players in this 
terrain as they are coming from different positions, which is further reflected in the 
different portfolios of their provisions. These will be elaborated in more details in section 
4.3 of Chapter Four. 
 
3.3.3 China-related scholars (both working with the CI and those refusing to work 
with the CI)  
 
Foucault (1980) has explained in his power of discourse theory that power is constituted 
through accepted forms of knowledge and ‘truth’, which are reinforced (and redefined) 
constantly through the education system, the media, and the flux of ideologies. Gramsci 
was more explicit in pointing that “knowledge is not an established body of data and 
ideas possessed by a culturally superior entity; rather, knowledge is itself the product of 
the ‘conversation’ between teacher and student, and ‘truth’ is understood as the inter-
subjective’ product of the interaction” (Fontata, 1993: 151). Therefore, a change of 
China’s cultural image may only happen when a new counter-discourse begins to gain 
access to the centre of legitimate knowledge. China-related scholars are academics 
standing at this very centre of knowledge and very sensitive to this new discourse, they 
follow closely the Chinese government rhetoric, or in most cases, the English translation 
of the Chinese speeches, and based on their own interpretations, their perceptions and 




Many American professors have sounded alarm at such counter-discourse as 
‘ideological infiltration’. For example, Chicago University professor emeritus in 
Anthropology Marshall Sahlins devoted a chapter to ‘Official Chinese Views on the 
Politics of Culture and Confucius Institutes’ in his book Confucius Institutes, Academic 
Malware (2015), he collected many government speeches, including the one given by 
Liu Yunshan, Ministry of Propaganda in 2010:  
 
Coordinate the efforts of overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a 
favourable international environment for us…. With regard to key issues that 
influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international 
propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, 
and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad…We should 
do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centres and Confucius 
Institutes. (Sahlins, 2015: 6) 
 
Wang Gengnian, Director of China Radio International, in a 2011 speech said: “we should 
quietly plant the seeds of our ideology in foreign countries, we must make good use of 
our traditional culture to package our socialist ideology” (Sahlins, 2015: 8). 
 
Words such as ‘propaganda’ and ‘socialist ideology’ are used as evidence to show 
China’s intention through expanding CIs overseas, particularly because the CI’s 
government background may ‘reduce academic discourse’ on campus. The most 
sensational alarmist talk was from American socialist Mosher (2012), who dubbed the CI 
‘a Trojan horse’, seeing this external ‘other’ now becoming part of a living community of 
‘us’. Such remarks were refuted by other American scholars, such as Paul Smith, a 
professor for area and languages studies at Harverford College, who worried that the 
frustration of US’s own ability to fund academic projects eroded by the economic 
downturn could “fuel unproductive resentments against China” (Redden, 2012, n.p.). 
There are also quite strong counter-arguments from other China scholars, such as 
Nakagawa (2011b: n.p.) who has concluded after speaking to a range of people 
(including China scholars, journalists and CI directors) that “I’ve seen little to support the 
notion of Confucius Institutes as ominous propaganda”. Two Taiwanese scholars, Yang 
and Hsiao (2012: n.p.), have put forward their strong doubts that the CI-related activities 
are combining cultural transmission with purposeful, explicit propaganda, and believe 
one “may not argue arbitrarily that CIs must be involved in intelligence collection or 
operating with specific political intent as indicated by some criticisms”. This is supported 
by Robert Saunders (2006: n.p.), an assistant professor of history and politics at the 
State University of New York: “the Chinese government has reaped so much benefit from 
the CI, that doing anything that might jeopardize their image and their acceptance by 




As a matter of fact, many posts of ‘foreign Directors’ are taken by such pro-China 
scholars, and most CIs have China scholars as members of the board, such as Tim 
Wright, professor of Chinese Studies and executive board member of the Confucius 
Institute at Sheffield University. He was quoted to say, “the Chinese government is well 
aware of the danger of the CI being perceived in this way. We are given more or less a 
free rein to do what we want. Someone who wished to undermine China might not be 
welcomed at the institute, but then the British Council didn’t exactly put on talks about 
the IRA” (Shepherd, 2007). 
 
The most heated debate amongst academics was started after Professor Marshall 
Sahlins published an article China U in November 2013, which received a rebuttal from 
Professor Edward McCord of George Washington University. Both scholars work on 
campuses with CIs, but McCord believes CIs are “hardly a threat to academic freedom” 
and we should “let a hundred flowers bloom”, while Sahlins believes CIs are “academic 
malware” (China File, 2014). The published “Debate Over Confucius Institutes” was 
intensified after the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) submitted a 
report in June 2014, calling on American universities to rethink their relationship with CIs. 
The debates were published in two parts on China File in July 2014, focusing on “the 
costs and benefits of having a CI on a university campus, the economic forces at play, 
and the role of China in university life more broadly”. These debates involved far more 
scholars (24 in total), but only a handful of them had first-hand experience with the CI. 
Their contributions embodied how divided their stands are: voices can be heard from 
both ends of the spectrum, which sets the conflict-ridden context in which the CIs are 
operating and seeking to realise their goals. 
 
One important observation here is that most of the counter-arguments come from people 
who have either done research, or worked with/for the CI first hand, while those accusing 
the CI of being a propaganda tool are those who either shut the doors to CI, or judged it 
based on speculative thoughts or media reports. McCord (2014: n.p.) has pointed out 
that the greatest problem with the “anti-CI literature is that it often leaps from suspicions 
and concerns to a conclusion of fact”. Said has pointed that (1996: 238) “nothing is easier 
for people to deal with something that is different than to portray it as dangerous and 
threatening and to reduce it ultimately to a few clichés”. Communism is such a cliché for 
China. In commenting on these criticisms of the CI, UKLH1 has expressed her frustration 
that these are not coming from people who have connections with the CI, nor students 
or the general public, but “professors who refuse to have any dealings with the CI and 
just believes that CI’s remit is to promote Communism”. This is obviously an 
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oversimplified sense of causation that seeks to de-legitimise any opposing perspective 
by putting on an ideological label. However, a point made by Professor Heilmann at the 
University of Trier in Germany, also the founding director of a China think tank in Berlin, 
Mercator Institute for China Studies, is worth special mentioning. He thinks that, overall, 
the CI issue looks far less ideologically charged from a European perspective, and that 
the overtones of great power rivalry with China that appear to drive parts of the U.S. 
debate about CIs, are mostly missing in Germany and the rest of Europe.  
 
To sum up, the China-related scholars are a special group of elites from academia that 
can be called people who are at the very centre of the centre of knowledge. They can 
play the role of opinion leaders, but it is common to see them take completely opposing 
stands in even the same institution, and there are divergent views concerning the CI’s 
ideological overtone across the globe. Most importantly, their debates tend to be 
highlighted by another influential player in this terrain, namely, the media, which will be 
the focus of the next section.  
 
3.3.4 The media (both from China and the host country);  
 
It is known to all that no matter how objective one media outlet claims to be, each serves 
its own purposes and interests, in Hartley’s words (2011:214), all communication “has 
some sort of spin”. As quoted earlier, Foucault (1980) believed the media was another 
means by which knowledge-power nexus was reinforced. It is one of the most effective 
tools for reinforcing power and hegemony, a very powerful player in shaping people’s 
minds through the languages it uses, the stories it tells, and the images it conjures up. 
As clearly argued by Manzenreiter (2010:43):  
 
Responsibility for the misperception is also with the mainstream media that are 
playing a leading role in the fabrication of a master narrative on the natural order of 
states and societies that position the West at the pinnacle of human civilisation. 
Rather than preparing the space for a dialectic exploration of alternative modes and 
views, the media contribute to the reinforcing of national stereotypes. 
 
Therefore, the “improvement of the international media environment and gaining more 
power of discourse” are listed among the main aims of China’s public diplomacy. To 
achieve these goals, an internationalisation campaign of Chinese state media was also 
sponsored by the government: Xinhua news agency, CCTV and China Daily all received 
vast sums of money to ‘go out’ and explain China’s point of view to the world (Zhang, 
2012b). Barr (2011:45) provided a statistical comparison in terms of government funding: 
 
China has committed US$ 6.5 billion for the overseas expansion of its main 
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media organisations. A little comparison may help put this into perspective: the 
USA currently spends about US$750 million annually on international 
broadcasting, whilst UK funding for BBC World Service runs at less than 
US$400 million per annum.  
 
What sets Chinese media apart from its Western counterparts is that they are state-run, 
and subject to the leadership of a number of competent ministries, including the CPC 
Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, the General Administration of Press 
and Publication, and the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV. They hold the power 
of appointment of key staff, resource allocation and final approval of content. Therefore, 
it is not an overstatement that the Chinese media are the conduits of government’s voice. 
What is more, the domestic rhetoric is rather explicit and open about media control, which 
is often reported in English. For example, the following remarks were made by Li 
Changchun, head of the CPC Propaganda Department from 2002-2013, in a speech to 
the All-China Journalists Association in October 2011: 
 
The journalist front must have a high sense of political responsibility and historical 
mission, deeply studying, propagating and implementing the spirit of the Sixth 
Plenum of the 17th Central Committee in order to promote the great advancement 
and flourishing of socialist culture (cited in Hughes, 2014: 61). 
 
After Xi Jinping came to power, an even tighter control of state media can be observed, 
first from his tour of the top three state-run media outlets in February 2016, when a sign 
of “the central television’s family name is the Party” was displayed to welcome him (Wong, 
2016), then from his address to the All-China Journalists' Association and winners of 
China News Award and Changjiang Taofen Award, the country's top two journalism 
awards, in November 2016: 
 
He urged the country's journalists to follow "the correct political direction," conform 
to the CPC Central Committee, adhere to the Marxist view of journalism, stick to the 
standpoint of the Party and the people and uphold socialism with Chinese 
characteristics (Xinhua, 2016). 
 
Under such media ambience, a blunder would be an accident waiting to happen. The 
most classic example was when Li Changchun was quoted in The Economist in 2009 
that the CI was “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”—a statement 
that has been frequently seized upon by critics as evidence of the CI’s politicised mission. 
Then in a plenary session in October 2011, the CCP Central Committee has published 
a key resolution on promoting the development of “socialist culture” in which the CIs were 
described (along with the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television) as part of 
the drive to “create new methods of propaganda to strengthen our international right to 
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speak, respond to foreign concerns, improve international society’s understanding of our 
basic national conditions, to display our country’s image of civilisation, openness and 
progress” (cited in Hughes, 2014: 55). These open rhetoric may explain why the CI was 
often associated with ‘propaganda’ in many media headlines all over the world. For 
example, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has openly opposed the establishment of 
CIs in universities, arguing that they were nothing more than a Chinese design to widen 
influence by ‘using culture as a propaganda tool’ (Times of India, 2009). Even neutral 
Swiss press carried such headlines as ‘Propaganda tool of the People’s Republic’ and 
‘Chinese culture centres spark propaganda fears’ when reporting the opening of the 
Geneva Confucius Institute in 2012.  
 
Besides, the official rhetoric for the CI’s goal is to give the world a ‘correct’ understanding 
of China: in UKD1’s words, “to enhance British understanding of China, and reduce the 
estrangement and bias from the media” (Appendix 10). But the question is: can this be 
done by a medium that is also biased? Hartig (2015:252), a German researcher on the 
CI, argues that “CIs do not present the ‘real’ China to the world, but rather a ‘correct 
version’ of it, which limits their ability to project China’s strategic narratives effectively”. 
This correct version, as described by Perry Link in the afore-mentioned ‘Debate Over 
Confucius Institute’, is an “overly rosy portrait of Chinese society”, “not only smaller than 
the whole but crucially different in nature” (China File, 2014: n. p.). When the Chinese 
government aims at unveiling the ‘true face’ of China to the rest of the world, it is actually 
using cultural diplomacy as plastic surgery to show a ‘beautified face’ of China without 
realising that there is any problem of doing so. In Guttenplan’s words (2012: n.p.), “they 
want to change the perception of China – to combat negative propaganda with positive 
propaganda”, but such thoughts are problematic: there is no such thing as ‘positive 
propaganda’; it will only meet with negative reception if it is identified as ‘propaganda’. 
As Dr. Robert Kuhn, a US public intellectual and a long-time adviser to the Chinese 
government as well as a columnist for China Daily, explained, when the information 
communicated is 100% good and positive, the credibility rate with American audiences 
is zero. In other words, ‘rich’ information can still create a ‘poor’ image. On the other hand 
however, it also shows the legacy of seeing China as the ‘ideological other’: almost a 
knee-jerk reaction that anything ‘they’ produce is deemed to be propaganda that must 
be resisted.   
 
One necessary explanation here is that the Chinese translation may take partial blame, 
as the Chinese word ‘xuanchuan’ is a neutral one meaning ‘publicity’, it has been 
routinely translated as ‘propaganda’ in the Cold War era and was kept in use till today. 
But English translation has become such a critically important issue in the globalised 
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media world today, the awkward English version offered by many of the Chinese 
government websites and news outlets often lends itself as a hilt to be used against 
China. For example, in a speech given by Li Changchun at the CI Headquarters, he was 
quoted saying “using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks 
reasonable and logical.” In attending a national conference on propaganda and ideology, 
he was again quoted as saying “they must vigorously sing the praises of the 
achievements of the CCP, socialism, the reform policy, and [the glories of] the great 
motherland” (cited in Lam, 2009: n.p.). 
 
A recent example shows that this kind of ‘eulogy’ style domestic report could have a fatal 
effect on a CI partnership: the only official reason given by the University of Chicago for 
suspending negotiations with Hanban concerning the CI agreement is that one domestic 
medium, the Jiefang Daily, disclosed in an admiring and flattering tone that “the 
University panicked at Xu Lin’s firm stance after receiving her personal letter and phone 
call, and immediately agreed to keep the CI open” (Wang, 2014, n.p.). This actually 
pushed the result to the exact opposite: the ongoing negotiations were immediately 
aborted and decisions were made by the university to terminate the contract. This is 
obviously a result Hanban regrets, probably more so to know the trigger, they would 
never imagine such a local media report written in Chinese and meant entirely for 
domestic readers, would fall under the scrutiny of the American media. This suggests an 
urgent need for domestic media to develop an awareness of the ‘sans frontiers’ nature 
of its audience in this globalised and digitised world. 
 
As for the Western media influence, UKD3 interviewed commented that “information in 
the West about China is often filtered and selected by journalists who know little about 
China or have a biased view of the country” (Appendix 10). Evidence of this kind of 
selective reports can be found from secondary data: the only two universities that hosted 
a CI and cancelled the Dalai Lama’s visit were repeatedly reported as evidence of the 
CI’s infringement on academic freedom: the University of North Carolina (in 2009) and 
the University of Sydney (in 2013) (reported by BBC, Bloomberg, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, etc). In contrast, a number of other universities hosting a CI have all invited Dalai 
Lama to visit and give a speech; these include the University of Stanford (October 2010), 
the University of Miami (October 2010), the California State University in Long Beach 
(May 2011) the University of Maryland (May 2013) and LSE (Jun 2014), just to name a 
few. Actually, Emory University has hosted the Dalai Lama a few times for a series of 
public and campus events, as he holds the title of Presidential Distinguished Professor 
there. The CIs in these universities were not involved in these activities, nor did they 
intervene or try to block such visits. Yet, these facts were never mentioned by the media 
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as counter-evidence to show that the CIs did not infringe on academic freedom. These 
show a clear ‘agenda-setting role’ (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) played by media by 
deliberate coverage of topics or events with the goal of influencing, and sometimes with 
the effects of swaying, public opinion.   
 
Similarly, there were reports about the University of Calgary being delisted as a 
recommended institution for Chinese students heading abroad after it awarded the Dalai 
Lama an honorary degree in February 2010 (reported by the Globe and Mail, CBC News). 
However, no western media ever bothered to point out that a number of other universities 
that also awarded honorary degrees to the Dalai Lama, such as UCLA, the University of 
Michigan, Emory University, Rutgers University and the University of Aberdeen, who all 
had a CI opened on their campus after the award of the degree. Their application to and 
recognition by the Ministry of Education was not affected by this incident at all. Actually, 
there are even a number of universities, including the University of Maryland, Miami 
University, and the University of Minnesota, which awarded the Dalai Lama an honorary 
doctorate after a CI had been set up on their campuses.  
 
Moreover, the termination of the CI agreements in 2015 with Chicago University, Penn 
State University, and the University of Stockholm have been played up all over the press 
as sensational news (reported by Reuters, the Economist, the Times High Education, 
New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, South China Morning Post, to name a few), 
yet the new opening of the 101st CI in the US following these incidents in February 2015 
at the University of California Santa Barbara did not appear in any major news outlet. 
There is no doubt that if it were another ‘closing down’, it would not fall off their radar. All 
the above incidents can serve as direct evidence of selective media reports, which is a 
form of ‘covert bias’, based on which sweeping accusations were made concerning the 
CI’s infringement of academic freedom.  
Of course, it is only fair to mention that on the other side of the coin, there are also 
different views and voices in the Western media. For example, the Guardian carried a 
report titled ‘Not a propaganda tool’ in 2007 (Shepherd); and in 2011, another article in 
The Economist stated that China “has been careful not to encourage these language 
centres to act as overt purveyors of the party’s political viewpoints, and little suggests 
they are doing so”. There were also more voices from the Chinese media outlets in 
English offering counter-arguments, such as the answer given in the Global Times article 
‘Why is Washington so scared of Confucius?’ (2012) is “the issue shows the US cultural 
confidence is not as strong as we thought. Only culturally weak countries have such 
sensitivity”. Then in 2015, following those CI closures, the China Daily USA carried an 
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article in response to the “chorus of concern”, stating that “Confucius Institutes are 
building bridges rather than Great Walls to share knowledge about the history, culture 
and language of a rising world power which has been in the shadows”(Watkins, 2015). 
The article also finished with a quote from Confucius: "Real knowledge is to know the 
extent of one's ignorance". However, as Anderson pointed out (2007: 84): 
Most newspaper readers are ‘pre-prejudiced’ in so far as they prefer to buy the 
newspaper that most suits their political viewpoint. From this point of view, the written 
and online news media most generally reflect and reinforce rather than re-shape 
their audience’s view of the world.  
 
It means the multiplied quantity of overseas distribution of the Chinese media do not 
necessarily mean the influence they exert also multiplied, as many are distributed 
through free circulations and do not get read or watched by the target audiences. Actually, 
in the report of The Soft Power 30, the lack of “political and press freedoms” were listed 
under the weakness of China’s soft power, while BBC was named among the pillars of 
British soft power, which was rated No. 1 in 2015: “Over 1700 foreign correspondents 
are based in the UK, and with a dynamic media market of its own, London is the global 
media capital” (The Soft Power 30 website). This shows the huge gap the role media 
plays in contributing to a country’s soft power. 
 
To sum up, the Chinese media in this global terrain still has only a limited role to play for 
various reasons including its propaganda and ‘eulogy’ style, and the English ‘language 
hegemony’ that dominates the international media landscape. Instead of helping the CI 
by offering counter-evidence of those ungrounded accusations, the Chinese media are 
often quoted as evidence of the CI’s official links and political overtone. The mainstream 
Western media still dominate the information order and are often pervaded with 
discourse portraying China as the ‘ideological other’, which was criticised by the Chinese 
media and government as ‘Cold War mentality’ (Ding, 2008; Zhang 1998; Zhang 2010). 
However, it is the media in the host country that are exerting direct influence on the main 
target audiences of China’s cultural diplomacy, the general public in host countries.  
 
3.3.5 The general public in host countries including students of the CI  
 
In a 2001 report produced by the China National Tourism Administration, it was 
mentioned that when China was promoted as a tourist destination, a frequently asked 
question is: “China is a socialist country, can American citizens travel to China?” (cited 
in Zheng, 2015: 100). Of course, the level of understanding/knowledge about China held 
by an average member of the ‘general public’ in the host country has improved 
tremendously in the past decades, but it is still lagging. As explained by UKSC2, “for 
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foreigners who have never been to China, their impression of the country is the one 
conveyed by the media, which is very tarnished in many countries” (Appendix 10). A 
common phenomenon is that tourists tend to look for the more ‘backward’ side of China 
as the ‘real’ China when they first visit, even when everything they see with their own 
eyes are real. For example, UKD1 said the highlight of the trip to China was ‘nights out 
on a bicycle to local areas’, a similar example was given by Hubbert (2014a) in her 
recounts of the ‘Chinese Bridge Summer Camp’ that “the night market with snacking on 
unidentified creatures roasted on a stick” was what they perceived to be a “form of 
Chinese authenticity”.  
 
UKLH1 elaborated this with an example:  
 
Most people in the local community have a completely outdated knowledge and 
understanding about China, their image of China is a country where farmers 
work in the field everywhere with no modern buildings and modern lifestyle, very 
poor and backward. What is even worse is those who have never been to China 
but thought they knew a lot about China. Most of their perceptions of China are 
based on media reports, such as about China’s one child policy and child 
trafficking, Tibet riots, etc, and use this as their judgement of the whole country. 
(Appendix 10) 
 
Or, as UKD1 said:  
 
For some people they based their whole understanding of China on the only 
book they’ve read – Wild Swans; as for contemporary China, again they based 
their knowledge on only one media report they’ve read or watched - about 
China’s environmental problems. (Appendix 10) 
 
This is why UKD3 believed that “China is a much misunderstood country”, thus the CI’s 
role is to “show them a China that is not shown in local media” (Appendix 10). In other 
words, the CI can offer a new counter discourse, to influence the general public and CI 
students with people-to-people contacts, to teach people Chinese so that they can get 
access to vastly more sources of first-hand information about China, and to correct some 
of the mystified or imagined ‘knowledge’ about China, like the example given by UKLH1: 
“one primary school pupil said to her parents that the teacher told them ‘Chinese people 
eat dogs’. Kids like that age never question what the teacher says, so we need the CI to 
educate people”. She said quiz is used as a means of knowledge transfer to school 
students and teachers: “the ‘true or false’ statement would help to some extent dispel 
the common misconceptions by explaining the correct answers” (Appendix 10). 
 
If the above represents the average knowledge level about China among the general 
public, it does not actually fall far short of that among the educated elites on a university 
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campus. UKD3 admitted in the interview that “when I was young, I was taught only British 
and European history, music and art, and know nothing about Chinese history or Asia”; 
he also gave examples of a Europe-centric view of one little town in Britain claiming to 
be ‘the first gunpowder factory in the world’, “it may well be the first one in Europe, but 
the world is not Europe” (Appendix 10).   
 
Even for students in today’s world, their knowledge about China is still haunted by the 
phantom of the ‘otherness’: The Chinese cultural image seems to be either antiquated 
or tinted with ideological colour. SKSC2 gave an example when she asked a Spanish 
student about the image of Chinese people in his mind before coming to China, the 
answer she got was “men wearing long pigtail hair and hats in the Qing style” - an image 
of China over 100 years ago as an empire. This offers an interesting comparison with 
another answer given by UKLH3 - China during the Cultural Revolution when “everyone 
wore Red Guard’s caps” - an image of China 60 years ago painted with Mao’s ideology. 
SKSC3 added that “many students thought China is a similar country to North Korea 
before they visited it, because of ideology”. UKD1 also cited the comments of a British 
student on the first trip to China that he “does not feel Beijing is very political as imagined: 
I am not being watched, I can go to places freely and talk to people on the street freely” 
(Appendix 10). 
 
These are vivid descriptions of China’s image as being the ‘ideological other’ among the 
general public. Hubbert (2014b: 340) explained this as highly “culturally constituted, not 
by Chinese culture but by U.S culture and the ideologies of democracy that shaped their 
conceptions of Chinese state intentions and practices” because Communism is a 
“product of both historical discourse and contemporary analysis that take the nature of 
Communism for granted”. This confirms the view that the receiving end of China’s 
counter discourse is not a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that was already occupied or 
even embedded with ‘accepted forms of knowledge’ shaped through media and the flux 
of ideologies. 
 
However, no one can ignore another significant aspect of contemporary China in this 
terrain: China has become the second largest economy and the largest trading nation in 
the world, an undisputable rising power on the economic front. This adds an extremely 
important dimension to the general public’s perception of China. According to UKSC4 
interviewed, most of the CI students are school students and the general public, they do 
not feel the rising China as a threat in their life, instead, “the more developed Chinese 
economy is, the more attractive China becomes, as more and more people would be 
interested in studying China to find out how it can achieve such growth” (Appendix 10). 
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It is interesting to note that ‘China’ is mentioned as the subject of study here, not just 
Chinese language.   
 
This perspective was also shared by answers from SKD2 and SKD4, who both confirmed 
that because they are so close to China, they see the huge opportunities offered by 
China’s booming economy:  
 
Korean people nowadays are very interested in going to China for various 
activities, be it trade, educational or cultural exchanges, so there are more and 
more people learning Chinese. Over the past 10 years, we offer more and more 
opportunities for our students to go to China, there are also more and more 
students and tourists coming from China. For big shops and tourist information 
centre they all hire staff speaking Chinese, this means more job opportunities 
for Chinese-speaking skills (SKD2, Appendix 10). 
 
SKD4 also gave examples of students changing major from Japanese to Chinese after 
failing to get any jobs with their Japanese skill set, and in the Business School, it is 
compulsory for students to take a second foreign language after English. “Due to the 
decreasing number of students taking Japanese, they simply closed the course, and 
between Russian and Chinese, the majority of students chose to learn Chinese” 
(Appendix 10). 
 
Of course, it is important to remember that all the interviewees in this project are working 
for the CI, and most of the people they work with are those who are already ‘interested 
in China’: students who choose to learn Chinese out of their own will, and members of 
the general public attracted by the CI outreach activities in the community, so in a way, 
this is a China-friendly circle, but nevertheless, they represent a huge potential for 
cultural diplomacy to play a constructive role. Therefore, as the target audience in the 
host country where the CI is based, the general public represents the group of players 
with the largest number and least vested interest in this terrain, they are very responsive 
to China’s changing power position in the world as well. They may have been influenced 
by the local media and the ‘othering’ discourse about China, but can also be influenced 
by the new counter-discourse and people-to-people contacts offered by the CI.  
 
3.4 Step Three: Charting the terrain into hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides 
by employing the key concepts 
 
At the turn of the 21st century, we find our world beset by a growing sense of global 
connections, which transcends national and regional borders and boundaries; nowhere 
is it more evident than the cultural realm. At the same time, as boundaries have become 
more fluid and the movement of people and capital accelerates, questions of cultural 
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boundary have become more contested than ever, a remapping of the global cultural 
terrain becomes necessary to reflect the shifting positions.  
 
Now that the shaping of this ‘terrain of struggle’ has been explored and the various actors 
at play been presented, the analysis of it can only start with a reasonable understanding 
of the current terrain configurations. Therefore, the next step is trying to determine the 
boundaries within the terrain between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides by 
employing the key concepts again, and examining the deployment of all the actors at 
play. This process considers the following questions: how the global cultural terrain is 
constructed and deployed by particular actors at particular times in history; how has the 
flow of commodities, peoples, and ideas influenced the relationship among different 
actors in this terrain; and what power dynamics underpin these inter-cultural connections 
and the shifting of the cultural terrain. 
 
A good place to start is the framework of cultural hegemony constructed by Antonio 
Gramsci that has been elaborated in the Literature Review, he believed that cultural 
hegemony exerted an inordinate influence and had the potential to suppress other 
cultural expressions to the point where if diversity is not lost, cultural equality is.  
 
If we apply this concept in looking at this terrain, it will not be hard to see that the first 
group of players ‘Chinese government and Hanban’ has taken a clear counter-
hegemonic stance, as the development of cultural pluralism is declared as the main goal 
and mission of China’s cultural diplomacy. In 2012, Hu Jintao said the following in a 
speech:  
 
The hostile forces in the international community are hastening their steps to 
westernize and separate (disintegrate) our country. The ideology and culture fronts 
have been their key areas of infiltration. We must deeply understand the seriousness 
and complexity of ideological struggles, and take powerful measures to cope with 
them. (cited in Sahlins, 2015: 7)  
 
Even if we disregard the arguable appropriateness of the English translation, the 
Chinese government’s counter-hegemonic stance is plain to see; it also shows a 
stronger China is ready to become more defiant in fighting against Western hegemony. 
However, Castells (2009: 19) has put forward a strong argument to the effect that power 
is derived from networks. It is constituted by a “specific configuration of global, national 
and local networks in a multidimensional space of social interaction”. Therefore, in this 
terrain, “the state becomes just one node (however important) of a particular network”. 
Any national government, no matter how powerful, has but limited power over how 
information is received, as their voices will be in competition and interaction with the 
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others in this terrain.  
 
The second group of players (‘the CI directors and staff’) is a bit more complex, as it is a 
joint force of host and home institutions, but sharing the common goal of promoting 
Chinese language and culture. Therefore, as one entity, they are at the forefront of the 
counter-hegemonic side from China’s perspective, though physically, they can be based 
in a host country that is well resided in cultural hegemony. It is important to point 
that when a culture becomes hegemonic, it becomes “common sense” for the majority 
of the population, it means the CI has to grapple with an invisible force. It is not surprising 
that they find the current terrain not a ‘level playing field’ as pointed by UKLH2: “I feel 
Chinese culture is considered as a weak culture here, it is not really a level field we can 
play in. Because you are trying to promote and sell your things, which would naturally 
put yourself in an inferior position” (Appendix 10). An example given was that of a 
Chinese New Year performance, which is paid for by Hanban, but the CI has to first deal 
with the unenthusiastic city council and theatre, then face the challenge of filling all the 
seats, even with complimentary tickets. UKD1 from the same CI also added: “the 
popularity of our programme or event in the UK and the local area is no match for a 
Hollywood blockbuster, or a European exhibition in China. At least in China, people are 
willing to pay for such performances, while here, even with complimentary tickets, it’s not 
easy to fill the theatre” (Appendix 10). So the CI’s position can be described as head-to-
head against the hegemonic side.  
 
The third group of ‘China-related scholars’ is only classed as one group because of their 
position at the very centre of knowledge; however, even if they are physically standing 
at the same centre (in the same host institution for example), their viewpoints could be 
miles apart, or even stand at opposite ends of the spectrum, from strongly hegemonic to 
strongly counter-hegemonic. Chicago University could be a handy example to show the 
divide. Hanban Director Xu Lin told the BBC reporter during the 2014 interview that: 
“Chicago University visited us many times, they are strongly interested in establishing a 
Confucius Institute, so they chose us, it is not Hanban who pushed them…..the concerns 
are only from very few people, but the sound is very strong” (Sudworth, 2014: n.p.). This 
seems to be consistent with the common pattern revealed from my interviews, as UKLH1 
commented: “people who disagree have the loudest voice, people who benefit from the 
CI are not as outspoken”.  
 
Or rather, because they do not have a voice to be heard. During my interview with the 




Most of the media reports I read about the CI are negative, about the Communist 
influence, but I’ve also heard the contrary, people who are involved in the business 
saying No, we’re free to do what we want. What are you writing there? Ask me! I can 
tell you it is not true (Appendix 10).  
 
Yet, their voices are only heard among a small circle, while those scholars who dwelled 
on the Orientalist discourse have their stances amplified by the mainstream media, 
reinforcing their discourse.  
 
Of course, the ‘media’ group is also divided into two camps, working hand-in-hand with 
the divided academic discourse. Bhabha (1994: 19) believes that “economic and political 
domination has a profound hegemonic influence on the information orders of the Western 
world, its popular media and its specialized institution and academics”. In this dynamic 
terrain, we can see China’s growing economic power challenges the US economic 
domination, while the American power of discourse also challenges China’s political 
values. The Western media are like a barometer of the changing temperature in the 
global economic and political climate: they keep a close watch on the ‘other’ side, 
including the Chinese media, who may have some potential to fight the ‘war of position’, 
yet the potential is far from being fully unleashed. It needs to learn how to better fight the 
counter-hegemonic battle, especially when English remains the international media 
language.  
 
For the last group, it is only fair to argue that the ‘general public in the host countries 
including CI students’ spread across both the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides, 
but one thing clear is that as the target audiences, they are not a vacuum chamber as 
argued earlier, so the counter-discourse the CI is trying to provide does not go through 
a one-way conduit; rather, it is a two-way interplay with the discourse already produced 
by others in the destination. Another thing also clear is that China’s rise is undisputable 
and affects the power positions with the host countries the CIs are located in, creating a 
more favourable terrain for the CI to work the magic in ‘the last three feet’. 
 
From the above we can see that none of the groups of players are monolithic; they all 
contain internal dynamics or even some conflicts to a certain degree. This ‘terrain of 
struggle’ may be best summarised by Said’s remarks that it is a struggle between the 
‘relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony’ 
(1978:5). In practice, there is no clear-cut division in which some players stay on the 
hegemonic side while others stay on the counter-hegemonic side: their relationships and 
positions are more shaped by the intercultural interactions with other players in the 
terrain, making the relationship both complex and circular and interweaving. More 
importantly, as Foucault (1982:793) pointed out, every relation between forces is a power 
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relation, which is circular: it is “actions upon actions of the others”. Such intertwining 




3.5 Step Four: Examining the dynamic interactions among various players in the 
cultural terrain of struggle 
 
As presented in the sections above, the ‘terrain of struggle’ is a dynamic complexity with 
five main groups of actors at play. This section will attempt to delineate such complexities 
and intricacies by mapping out some snapshots in these interactional cycles, as what we 
are looking at here is an ensemble of actions which induce and modify one another.  
 
3.5.1 Snapshot 1: Chinese government     Hanban     CI     China-related 
Scholars     media     Chinese government 
 
At the Chinese government level, Hu Jintao’s speech at the 17th National Congress in 
2007 about building cultural soft power as “an important source of national cohesion and 
creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national 
strength” carried implicit policy prescriptions for government departments in the areas 
such as cultural diplomacy. As explained earlier, Hanban is such an organization 
committed to the claimed mission of developing cultural pluralism and contributing to the 
construction of a harmonious world, while the CI was considered as a key project to 
implement this strategy. Directly responding to Hu’s speech in 2007, a new plaque of 
‘Confucius Institute Headquarters’ was hung in Hanban to show its new remit of 
administration and supervision of the CIs.  
 
The following speech given by Madame Xu Lin, Director of Hanban, clearly shows the 
vertical hierarchical structure of the Chinese government:  
 
 Every year since 2004, Li Changchun gave numerous important instructions to the 
CI and visited CIs in 15 countries when traveling abroad. He has established a 
favourable image as a Chinese leader in the international society. The series of 
important instructions by Li Changchun on the CI are theoretical treasures of the 
CI undertaking. We studied them in the past, and we must continue to study them 
now and in the future (Sahlins, 2015: 7). 
 
This speech was given in 2011, after Li was quoted in The Economist in 2009 saying that 
the CI was “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”. The eulogized 
visits by Li to the CIs in Xu’s speech was also mentioned during one of my interviews 





For example, when state leaders visit other countries, they would normally attend 
unveiling ceremonies for CIs, it is good this time Xi Jinping did not visit a CI in South 
Korea, but the Halla CI in Jeju was unveiled by Li Changchun, giving it a strong 
political colour. The CI’s image among the media and general public is very 
government-related, we were often questioned why we are serving the Chinese 
government (SKD4 is a South Korean).  
 
The government role in cultural diplomacy was much discussed in the Literature Review. 
Hu (2008) has pointed that the West has an innate and deeply rooted aversion to any 
government-manipulated culture. Domestic rhetoric from the Ministry of Propaganda will 
only make the implicit manipulation explicit, such as the Minister Liu Yunshan’s speech 
to “make sure that all cultural battlegrounds, cultural products, and cultural activities 
reflect and conform to the socialist core values and requirement” (Sahlins, 2015: 6). 
Other scholars such as Seiichi (2008) also argue that government involvement is liable 
to be seen as ‘meddlesome intrusion’ by the authorities, raising suspicions and causing 
reflexive backlash.  
 
One such backlash incident happened during the annual meeting of the European 
Association of Chinese Studies (EACS) held in Portugal in July 2014, when Xu Lin 
ordered four pages about the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (CCKF) to be torn out from 
the volume of conference programme and abstracts. Actually, both Hanban and CCKF 
are sponsors of this conference; Xu’s overbearing and arbitrary manner shocked the 300 
participants who were present there and then, and later, through media report, it shocked 
a far wider audience within academia. The president of the Association, Professor 
Greatrex from the University of Lund, publicly criticised Xu’s action as “totally 
unacceptable” as this was “the first time in the history of EACS that its conference 
materials had been censored”, and “censorship of conference materials cannot and will 
never be tolerated by the EACS” (Greatrex, 2014a, 2014b).  
 
This incident happened right among the China scholars, and an academic conference 
held abroad is probably the worst possible platform to stage China’s censorship. When 
freedom of speech and belief are protected by law in many European countries; Hanban 
is showing that a Chinese government decree can override academic freedom, but the 
vertical line of Chinese government over university and media do not translate across 
the border. Almost on the contrary, in many Western countries, universities and media 
are at the very centre of the greatest challenges to governments. While the incident was 
reported in the Western media (the Wall Street Journal, BBC News, the Diplomat, EACS 
website) as an outrage, it was lauded as an act of patriotism in the Chinese press under 
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the headline of ‘There is no shame in Hanban tearing up overseas conference program’ 
(Li, 2014). In the report, the blame was put on the EACS, who “should not lack clarity 
over the gravity of the Taiwan problem for China. The reference to the CCKF in the 
program should not have appeared in the first place” (cited in Sahlins, 2015: 38). But 
CCKF has been funding the conference for the past two decades. Despite Xu herself 
emphasising during the BBC interview that the content she removed was ‘not academic 
but political’, this incident was quoted as evidence of the CI’s threat to academic freedom: 
the Wall Street Journal reported it under the headline ‘Madam Xu’s Party Line, Beijing 
confirms that Confucius Institutes subvert Western academic freedom’: “After 
vehemently denying for years that the CIs have any kind of censorship agenda, Beijing 
has now tacitly acknowledged that this was false”.  
 
Actually, more frictions were disclosed in a BBC article entitled ‘Confucius institute: The 
hard side of China's soft power’, written by the BBC interviewer of Xu Lin in December 
2014. The starting line reads as the following:  
 
For starters she accepted a request for a BBC interview. Admittedly she came 
quickly to regret it, demanding that we delete a large section of our recording. 
…… 
After we had finished the recording, along with her deputy and her press officers, 
she kept us for well over an hour, insisting that she had been misled into agreeing 
to the interview and demanding that we erase, there and then, the section about 
Portugal.……We refused to delete our tape.’ (Sudworth, 2014)   
 
These two incidents were quoted together as examples of the Chinese government’s 
“very heavy-handed and very public attempts at censorship” (Scotton, 2015, n.p.). The 
BBC incident showing Hanban “demanding” that a foreign media organ “delete” a section 
of an interview recording, and then having the “demand” “refused” indicates how the 
relationship between the media and the government differs drastically in China and the 
UK; on the other hand, it also shows the potentially conflicting interface between 
domestic and international contexts faced by the Chinese media: when they are written 
to feed the national pride in China’s growing power and stature, in how China is 
becoming tougher in safeguarding its national interests, it can be used by the Western 
media as an alarming proof of China’s hard edge. 
 
These incidents embody a few cruxes in this line of interactions that involves government, 
academia and the media. As explained earlier, the latter two were subject to the 
hierarchical rule of the government in China, which even casts shadows over China 
scholars abroad, according to the 2008 report submitted by the U.S-China Economic and 




This takes the form of providing both positive rewards to ‘friendly’ scholars – such 
as preferred access to interviews and documents – as well as taking punitive actions 
such as denying visas for academics who anger Beijing. These rewards and 
punishments offer the Chinese government leverage over the careers of foreign 
scholars and thereby encourage a culture of academic self-censorship” (USCC 
report, 2008).  
 
Actually, the same thing applies to foreign journalists. Melissa Chen, an American 
journalist working for the English-language arm of Al-Jazeera was denied renewal of her 
visa and press credentials in 2012, which was widely reported as ‘being expelled from 
China’ by the Washington Post (Richburg, 2012), the Guardian (Watts, 2012) and Al-
Jazeera English. When government control is extended to foreign academics and 
journalists in such an explicit manner, it will not be compatible or acceptable in the 
international domain, but the state-run nature of China’s cultural diplomacy determines 
that a stern domestic approach would definitely prevail when such incompatibility occurs, 
at the cost of causing conflicts. When counter-hegemonic endeavour was driven by an 
authoritarian government, it may be backfired to be felt as imposing hegemonic influence 
as well, especially when Xu’s action would appear to be a denial, not a defence, of the 
image of a harmonious and tolerant China that Hanban is so keen to project. The EACS 
incident is particularly detrimental in that Taiwan has always been part of the Chinese 
nation, the only consensus that has been reached across the Taiwan Straits since 1949.  
Therefore, its culture should be considered part of the cultural diversity in China, yet it 
was rejected by Beijing’s cultural diplomacy. What is more, the opposite media reactions 
this incident received inside China and abroad exemplified the contradiction existing 
between the cultural goals of the Chinese government and the current political system’s 
ability to deliver progress towards those goals as discussed in 1.3.2. Therefore, a state-
run approach could contribute counterproductively to the effects of cultural diplomacy, as 
government sponsorship is already seen as a ‘hard edge’ in the breeding of ‘soft power’, 
let alone censorship or ‘agenda setting’ influence extended beyond its border.  
 
Actually, censorship and government control of China’s public sphere have been widely 
reviled as features of authoritarian rule and have already given ammunition to its critics. 
What is happening in the Chinese universities only gave more grounds to this worry: the 
CCP directive issued to local party committees in May 2013 had officially banned the 
discussion of seven topics in universities and the media on the grounds that they were 
“dangerous Western influences”. The seven topics are: universal values, freedom of 
speech, civil society, civil rights, the historical errors of the Chinese Communist Party, 
crony capitalism, and judicial independence (Liou & Ding, 2015:138). The Chinese 
journalist Gao Yu, who was accused of leaking this ‘state secret’ to western media, was 
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initially sentenced to seven years in prison and then reduced to five years after her 
appeal in November 2015, which was also widely reported by all the mainstream 
Western media such as BBC and CNN, adding another dimension, human rights, to this 
censorship issue.  
 
The speech given by Xi Jinping in December 2014 calling for tighter ideological control 
in universities was also put under the media spotlights, including the BBC, Guardian, 
Daily Mail and Reuters. As a direct response to Xi’s speech, the Chinese Education 
Minister, Yuan Guiren, jumped on the bandwagon and called for a ban on textbooks that 
promote Western values, and warned against “remarks that slander the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China and smear socialism” in the classroom (Xinhua, 2015a). 
When Western values and textbooks are banned in Chinese universities, such acts are 
not recognised as counter-hegemonic actions, but countering its own principle of 
‘harmony with diversity’ claimed as the very goal of China’s cultural diplomacy, it also 
runs against the definition of cultural diplomacy per se by reducing ‘mutual understanding’ 
to one-way explanation. 
 
What is worth noting is that the same Minister told a prominent government advisory 
panel four years previously that restricting the use of Western teaching materials was 
wrongheaded. This stark reversal revealed the growing tension between academics and 
party control on the one hand, and the power of bureaucracy on the other hand. If the 
MOE can change direction like a weathercock, Hanban and universities under its direct 
auspices will just have to trim their sail to the wind, and it is not hard to understand why 
the number one ‘rule of thumb’ according to UKD2 was “do less, err less”, echoing 
UKD4’s first mandate is not to “get into any trouble”, as they are working for the position, 
not the mission. One smart way of avoiding getting into trouble while getting the work 
done is shared by UKLH3: by working with the Students’ Union and organising forums 
through them, “as it would have more political sensitivity and is more likely to cause 
disputes if organized by the CI”. For example, Global Media was the theme of one such 
forum, where they discussed the media censorship issue very openly. “This shows 
inclusiveness of different views and respect for academic freedom” (Appendix 10). This 
is indeed a very good example to show how the interaction with the student body is 
utilised to tone down the CI’s government colour. 
 
As for censorship of topics inside the CI, Hanban’s explanation is that political discussion 
is not the CI’s remit, and CI teachers do not have the expertise or knowledge to handle 
such discussions. This view was echoed by UKSC5: “after all, I am not a teacher of 
politics, I cannot offer an expert answer, and I would not want my language class to 
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evolve into a politics class” (Appendix 10). Nor does Hanban want this - all the CI 
secondees interviewed said that during the pre-departure training organized by Hanban, 
they were instructed to either respond with government rhetoric, or try to divert the topic 
when politically sensitive discussions arise in the classroom. According to UKSC5:  
 
The advice Hanban gave us in pre-departure training is to take the Chinese 
government stand to speak for China, tell students Chinese official views.  After 
all, I’m sent here by the Chinese government, of course I would not say anything 
negative about China. I would safeguard China’s national interest; this is my 
personal view anyway as I am very patriotic. To see the country image tarnished 
is like ruining my own image…….They also advised us not to engage in extended 
debates with students, if students stick to their views, we can only present our 
views in a mild manner and avoid head-to-head confrontations (Appendix 10). 
 
Probably UKSC2’s stance is more advisable: “I would not say the students are wrong, 
but I think it is necessary to let them know the Chinese views. Then it is up to them to 
decide if they support this view or not”. This accords with UKLH3’s explanations: “our 
main purpose is to offer a platform where different views can be put forward, not to argue 
who is influenced by whom” (Appendix 10). This approach of ‘just letting them know’ is 
how counter-discourse is gaining access to the knowledge centre from the Chinese 
perspective, but it is also identified and resisted as ‘ideological infiltration’ from the 
hegemonic side, thus keeping the two sides wrestling in this ‘terrain of struggle’.  For 
example, according to empirical evidence provided by Hubert’s research (2014b: 330): 
 
Inside the classroom, the CI teachers reinforced an idea of a China defined by its 
cultural glories and modernization feats, not its political practices. Whenever 
politically laden topics emerged from classroom discussions, I observed that the 
teachers quickly refocused students on language acquisition and cultural activities.  
 
This approach is fine pedagogically in a language class, but as Hartig (2015) argued, it 
was complicated by the fact that it is precisely those sensitive topics that are probably 
most familiar to the CI target audience as they regularly appear in the media. This caused 
a potential perception gap which hampers the credibility of CIs. Yet it does not stop at 
this lack of credibility, as Hubert’s research (2014b) concluded, because China is 
routinely imagined as politically repressive, the purposefully apolitical nature of its 
pedagogical materials and classroom practices sometimes served as an impediment to 
Hanban’s efforts, as this “political absence” is interpreted as “authoritarian presence”, 
thus “reinforcing perceptions of a repressive Chinese government apparatus”. All of her 
interviewees recognised that Hanban’s “attempts to depoliticise the classroom had this 
paradoxical effect” (Hubert, 2014b: 339). 
 
Most of the foreign Directors of the CI have expressed their views with a rhetorical 
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question: “there are so many other things we can do, why must we touch the ‘minefield’ 
when the fund for the CI operation is provided by the Chinese government?” (UKD1) 
However, such a response indicated the existence of self-censorship which is always an 
inherent danger that may or may not operate at a conscious level. UKD1 used the British 
Council as a defence as “they wouldn’t want to talk about IRA either”. UKSC2 cited the 
example of “foreign teachers who came to China to teach 20-30 years ago, some of them 
have a missionary background and would infill religious influence in their teaching, but it 
does not mean their students will be converted to Christianity”. UKD2 simply retorted: 
“no one would claim if you study in the US and taught by Americans, you’ll be in danger 
of indoctrination, or being guided or governed by the American government. Why would 
you start saying this about China?” (Appendix 10) 
 
This ‘double standard’ is obviously built on the Western cultural hegemony in this ‘terrain 
of struggle’, but just as Gramsci believed, the fight for hegemony and struggle for power 
is ceaseless; if the hegemon starts to worry about lose the hegemonic position, the sense 
of crisis would be translated into an urge to fight on to keep that position, especially by 
the academia and the media. So, when Chinese UKD4 can comment rather sensibly that 
“they are very alert, which is understandable”, this ‘understandable alert’ tends to be 
escalated into alarms on the hegemonic side based on their speculative assumptions 
that the CI’s remit is to ‘promote Communism’, which is used as a synonym for ‘Chinese 
ideology infiltration’. For the CIs that are located in the centre of the hegemonic side, an 
important job is to disable such alarms. UKD2 used himself as an example to disprove 
the assumption: “I do not think the CI is trying to sell political ideology, I myself am not 
even a Communist party member. It is not listed as a criterion to select the CI directors 
or teachers. What we want to do is cultural promotion, and in today’s information era, it 
is impossible to brainwash people, local people have full access to a wealth of 
information”. UKLH3 also used the example of her won case to reject the accusation that 
the CI teachers are brainwashed by the Chinese government: “I was locally hired by the 
host institution as a fulltime staff and has never been brainwashed by the Chinese 
government. I went through a rigorous recruitment process. We also have locally hired 
office administrators and language instructors” (Appendix 10).   
 
Some noticeable adjustments have been made by Hanban as a response to the 
changing dynamics in this terrain; one interesting change of tone is about the CI’s 
function in increasing China’s soft power. In 2007, Xu Lin proudly claimed that CI is the 
“brightest brand for China’s soft power”, which was made the title line in the Xinhua report, 
but by 2010, she emphasized that CIs “are not projecting soft power, nor aim to impose 
Chinese values or Chinese culture on other countries…… just hopes to be truly 
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understood by the rest of the world” (cited in Yang, 2010:243). Also, recognising that this 
current terrain is not a level playing field, and that very few of the partner institutes are 
from the Ivy League Colleges in the US or state-run universities in Japan (Ren, 2010), 
Hanban made a series of moves in order to enlist more prestigious universities, dispel 
their apprehensions and prevent further closing downs. For example, not insisting that 
universities adopt a policy that Taiwan is part of China, and deleting the reference to 
Falun Gong participation in its recruiting criteria after it led to the closure of the CI at 
McMaster University in 2012, which has caused very negative media reports. Video 
materials on the CI Online platform about ‘the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid 
Korea’ were also deleted after being criticised and labelled as ‘Anti-US propaganda’ 
(Robertson, 2012). 
 
However, these changes did not receive all positive responses. Both the actions taken 
by the counter-hegemonic side and the reactions received from the hegemonic side were 
subject to interpretations that can be poles apart from both sides: from the Chinese side, 
it can be interpreted negatively as they mean China gave in to the Western hegemonic 
influence, or as positive learning experience of making cultural diplomacy more subtle; 
from the hegemonic side, they could be considered as a positive sign of China 
conforming to the Western standard; or they could be negatively labelled as measures 
of expediency to exchange for long-term gains. As professor Nylan of Chinese history at 
the University of California at Berkeley hinted, compromising does not necessarily mean 
that Hanban has abandoned its political mission, only that they have become subtler 
about it (Mosher, 2012). 
 
Whichever interpretation is correct, these responsive actions taken by Hanban close the 
first loop line of interaction from the government level feeding back to the government 
level. It is not such a straightforward picture in practice though, with vertical interactions 
mixed with horizontal ones, and more delicate interplays taking place at every sub level. 
Vertically, the topography of this ‘terrain of struggle’ is characterised by the hegemonic 
side maintaining the superior position and dominating the academia as the source of 
legitimate knowledge, with Western media occupying the moral high ground through 
power of discourse; on the other hand, the Chinese government hierarchy is also 
exerting top-to-down influence over the CIs and the Chinese media; whilst horizontally, 
there are cultural encounters across different types of cultural boundaries, and constant 
struggles for cultural influence between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides in 
this terrain. These interwoven interactions are three-dimensional and conflict-ridden. The 
next section will examine another snapshot at sublevel with a view to adding more 




3.5.2 Snapshot 2: Hanban     home institution of the CI     host institution of 
the CI     Hanban 
 
The Confucius Institute is born out of a triangular partnership: Hanban, home institution 
and host institution. Hanban provides funding through budget control, it convenes the 
annual assembly, examines the CI reports, and organises training for both Chinese 
directors and tutors from the home institutions before their departure, and also pays for 
directors from the host institutions to fly to China for the annual assembly and training 
programmes. From each of these remits, Hanban can exercise control as authority:  
they decide on whether to approve the budget or not; who needs to be trained on what 
and by whom; and censor the news release on their official website. At the CI level, the 
host side supplies the position of Director, and Chinese side is the Co-Director, revealing 
a triangular and vertical structure among Hanban, host institution and home institution. 
 
Sometimes, the embassy also participates as a fourth party, as explained by MOD and 
UKD1. The staff working at the Education Section of the Embassy or Consulate are 
seconded from the Ministry of Education, so they belong to the same ‘system’ as Hanban, 
and their supportive, monitoring, and supervisory role is considered as their competent 
‘line of business’. On the other hand, the CI also needs the support from the embassies, 
including some resources provided by them; they would always be invited to important 
CI events, and the annual report submitted to Hanban was also copied to them.  
 
However, concerning the accusation of government involvement, a common theme from 
my interviews shows that this accusation is not justified: all the UKDs and SKDs 
interviewed denied Hanban ever said NO to their activities. It is just that the budget will 
usually not be fully approved: 
 
More or less, it’s half-half: half of the activity budgets will be approved. But usually 
we would still carry them out even if we did not get Hanban’s funding, we just make 
the scale smaller, in other words, for things listed on our plan, we’ll make sure they 
happen, but the scale depends on if we can get Hanban’s funding to make it big or 
not” (UKD1, Appendix 10). 
 
There are also cases that due to the tedious procedure of approving the budget, the 
planned activity was already completed before Hanban replied with the green light or red 
light (UKD1). In addition, UKD 2 commented:   
 
I think CI is trying to play down its government involvement, CI has become part of 
the school at the host institution, subordinate to the council whose members are 
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from both partner universities; Hanban does not play a part in CI’s day-to-day 
management, and the finance is managed by the host institution, we do not have 
our own ‘little coffers’ (hidden reserve) (Appendix 10). 
 
However, he did give an example concerning Hanban’s censorship of information 
released on its website, it is about one original CI report on a guest lecture which in 
content was favourable to China, but since the topic itself contained a derogatory term, 
even if it was disputed in the lecture, the whole entry was deleted, as Hanban has zero 
tolerance for discord – every word showing on the official website must be 100% positive. 
It is important to note that there are many examples about some proposed topics for 
lectures and conferences not approved by the CIs themselves as a practice of self-
censorship discussed in 3.5.1, such as a conference on China’s Human Rights. There 
are also a few cases of CI closures due to such disapproval from Hanban. These will be 
looked at in more details in section 4.3.2 of Chapter Four. 
 
For the CIs based in a host country with a hard cultural boundary with China, the 
relationship with host institutions could pose more problems. Many such problems are 
due to general cultural differences or different ways of doing things, such as the decision-
making process, notice time, efficiency and procedure. Occasional cultural frictions 
would also occur between Hanban and the host institution; for example, on the global 
venture of having a China Day in Sep 2014 to celebrate the CI’s tenth anniversary, UKD3 
commented quite candidly:  
 
I think it’s a terrible mistake, it hasn’t taken into account the different cultures in 
different countries, and different cultures of different kinds of universities. In the UK, 
it’s way too early to organize such a big event in mid-September. The timing is quite 
wrong, most students would only arrive on campus for induction, the last thing they 
want to participate in is a China Day. It’s also on a Friday, a holy day for Muslims, 
any Muslims in the country wouldn’t be here. This is the kind of drawback. I think 
Hanban needs to recognize that we all have the same objectives, and follow the 
same kinds of plans, we recognise their leadership, we recognise the importance of 
all working towards the same goals, but we should also recognise cultural 
differences around the world, in exactly the same way we want people around the 
world to recognise Chinese culture. It is a two-way process, we need people in 
Britain to recognise other cultures, and we also need the Chinese authority to 
recognise there are different cultures” (Appendix 10).   
 
This is an extremely important message for Hanban to listen to, as it is not from the 
media but from the CI Director, who made the application to have a CI set up in the first 
place, and run it on a daily basis to help accomplish the purpose of China’s cultural 
diplomacy. If they also think some practice runs counter to exactly what cultural 
diplomacy is about - promoting ‘mutual understanding’ of ‘cultural diversity’, they would 
lose faith in the CI. When such opinions were fed back to Hanban, it was handled in the 
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Chinese way: listen to the majority’s voice, but UKD3 argued that: 
 
Democracy doesn’t always work. In the discussion of that example of CI Day, there 
were probably four people in the room who felt exactly the same way, other people 
from other countries are all right because they have a different timetable. In a way, 
it looks like most people are happy, we are the minority, just a small number of 
awkward British people, but that’s because our culture is different, it is not about 
what the majority want, it is about how to make it work in individual areas” (Appendix 
10).  
 
As a pro-China scholar himself, what UKD3 suggests is exactly what the CI claims to be 
trying to promote: ‘harmony through diversity’; however, its centralised and unified 
approach defies its own goal. Hanban needs to become a better listener in these 
communications, and adopts a more responsive method to suit the local culture.  
 
Another source of friction is the tutors provided by Hanban. There are some hiccups 
according to UKD3: 
  
Hanban reserves the right to select the tutors, no British university would ever make 
an appointment. There is a potential clash as the university demands that it makes 
its own appointment. At the moment, this hasn’t become a conflict, but we know it is 
there lurking when the appointment is made (Appendix 10).  
 
In other CIs, however, this kind of frictions have already been escalated to conflicts. If 
we look at the few CIs that have decided not to renew their agreements with Hanban, 
we can see that they all, in one way or the other, have to do with this arrangement of 
having Hanban select and train teachers before sending them over to the CIs, which 
invites the suspicion of compromising academic freedom on campus. Host institutions 
were asked “why risk the reputation for academic freedom and integrity by 
subcontracting teaching and research from a Chinese government that has repeatedly 
shown itself to be inimical to these values?” Some host institutions were criticised that 
accepting such appointments is to “ignore or dismiss the unsavoury political aspects of 
Confucius Institutes so long as they get a good deal” (cited in Sahlins, 2015: 62). These 
questionings are obviously from the China scholars holding onto their hegemonic 
positions and moral high ground, but Hanban and the CI need to have counter-measures 
in place, as these scholars are using their power of discourse at the knowledge centre 
to influence the general public in the host country.  
 
For example, to address the three common concerns shared by the CI closures so far, 
namely recruitment and control of academic staff; choice of curriculum and texts; and 




1) In 2009, Hanban established ‘Confucius Institute Scholarships’ to recruit 
overseas students on the MA course of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other 
Languages in China, followed by scholarships granted to CIs all over the world 
in 2010 to train locally hired Chinese teachers.  
 
In April 2013, a Hanban directive was distributed regarding jointly setting up 
positions of CI head teachers who are locally hired by the host institution but paid 
by Hanban fund. In other words, Hanban is paying for the salary of CI head 
teachers who are appointed by the host institution following their own recruitment 
procedures, as long as the host institution grants the position a formal 
employment contract and “pledges to maintain this position over the long-term” 
(Appendix 11). By the end of 2014, thirty positions of CI head teachers had been 
established according to Hanban’s Annual Development Report.  
 
These measures were a response to feedback from the frontline and can kill two birds 
with one stone: while relieving the pressure of teacher supply from the home institutions, 
and the worries of reduced academic discourse in the host institution, it will offer 
students equal access to different voices on the debatable questions, and help improve 
the ‘quality and expertise’, which will be discussed in more details in 4.2.2 of Chapter 
Four.  
 
2) Increased international cooperation in developing Chinese language teaching 
materials with Cambridge University Press, Mandarin Matrix Press, and 
Espaces et Signes Press of France, etc. was reported in the CI’s Annual 
Development Report 2014. 
 
3) In the Eight-Year CI Development Plan 2012-2020 (Appendix 2), “to formulate 
rules regarding the exit mechanism of CIs” was already listed under the first 
‘Major Task’.  
 
If the first two are responsive measures, the third one is very pro-active and forward-
thinking, as it was proposed in 2012, before any of the CI closures took place. 
 
Another common cause of conflict has to do with access to funds. Hanban allocates the 
operating fund to the host institution/school account, and the host institution is supposed 
to match the funding, but it is mostly provided in kind, such as campus facilities and office 
space, as well as administrative and accounting services. When the CI needs to use 
cash payment for events and activities or procurement, even if they are using the ear-
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marked fund that they are fully and solely eligible to use, they have to get approval from 
the host institution/school authority, which may delay the process for various reasons. If 
the CI Director happens to be the Dean or Head of School, it may help speed up the 
process, but such delays often constitute the most frustrating part of the CI’s relationship 
with the host institution, because these delays are not just bureaucratic traits, in some 
cases they even breed power struggle. 
 
In contrast, along the other line of interaction between the CI and the home institution, 
all interviewees felt the relationship was relatively trouble-free, as all home institutions 
have a special CI Office designated to communication with Hanban and with the host 
institutions abroad. However, according to SKD1, “once the directors/teachers are 
expatriated, the home institution pay little attention to what’s going on out there, they just 
pay ‘ear service’ to the annual report once the CI is set up”, echoing the earlier statement 
that having a CI set up and running is considered as ‘mission accomplished’ by some 
home institutions, so “as long as you don’t bother them, they won’t bother you much. But 
if you need support from then, usually they are very supportive” (UKD4). Such 
unconditional support comes from the fact that the CI and the home institution are on the 
same counter-hegemonic side in this terrain.   
 
However, the line of interaction becomes much more complex when we look at the 
triangular partnership as a whole. If we can use the metaphor of intercultural marriage 
for CI’s partnership between a Chinese home institution and an overseas host institution, 
we can see it experiences common problems faced by such relationships: cultural 
differences reflected in decision-making on a daily basis, trivial or major, could potentially 
lead to power struggles and conflicts. In a traditional Chinese family hierarchy, the 
mother-in-law is a very powerful figure to whom the young married couple should show 
reverence if not obedience, while Hanban’s role is like a ‘rich mother-in-law’ who provides 
for the new couple generously to build a new life. In a way, along this line of interactions, 
it is very much like family issues: there is always drama going on and no easy way to 
judge who is in the right, who is in the wrong. The intercultural marriage only exaggerates 
the complexity, as the ‘Chinese husband’ looks up to his mother and expects the ‘foreign 
wife’ also to show obedience to her ‘mother-in-law’, which is not always compatible with 
her native culture, plus the rich ‘mother-in-law’ can only speak Chinese. Even if the 
‘foreign wife’ is learning the Chinese language, she may find it hard to communicate with 
her ‘mother-in-law’ in the Chinese way.  
 
The positive side is that the ‘mother-in-law’ does not live with them and tries to give them 
autonomy to make their daily decisions, and the young couple tries really hard to balance 
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both sides’ interests as they have a common wish to live happily ever after. However, a 
few such marriages have ended in a divorce so far. These will be looked into in sections 
4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter Four. A quick example that can be cited here is Pennsylvania 
State University, whose Dean Susan Welch confirmed in a written statement on their 
university website that over the past five years: “we worked collegially with our partners 
at the Dalian University of Technology. However, several of our goals are not consistent 
with those of the Hanban, which provides support to CIs throughout the world” (cited in 
Redden, 2014b: n.p.). They are quite clear in putting the blame on Hanban while 
stressing the good partnership with the home institution. When asked to elaborate on the 
specific ways in which the goals differ, a professor in the Asian Studies department and 
a former Penn State CI Director said via email:  
 
I will say that in my experience as CI director one of the major frustrations with the 
relationship was that we consistently had more ambitious ideas for the ways CI 
funding could be used -- mainly to support research not only in the humanities or 
on Chinese culture, but also on science, politics, the environment, and a variety 
of other topics -- that the Hanban regularly rejected as too far outside the official 
CI remit (which they would tell us was mainly 'cultural')”. Meanwhile, "A lot of what 
the Hanban wanted us to do didn’t make sense given our institution, faculty 
population, and student population…Had they been flexible, it would have helped 
Confucius Institute succeed here (cited in Jacobs & Yu, 2014:n.p.). 
 
To summarise all these interactions, one thing that needs to be emphasised is its 
dynamic and responsive nature - every interaction could be both a cause and an effect 
of a change, just as Foucault put it (1982:789): “when faced with a relationship of power, 
a whole field of response, reactions, results and possible inventions may open up”. 
Therefore, they should not be examined in isolation but studied in an integrated manner. 
The complexity of the interactions between the elements of the ‘triangle’ was further 
complicated by the relationship between government and university that is completely 
different in nature cross the two sides: universities hold strong power of discourse as 
independent constituents of academia in many host countries, while in China, they’re 





Unlike the usual approach to examining how China is crafting its soft power by engaging 
in cultural diplomacy, this chapter presented and discussed the research findings by 
applying the alternative analytical framework in charting the ‘terrain of struggle’ that 
China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into. It has developed an argument that this is 
an uneven terrain both in terms of unbalanced powers with hidden barriers for the 
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counter-hegemonic side, and also a hierarchical one influencing the interactions 
between many players. This perspective has allowed us to gain a three-dimensional 
view over the massive amount of data collected.  
 
This chapter has first framed the broader context of the terrain in which the CI has placed 
itself, and presented the various actors on the different sides, holding different positions, 
and playing different roles in this ‘struggle’. The complexity of the interplays among all 
stakeholders is also unpacked by mapping out two snapshots, using primary and 
secondary data as evidence to support the theoretical discussions.   
 
Both culture and ideology help draw the line between the two sides of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony in this terrain. Compared with the line of ‘cultural superiority and 
inferiority’ carved by Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or enemies’ were 
created by Communism, and China’s attempt at gaining more power of discourse was 
often accused of ‘ideological infiltration’ by the hegemonic side. Therefore, in terms of 
the ideological context, Communism appeared to be the biggest stumbling block behind 
the CI’s setbacks in some Western countries. Actually, it appeared to be the lens China 
was envisioned, supporting the finding from the Literature Review that ideology is the 
new form of ‘otherness’: Communism was thought to be the other end of binary 
oppositions to freedom and democracy, which has further resulted in China being 
imagined as the ‘opposing force’ in the ‘terrain of struggle’, and anti-Communism lies at 
the very heart of many of the speculations and criticisms against the CI. 
 
Promoting cultural pluralism, thus contributing to the construction of a harmonious world, 
is the rhetorical goal of China’s cultural diplomacy set by the highest level of Chinese 
government, but it does not seem to lend enough power to the ongoing battle of ‘isms’ 
taking place in the current contested terrain, the drive to this claimed goal was disrupted 
in the interactions between players from different sides and various levels in this terrain, 
with some rigid Hanban practice even showing signs of running against the defined goal 
of its cultural diplomacy.  
 
The next chapter will engage in an analytical comparison between the CI and its Western 
counterparts. It will continue to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to reveal the hidden 
barriers existing in this terrain. Once these barriers are exposed, they would shed lights 
on the most fundamental differences in the terrain conditions for the CI and its Western 
counterparts apart from just having different operating models. It will also look at what 





So Similar, So Different, So Chinese -  
Analytical Comparisons of the Confucius Institute  




As a ‘latecomer’ to cultural diplomacy, Hanban did not try to hide its intention to copy 
the successes of ‘forerunners’. It is made clear on its own website that “benefiting from 
the UK, France, Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their national languages, 
China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions with 
an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these 
were given the name of Confucius Institute” (Hanban website). Therefore, it is a self-
identification that the CI is seen as the Chinese version of the UK's British Council, 
France's Alliance Française, Germany's Goethe Institute, and Spain's Cervantes 
Institute. Although it is incomparable with the Alliance Française in terms of history and 
scope - over 130 years and 800 establishments (Alliance Française website), or the 
British Council in terms of impact - it administers 1.5 million examinations each year 
(British Council website), comparisons are frequently made between the CI and these 
organizations in both media and academic literature. This Chapter however, will try to 
show how a different picture can be revealed by adopting the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ 
and the theoretical frameworks of Orientalism, culture hegemony and knowledge-power 
nexus to engage in analytical comparisons. It will also go a step further in revealing the 
‘differences in similarities’ and ‘similarities in differences’, as well as the reasons behind 
them. It will unfold the comparisons in the same layers as discussed in the Literature 
Review: their purposes, operating models and provisions.  
 
4.1 Purposes  
 
4.1.1 Similarities and differences 
 
If we look at the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Goethe Institute, and Cervantes 
Institute, it is easy to see that all these countries engaged in public diplomacy are trying 
to achieve a similar goal, namely to improve their international status and the position 
of their culture in the global multicultural spectrum through the promotion of their 
languages. For example, on its official website, the British Councils says:  
 
The British Council creates international opportunities for the people of the UK 
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and other countries, and builds trust between them worldwide. We call this 
cultural relations. … Our work in English aims to bring high quality language 
materials to every learner and teacher who wants them. … We encourage 
international students to come and study in the UK, and British students to 
experience life abroad.  
 
There is a clear two-way engagement that reflects very well the definition of cultural 
diplomacy discussed in the Literature Review: “the exchange of ideas, information, 
values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of culture, with the intention of 
fostering mutual understanding”. The word “want” also shows its superior position in the 
cultural terrain as “demand” could be driven by practical needs, while “want” is driven 
by voluntary desire.  
 
Similarly, the Goethe Institute states the following on its website:  
 
The Goethe-Institute is the cultural institute of the Federal Republic of Germany 
with a global reach. We promote knowledge of the German language abroad 
and foster international cultural cooperation. We convey a comprehensive 
image of Germany by providing information about cultural, social and political 
life in our nation. Our cultural and educational programmes encourage 
intercultural dialogue and enable cultural involvement. 
 
Alliances Française’s website states:  
 
All Alliances Françaises work towards three essential tasks: 
• Offering French classes for all, both in France and abroad  
• Spreading awareness of French and Francophone culture  
• Promoting cultural diversity  
 
Cervantes Institute uses the slogan of “Spanish, a language for dialogue” to highlight 
the interactive nature, followed by one-line introduction on its website:    
 
The Instituto Cervantes was established by Spain in 1991 to promote and 
teach Spanish and to spread the culture of Spain and Spanish speaking 
countries.  
  
They all suggest learning the language is only the means to the end of appreciating 
cultural diversity. Actually, at the founding of the British Council in 1935, the Prince of 
Wales clarified that:  
 
We are aiming at something more profound than just a smattering of our tongue. 
Our object is to assist the largest number possible to appreciate fully the glories of 
our literature, our contribution to the arts and sciences, and our pre-eminent 
contribution to the political practice. This can best be achieved by promoting the 




Similarly, China with its Confucius Institute is just no exception here:  
 
As China's economy and exchanges with the world have seen rapid growth, 
there has also been a sharp increase in the world's demands for Chinese 
learning. (Hanban website) 
 
Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people 
from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese 
language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by 
these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and 
cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly 
relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-
culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. (the CI Constitution) 
 
As non-English-speaking countries, France, Germany and Spain have all used the 
wording “(to) promote” their languages and “spread” the culture, while the CI did use 
“promote” in explaining that this is to learn from its western counterparts, but in the 
formal document of its Constitution and By-Laws, it was carefully worded as offering 
the service to “satisfy the demands” and “enhance understanding”. These deliberations 
reveal at least two differences in the similarity of the purposes: 
 
1) To “satisfy the demands”: instead of actively “promoting” its language, or 
“spreading” its culture, the CI puts itself in the position of “responding” to the 
growing demand for learning the Chinese language, “the unprecedented China 
fever” and “Chinese language fever” (Hanban website), which is encouraged 
by the economic rise of China. 
 
2) To “enhance understanding”: this indicates there is insufficient understanding 
of the Chinese language and culture at the moment, or rather, even some 
distorted understandings as discussed in Chapters One and Three, setting a 
different priority for the CI in comparison to its Western counterparts.   
 
These differences show a mixture of ‘pride and prejudice’: 
 
1) In the domestic context, there is a dose of national ‘pride’ because of the recent 
rise of China: the “rapid growth” of the economy and the “sharp increase” in the 
demand for learning Chinese not only justifies what the CIs are trying to do, but 
signifies the growing influence of China, which is articulated and communicated 
through the new leadership vision of the ‘China Dream of national rejuvenation’ 
to the domestic audience. While constructing domestic legitimacy, it is a proud 




2) In the international context however, there is a need to counter the existing 
‘prejudice’, or misconceptions that discursively defined China outside its 
borders. To “enhance understanding” is therefore a proactive task the CI sets 
itself with the hope of also constructing global legitimacy. As one scholar noted, 
“the founding of the CI is, by and large, an image management project….to 
promote the greatness of Chinese culture while counterattacking public opinion 
that maintains the China threat” (Guo, 2008:36). 
 
The above analysis shows that the different wording of the CI’s purpose actually reflects 
its different position in this terrain of struggle, which can help further explain the next 
question: why, unlike its Western counterparts, the CI’s intentions were often 
questioned with suspicions of cultural invasion or ideological infiltration, particularly by 
some academics and media in North America and Europe? 
 
4.1.2 Why is the CI’s purpose perceived differently?  
 
This question was also asked by a China Daily article in 2010: “perhaps no one will call 
Goethe Institute, Alliance Franchises or Cervantes Institutes propaganda vehicles or 
tools of cultural invasion. So why all the fuss over China’s Confucius Institute, which 
share the same goals?” (Chang, 2010). Disappointingly, the article did not really answer, 
or even attempt to answer this question; instead, it just gave its own answer to explain 
the title: ‘No need to fuss over Confucius Institute’. This thesis argues that an answer 
can be found through the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’, which reveals the biggest 
difference between the CI and its Western counterparts: it is the same competition, but 
not a level playing field and they occupy completely different positions in this terrain of 
struggle dominated by Western cultural hegemony.  
 
As discussed in the Literature Review, the above question must be studied in its 
international context, where Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, Foucault’s theory 
of power relations and Said’s critique of Orientalism can be employed as the analytical 
frameworks. Section 3.1 explained that while the counter-hegemonic side will be 
engaged in ‘a war of position’, the hegemonic side will resist any emerging new forces 
that could challenge its hegemony. When the CI emerged as a new force in the terrain, 
it was recognised as such a challenge that needs to be resisted, and some Western 
countries simply used their power to determine what they think the CI’s goal is, and 
further, use the power to turn their voices into the truth, just like Foucault has argued 
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that knowledge impregnated in power is no longer an objective reflection of truth, but is 
presented and accepted as truth with power in practice.  
 
This is how an Orientalist understanding of China is maintained in a global culture 
terrain shaped by Western hegemony. When the hegemonic side may perceive China’s 
rise is at their expenses (Nye, 2005), it is hard for the Chinese appeal of cultural 
pluralism and harmony to be accepted. The recognition has to start with an 
understanding of China’s cultural diplomacy not seeking to negate the hegemonic 
culture, nor to replace it with a new hegemony; rather it wishes to offer an alternative to 
view cultural interaction as a plus-sum game. With this in mind, I think the contribution 
the CI can make to achieving this purpose is to start with tipping the balance by letting 
as many Westerners understand China in Chinese language as the educated Chinese 
can speak and read in English. It is not rare for programs of China Studies offered in 
Western countries to be taught in English and by academics or sinologists who cannot 
speak or read the Chinese language. Only when this change occurs can we begin to 
lay a foundation for a possible equal dialogue.   
 
However, as argued in Chapters One and Three, the CIs operating in some Western 
countries can be described in a position of the ‘last three feet’ with the hegemonic side, 
this means the CIs have to face a lot stronger resistance from the hegemonic side, who 
controls the power of discourse and tends to highlight the ideological connotations in 
the concept of culture to justify their resistance. As discussed in the Literature Review, 
the contents and boundaries of culture as a most elusive term are open to debate, 
especially concerning its relationship with ideology, but the hegemonic side can again 
wield its power to disseminate its own version of interpretations and highlight a 
particular aspect of culture to justify the type of resistance they want to generate.  
 
On the other hand, some Chinese Directors’ comments on the differences between the 
CI and its Western counterparts may ‘lend hilt’ to the other side, for example, UKD4 said:  
 
We have to have a firm stand about the ‘five poisons’- Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, 
Falungong and democratic movement, there are principles that we must stick to as 
government sponsored teachers, this is one of the differences between CI and 
Goethe Institute and British Council, we are state sponsored, so the minimum we 
should do is not to harm national interest. This is the bottom line. (Appendix 10) 
 
The above open rhetoric about the CI being state-sponsored and how they would 
safeguard national interest feed speculations about the CI’s purpose. Hughes (2014: 54) 
argued that “while the more modern idea of public diplomacy has been very attractive in 
China in recent years, it is still shaped by the norm of seeing culture as a tool for the 
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preservation and promotion of the CCP power”. Pan’s research (2013:29) also 
concluded that “CIs function as agents of the state by relaying knowledge and 
information regarding China’s language, cultural traditions, way of life and foreign 
policies, in order to foster international recognition of China as a civilised and harmonious 
society”. These were seized upon by critics such as Mosher (2012: n.p.) to claim that the 
seemingly benign purpose of the CI leaves out a number of purposes both salient and 
sinister, namely “sanitising China’s image abroad, enhancing its soft power globally, and 
creating a new generation of China watchers who are well-disposed towards the 
Communist dictatorship”. This is a typical Western hegemonic perspective as it is the 
wording that describes China’s purpose is ‘sinister’, not necessarily the purpose itself, 
actually, shaping preferences in attitudes towards a particular country is named as the 
very goal of public diplomacy by its founding father Gullion (Melissen, 2005). UKD3 
commented that: “Chinese intention is not sinister in itself, it is only read as sinister 
because Chinese is seen as the Other, and therefore different motivations” (Appendix 
10). 
 
Besides, the political dimension is not a unique ‘Chinese characteristic’. Belanger 
(1999:678) argued that “cultural diplomacy has never been apolitical, even if in general, 
and quite naturally, it claims to be so”; and Taylor (1997:80) put it more blatantly that 
“cultural diplomacy is very much a political activity designed to serve national interests 
in an ostensibly cultural guise”. Again, the hegemonic side controls power to leave their 
own activities under the cultural guise, and only unveils the political intention for CIs as 
if it only applies to them. This perceived political intention induced more resistance from 
the hegemonic side who already occupies the vantage points, making the uphill struggle 
of the CI more arduous. 
 
Therefore, despite the similar missions of these organizations, the actual journey and 
‘road conditions’ of getting there are so different that even the similar intention gained 
a political dimension for the CI. For other organizations who share the same political 
values, their mission is simply language and cultural promotion that is considered 
‘harmless’ and not conflict-ridden, and the hegemonic position they occupy helps to 
shape this process into a natural flow from high to low, while for the CI, its mission was 
interpreted as challenging the current culture hegemony by spreading their own 
ideologies, thus considered as a threat.  
 
However, these fundamental differences that put the CI in an extremely disadvantaged 
position in the terrain were hidden barriers that are rarely mentioned in the Western 
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media or academic literature, instead, they tend to seize upon other differences at a 
more visible level, namely the CI’s operating model and government background. 
 
4.2 Operating Models 
 
The establishment of the CI follows a formal and regular procedure as detailed in 1.5.2. 
The fact that it begins with an application proposal from a foreign organisation is often 
used by Hanban as the strongest counter argument for the conspiracy theory: the CIs 
are invited by their host universities overseas, not imposed on, let alone invaded them. 
Another important mechanism is that each CI has a Board of Advisors with members of 
the host university, usually its president and professors as decision makers. The 
Director from the host university is also taking the leadership role in approving CI plans, 
whereas the Chinese co-Director is mainly responsible for implementing the plan and 
communicating with Hanban.  
 
4.2.1 Chinese rationale behind choosing the model 
 
It is true that the CI did not copy its Western counterparts’ model of operation. Instead 
of being based in city centres, the CI chooses to operate within established universities 
and institutions, or partner with city councils, providing funds, teachers and educational 
materials. This is an excellent strategy of “creating alternative institutions and 
alternative intellectual resources within existing society” (Cox, 1983:165). It is a modern 
day annotation of Gramsci’s term of ‘war of position’, expanding its scope of analysis 
from domestic politics to international relations. The CI’s operating model can be viewed 
as a deliberate move in the ‘war of position’ to counter hegemony. From China’s point 
of view, its rationale can be found in the following three points: 
 
1) The significance of establishing CIs in overseas universities can be revealed in the 
de facto existence of China as no longer the external ‘Other’, but part of a living 
matrix of ‘Us’. This is a vitally important move following the knowledge-power nexus: 
If the discourse in a classroom implicitly either mainstreamlise or marginalise certain 
ideas or values, by being there and telling its own stories, and influencing students 
with people-to-people contacts, the CI would be able to play its subtle role in 
enhancing mutual understanding. 
 
This was endorsed by the ethnographic research findings of Hubbert (2014 b: 348), 
that “the more personal contacts students had with CI teachers, the less China 
appeared the epitome of an authoritarian state”. Also, since most educated people 
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in the host countries do not read Chinese, their understanding of China mainly relies 
on second hand information in English, which is infiltrated with Western hegemonic 
perspectives and Orientalist representations. In this sense, language learning is the 
first step in gaining a more balanced understanding of China, which are the two 
identified mandates of the CI.  
 
2) Secondly, using universities as a vanguard would give cultural diplomacy a more 
non-official face, and universities can be driven by their own motivations to pursue 
“the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other 
aspect of culture” with foreign academic institutions as defined by Cummings (2003). 
Universities can play the roles of autonomous ‘diplomats’ to aim for a win-win 
partnership. 
 
3) Moreover, according to the three layers of public diplomacy suggested by Cowan, 
Geoffrey and Amelia Arsenault (2008:10), the CI model is actually leading the move 
from ‘Monologue’ to ‘Dialogue’, then further to ‘Collaboration’, which was defined as 
“initiatives that feature cross-national participation in a joint venture or project with 
a clearly defined goal”, because “nothing creates a sense of trust and mutual 
respect as fully as a meaningful collaboration”. Collaboration can be a more 
effective public diplomacy technique simply because when working together, 
participants can learn from each other, respect each other by not viewing difference 
as a barrier but a source of insight and synergy, and they may be able to find a 
common ground in at least one area of importance to them, which in turn can 
generate a structure to form more lasting relationships, and generate knowledge 
and insight that neither had before. 
 
This model was further elaborated by Zaharna (2014: 9) who used the case of the CI to 
exemplify a “network collaborative approach” with “relational structures and relational 
dynamics” as its pivotal features, they can help “extend the reach and sustainability of 
the communication” by “transforming the target audience into stakeholders”. This 
“stakeholder perspective is reinforced through co-created narratives and shared identity 
as well as shared ownership of the initiative” (Zaharna, 2014: 32). Cowan & Arsenault’s 
theory (2008) was also endorsed by the Obama Administration in moving the US public 
diplomacy “from the old paradigm, in which our government speaks as one to many, to 
a new model of engaging interactively and collaboratively across lines that might 




The rationale seems to make sense in theory, and according to my interview findings, 
the model appeared to be working in practice as well. The question of ‘advantages and 
disadvantages and why the CI chooses to be based in overseas universities’ has 
surprisingly generated only positive answers, which provided useful evidence in the field 
to support the merits of the collaborative approach on the one hand, but also needs to 
be treated with caution on the other hand as a potential ‘selection-on-the-independent-
variable’ bias, as all the interviewees are working for or with the CI, while those who 
oppose this mode may not have chosen to work in the CI in the first place. 
 
A long list of advantages were mentioned for this model, for example, both the MOD 
and MXD mentioned the “the speed and scope the CI has managed to achieve so far, it 
is very efficient”. What is more important than efficiency is the sustainability pointed out 
by UKD2: “Hanban is very smart in creating this model, it utilises the good platform 
provided by British universities to build creditability and trustworthiness. It also helps 
with long term development” (Appendix 10). 
 
This echoes Zaharna’s (2014) argument that the collaborative approach helps with 
sustainability by transforming the host university into stakeholders, which also include 
local community as pointed by UKD3 who illustrated this point with an example: 
 
It requires the local community to make a positive commitment, a partnership with 
a university or local school gives you a partner who has already made that first step, 
they are more likely to act as the bridge… If we were based in city centre, we could 
encourage local universities to offer a Chinese degree course, but why would they 
want to listen to us? I doubt it would have any influence on our curriculum at all. I 
cannot believe they would have been able to persuade the Pro Vice Chancellor and 
colleagues to include Chinese as part of our degree to improve student experience, 
and build Chinese studies into the research, while because CI is part of the 
university, we now have achieved this (Appendix 10). 
 
An extra bonus of having these local stakeholders on board is to gain ‘credibility’ as 
commented by UKLH2: “it gives public more faith in your product, to see it based on a 
university”; the point was also supported by the example given by UKSC2: “It helps with 
identity building and recognition, for example, when we run a event and CI’s brand is 
new to the local community, the university logo which also appears on the banner or 
stand would help establish trust and status”. The merit of ‘learning from each other’ 
argued by Cowan & Arsenault’s (2008) was also endorsed by one SKD4: “Having a host 
university means more solid support, it facilitates mutual learning and cooperation 
between Chinese and overseas universities” (Appendix 10). 
  
Perhaps the most hidden but potentially biggest benefit for China from this model was 
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revealed by UKD1: “Hanban can assemble hundreds of university presidents/vice 
chancellors from all over the world to Beijing every year to listen to them, if the effects 
are not to ‘brain wash’ them, at least to tame them not to ‘sing an opposite tune’” 
(Appendix 10). This annual conference also invites a wide spectrum of ‘honourable 
delegates’, from officials to academia, from media to business, and senior 
advisors/consultants of various cultural organizations such as the British Council, 
Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute. They represent the elite groups that cultural 
diplomacy targets, and the CI’s model has created a multilevel face-to-face 
engagement, leveraging the knowledge and power equation. Therefore, both theory 
and practice seem to suggest that this model is a smart strategy in the ‘war of position’.  
 
However, everything changes colour through the tinted glaases of ideology, even the 
right form of collaboration does not look right for China. Of course, it is fair to argue that 
although collaboration has the potential to engender such positive relationships, not all 
collaborations managed to realise this potential. When placed in this ‘terrain of struggle’, 
this model is again perceived differently by the other side, its potential constraints, both 
endogenous and exogenous, came to the fore during interactions with the hegemonic 
side. By endogenous constraints, I mean factors from within the CI structure, while the 
exogenous constraints are caused by factors outside the structure. The next section 
will first look at the endogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model.  
 
4.2.2 Endogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model 
 
Compared to Alliance Française’s identity as being “a private higher education 
establishment” and “a local not-for-profit organisation operating autonomously with no 
political or religious commitments” (Alliance Française website), the CI does not claim 
to be independent from the government, actually, it has a double identity as pointed out 
by Kahn-Ackermann (2014): its headquarters Hanban is a government organization 
while the CI exists as a local organization overseas as part of the host university. This 
double identity can also be reflected in the three forms of cultural diplomacy prescribed 
by the Berlin-based Institute of Cultural Diplomacy (cited in Pan, 2013:24):  
 
(1) state-sponsored cultural diplomacy, which is often used by governments for 
distinct political purposes;  
 
(2) independent or semi-independent cultural diplomacy institutions, such as the 
British Council and the Goethe Institute, which take an informative and 




(3) potential cultural diplomacy channelled by academic institutions or individual 
artists, academics or professionals involved in academic exchanges and 
cooperation. 
 
The CI actually falls into form one and three at the same time. These two irreconcilable 
identities have led to a “clash of missions” according to Hughes (2014), who used the 
same example of using university logo as mentioned by UKLH2 and UKLC2 earlier: 
 
There is a big difference between organising a conference with a Chinese university 
or working with academic colleagues from China on the one hand, and allowing an 
institution that has the mission of promoting the values and interests of the CCP to 
have a long-term base on campus and to share in the prestige of the university by 
having a page on its website and use of its logo, on the other. (Hughes, 2014: 57) 
 
This clash of missions has raised a series of concerns over ﬁnance, academic freedom, 
as well as ideological concerns about improper inﬂuence over teaching and research. 
The most sensational way to describe this double identity is the "Trojan horse" with 
ulterior motives dubbed by Mosher (2012). Despite Xu Lin’s direct confrontation with 
this accusation in a China Daily article (Qu, 2012), saying that “CIs are definitely not 
Trojan Horses, since we are holding no weapons in our hands”, Mosher (2012, n.p.) 
perceived this difference as so vital that it invalidates the whole comparison of the CI to 
its Western counterparts:  
 
Unlike Alliance Francaise, the Confucius Institutes are not independent from their 
government; unlike the Goethe Institute establishments, they do not occupy their 
own premises. Instead, participating universities agree to provide office space in 
exchange for funding, and to cede academic control to the United Front Work 
Department of the Chinese Communist Party.  
 
Jocelyn Chey (2008:42), a former diplomat and expert in Australia-China relations, also 
disagreed with the view of the CI as a counterpart to the Goethe Institute or Alliance 
Française, as the close links between the institute and the Chinese Communist Party 
"could lead at best to a 'dumbing down' of research and at worst could produce 
propaganda".  
 
As explained in Chapter Two, all interviewees participating in this research, except Mr. 
Anders of the Goethe Institute in Beijing, work at the CIs, and it is interesting to note that 
none of them viewed the CI’s government background as a drawback, but more of an 
advantage to make its quick expansion possible. However, the ‘quick expansion’ per se 
was seen as leading to fears of China as a threat when the word “alarming speed” (Dale, 




CI’s double identity could explain why some of the advantages in the Chinese eyes would 
turn into disadvantages in the critics’ eyes, such as its location at the “centre of 
knowledge dissemination”. UKSC2 mentioned this as an advantage: “It stands at the 
centre of knowledge dissemination, to have access to students and faculty, it is better 
targeted as university students are elite groups and backbone of the country” (Appendix 
10). However, this was perceived as a potential constraint that can lead to worries of 
reduced academic freedom and ideological infiltration as well as procedure issues as the 
CI teachers are not appointed by the host universities. As pointed out by UKD3: 
 
In universities that uphold academic freedom, this could pose ‘potential 
concerns’ or ‘occasional cultural frictions”, as “what we’re looking at is a conflict 
between the structure of the large organization of CI on overseas campus and 
its goals of seeking to achieve and promote a favourable picture of China. 
(Appendix 10) 
 
These ‘potential concerns’ that ‘could’ be caused were often turned into judgmental 
assumptions by those who shut the doors to the CI. What we can see here is an 
important line of difference between the discussions of ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’ 
of the CI model: all the advantages were raised by the interviewees with facts of what 
has happened, such as the rapid expansion of the CI, while the disadvantages are 
mostly potential constraints that were supported by little evidence but speculations or 
worries that things may happen if we had a CI.  
 
Interestingly, with regards to the negative aspect of the CI model, although all the 25 
interviewees pondered over it, there is only one answer provided by the MXD, and in 
comparison with the GI: “CIs could be very uneven in quality, unlike the Goethe Institute 
that has a standard, the CI is restrained in its ability to follow the Goethe Institute model, 
both in terms of getting approval and registration overseas and in management 
expertise” (Appendix 10).  
 
Kahn-Ackermann (2014), the first Director of the Goethe Institute (GI) in Beijing and 
currently advisor to Hanban, shed more light on this difference in quality and expertise 
in one of the talks he gave in comparing the CI with the GI: the Headquarters of the GI 
guides and supervises all the GIs worldwide to maintain the standard, while Hanban 
only provides funding and teachers to each CI, which is a local organisation in its legal 
status and management. The other difference is the GI trains and develops its own staff, 
the position of the GI Director could be a lifetime career, while the CI does not have ‘its 
own people’ on its premise: both the Chinese director and teachers are seconded on a 
short-term basis and some do not even speak the language of the host country. They 
are not trained adequately to conduct intercultural communications, let alone become 
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an expert in this profession that requires a lot of knowledge, skill and experience.  
 
The defect in its quality assurance mechanism was also recognised by Hanban itself. 
The CI’s quick proliferation in the past ten years only adds to the difficulty of ensuring 
high-quality instruction. Actually at home university level, the supply of full-time 
professional teachers for secondee positions is a real challenge, many home institutions 
lack understanding of the needs of their foreign partners and local conditions, and also 
lack expertise of teaching Chinese as a second language according to Li (2008). The 
high turnover rate of the CI tutors (two-year contract based) makes it harder to maintain 
standard and continuity of teaching, or to expect long-term commitment and initiative 
from the teachers. As a new measure to tackle this problem, Hanban has modified the 
contract to three years as from September 2013. While it may help relieve the concern 
of teaching continuation and student experience overseas, it may make things even 
harder at home for Chinese universities to find enough willing and qualified candidates, 
especially for countries that are not considered as attractive destinations in many parts 
of the world. Many of the interviewees have mentioned the ‘sacrifices’ they have to make 
for such overseas postings: interrupted career ladder, family separation and children’s 
education are the three major restraining factors. Even for attractive destinations like the 
UK, most of the UKSCs interviewed still complained about delayed promotions, and 
difficulties in getting visas for their children to join them and study in the UK. The 
challenge is much more salient for CIs in Africa. For example, after two years’ service, 
the MRD’s conclusion is:  
 
I don’t think the government should try very hard to establish CIs in remote and poor 
parts of Africa, as the conditions are too harsh for the teachers, it is difficult to send 
people there, no quality staff means no quality provision, and therefore no impact 
produced, it would be a waste of money and effort. The teachers have to sacrifice a 
lot, both in term of their personal life and health, while the impact it can produce is 
very limited, it’s just not worth it (Appendix 10). 
 
This was supported by Hartig’s (2014:57) research focusing on CIs in Africa, which 
identified “lack of skilled teachers who are willing to go to Africa” as “one of the most 
crucial issues”. The Chinese Ministry of Education estimated that 100 million people 
outside China would be learning Chinese by 2010 (Peters & Zhang, 2011), and the gap 
of teacher shortage worldwide was five million in 2014 according to Chen & Yu (2016), 
which means many CIs have to use MA students or high school teachers as volunteers. 
Actually, all the three SCs I interviewed in South Korea fall into this category. Though 
eligibility for becoming a volunteer has raised the bar from “any applicant with a HE 
diploma, including retired Chinese subject teachers from university, secondary and 
primaries schools”, to “post-graduate students and in-service teachers who hold a 
138 
 
degree in the areas of teaching Chinese as a second language, Chinese literature, 
foreign languages, education, history and philosophy” (hanban website), it still raised 
concerns about teaching quality, especially when qualified locally hired teachers were 
turned away because of the free staffing from Hanban. When locally hired teachers from 
Taiwan were fired to make place for Hanban sponsored less experienced teachers, 
outrage and protests followed, giving it a political overtone. 
  
The other potential problem pointed by Kahn-Ackermann (2014) is the double-edged 
nature of being engaged in a cross-cultural collaboration: the two CI directors from the 
host and home universities have to work together collegially. It sounds wonderful when 
both sides are in harmony, but in reality, all kinds of misunderstandings, disagreements 
and even conflicts could arise in this process. Many of the examples given in section 
3.5.2 of Chapter Three prove such constraints could be real problems in practice.   
 
Another example of the double-edged feature of the CI model is its ‘long-term 
development’ could be very reliant on the host university as ‘the other half’: the recent 
incidents of closures have all shown that the CI’s life can come to an end if they lose the 
support of the host university. For example, when the CI’s function of opening contacts 
with China was served, it led to the Stockholm University not renewing the agreement 
as “its usefulness had been outlived”, and actually, even a change of staff at the host 
university could have a direct bearing on the CI’s fate. For the same example of the 
Stockholm University, the decision was already once announced in 2008 to remove the 
CI from its campus due to concerns of undue influence (Fiskesjö, 2015), but the 
termination was not executed due to strong support and influence from its Director, 
Professor Torbjörn Lodén, until his retirement in 2014. The other case of the LCI closure 
also had to do with change of Director, which will be looked at in more details in section 
4.3.2. 
 
Actually, this ‘human factor’ was mentioned by all the Directors interviewed as a key 
factor: a different Director behind the wheel of the same CI could mean taking different 
directions and paths, as each CI has a clear hallmark of the Director’s personal style, 
competence and perceptions of China. For example, some Chinese Directors do not 
speak good English or the language of the host country; and some foreign Directors may 
not speak a word of Chinese while his/her predecessor/successor could well be an 
overseas Chinese with acquired citizenship of the host country. This change of Director 
also has a direct effect on the CI’s day-to-day work, as UKLH4 put it:  
 
At the time when our Director was the Head of School, the CI was in close working 
139 
 
relations with the host school, but since the new Director took over, the CI is on its 
own tracks with little convergence with the host school, even on Open Days, we 
have our own stand, kept a distance from the school stand, we also teach different 
students with no overlapping groups. It seems each side feels that we do not need 
each other (Appendix 10).  
 
All these exemplified that the double-edged feature means some of the merits could also 
produce side effects, just as some of the advantages can be perceived as disadvantages 
by the other side. If these can be understood as endogenous constraints that are results 
of factors from within the CI structure, the next section will look at the exogenous 
constraints caused by factors outside the structure.  
 
4.2.3 Exogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model 
 
Though operating as the Cultural and Educational Section of the British Embassy, the 
British Council claimed itself to be a "stand-alone organization” according to its chief 
executive Martin Davidson, who believed the CI is “not comparable” because “they are 
being embedded in university campuses. The real question has to be one of 
independence. Are we seen as simply representing the views of the government? Or is 
there a degree of separation?" He went on to query the government funding that comes 
with it: “I doubt they have to say, ‘we’ll only give you this money if you never criticise 
China.’ The danger is more of self-censorship — which is a very subtle thing” (cited in 
Guttenplan, 2012: n.p.). 
 
How can the British Council, who also gets funding from the government and is even 
based in the embassy, accuse the CI of lacking independence when it is based on a 
university campus? Was this merely due to its government connection? A 
distinguishment must be made here between government connection and affiliation. 
Hanban does not just get money from the government; it is under the leadership of the 
government, while the British Council defines itself as “the world’s leading cultural 
relations organisation” which “focuses on developing people-to-people links and 
complements government-to-people and government-to-government contact” (British 
Council website). Its role to ‘complement’ government contact, not to ‘implement’ 
government aims may represent the ‘degree of separation’ in Davidson’s words. In the 
GI Director Anders’s words, the GI actually enjoyed ‘autonomy’: 
 
We are a world-wide structure and I’m very happy to have the autonomy. After 
the WWII, we were very concerned about propaganda, the political 
instrumentalisation of culture, it was written into the German constitution that 
arts and culture has to be autonomous, it is not a field of government influence. 
Therefore, the freedom of art is upheld. We’re getting our money from the 
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Foreign Ministry, but as an association, not a state organisation. the GI is not 
affiliated to the ministries or housed inside the embassies, and the GI Director 
is not part of the diplomatic mission (Appendix 10).  
 
 
Kahn-Ackermann (2014) actually referred to this as a “small difference” between the CI 
and GI’s government background, as they both rely on government funding and support, 
which is of “tremendous help but also a burden”, so both institutes have to walk the 
same tightropes between the “political and cultural realms”, but I argue the real ‘big 
difference’ lies at the ‘political realm’, which represents the exogenous constraints of 
the CI model. According to Li & Dai’s research (2011) on the CI’s International Media 
Environment, the top three factors contributing to the CI’s negative reports are: 
Communism, propaganda, and threat/danger. Actually, the three factors are inter-
related one another. In Germany, critics and sinologists fear that the influence of the 
Chinese state on the CI would put “German universities at risk of becoming 
mouthpieces for the Chinese Communist Party” (Ricking, 2012). Here we can see the 
‘equation’ discussed earlier: the Chinese government is equated with the Communist 
Party, which is a synonym for authoritarian ruling and a threat to democracy, therefore, 
people who dislike the Chinese political system tend to see state involvement in the CI 
as ‘dangerous communist propaganda’. In other words, being the ‘ideological other’ is 
a more salient label, overriding the similarity in government funding with this one big 
difference that “springs from the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system” 
(Hartig, 2012: 70).  
 
On the other hand, this speculation is encouraged by the Chinese government 
presence, which tends to be much more ‘in the limelight’ compared with Western 
government’s backstage role, a lot of CI’s media exposure is because of a high-profile 
official visit from the government. Actually, such pictures were often used in negative 
Western media reports about the CI. For example, a picture of Xi Jinping unveiling a CI 
plaque in Melbourne in 2010 was used in the 2014 BBC report about the closure of 
Chicago University CI; and the Telegraph report used the picture of Liu Yandong, Vice 
Premier and Council Chair of the CI Headquarters, speaking at George Washington 
University CI in 2013. Xi Jinping’s picture of attending a function at the Stockholm CI in 
2010 was also used by South China Morning Post in its 2015 report on Swedish 
University Severs Ties with Confucius Institute. In comparison, pictures of state leaders 
are rarely found in the websites of the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Cervantes 
Institute or Goethe Institute. 
 
When the interview question of ‘how the CI is compared to its Western counterparts’ is 





Cervantes/Goethe Institute are non-governmental while the CI is governmental, 
and often takes on a political colour. The CI should be a non-governmental 
organization for cultural transmission, but it serves a national strategy and the 
Chinese government has spent a lot of money on it every year, so they have their 
stand and want to show this through their visits (Appendix 10). 
 
A reading of the Milestones in 2014 in the CI’s Annual Development Report (hanban 
website) shows 16 high profile official visits to CIs by Chinese top leadership, including 
six from Xi Jinping himself. These visits seem to make the implicit government 
connection more explicit. Lo, a political science professor at the University of Waterloo 
that hosts a CI, called the CI’s controversial activities “unintended consequences of their 
close alignment with Beijing” (cited in Little, 2010). These “consequences” support the 
discussion in the Literature Review: the dose of government defining, planning, funding, 
and leading is one of the ‘ingredients’ that are causing side effects of reducing the 
cultural appeal while courting fears of ideological infiltration.  
 
If government presence is an overt demonstration of the CI’s the government affiliation, 
censorship is a covert indication, even if it is not directly about what the CI can do, its 
existence in the domestic environment could be considered a source of exogenous 
constraints as well. A recent example was given during my interview with Mr. Anders: 
a blacklist was published by the Ministry of Culture in August about 120 pop songs that 
are not allowed to be aired anymore:  
 
This act raised a lot of questions in the Western context and immediately made 
problems for the CI, as they are the representative of Chinese cultural 
organisation in the host country, people would ask: what is going on in your 
country? From this you see a heavily censored country, one must be aware 




At the same time, the international media environment may represent another source of 
exogenous constraints for the CI as they did not have much voice heard. Both overt and 
covert biases can be observed in the international media reports regarding the CI. For 
example, in Guttenplan’s New York Times article (2012) titled ‘Critics Worry About 
Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses’, Mosher’s ‘Trojan horse’ accusation 
and other criticisms were elaborately reported, but they would not point out to readers 
that the criticisms all come from people who do not work with the CI, and only use their 
secondary information or so-called ‘knowledge’ to judge it, nor would they show the 
profile of Mosher as an advocate for human rights in China, using ideological differences 
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as a sweeping allegation to ignore the CI’s focus on language teaching that does not 
necessarily has any political aims. The only counter argument came from Mr. Byrne as 
a CI Director from LSE, who denied there had been any pressure from his Chinese 
partners to steer clear of any areas. “Our focus is on the language of business and 
culture. We’re not here to engage with difficult issues”. No views from China were ever 
represented in this article. Even when China is given a voice in some of the Western 
media, it tends to be left in a position trying to justify what it does. When media decides 
on what to write, what not to write, how much to write, who to interview and what 
questions to be answered, these decisions are loaded with the power of discourse. 
 
So far, the discussions have revealed that despite the number of merits of the CI model, 
it also comes with both exogenous and endogenous constraints that that set the CI apart 
from its Western counterparts. As Starr (2009) has summarised, these constraints fall 
into two categories: ‘insiders’ with practical concerns and ‘outsiders’ with ideological 
concerns. In this uneven terrain of struggle, advantages and disadvantages are like 
mirror images. It is important for the CI to understand how and why many of the 
advantages could potentially be a ‘double-edged sword’ and perceived as 
disadvantages by the other side, because after all, what matters most is how to make 
the partnership work. In order to make it work, the CI model has demonstrated a high 
level of flexibility and responsiveness, which will be discussed in the next section as 
another aspect of the difference to its Western counterparts.   
 
4.2.4 Flexibility and responsiveness of the CI’s operating model 
 
Compared to its Western counterparts, such as the Goethe Institute, which follows a 
standard operating model all over the world prescribed by the Headquarters, the CI’s 
model is given more room for flexibility to fit into the local conditions, and is more 
responsive to different bargaining powers and capacities of the host universities, as well 
as emerging challenges. In order to provide more text based evidence to showcase this 
flexibility and the adjustments made to the CI’s operation over the years, four CI 
Agreements (see Appendix 7) were collected to trace the changes: two were signed in 
the UK (April 2008 and 2009); one was signed in the US (July 2013), and one was signed 
in Poland (September 2014). In order to see the evolving developments throughout the 
years, these agreements will be referred to by the year they were signed, i.e. the 2008 
UK Agreement. Of course, no conclusion can be generalised from comparing these four 




1) The framework remains the same under the title of ‘Agreement Between 
Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and XXX University on the 
Establishment of Confucius Institute at XXX University’. 
 
2) One addition was made to Article 3 Executive Institution in the 2014 
Agreement: “The institute must be launched within one year after this 
agreement is signed”. This amendment could be a response to the aborted 
agreement signed with Toronto District School Board in 2012. A similar case 
was the agreement signed with Stuttgart Media University in August 2014 
and was cancelled in 2015.     
 
3) In Article 4 Scope of Activities, there are two notable changes in wording. 
Firstly, “academic activities” used in the 2008 and 2009 Agreements was 
replaced by “language and cultural exchange activities” in the 2013 and 2014 
Agreements, in line with the changes in the official document of Confucius 
Institute Constitution discussed in section 3.5.1; secondly, in the agreement 
signed in 2013, the description of “other activities” was changed from “with 
authorisation and by appointment of the Headquarter” to “as mutually 
agreed”, which clearly shows more respect and attention paid to equal 
partnership.  
 
4) Similarly, in Article 5 Organisation, the wording was changed from “The 
institute must accept the assessment of the Headquarters on the teaching 
quality” to “The institute will collaborate with the Headquarters on the 
assessment of teaching quality”, which again shows more of an equal 
relationship between the Headquarters and the CI.  
 
5) Article 6 Obligations contains most variations, for example, the start-up 
fund provided by Hanban varies from 50,000-150,000 US Dollars just among 
these four Agreements; Some prestigious universities such as the Chicago 
University received 200,000 US Dollars start up fund, (Sahlins, 2013) and 
Penn State University was even awarded 1 million US dollar’s grant to create 
the CI according to its website (http://news.psu.edu/tag/confucius-institute). 
Other examples of disparity include teacher’s accommodation cost: the 2008 
Agreement stated that the Headquarters will pay for the “air fares, 
accommodations and salaries” for the Chinese instructors sent by them, but 
no accommodation was included in the 2009, 2013 and 2014 Agreements, 
and it was specified in the separate Agreement on Provision of Chinese 
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Language Teachers signed between Hanban and the host university that the 
host university will “provide accommodation”.  
 
6) The biggest disparity was found in Article 7 Financial Support, which only 
existed In the 2008 and 2009 Agreement and started with the same 
statement that “The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by the XXX 
University (host University) and the Headquarters”, but not followed by any 
specific ratio defined for the host university contributions to the operating 
fund in the 2008 and 2009 Agreements. Then in the 2013 and 2014 
Agreement, this part was moved to “The obligations of the host university” in 
Article 4/6, and the ratio was specified as “should not be less than the amount 
provided by the Headquarters”, which means a minimum of 1:1 match fund 
from the host university.  
 
By 2014, as published in the Confucius Institute Annual Development Report, the 
ratio of Hanban expenditure to those of host institutions stood at 1:1.5. According 
to SKD4, some CIs operating in Asia (especially in Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore) simply do not request operating funds from Hanban but only apply for 
teacher support and other intangible things. This gives the full spectrum of how 
operating funds are provided, from 1:1 and 1:1.5 matched by the host university, 
to 100% provided by the host university.  
 
    7) Another important change can be identified in Article 10 Term, following 
the same line of “The agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity”, the older 
version says “Either party, if it wishes to terminate the Agreement must notify the 
other in writing during the 90 days before the end of the Agreement, otherwise it 
will automatically continue thereafter unless and until it is terminated by either 
party giving to the other not less than 90 days written notice”; in the Agreement 
of 2013, this wordy sentence was changed to a succinct one: “The Agreement 
will be subject to renewal only by mutual written agreement of both parties”. This 
change made the renewal a much more considered and transparent process, 
clearing worries of a ‘done deal before you know it’.  
 
    8) In Article 12 Termination, the older version has only mentioned in such an 
event that the host university should “make appropriate arrangements for the 
enrolled students and other workers” while in the Agreement of 2013, it was 
added that the host university shall “promptly reimburse the Headquarters for any 
excess funds advanced by the Headquarters under this Agreement, over and 
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above non-cancellable commitments and costs incurred” by the host university 
as of the date of termination. This may mean more financial consequences to 
consider when termination decisions are made.  
 
It is important to bear this responsiveness in mind when analysing the CIs as there is no 
standard formula. Similarly, flexibility and non-uniformity are also seen in the next section 
that will move on to the last aspect of the comparison: its provisions.  
 
4.3 Provisions  
 
According to paragraph 11 of its Constitution and by-laws (2007 version), Confucius 
Institutes provide the following services overseas: 1) provide Chinese language 
teaching; 2) train Chinese language instructors and provide Chinese language teaching 
resources; 3) hold the Chinese proficiency test (HSK) and tests for the certification of 
Chinese language teachers; 4) provide information and consultative services 
concerning Chinese language education and China’s culture, economy and society; 5) 
conduct research on contemporary China (Ren, 2012:12). 
 
It showed a clear focus on language teaching, with the word ‘language’ repeated in the 
top three services, while culture was only mentioned as an area of its consultative 
services in point four. Unable to identify since which year the change was made, but at 
least after 2012, the information on Hanban website was changed into: “4) provide 
information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so 
forth”; and “5) conduct language and cultural exchange activities between China and 
other countries” (hanban website). It is noticeable that “cultural exchange activities” 
were specified and replaced “research” in the old version. These two aspects of 
provision will now be compared with the CI’s Western counterparts. 
 
  4.3.1 Cultural activities, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
 
As shown in 4.2.4, despite the centralised input from Hanban and the globalised outreach 
of the CI, no standard ‘recipe’ can be found for all the CIs. Each CI has its own way of 
operation, which is allowed if not encouraged, by Hanban, and determined by the specific 
factors within the home and host institutions. For example, the ratio between language 
and cultural provision varies from CI to CI, depending a lot on the host institutions: if they 
are not offering any Chinese language programs, then the CI can add great value in 
running Chinese modules or even setting up a degree course; if otherwise, then the CI 
will add value more in the cultural provisions, both for the host university and to the wider 
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community. Penn State University is the latter case, as one professor of Comparative 
Literature and Asian Studies explained, since we have a “very robust Chinese-language 
program”:  
 
We did not use Chinese teachers from Hanban at Penn State, and did not use 
Hanban pedagogical material, this meant that much of the work the CI could do was 
restricted to a fairly narrow range of activities within the university - cultural activities 
and events by visiting Chinese troupes promoted by Hanban for instance, and then 
some other activities outside the university (support for community events) (cited in 
Redden, 2014b: n.p.).  
 
 
Among these cultural activities, the most popular one is ‘China Day’ at schools, with 
repertoires including calligraphy, Chinese brush painting, food and tea tasting, taiji, 
shuttlecock, Chinese knot and lantern making, language taster, quiz and lectures, just to 
name a few. Such cultural activities are often criticised for reducing the diversity of 
China’s cultures to a “uniform, quaint commodity” characterised by Taiji and Chinese 
dance performances, it tends to become a “taxidermised” version of Chinese culture, or 
a product of “culturetainment” as criticized by Lionel Jensen, an associate professor of 
East Asian Languages at the University of Norte Dame, meaning “the abridgment of 
Chinese civilisation in the name of digestible forms of cultural appeal can be readily 
shipped overseas” (cited in Redden, 2012, n.p.). This commodity concept is actually 
closely related to the CI’s new nickname of ‘spiritual high speed train’: it may go very far 
very quickly, but the impact it can produce may be short term. This was echoed by 
UKD1’s comments that “most of these are ‘superficial stuff’”, UKD3 also pointed that  
 
One of the dangers of CI is that it can project a slightly folk culture, like using 
thatched cottages to represent England, they do exist in a few places, but they are 
not really what England is about; traditional Chinese dance is important, but it does 
not really capture the real rich modern range of Chinese culture (Appendix 10).  
 
During the interview, Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing, also 
enunciated that:  
 
The main and obvious difference is our understanding of culture is much broader 
than those held by the CI concerning cultural activities. Their notion of culture is 
very traditional, also in a way very repetitive, meaning they are very much focused 
on calligraphy, Chinese cooking etc. These aspects of life are important, but it 
would be more successful to open up discussions of contemporary society, to 
engage with the discourses of the country where they are. The CIs are very close 
to the academic world, they are easily linked up to the other departments of the 
University, for example, if they do a symposium on something, such as China’s 
urbanisation or digitalisation, the CI can bring in somebody from China, this would 




On the one hand, these interview findings seem to support Shambaugh’s (2013) 
observation of China’s cultural ‘footprint’ of being increasingly broad across the globe, 
but not particularly deep. On the other hand, it shows the dilemma for the CI: since it is 
based on university campus, it has the stage to play a bigger role, but at the same time, 
the controversies it has caused suggest it is safer simply repeating those harmless, 
traditional cultural activities. Therefore, it is up to the individual CI’s position and vision 
to use the scope available, either in a more trailblazing manner, or a more ‘play it safe’ 
mode. 
 
The second difference mentioned by Mr. Anders in the interview is the approach:  
 
Our approach is to develop everything we do together with our partners in the 
respective countries, for example, we work closely with ministries and the 
academic world in China to promote professionalization of German teacher 
training, while my observation is that the Chinese approach is very much 
focused on themselves: talking about the significance of Chinese tradition and 
culture, emphasizing the difference of the Chinese way, of course, it is right 
there are differences and that’s why we’re here, to discuss the differences, but 
we felt the different approach is they want to promote themselves, and we 
promote the partnership. (Appendix 10) 
 
 
It is a little ironic being compared this way as the CI model itself is a partnership. Going 
back to the earlier example of the global China Day Hanban initiated in September 2014, 
it was considered a bad idea by UKD3 interviewed: 
 
Because of the misunderstandings of China, people need to be persuaded in a 
more subtle way to take China seriously, they need to watch a good film, a 
wonderful cultural show, then they feel, Oh gosh, China is good, but having a 
China Day in town is something like, an unfriendly analogy, having a Jehovah's 
Witnesses Day, a kind of Day that a set of people with a particular interest, it 
doesn’t fit into British culture, we don’t have other days - we don’t have a 
Germany Day, or US Day, a China Day is in a way almost reinforces the sense 
that China is quite a different culture. (Appendix 10) 
 
 
Nothing is more critical than getting your own partner on board to make the partnership 
work. Hanban is actually using the Goethe Institute as a consultant, they meet regularly 
to exchange ideas, the above two points made by Mr. Anders can provide good food for 
thought for Hanban.  
 
4.3.2 Research, an unique element associated with the CI’s model 
 
A quick comparison between services offered by the CI and its Western counterparts 
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would show one distinct element that was only offered by the CI: research, which may 
have to do with its unique model of being based on university campus. Compared with 
the deletion of “economy and society” from its scope of consultative services in point 4, 
the complete change of content in point 5 of its mandate is very intriguing, while the 
explanation for the reasons behind the removal of “research” is nowhere to be found 
(none of the interviewees was even aware of the change). It may suggest that Hanban 
wishes to avoid controversial activities that might make the cooperation difficult and 
lead to some ill-defined relationships, or even closures.  
 
However, despite the removal of the word “research” from the list, the work of research 
was not entirely called off, in the directive Hanban issued in 2011, it asked each CI to 
conduct research on Chinese culture and “foster a new generation of sinologists” (cited 
in Kluver, 2014). Then in November 2012, it launched the new ‘Confucius China Studies 
Program’ to take on more of a facilitator’s role in channelling research from overseas 
campus to China. This program is a series of research projects including generous 
scholarships for ‘PhD in China fellowship’, ‘Young Leaders in China Fellowship’ as well 
as ‘Understanding China Fellowship’ that serves to support academics from foreign 
universities to “undertake research with Chinese researchers in China” (Hanban website). 
This could be considered a clever move of ‘stepping backward is actually moving forward’ 
in the battle for the power of discourse by inviting foreign scholars to study the ‘Other’ 
with the ‘Other’ in the ‘Other’s land, also being consistent with the CI’s priority task: “let 
more foreigners come to experience China first hand” (UKLH3); but it has also attracted 
scepticism from some critics who interpreted the “new generation of sinologists” as 
“China watchers who are well-disposed toward the Communist dictatorship” (Mosher, 
2012). This view was refuted by UKD2: “but no one would say if you to study in the US 
with a full scholarship, you’d be polluted and anything you wrote would automatically be 
in favour of America” (Appendix 10).  
 
However, this new-found form of research sponsored by Hanban, the ‘Confucius China 
Studies Program’, was still mentioned as a direct reason leading to the closure of the 
Lyon Confucius Institute (LCI) in September 2013. It was rarely reported until “The 
Debate Over Confucius Institutes” was published on China File following the AAUP’s 
report submitted in June 2014. Gregory Lee, Chair of the LCI Board participated in Part 
II of the debate and explained that since a “new director taking his instructions directly 
from Beijing arrived in Sep 2012”, he “insisted strongly on a deeper integration of the 
LCI in the University itself” through participating in teaching of the University degree 
programs and partnership with the university research centres on the Confucius China 
Studies Program to send PhD students to study in China (China File, 2014). As 
149 
 
disclosed in a BBC report titled: Investigation: Behind the Closed Door of LCI, the 
Chinese Studies program at Lyon 3 University also offers courses in Min Nan Dialect 
(spoken in Taiwan) and Taiwan studies. The CI’s new move was perceived as gaining 
leverage over independent research, and when this “interference” was deemed to be 
“inappropriate since it would put in doubt our academic freedom” thus refused by the 
LCI Board, Xu Lin, the Hanban Director, demanded the resignation of the LCI Board 
chair and announced without warning the suspension of Hanban’s annual fund. As a 
result, one locally hired teacher was fired, and the LCI eventually ceased its activities 
in September 2013, becoming the first CI closed down due to research controversy. 
Both sides felt hitting a bottom line that could not be compromised (BBC, 2015). 
 
If we look into the reasons behind the Penn State University CI’s closure, a similar dose 
of ‘research’ can be detected. This CI is one of the few that have specified “research” 
in its mission statement, and according to the report in New York Times (Jacobs & Yu, 
2014), it was “Hanban’s regular rejection of their research plans, including those on the 
environment, science and politics, saying they were beyond the scope of CI’s mission” 
that led to the termination of the partnership.  
 
An interesting comparison can be made between the LCI’s case, where it is Hanban’s 
demand for the CI to offer sinology PhD scholarships in China through its partnerships 
with the university research centres that caused the relationship to stumble; while in the 
Penn State’s case, they wanted to utilise the CI’s resources to support more activities 
in humanities research, but these ideas were rejected by Hanban for being too far 
outside the official CI remit. These two cases may seem to contradict each other, but if 
we look at the actual ‘war of position’, we will see it is the same fight for power: the 
significance of the Confucius China Studies program is that China’s contribution to 
research is not just in the form of funds, but more in terms of ‘knowledge’ production, 
while just providing funds to the host university to do research that the CI has no direct 
participation does not contribute to gaining positions of influence at all. However, in the 
current terrain where the US and Europe hold and try to maintain their ‘positional 
superiority’, it seems no matter whether the CI wants to be actively engaged in research 
or passively refuses to get involved, they all lead to the same discord in the partnerships.  
 
Another interesting observation concerning the Confucius China Studies Program is 
when the Institute for International Education (IIE) made the announcement on their 
website in February 2015, a special note was added in full-capitalised letters: “NOTE 
THAT DESPITE THE NAME OF THE FELLOWSHIP, THIS IS NOT ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE "CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE" PROGRAM. IT IS MANAGED BY THE 
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INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION.” (IIE website) This clarification 
reveals the delicate balance that Western academic institutions are trying to strike: Yes 
we want your money, but we do not want your money to contaminate our reputation.  
 
We can see from these examples that research can be a flashpoint in the interactions 
between China scholars, host universities, and the Chinese government. A deeper 
investigation is thus worthwhile to look at a more influential CI closure, the one at the 
University of Chicago (CIUC) who claims to be “research oriented”. Of the seven CI 
closures that have taken place so far, the University of Chicago created the biggest 
sensation by announcing not to renew its agreement when Hanban was celebrating 
CI’s first ten-year anniversary in September 2014. Then in the same week, Penn State 
University also made the closing announcement, making a big impact through wide 
media coverage (reported by BBC, Reuters, the Economist, Times High Education, 
New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Telegraph, South China Morning 
Post, to name but a few).  
 
The CIUC’s closure was then referred to when the Stockholm University announced its 
decision to close its CI in December 2014, and further in June 2015, when the Stuttgart 
Media University decided to ‘scuttle’ its plans to establish a CI as per its contract signed 
with Hanban in August 2014, “after various discussions with representatives of politics 
and economy and did not succeed in finding the necessary support" (cited in Redden, 
2015). The long lasting effects made CIUC a very illustrative case to show the 
challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy. Besides, the University of Chicago only 
came to this decision after lengthy negotiations with Hanban, which can function like a 
micrograph of the ‘terrain of struggle’ that merit a detailed investigation into this process.  
 
4.4 To be, or not to be - A Tale of the CIUC Closure  
 
Since the first CI’s establishment in 2004, it has quickly expanded to 500 all over the 
world by December 2015, while seven CIs have ceased to operate so far6. The first two 
closed in 2010 were not extensively reported: one was the CI at Osaka Sangyo 
University in Japan, which was closed in March 2010 due to spy concerns (Lumsden, 
2015); the other one was closed by the local Security Bureau in Yakutsk of Russia 
                                                             
6 These do not include the aborted CI agreements: one was signed with the Toronto District 
School Board in 2012 but was cancelled in 2014, and one was signed with Stuttgart Media 
University in 2014 and was cancelled in 2015. The former decision was made as a result of 20 to 
2 vote among the trustees after parents, teachers and students protested against any involvement 
of the Chinese government in Canadian schools (Reuters, 2014). This incident was featured in 
the documentary of In the Name of Confucius released in December 2016.  
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(Tîrnoveanu, 2016). The later five CI closures from 2013-2015 received much more 
media attentions and triggered a lot more debates: apart from the Lyon Confucius 
Institute that was closed by Hanban in 2013 (Hughes, 2014), the other four decisions 
to terminate their renewable CI agreements were all made by the host institutions - 
Macmaster University in 2013, Chicago and Penn-State universities in 2014 and 
Stockholm University in 2015. There were also two universities in Canada that have 
severed their ties with the CI, but the CIs continued to exist with college level partners: 
one is the University of Sherbrooke, who acted on the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers (CAUT)’s appeal for “universities and colleges in Canada which 
currently host Confucius Institutes on their campuses to cease doing so” and severed 
ties with the CI on 31 December 2013 after months of failed negotiations, saying that 
Hanban’s arrangement no longer met the University’s international plans, leaving the 
CI in Quebec only hosted by Dawson College. Then in June 2015, the University of 
Waterloo also decided to “withdraw” from the four-party partnership in the CI following 
a campus consultation, leaving the CI remain open hosted only by its affiliated Renison 
University College (Montgomery, 2014).  
 
If we look at the sheer number of these closures, the tiny proportion of 7 out of 500 may 
be rightfully considered a sign of ‘success’ of the CI, however, if we look at their calibres 
and locations, we will note the fact that all the closures after 2013 took place in North 
America and Europe, the most targeted areas where perceptions of China have been 
the most unfavourable, thus received the most concentrated CI spreads: according to 
statistics released by Hanban in December 2015, there are 157 CIs in North America 
and 169 in Europe, over 65% of the global total. The uneven distribution is more obvious 
if we look at the number of Confucius Classrooms: 801 out of the 1000 classrooms 
(over 80%) in the whole world are located in these two regions (Hanban website). All 
the Hanban-sponsored student summer camps and school principal visits, nine in total 
in 2014, were only from these two regions as well (CI Annual Development Report 
2014).  
 
Besides, all the five host universities are prestigious institutions: McMaster is rated No. 
four among all Canadian universities and the highest among all the 13 that host a CI in 
Canada; The Lyon Confucius Institute (LCI) partners with two universities (Université 
Jean Moulin - Lyon 3, and Université Lumière- Lyon 2); Stockholm University was the 
first in Europe to host a CI, its closure left a big gap in Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
where no major universities now host a CI; and Chicago University is the highest rating 
one among all the 100 American universities that host a CI. The section below will take 




4.4.1 The ‘Trilogy’: three key documents and their subtexts 
 
To set the scene for this investigation, three key documents that led up to the final 
announcement will be presented in a timeline: the Chicago University petition, the 
AAUP report and the Chicago University statement, followed by a close reading and 
subtext analysis that continue to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to decipher the 
messages conveyed and examine different players’ roles in driving CIUC to this result 
step by step.  
 
i) The Chicago University petition  
 
In April 2014, 108 professors, including seven department chairs from the Chicago 
University, signed on a petition to “urge the Council of the Senate to terminate the 
contract with the Confucius Institutes”. Among the reasons presented, the four points 
below were highlighted (the full text can be found in Appendix 4): 
 
--The fact that Hanban is an agency of the Chinese government, whose global 
agenda is set by high officials of the Party-State, makes it a dubious practice to 
allow such an external institution to staff academic courses within the University 
and approve funding for its research proposals.  
 
-- It subjects the University’s academic program to the political constraints on 
free speech and belief that are specific to the People’s Republic of China. The 
Executive Director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) 
was quoted that Canadian colleges and universities were compromising their 
own integrity by allowing Hanban “to have a voice in a number of academic 
matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of class discussions”. 
 
--It was established in the McMaster case and has since been corroborated as 
well in an American Confucius Classrooms that the Hanban teachers are 
trained to ignore or divert questions on issues that are politically taboo in China, 
such as the status of Taiwan, Tiananmen, the pro-Democracy movement, etc.  
 
-- Although the University of Chicago has ignored the provisions in the  
Agreement specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials for 
Chinese language instruction, the University of Chicago is hosting a CI under 
privileges not available to many other schools, the effect is that, mindful only of 
its own welfare, the University is participating in a worldwide, politico-
pedagogical project that is contrary in many respects to its own academic 
values.  
 
The wording of ‘dubious practice’ and the quotes emphasised in italics suggest a logic 
that because Hanban is “an agency of the Chinese government”, which is a party-state, 
therefore, to submit research proposals to them for approval is dubious practice, as it is 
to subject the University’s academic program to the “political constraints on free speech 
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and belief” (According to its official website, CIUC was founded as a “research-oriented” 
CI). For such a radical conclusion, there was no evidence given except the ‘counter’ 
evidence that the University of Chicago “has ignored the provisions in the Agreement 
specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials for Chinese language 
instruction”, and as quoted earlier, Penn State University also “did not use Chinese 
teachers from Hanban at Penn State, and did not use Hanban pedagogical material”, 
which means this did not happen due to their ‘privileges’, and all these are no more than 
speculative assumptions. This confirms what McCord (2014: n.p.) has argued that the 
greatest problem with the “anti-CI literature is that it often leaps from suspicions and 
concerns to a conclusion of fact”. Actually, the choice of not using Hanban supplied 
textbooks is not such a rare ‘privilege’, according to Xu Lin, “only 12.5% of the institutes 
used textbooks published in China, the others used teaching materials composed in 
foreign countries” (Qu, Zhao & Cheng, 2012). 
 
The McMaster case was cited as an evidence, which is about one individual tutor who 
hid her faith in Falun Gong in order to get the job, and based on one individual case, 
the CAUT’s statement made a blanket assertion and appealed for all Canadian 
universities not to compromise their own integrity by “allowing Hanban to have a voice 
in a number of academic matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of class 
discussions”. Hanban was clearly treated as a source that would impose inappropriate 
influence over such academic matters as it is identified as a government organisation. 
But not using ‘teachers from Hanban’ is a deceiving change of concept here: Hanban 
as a government organisation has no teachers, all teachers were recommended and 
sent by the home universities in China. If teachers from Chinese universities are 
considered as not fit for teaching Chinese abroad, then it is no longer a covert, but an 
overt claim for the sole legitimacy of ‘Us’ to teach about ‘the Other’ under the hoisted 
banner of academic freedom. It is such a classic case mirroring the famous quote of 
Karl Marx in the first page of Orientalism (1978): “they cannot represent themselves, 
they must be represented”.  
 
As for its accusation that “Hanban teachers are trained to ignore or divert questions on 
issues that are politically taboo in China”. This is again paradoxical: if the CI teachers 
are accused of ‘ignoring or diverting’ such questions, are they encouraged, or even 
allowed, to engage in these discussions and have the Chinese voice heard? Isn’t this 
self-contradictory in criticising censorship by censoring voices from China? True, the 
interview findings of this research did confirm that during the pre-departure trainings, 
the CI tutors are advised to avoid or divert discussions of politically sensitive issues. 
Hanban’s stand is always that political discussion is not the CI’s remit, and the CI 
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teachers do not necessarily have the expertise to handle such discussions either. The 
teachers are on a mission to teach Chinese language and do not have to “introduce 
into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject”. This is to 
borrow a line from the AAUP’s definition of academic freedom: “teachers are entitled to 
freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to 
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject” 
(AAUP website). A fine line needs to be noted here: if the ‘subject’ is Chinese language 
teaching, then “politically sensitive issues” can be argued to be “controversial matter 
which has no relation to their subject”. If this is the definition endorsed as the core 
principle by more than 200 national scholarly and educational associations, then it is 
another classic example of double standard when the CI teachers doing exactly the 
same thing would be accused of interfering in ‘academic freedom’. This is not a 
definition of freedom but one of hegemony in essence.  
 
Of course, the CI teachers are not a homogenous body, they come from various 
backgrounds and are delivering various content of teaching in various styles. They are 
a rather heterogeneous group of teachers in this sense, yet both sides seem to refer to 
this group as one monolithic: both in the accusations against ‘Hanban teachers’ in the 
petition and the defence against ‘the CI teachers’ given by Hanban, though both sides 
could be referring to an actual minority in this group of actors in their arguments. The 
common thing shared in this group is they are the commanders of classrooms. Said 
(1993: 206) has commented on the power of classroom discourse with a punch: “One 
is taught to be patriotic, to understand certain, carefully selected aspects of history of 
this country, and so on. It’s very powerful.” Because it is so powerful, it can help maintain 
hegemony by not only deciding on what can be said and what cannot, but also who can 
say it and who cannot. 
 
The other common trait of ‘the CI teachers’ is they are sent by the home universities in 
China, not recruited by the host universities, which reflects back to the McMaster case 
where both the discriminatory hiring and the fact that host university cedes hiring 
decision entirely to Hanban was at the core of the disagreement. Actually, in the 
negotiation process between Hanban and the University of Chicago as disclosed by 
Redden (2014b), an ad hoc committee charged with evaluating the CI function issued 
a report proposing some significant changes, including “replacing the three instructors 
hired through the Confucius Institute and Hanban with instructors hired directly by the 
East Asian languages department”. The report concluded that “a permanently 
renewable and adequately large group of locally hired, trained, and supervised Chinese 
language instructors would be preferable to these temporary, ‘outsourced' teachers”. 
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Hanban is willing to consider this and actually has already initiated changes on this 
practice in 2013 as discussed in 3.5.2, because Hanban is aware of the issues about 
‘quality and expertise’ as discussed in 4.2.2. It was also acknowledged by the CI staff 
themselves. UKSC4 commented:  
 
I think there are two main differences compared with Alliance Francaise, first is 
that they hire local people to do it, second and more importantly, they charge for 
their language services. Here, when we offer many activities for free, it actually 
make people suspect if there is any hidden intentions. Also, in Cervantes Institute, 
they have staff expatriated from Spain to China as a permanent job, while in CI, 
all teachers are from Chinese universities on a short time basis, by the time we 
learned how to do a better job, we’re leaving (Appendix 10).     
 
However, the negotiation process was aborted suddenly as disclosed in the university’s 
statement, which will be looked at later following the time line. 
 
ii) The AAUP report  
 
Then in June 2014, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 
submitted a report On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius 
Institutes, calling on American universities to rethink their relationship with the CIs (the 
full text can be found in Appendix 5), claiming that “Confucius Institutes function as an 
arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom. Their academic 
activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired 
by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China”.  
 
The report compared the CI with the British Council, the Goethe Institut, and L’Alliance 
Franςaise, and pointed that  
 
These latter three entities are clearly connected to imperial pasts, ongoing 
geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of ‘soft power’, but none of them is located 
on a university or college campus. Instead, their connections to national political 
agendas and interests require that they be established in sites where they can fulfil 
their mandates openly without threatening the independence and integrity of 
academic institutions in host countries.  
 
The report concluded that AAUP joins CAUT in recommending that universities cease 
to permit CIs to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, 
in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.  
 
From the above we can see the report very much echoed the key points in the petition: 
the “protection of academic freedom” was hoisted as the banner at the very start, allying 
with CAUT to make the appeal for the whole North American campuses to cease their 
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involvement in the CIs. The CI’s function is again interpreted as “an arm of the Chinese 
state” under the supervision of Hanban, which is chaired by a member of the Politburo 
and the vice premier to “advance a state agenda” in the recruitment and control of 
academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate. Three days 
after the AAUP report was released, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua 
responded with an angry editorial titled “China Voice: Fear, ignorance behind calls to 
stem Confucius Institutes” (Ren, 2014), saying that the claims made by the report 
actually “expose not so much communist propaganda as their own intolerance of exotic 
cultures and biased preconceived notions to smear and isolate the CPC”. As a counter-
argument, the Xinhua article emphasised the role of the CI Board and management 
committee that consists of both Chinese and foreign scholars, including many 
professors and university presidents of the host institution, who have their direct say in 
decision-making.  
 
It is interesting that the AAUP report also put the CI in comparison with its Western 
counterparts, and even recognised that these Western institutions “are clearly 
connected to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of soft 
power”, but the ‘imperial pasts’ was brushed off lightly as a passing comment, ignoring 
that this ‘past’ is 500 years of colonialism and capitalism that created today’s West-
cantered world in terms of culture, economy and politics; it is a past with lingering 
influence of Orientalism and Western cultural hegemony that still shapes today’s global 
cultural terrain, and puts them in an superior position in pursuing the ‘ongoing 
geopolitical agendas and the objectives of soft power’. However, the power position 
was dismissed as an understatement, while putting an overstatement on location as the 
critical difference, as the sites of the CIs “threaten the independence and integrity of 
academic institutions in host countries”.  
 
iii) The Chicago University statement 
 
Then after five months’ negotiations, a statement was made regarding the CI on 
September 25, 2014 by the University of Chicago (full text can be found in Appendix 
6), stating that “the University and Hanban have engaged in several months of good 
faith efforts and steady progress toward a new agreement. However, recently published 
comments about UChicago in an article about the director-general of Hanban are 
incompatible with a continued equal partnership”. It then quoted the article7 saying Xu 
Lin wrote a letter to the college president containing only one sentence: “If your school 
                                                             




has made the decision to pull out, then I agree”.  
 
Surprisingly, in this final CIUC statement announcing the University’s decision to 
suspend negotiations for the renewal of the agreement, the repeated accusations of 
“academic freedom” disappeared and only one reason was mentioned: the state-
backed Jiefang Daily’s article, which sang an eulogy to Xu Lin in showing how powerful 
she is: “That attitude of hers made the other side anxious, and they quickly replied that 
they’d continue to operate the Confucius Institute” (Wang, 2014): the University of 
Chicago is the ‘they’, who finds Xu’s attitude “incompatible with a continued equal 
partnership”. As explained in Chapter Three, there is a vertical hierarchy between 
Ministry of Education/Hanban and universities in China as well as between Chinese 
government and the state media, meaning that the Hanban Director can talk to a 
Chinese university in such a commanding manner, and there are often eulogy-style 
media reports about government officials in China. However, here Hanban is dealing 
with an American University that cherishes its reputation as independent from 
government influence, and is already under intense internal questioning of jeopardising 
such a reputation. It also regards itself as holding a superior position and finds Hanban’s 
imposing stance ‘hegemonic’, thus resisted it with full pride. The Economist article of 
‘Confucius Institute: About Face’ called Xu Lin’s statement a “boastful challenge”, and 
the Business Spectator also criticised the hard-line behaviour of officials like Xu, “who 
still think and act like party ideologues who like to assert their authority and bully people 
into submission” (Cai, 2014). As commented by a professor at University of Chicago on 
the lengthy negotiations, “the Chinese officials were heavy-handed, condescending and 
difficult” (cited in Redden, 2014). In a way, this feeling of not being treated as an ‘equal 
partnership’ left them with no choice but to end the relationship altogether.    
 
We can see the knock-on effects from this chain of events, especially when the first CI 
closure at McMaster was cited in the petition, and the Chicago’s closure was further 
referred to in the following closures. The CIUC case has offered us a lot of food for 
thought: Gramsci has viewed the “education relationship as a political relationship” 
(Fontana, 1993: 145), and the closure revealed such hidden power relations at the core 
of these interactions. Just as Foucault once pointed out (1982: 794-795), “at every 
moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two 
adversaries”, and “a relationship of struggle between two adversaries is the result of 
power relations with the conflicts and cleavages they engender”. The closure of CIUC 
is an example of such a cleavage. When the CI was trying to be engaged in a ‘war of 
position’, it found itself being dragged into a ‘battle of location’, the hegemonic side 
holding vantage positions can easily manoeuvre a blocking action based on the CI’s 
158 
 
location on campus: it is both accused for ‘political censorship’ when the CI teachers 
avoided discussing contentious topics, and ‘ideological inroads’ when those issues 
were discussed. It was these dual accusations that brought it to a deadlock, raising the 
classic question of ‘to be, or not to be’: it seems for the CI, to discuss, or not to discuss 
those sensitive topics, they are equally accusable of violating ‘academic freedom’, 
which is a recurring key word in most of the criticisms against the CI. Through the 
repetition of the same discourse, this perception of the CI is manufactured as a 
generally accepted ‘truth’, and the CI’s attempt at fighting back could backfire and 
trigger resistance.  
 
It also shows the counter-productive role played by Hanban as the third party, which is 
fatal in terminating the partnerships of both LCI and Penn State University CI, and now 
CIUC. It offers further evidence that government-led approach can have deadly effects. 
On the other hand, Kahn-Ackermann’s (2014) very incisive comments concerning these 
CI closures support this point from a different angle: “this decision (of closing down the 
CI) has nothing to do with the CI, it is made by people who dislike the Chinese 
government and their policies and simply use the CI to show their discontent… Cultural 
Centre is very easily made a target to show such resentment, the Goethe Institute has 
encountered similar problems, when it was shut down in Iran following the Iranian 
Revolution”. With full agreement to Kahn-Ackermann’s comments, I still believe there 
are lessons to be learned from these incidents. Isn’t it the very purpose of cultural 
diplomacy to turn adversaries into partners with mutual understanding? So the question 
must be considered: what can we learn from these closures to facilitate better mutual 
understanding? Reflections and implications for the operations of the CI and the 




This chapter has continued to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to examine what 
sets the CI apart from its Western counterparts operating in the same terrain. Theories 
of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and knowledge-power nexus were applied to make 
analytical comparisons that addressed a much broader and deeper dimension beyond 
the superficial differences in operating models. The results can be summarised as being 
‘so similar, so different, and so Chinese’:  
 
• The missions are very similar, one can even venture to say government 
involvement is also a similarity, which are all in conformity with the definition of 




• What is visibly different is the deliberated wording of the CI’s purpose, its specific 
operating model and unique element of research in the menu of provision, but when 
pitched against different historical, cultural and ideological contexts, a much hidden 
and vital difference is revealed: the uneven condition in this terrain dominated by 
Western cultural hegemony, and the ensued different power positions and relations 
between the CI and its Western counterparts. This hidden difference explains the 
perceived differences in the CI’s intentions and government involvement; 
 
• The Chinese government’s presence both ‘behind the stage’ and ‘on the stage’ of 
cultural diplomacy is a distinguished Chinese character. It brought the government 
‘background’ to the ‘foreground’, thus easily seized by the hegemonic side to 
generate resistance.  
 
Through the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’, we can see how some of the similarities 
between the CI and its Western counterparts were converted into differences: the 
similar purpose of language and culture promotion was interpreted with political 
connotations, turning the CI into an imagined propaganda vehicle; the similar funding 
sources from government was also interpreted as ‘strings attached’ for the CI because 
of the different ideology of the Chinese government. This lens revealed that the 
difference is not in the organisation itself, but in power relations with others, as sharply 
pointed out by Foucault (1982: 791), “the fundamental point of anchorage of the 
relationships, is to be found outside the institution”. If we detach the organisation from 
the terrain of struggle it is placed into, we distort and inhibit the possibility of a 
comprehensive analysis. 
 
A specific example is the CI’s purpose, for we can see a clear disjunction between 
Hanban’s aspirations and the external perceptions of it. Of course what matters is not 
how the CI sees its own intentions, but how it is perceived by others, just like the famous 
Henry Kissinger quote: “It is not a matter of what is true that counts but a matter of what 
is perceived to be true”, by the hegemonic side, I shall add, and the power they hold 
transforms this perception into accepted ‘knowledge’.  
 
While the differences in operating model are surely a major source for setting the CI 
apart from its Western counterparts, it is also a simplification that does not challenge 
the Orientalist grounds or the ‘positional superiority’ the hegemonic side occupied in 
this terrain of struggle. Instead, this difference was magnified under the ideological 
spectacles, and tied to the above two perceived ‘differences’ in the CI’s purpose and 
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government background, to the extent of negating the comparability of the CI to its 
Western counterparts. The way they over-interpret the difference is just a strategy of 
struggle, as Foucault (1982:794) pointed out indeed, “between a relationship of power 
and a strategy of struggle, there is a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal”, which 
drives to the same point: the real difference still rests in power relations, and hegemony 
is maintained by the “locking together of power relationship with strategy and the results 
proceeding from these interactions” (Foucault, 1982:795). 
 
From Hanban’s point of view, in a way, it is looking up to the CI’s Western counterparts 
as role models to learn from and targets to exceed. Hanban’s grandiloquent ambition 
to condense the achievement of Alliance Francasie of 130 years into 16 years is 
supported by the Chinese government which seems to be proud of the CI as the 
‘spiritual high speed train’, a nickname happily adopted by Liu Yandong, Vice Premier 
and Chairperson of the Council of CI Headquarters. However, the government presence 
as another critical difference that sets the CI apart from its Western counterparts is a 
major source attracting scepticism. Perhaps, there are better ways of utilising 
government input to move the CI’s model to a more constructive collaboration and equal 
partnership by sponsoring locally hired positions appointed by the host universities.  
 
This Chapter has also dissected the few cases of CI closures so far, especially the 
CIUC, to reveal what lessons can be learned from these incidents. The next Chapter 
will pursue further along the lines of argument begun in previous chapters, and attempt 
at an evaluation of the research findings from Chapters Three and Four, based on which, 
the four inductive statements presented in Chapter Two about the prominent features 




















Chapter Five:  




Chapter Four demonstrated why the CI is ‘so similar, so different, and so Chinese’ 
compared to its Western counterparts, this chapter will further elaborate its ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ by continuing to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’. A diagnostic 
description of the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project will 
culminate in four statements that correspond to the four themes of the research 
questions set out at the very beginning, i.e. why China wants to launch cultural diplomacy 
and the CI project, what is the vehicle of the CI, who is the agent, and how it is carried 
out in the field. This output represents one of the key elements of originality of this 
research project. 
 
However, one thing that must be borne in mind is that China’s cultural diplomacy aims 
to engage with the entire world, so that any generalised conclusions would not be tenable 
given the uneven conditions in the global terrain as argued in Chapters Three and Four. 
Therefore, a comparison and contrast of the primary and secondary data collected in the 
UK, US and South Korea will be undertaken first before any conclusion is drawn.  
 
5.1 Comparing and contrasting the terrain marked by soft and hard cultural 
boundaries 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, both the aim of China’s cultural diplomacy to 
improve its position in the global cultural terrain and the means through global coverage 
of projects such as the CIs give this endeavour a global nature. However, ‘the globe’ is 
one big place, marked by various boundaries: cultural, social, territorial, political, racial 
and psychological. Chan and McIntyre (2002: xv) define boundary as “the interface 
between two entities; it marks the end of one and the beginning of another”. Duara 
(1996:49) elaborates the cultural boundary in that “every cultural practice is a potential 
boundary marking a community. These boundaries may be either soft or hard”: groups 
with soft boundaries between them do not view mutual boundary breaches as a threat, 
while communities with hard boundaries tend to privilege their differences, and develop 
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an intolerance and suspicion toward other cultures.  
 
This narrative offers a useful insight into the analysis of this ‘global terrain of struggle’ at 
another sub level marked by cultural boundaries. As explained in Chapter Two 
concerning case selections, four CIs were selected from East Asia (South Korea) and 
Western Europe (the UK), to keep the contrasting angles where cultural debates are 
historically referred to as the Orient and Occident. By drawing on primary data collected 
through a similar set of interview questions in the UK and South Korea, and some 
secondary data concerning CIs collected from the U.S., the section below will examine 
how the interactions differ in the different blocks of the terrain, and how the CI adapts its 
strategies to these blocs by gauging the cultural boundaries of different natures.  
 
5.1.1 One mission statement, two different priorities  
 
According to the CI’s Constitution and By-laws, it is a non-profit public institution that 
aims to “develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and 
promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other 
international communities” (Hanban website). There seems to be a general consensus 
among all interviewees concerning its purpose, with a few directors emphasising the 
careful wording of “introducing” Chinese culture instead of “promoting” it, to be sensitive 
to the worries or fears of China’s supposed ‘cultural invasion’ in the recipient country 
(SKD1 and SKD4). However, despite the unanimous understanding of the two-fold 
mission of the CI, a clear difference in terms of priority setting can be observed from the 
responses gathered from the UK and South Korea. 
 
In South Korea, where the geographical vicinity, cultural closeness, economic and 
business connections with China mean that many people have been to China already, 
language teaching was made a clear central task of the CI, as pointed by SKD2:  
 
China is our neighbour, the closest country to us, historically we were heavily 
influenced by Chinese traditions, Chinese literature and other aspects, so Korean 
people nowadays are very interested in going to China for various activities, be it 
trade, educational or cultural exchanges, there are more and more people, both old 
and young, learning Chinese, we have tens of thousands candidates sitting the HSK 
tests every year, the largest group in the whole world. (Appendix 10) 
 
This may help explain why the very first CI in the world was established in Seoul, 
because South Korea has been the number one source country of international students 
learning Chinese in China since 2000 (Caijing, 2012). The host organisation of this first 
CI is an institute that has started to promote HSK tests in South Korea since 1993, thus 
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it has had a decade-long relationship working with the MOE in China before the CI was 
set up in 2004. According to SKD1, SKD2 and SKD3 interviewed, CIs in South Korea 
 
 have focused a lot on selling HSK exams and offering scholarships to high school 
students to study in China. 
 
This priority of language teaching was also clearly recognised by SKSC2: “I think our 
primary goal is language teaching, and through language teaching, probably infiltrate to 
other layers, such as culture”. SKSC1 put it more bluntly that “they (Korean students) 
are very pragmatic, not interested in the cultural aspects, they only care if they can speak 
the language well nor not”. (Appendix 10) 
 
SKD1 even commented that:  
 
There is really not much need for the CI to ‘promote’ Chinese language and culture 
here, in fact, there is such a high demand and inner drive to master the language 
that more and more Koreans are voluntarily learning the language in the hope to use 
it as a tool to tap into opportunities offered by this next door neighbour. As for culture, 
some of the traditional Chinese cultural practices were kept better in South Korea 
than in China. (Appendix 10) 
 
Actually, Hanban is aware of this regional difference and some CIs operating in Asia 
(especially in Japan, South Korea and Singapore) do not request operating funds from 
Hanban but only apply for project funding, as explained by SKD4: 
 
Some universities offer Chinese as compulsory degree modules, so they pay for 
Hanban sponsored teachers’ salary into CI’s account as their operating fund. This is 
not a significant amount of money for the university to bear. This would gain them 
more freedom than requesting operating fund from Hanban. (Appendix 10) 
 
This forms a stark contrast to most CIs in other parts of the world that are attracted by 
Hanban’s funding to nurture the language program, both in Africa (Hartig, 2014a) and 
the U.S. (Sahlins, 2015). The attraction for learning the language is also a lot less in the 
UK compared to South Korea. According to Young (2014), being born a native English 
speaker is both a blessing and a curse as 39% hold the perception that “most people 
speak English”. When commenting on the fact that the number of UK students choosing 
to study foreign languages at university level has been in steady decline for the past 
seven years, Worne (2015), Director of Strategy at the British Council, used “can’t, won’t, 
don’t” to sum up the British national view on speaking foreign languages. This was 
confirmed by responses received from the interviewees: UKLH2 commented that 
“Chinese is not yet a language popular enough that would automatically attract students 
to learn, actually, it still has the reputation of one of the hardest languages to learn”. 
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Therefore, in UKSC5’s words, “trips to China are the ‘appetiser’, culture is the ‘main 
course’, and language teaching is the ‘side order’” (Appendix 10).  
 
Unlike South Korea, organising trips to China is a highlight event for all the other CIs 
interviewed (in the UK, France, Mexico and Morocco). In UKD3’s words, this is “to 
provide a window into China, for those who would otherwise live with their prejudices 
and ignorance with China”. All the interviewees mentioned the visitors’ excitement or 
even shock to see ‘the real’ China with their own eyes compared to their imaginative 
impressions of the ‘Other’. For example, in the UK, in a local school’s pre-departure 
briefing meeting for their first trip to China, UKLH1 was asked if 200 pounds is enough 
to buy a house in China. In Morocco, where China has always been pictured as a poor 
developing country and their own as a developed country, students simply could not 
believe or even accept that the airport in Beijing is much more modern than their own at 
home. Therefore, UKD1 believes “it is very important for us to offer students the starting 
opportunity to walk into China”. These organised tours (both for school principals and 
students) have significantly changed their perceptions through first-hand experiences:  
 
The travel to China funded by CI plays a very positive role in changing students and 
school headmasters’ impressions of China, many school partnerships were formed, 
and exchange of visits fruited following the agreement. There are also many degree 
students decided to go to China for MA courses on CI scholarships after graduation. 
(Appendix 10)  
 
The significance of such personal contacts with China was also enunciated by UKLH3: 
 
When CI can offer opportunities like this to someone who does not have much 
expectation, or even some negative expectations of China, to see China with his 
own eyes and see the difference from media image, Hanban has already achieved 
its initial purpose. They gain one more person who likes China and wants to speak 
for China. (Appendix 10) 
 
This was echoed by UKSC5 who works in a different CI in the UK:  
 
In advanced class, all our students have been to China and seen modern China with 
their own eyes, so they all have a good knowledge about China, more willing to 
accept the difference, to recognise China as a different country from the West, and 
they would express the difference in a more respectable way. They are able to 
understand China in the Chinese way. If people do not have the knowledge, they 
tend to take the opposite stand……Therefore, the scholarship we offer is a great 
thing, for foreigners to study and stay in China for a period of time. No matter how 
much we try to teach, or tell them about China here, it will never match the first-hand 
experience. After having a positive experience of China, the students would come 
back to talk up China, no need for us to make a painstaking effort. It is much more 




According to UKLH3, this is why in a language class in the UK, the CI’s main job is “to 
arouse and keep students’ interests in China. Once they are interested, they would want 
to know more, and once they know more, they would have more objective views”. Then 
the CI can invite such experts who have already formed objective views of China as 
guest speakers: 
 
When the guest speaker is a dignitary ‘foreigner’ to talk about China, Chinese culture 
and Chinese economy, the effects are much better than a Chinese speaker. They 
play a very constructive role in helping enhance understanding of China, they are 
not blowing trumpets for China like propaganda, but have a very fair tone. (Appendix 
10) 
 
The above explains the rationale of the cultural focus of the CI’s function in the UK, as 
for Chinese language teaching, “it focused a lot more on nurturing and keeping students’ 
interests” according to UKSC2, as “our main goal is to correct misunderstandings of 
China held by foreign countries”. He carried on to elaborate this ‘infiltration process’:  
 
To start with, we need to get more foreigners interested in China, then after getting 
some knowledge and understanding, they may want to go to China and see it for 
themselves, then they can come back to influence more people, to generate a 
radiation effect. It takes a long time to work the infiltration. (Appendix 10) 
 
Citing figures from China’s MOE, Lampton (2008) highlighted that over 30 former 
students who undertook studies in China hold ministerial positions back in their own 
countries; more than 10 have served as their country’s ambassadors to China; 30 hold 
high level positions in their country’s embassies in China; 120 are associate professors 
or professors and hundreds more serve in cultural, economic and trade entities involved 
with China. Now with the CIs reaching out into 125 countries in the world, this potential 
benefit can only build up over time.  
 
This corresponds very well with the rationale of Hanban elaborated by Xu Lin herself, 
who has once said in an interview:  
 
The CI sends over 10,000 tutors and volunteers a year abroad, each of them would 
teach a minimum of 200 students, and there are another 200 families behind these 
students. Through them, foreigners would see the amazing changes taking place in 
China, and the good qualities of Chinese people. (cited in Wang, 2014) 
 
This shows the charm of cultural diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy on the one 
hand, and the intention of Hanban to entrust the CI to play such a role; on the other hand, 
it also helps explain why the U.S. is home to the biggest number of CIs (109 CIs and 348 
Confucius Classrooms) in the world, and UK has the most concentrated coverage (29 
CIs and 108 Confucius Classrooms) in Europe. In contrast, in the whole of Asia (110 CIs 
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and 90 Confucius classrooms in total) where the demand for Chinese language learning 
is arguably stronger, and the whole of Africa (46 CIs and 23 Confucius Classrooms in 
total)8 where the demand for Hanban funding in expanding Chinese provision is arguably 
stronger, their stronger desire and interest only made them less prioritised target 
destinations of the CI, because the Chinese government wants to use the CI to ‘correct 
misunderstandings of China’, and these misunderstandings are more prevalent in the 
host countries with hard cultural boundaries with China.  
 
The above appears to reveal a pattern of ‘one mission statement, two different priorities’ 
delivered by the CIs in the different blocs of the terrain with different cultural boundaries: 
regional differences are clear and allow for localised priorities: language teaching is the 
core function of the CIs in the East Asian countries like South Korea, where traditional 
China enjoys a very respectable culture image and modern China offers new 
opportunities; while in the West European countries like the UK, where vestiges of 
Orientalism and the Cold War mentality are amplified by the distances in culture and 
space, Chinese cultural introduction and enhancing local people’s understanding of 
contemporary China is given more weighting, with trips to China as a particularly effective 
tool. The next section will look at how the two different ‘priority’ tasks of the CIs are carried 
out in the field.  
 
5.1.2 The different ‘wheel’ focus in left-driving and right-driving countries 
 
In the Literature Review, the metaphor of ‘one wheel’ and ‘the other wheel’ was used to 
indicate the two positions concerning the ‘what’ to be delivered on the vehicle of cultural 
diplomacy: one position emphasises the spiritual and popular culture (Hu, 2008), 
representing ‘one wheel’ to serve the purpose of reshaping China’s image of being the 
‘cultural other’; while the other position argues that ‘cultural diplomacy is value diplomacy’ 
(Zhang, 2012b), representing ‘the other’ wheel of the vehicle to serve the purpose of 
countering China’s image of being the ‘ideological other’.  
 
From the CI’s own mission statement cited in 5.1.1, we can see it has an intentional 
focus on Chinese language and culture introduction as it defines its own role as that ‘one 
wheel’ of the vehicle. It thus tries to evade discussions of political values in its teaching 
and cultural exchange activities. However, after charting the ‘terrain of struggle’ in 
                                                             
8 The above statistics of the CI numbers were released by the Hanban’s website up to December 
2015: http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm. Interestingly, the number 
of Confucius Classrooms decreased in both US and UK from 356 to 348 and from 111 to 108 
respectively by May, 2016. None of the closures of the Confucius Classrooms were reported 
anywhere in the media. 
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Chapters Three and Four, it is evident that the separation of the two ‘wheels’ only exists 
in theoretical discussions. It is not possible to draw clear lines between the two in reality, 
because the two ‘Otherings’ of China (culturally and ideologically) have developed into 
a complex whole. Just like the Chinese saying goes, ‘the trees long for peace but the 
wind will never cease’. For example, UKD4 stated that “our understanding of the name 
Confucius is purely cultural related, but in the West, it was interpreted as cultural 
infiltration, and that means brainwash” (Appendix 10). There were even scholars like 
Jacob Kovalio (2010) who came up with a questionable label of ‘Confucommunism’. 
 
This transmutation from cultural promotion to brainwash shows the Western hegemonic 
stance on the one hand, and a mixture of culture and ideology on the other. True, as 
Fallers (1961:677) defined ideology, it is “that part of culture which is actively concerned 
with the establishment and defence of patterns of belief and value”. Despite China’s 
repeated efforts to separate the CI’s cultural promotional role from anything to do with 
ideological infiltration, it could not stop such criticisms and worries, because China’s 
image as the ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ has grown to become an organic 
whole over the years, making the separation of the two a one-sided wishful thinking for 
the Chinese government. This is exacerbated when the CI’s voluntary compliance with 
its role as the ‘one wheel’ was interpreted as censorship in many host countries. This 
can be seen from the case of CIUC discussed in 4.4, where dual accusations were made 
against the CI for both ‘political censorship’ when the CI teachers avoided discussing 
contentious topics, and ‘ideological inroads’ when those issues were discussed.  
 
However, on the other side of the globe, ideology seems not to be a barrier to the CI’s 
mission of culture promotion: all the SKSCs answered the question of “how do you 
handle sensitive questions?” in a very relaxed manner: “Korean students are generally 
very reserved and quiet”, said SKSC2, who also described a typical scenario in class:  
 
Generally, Korean students do not like to talk about politics, when sensitive topics 
arise, they would say, ‘let’s not discuss politics’ and change topics to something that 
interests them, mostly about where to go for travelling and eating, topics that would 
not hurt people’s feelings. So politics is off the table. (Appendix 1) 
 
Rather than intentionally avoiding discussions of ‘politics’, cultural traits is an important 
reason for this as explained by SKSC3: “Korean students are very polite, they genuinely 
care the feelings of the teacher, if they think the question would upset a Chinese person, 
or make the teacher uncomfortable, they would not ask”. 
 
In contrast, students from the UK are from a different culture that encourages questioning 
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in class: “There will be students vocally questioning China, especially in the advanced 
class where students are able to express themselves freely”, said UKLH3, who explained 
her approach to handling such discussions:  
 
As the teacher I’ll make sure the class is not dominated by any one student, both in 
terms of speaking time and the viewpoints. I’ll make sure other students and other 
views can be voiced too, so usually I’ll set the rule, every student has 3 to 5 minutes 
to express their views, as long as they do not go off topic and speak English 
(Appendix 1).   
 
The above shows a difference not only in the focus of the CI’s function, but also different 
ways of delivering it. If we continue to use the metaphor of ‘vehicle’, the difference 
between the CI’s practice in South Korea and the UK can probably be likened to driving 
in left-driving and right-driving countries: in South Korea, it is like driving on the same 
side of the road as home, things go smoothly due to similar driving habits; however in 
the UK, the CIs need to be more careful in adapting to the left-driving practice, otherwise, 
they may run into unexpected problems and be ‘honked at’ without realising what is 
wrong. In other words, when the vehicle is on the road, what matters most is to comply 
with local driving practice, and that indicates a different focus on the different ‘wheel’.  
 
5.1.3 See China and read China: first-hand knowledge vs. third-hand stories 
 
Aside from understanding the local road conditions and driving practice, it is as important 
to have adequate local knowledge about the target audiences, especially about what 
they already know about China and how they acquire that knowledge. As mentioned in 
the Literature Review, it is imperative to understand that the messages from China are 
not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that is preoccupied or even embedded 
with pre-perceptions. In other words, this is not a one-way dissemination but a two-way 
interaction between two sets of identities: the sender’s view of China and audiences’ 
perception of China.  
 
An example from my direct observation shows how deeply embedded such pre-
perceptions can be: in a talk about China, the New Land of Opportunities given to a local 
high school, the CI teacher asked if any students in the audience have been to China 
before, only one raised his hand. So the teacher said she would show them a BBC video 
first and then asked students to share their impressions of China with some key words 
after watching it. It is a two-minute video clip called China China (BBC, 2009). There is 
only one-word narrative ‘China’, repeating itself numerous times throughout the video 
with thousands of different snapshots from China, from varied landscapes to a wide 
variety of wild animals, from diverse dishes to different ethnic groups, wearing different 
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costumes and following different life styles in rural and urban China, the message is quite 
strong and clear: This is all China, a country of vast diversity. Yet, when the floor was 
given to students, the first answer (not from the one who has been to China before) of 
the key word was ‘Communism’. Even the British teacher at present was baffled: where 
did he get that from? There is not even a glimpse of red flag during the video, nor any 
images of Chinese leaders or government.  
 
It is a serious question worth pondering: where do people get pre-perceptions from? As 
pointed out by Morley and Robins (1995:133), “we are all largely dependent on the media 
for our images of non-local people, places, and events, and the further the ‘event’ from 
our own direct experiences, the more we depend on media images for the totality of our 
knowledge”. Manzenreiter (2010: 43) simply attributes the responsibility for people’s 
misperception to the mainstream media that “rather than preparing the space for a 
dialectic exploration of alternative modes and views, the media contribute to the 
reinforcing of national stereotypes”, echoing Said’s argument back in 1978 (1978:26) 
that one aspect of the electronic postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement 
of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed: “so far as the Orient is concerned, 
standardisation and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the 19th-century 
academic and imaginative demonology of the ‘mysterious Orient’”.  
 
In the modern world today, mass media and cultural exchange programs are probably 
the two strongest image shapers that influence and shape public perceptions of a country 
according to Kunczik (1997). For China, they work well hand-in-hand in most of the Asian 
countries, while in Western countries such as the UK and US, where fewer people benefit 
from direct experience in visiting China, media works hand-in-hand with power of 
discourse consolidated by the cultural hegemony, leaving the general public more 
subject to media influence, or more dependent on media images for their knowledge of 
China, especially when “the Western media which arrogate to themselves the right to 
represent all non-Western Others, and thus to provide ‘us’ with the definitions by which 
‘we’ distinguish ourselves from ‘them’ ” (Morley & Robins, 1995:134). It is at this point 
that we need to consider the impact of Western media on ‘the Rest’, and the impact of 
representations of ‘the Other’ on Western audiences, like the ossified image of China 
planted in that student’s mind that can become so deeply embedded that if it does not 
generate resistance, at least it forms an inertia to embrace a new understanding of China. 
 
It is common sense that first-hand knowledge is the knowledge you have acquired from 
personal experience; second-hand information is information learnt from someone who 
has first-hand experience; while third-hand information can only be called ‘stories’ learnt 
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from people who did not experience the subject and only receive the information from 
people with second-hand experience. Therefore, even when presented as 'fact,' or with 
an 'air of authority' such as mainstream media, and even when the reporter is reporting 
live or write the report in-situ, the audience can only see or read what is edited and 
modified (intentionally or unintentionally) by the reporter, thus can be best classed as 
second-hand information, while editorials written by commentators with second-hand 
information can only be taken as ‘stories’ that may not enable the audience to get to 
know the whole truth. In other words, the audiences experience events, not first hand, 
but through perception, thus need to be reminded that what-they-think-they-know may 
not be the ‘truth’, or may not be as reliable as it first seems. 
 
Both the geographical and cultural distances between China and Western countries such 
as the UK and US can expand the gap between first-hand knowledge and third-hand 
stories. As discussed in Chapter Three, among all the players in this terrain of struggle, 
the media plays a critical role in shaping people’s perceptions. Examples were given 
about selective news reports and selective interviews, even for reports about the CI 
where there are people-in-the-know available with important first-hand experience, they 
are not fully engaged with as the media report can be an attempt to exploit pre-
established assumptions. Scholars like Clifford and Marcus (1986) have explained this 
with the Foucauldian version of the question of representation: it always involves a 
relation of power as well as a relation of knowledge, between the representor and the 
represented. Within media studies, the issue has been addressed in terms of ‘media 
imperialism’. For example, in the works of Schiller (1992), Mattelart et al (1984) and 
Tunstall (1977), there has been considerable analysis of the cultural consequences of 
the West’s long-exercised control over the world’s media systems, and there is a 
complex process in which the media plays a vital role in having influence over their 
audiences. 
 
For example, Willnat and Metzgar’s (2012:24) research on ‘American Perceptions of 
China and the Chinese: Do the Media Matter?’ is based on the content analysis of 886 
news stories about China published in the New York Times throughout 2010 and a 
national online survey conducted in early 2011. The findings show significant 
associations between respondents’ media use and their views of China’s economic, 
political, and military power. Their findings generally support the assumption that the 
American public is influenced primarily by media agenda setting and framing processes, 
and that “respondents with more news exposure hold more negative perceptions of 
Chinese foreign and economic policies”. Other similar research (Mattimore, 2010; Zhang, 
2007) undertaken through analysis of the China-related reports in American mainstream 
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media also found that the US press seldom constructed a favourable image of China, 
but tended to focus on negative issues such as censorship, internal controls, and human 
rights abuses. They also tend to adopt a negative angle even in reporting developments 
made in China, such as the Olympic successes or breakthroughs China made in 
exploring outer space, the reporting is persistently constructed in an anti-Communist 
frames and Cold War mentality.  
 
More specific research about the CI-related reports in The New York Times (Liu, 2014) 
found that 35.3% reports were negative, 31.4% were neutral and 27.5% were positive, 
which is on the whole consistent with Li & Dai’s (2011) research about the overall 
American media environment for the CI, sampling 33 media including newspapers, 
journals, TV, radio and websites, and concluded that 50% were negative reports, 15% 
were neutral and 35% were positive.  
 
There was also similar research done in South Korea concerning their media coverage 
about China. One study entitled Chinese News in Korean Media was carried out in 2005 
by Yoo, who analysed 632 randomly selected articles from one of the major Korean 
newspapers, Joong Ang Ilbo, from January 2000 to November 2004, just before the first 
CI was set up. The study found that overall attitudes of the Joong Ang Ilbo toward China 
were neutral (54.7%), but 33.3% remained unfavourable. It also found a few recurring 
themes constructing positive images of China: the economic growth of China and the 
development of China in technology, cultural and diplomatic fields. Another more recent 
study done by Xu (2010) focused on a case study of Chosun Ilbo from 2007-2008: it 
found that it had more reports on China than other developed countries such as the US 
and Japan. Of these China-related reports, 59.4% were neutral, and 20.5% were 
favourable, in other words, 79.9% of the reports were not negative, showing an overall 
friendly media environment toward China in South Korea. In January 2015, a seven-
episode documentary Super China was aired by KBS TV in South Korea, which 
completely ‘shook’ China: even the Chinese media could not believe this was made by 
a ‘foreign media’: instead of showing the dark side of China ridden with poverty and 
human rights issues, it projected the ‘superness’ of China in a very positive light, so 
positive that many Chinese audiences commented that it had done a better job than 
China’s own central television CCTV. This documentary also gave a thorough 
introduction of China, from history to culture.  
 
There has also been research particularly focused on South Korean media reports on 
the CIs operating there: Jin (2013) sampled five mainstream newspapers and three TV 
channels, namely KBS, MBC and SBS, and collected their reports of the CIs from 
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November 2004 to November 2012. The research found that for the first two years since 
the very first CI in the world was established in South Korea in 2004, the main content 
of CI-related reports was mostly ‘positive’, about the academic and cultural exchanges 
as well as opportunities to learn Chinese language provided by the CIs. Then since 2006, 
‘soft power strategy’ has become the most frequently mentioned theme in the CI-related 
reports, Jin’s research (2013: 239) found that:  
 
Owing to the far-reaching influence of Confucian thoughts in South Korea, and the 
homogeneous nature of Confucian culture in Korean society, the fact that the CI was 
identified as a tool of enhancing Chinese soft power did not lead to more criticisms 
or oppositions of it; instead, they are more focused on the revelations this may have 
for South Korea.  
 
Even in other Asian countries with less amicable media environments than South Korea, 
the most recent 2015 Pew reports found that ‘‘Overall, despite historical and territorial 
frictions, Asia-Pacific publics tend to view their regional neighbours in a positive light”, 
and “Asia-Pacific views of China are far more positive than the perception held by 
Americans” (Pew Research Centre, 2015). 
 
As mentioned earlier, due to the close relationships between China and South Korea and 
the geographical vicinity, more and more people from South Korea have already seen 
China with their own eyes, or watched Chinese films and TV series at home, and most 
importantly, have had opportunities to interact with Chinese people in shops, universities 
or companies. The examples discussed in 5.1.1 about students from the UK and 
Morocco changing their views about China following their visits also show that first-hand 
knowledge is the most powerful tool to combat third-hand media bias. It also justifies the 
priorities of the CIs in target countries with hard cultural boundaries are to provide 
opportunities for people to see the real contemporary China with their own eyes. This 
would appear to be the most effective method to correct their distorted perceptions 
shaped by reading and learning West-centric materials with third-hand information.  
 
To sum up, the different media environments in the South Korea and US discussed 
above help explain the different foci of the CIs: more on the language teaching in East 
Asia as the historical connection and cultural influence, geographical vicinity and people 
exchange help achieve the aim of enhancing mutual understandings; while in Western 
countries such as the UK and US, the geographical and cultural distances mean the 
media plays a stronger role in shaping the general public’s perception of China, hence 
the CIs focus more on providing opportunities for people to visit China, and more 
chances for local people to have face-to-face interactions with Chinese people through 
more access to the CIs, so that they can help achieve the goal of combating the 
173 
 
unbalanced media influence.  
 
5.1.4 Soft cultural boundary and hard nationalism boundary 
 
Among scholars of boundary studies, Wallman (1978) talks about how boundaries mark 
members off from non-members in a similar term as ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Newman and Paasi 
(1998) argue that boundaries and identity are different sides of the same coin, with the 
former creating and being created through the latter. This identity creation ability was 
also discussed in the Literature Review concerning the power of the nationalism 
discourse, which also divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ozirimli, 2005). What is 
under-discussed is the relationship between nationalism and cultural boundaries, whose 
interaction renders the boundary dynamic and fluid. Shaprio (2004:34) has argued that 
cultural governance grows out of Foucault’s understanding of power as a productive 
force that is generated by social relationship, aiming at “making territorial and 
national/cultural boundaries coextensive”. 
 
However, the most important attribute of cultural boundary is that it is always in flux as 
pointed by Duara (1996): soft boundaries can harden, and hard boundaries can soften 
as well, and what distinguishes cultural boundary from the territorial and national 
boundary is its dynamic nature as a relative concept with a reference object. In the frame 
of reference for this research, China’s cultural boundary with South Korea and the UK 
are at different marks in the spectrum as evidenced by the primary data presented in the 
above sections from 5.1.1 to 5.1.3: the level of cultural understanding, people exchange, 
and media influence as well as their relative positions in the global cultural terrain all 
contribute to the differences. Duara used the example of changing cultural boundaries 
between the Manchu and Han in Chinese history in his book, while I believe this narrative 
has contemporary and global relevance when such mutual transformations can find 
perfect demonstrations in looking at China’s cultural boundaries with South Korea and 
the UK respectively.  
 
The cultural boundary between China and the UK is arguably a harder one of the two as 
Europe is where Orientalism was bred and the UK was in a different ideological camp 
from China during the Cold War era, so China was held as both a ‘cultural other’ and 
‘ideological other’ in the past. If the lack of understanding of Chinese culture was partly 
a result of a lack of interest from the hegemonic side, the economic rise of China in the 
globalised era, along with the trans-border exchanges and people mobility can help 
generate and stimulate such an interest. As early as in 1848, the then Prime Minister, 
Henry John Temple, made the famous statement that no allies or enemies are eternal, 
174 
 
but only our interests are perpetual. Common national interests in working together can 
create an agent in softening the traditional boundaries. As Chan and McIntyre state 
(2002: xv), “boundaries are in a constant state of flux, being created, maintained, 
elaborated, contested, eroded and deconstructed”. Oommen (1995) has applied the 
contradictory trends of ‘isms’ in today’s world to explain such changes:  
 
It is a world of ‘endisms’ (end of history, ideology, nation, geography), ‘postisms’ 
(postindustrial, postcapitalist, postmodern) and ‘beyondisms’ (beyond the nation-
sate, beyond the Cold War). Endisms represent the disappearance of boundaries, 
postisms signify the emergence of new boundaries and beyondisms allude to the 
elongation of boundaries. (Quoted in Chan & McIntyre, 2002: xiv) 
 
Oommen thus concluded that the rise and fall, construction and deconstruction of 
different types of boundaries, including cultural boundaries, make up the very story of 
human civilisation and of contemporary social transformations. As argued earlier, this 
shows what carves the boundary and drives its change is actually power, and cultural 
diplomacy can potentially play a role in moving the boundaries along with the power shift. 
The new knowledge of ‘not the end of history’ and ‘beyond the Cold War’ and the culture 
flows across established boundaries facilitated by cultural diplomacy can help move the 
relatively hard cultural boundary between China and the UK towards the softer side. 
 
Meanwhile, the role nationalism plays could potentially move the relatively soft cultural 
boundary between China and South Korea towards the harder side as well. Robinson 
(2014:9) argued that “nationalism describes the creation of an ideology that serves to 
celebrate and emphasise the nation as the preeminent collective identity of a people”. 
As discussed in 1.1.3 in the Literature Review, the strength of nationalism derives above 
all from its ability to create a sense of national identity, which is constructed against ‘the 
other’, thus entails cultural resistance. Its dual attributes of being a ‘style of politics’ and 
a ‘form of culture’ (Smith, 1991) also complicate the cultural face. For example, in the 
interview with the SKLH, she mentioned the distaste of local people when seeing China’s 
national flags dotting around their city centre squares for CI’s China Day events. It is fair 
to argue that in Asian countries of the same Confucian cultural circle, this ‘otherness’ is 
more carved by the line of nationalism, or rather, cultural nationalism. In the book Cultural 
Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, Yoshino (1992: 1) defined cultural nationalism as: 
“Cultural nationalism aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving 
or strengthening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or 
threatened”. Robinson (2014:161) has commented on cultural nationalism in colonial 
Korea that: 
 
As the idea of nationalism rose among Korean intellectual at the turn of the century, 
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the Confucian tradition came under attack as an obstacle to the creation of a strong 
national identity. Subservience to foreign ideas and cultural norms inhibited the 
development of a unique, self-conscious Korean identity. Nationalist, therefore, work 
to exhume the Korean past as a repository of nationalist symbols smothering under 
a mantle of excessive veneration for Chinese culture. 
 
A number of scholars (Forsby, 2011; Li, 2008a; and Yan, 2011) have argued that there 
has been a Sino-centric tendency to direct attention inwardly towards the distinctness of 
Chinese identity. This is most conspicuously demonstrated by the rise of nationalist 
rhetoric from the 1990s and onwards. Sino-centrism signals an identity shift towards an 
increasingly self-centred-China more attuned to its distinct civilisational history. This gave 
its neighbouring countries a very mixed feeling. As explained by SKD4, Korean people’s 
feelings about Chinese culture is “very mixed”:  
 
There are aspects of Sadaejuui9, or admiration and worship of China from history; 
there are also components of contempt. Because Korea had been a tributary state 
to China for thousands of years in history, that some of the Confucian traditions or 
rituals that we carry out here in South Korea was already extinct in China, for 
example, our wedding and funeral ceremonies are more particular about rituals; and 
we never say ‘Traditional Chinese Medicine’ here, it is known as ‘Traditional Korean 
Medicine’……Actually we (the CI) are being very careful in using the word 
‘introducing’ Chinese culture instead of ‘promoting’ it, we always have to clarify that 
we are only providing opportunities. (Appendix 10) 
 
This carefulness in avoiding the wording of ‘promoting Chinese culture’ was shared by 
SKD1 from China, saying that “Koreans are very sensitive to ‘cultural invasions’ from 
China, they would accuse you of doing this if you do too much”. Another example is at 
the University of Malaya, the name of Confucius Institute was changed into Confucius 
Chinese Language Institute (孔子汉语学院) before it was agreed to be launched. This 
could be a good idea to clarify the mission and function of the Confucius Institute, while 
helping dispel the concerns and speculations. 
 
A hardening of boundaries occurs when one group privileges their cultural practices. 
Another way that could lead to a hardening boundary less consciously is when one group 
celebrates its distinctive culture. For example, the difficulty in selling traditional Chinese 
dance performances was also mentioned by SKD4, though for a different reason 
compared to Europe and the US: “Chinese art performance is not exotic enough for 
                                                             
9  Sadaejuui (lit. "serving-the-Great-ism," Hangul: 사대주의, Chinese: 事 大 主 义 ) is 
a Korean term which evolved in the mid-20th century from a more widely used historical concept. 
According to Wikipedia, Sadae literally means "dealing with the great" or "serving the great" and 
interpreted as "loving and admiring the great and powerful"; Juui means "ideology" and it is 
conventionally translated as "-ism." The Chinese term is sometimes translated as Flunkeyism in 
English, I think it is more accurate to keep the Korean expression here.  
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Korean audience, we’re very familiar with these art forms, and we also have our own folk 
dances. It is not as fresh and exciting” (Appendix 10). If Orientalism may be blamed for 
the lack of popularity of such performances in Western countries such as the UK and US, 
in East Asia, it was regarded as being ‘not exotic’ enough, or dismissed because this 
crossed the boundary that they wish to maintain as their own. This shows a delicate 
balance the CI needs to strike.  
 
On the other hand, China suffers a similar ‘loss of identity’ in such cultural encounters 
when aspects of culture that China takes pride in its distinctiveness and splendour, tend 
to be blurred into a general Oriental culture in Western countries. Like UKSC4 shared:  
 
Sometimes I cannot help feeling disheartened that after some painstaking efforts in 
explaining cultural traits of China, the students just said, well, it’s very similar to 
Japanese culture, not much difference it seems. Like once, after one hour into a 
paper cutting session held in a shopping centre to celebrate Chinese New Year, a 
participant asked if this is from Japan. (Appendix 10) 
 
SKSC3 also mentioned that in terms of contemporary art and culture, it is China that is 
in the weak position and copying everything from the South Korea, not the other way 
round. These mutual feelings show that nationalism is working as a two-way process, 
especially between China and other Asian countries that are familiar with and influenced 
by traditional Chinese culture. This ‘us-centred’ nature of nationalism acts like a ‘double 
edged sword’ that could harden the soft cultural boundary. Nationalism is used to offer 
defence in protecting one’s own national identities and draws the national cultural 
boundaries, which can be hardened by the increasingly assertive Chinese nationalism 
that emerged out of the domestic discourse and provides a driving force for China to 
pursue its dream of national rejuvenation. These changing dynamics in China’s identity 
shift has been felt by its Asian neighbours. In Jin’s research (2013:239) of South Korean 
media reports about the CIs, one of the findings is that “when the general public reads 
reports revealing the huge national interests of China behind the CIs, such reports tend 
to stimulate the rise of nationalism”.  
 
Nye (2015) believed this rise of nationalism has reduced the universal appeal of Xi’s 
‘Chinese Dream’ while antagonise its neighbours in the South China Sea and elsewhere. 
As one Indonesian official put it when speaking of his concerns about China: “the 
problem the Indonesian military has is not that China is communist, it is that China is 
nationalistic” (quoted in Lampton, 2008: 144). In this sense, nationalism has a particularly 
sensitive role to play in China’s cultural diplomacy to its Asian neighbours. On the one 
hand, countries in Asia, especially East Asia, are familiar with Confucianism and 
Confucian values, which carry universal meanings in this region on a par with freedom 
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and democracy in the West. According to the constructivist understanding of identity 
formation, the historical past is highly significant in forming the identity of the present. 
Anderson (1991:12) has pointed in his famous book Imagined Communities that 
“nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which-as well as 
against which – it came into being.” Therefore, China’s civilisation and historical legacies 
have the potential to summon common interests and orientations among those who 
share its legacy, and to be reconstructed and reinvented to help create an ‘imagined’ 
Asian identity and values (Cho & Jeong, 2008). On the other hand, China’s cultural 
diplomacy needs to tread a fine line between not appearing as too imposing when 
promoting the traditional aspects of its culture, and not too aggressive when showcasing 
the contemporary side of China that is involved in territorial disputes with a number of its 
neighbours. 
 
In summary, a soft cultural boundary may coexist with a hard nationalism boundary, and 
vice versa in this terrain of struggle, which means that the CI has to navigate very 
carefully in both East Asia and West Europe, drawing on the different attractions of its 
offerings. That explains why despite the centralised input from Hanban and the 
globalised outreach of the CI, no standard ‘recipe’ can be found for all the nine CIs 
interviewed, and stark differences can be observed in their day-to-day activities between 
South Korea and the UK. It explicates the need to tailor the ‘end products’ to each 
destination by gauging the cultural boundaries rather than having one unified model as 
a fit for all, ‘localisation’ would be essential for a strategy made by centralised approach 
to work, as the same message sent would be received and perceived differently in the 
process of interacting with different ideologies, cultural boundaries and power positions 
of the destination. In a way, cultural boundaries reconfigure themselves and become 
more dynamic in the process of cultural diplomacy, which will transfer the traditional way 
of viewing different cultures as barriers, but as different perspectives, thus contributing 
to knowledge generation.  
 
5.2 Prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI 
 
Based on the analysis and discussions in Chapters Three to Five, four statements are 
summarised as diagnostic descriptions about the distinctive features of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the CI project along the four themes of the research questions set for this 
project, i.e. why China wants to launch cultural diplomacy, what is the vehicle of the CI, 
who is the agent, and how it is carried out in the field. They started as a theoretical 
deduction from the Literature Review as outlined in 2.2.4, then they were carefully and 
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critically recalibrated with both primary and secondary research findings under the new 
analytical frameworks with a clearer focus on the CI project. A comparative perspective 
plays a critical role in this process, and the words of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ countries 
are used below as “tools to think with” (Hall, 1992), as historical, political and cultural 
constructs rather than a geographical one.   
 
1) China’s cultural diplomacy is launched in an uneven global terrain.  
 
In Western countries with a relatively hard cultural boundary, China’s cultural diplmacy 
was staged with Orientalism in the background, and anti-Communism in the foreground, 
giving China a dual stance of fighting for cultural pluralism on the cultural front, and 
against universalism on the ideological front; 
 
In Eastern countries with a relatively soft cultural boundary, the softness can be 
hardened by the double-edged nature of nationalism, which provides the driving force 
for China to launch its campaign of cultural diplomacy, but simultaneously the defending 
force for recipient countries to safeguard their national cultural identities. 
 
2) The vehicle of the Confucius Institute carries one mission statement on two 
wheels: ‘one wheel’ focuses on Chinese language teaching in countries with 
relatively soft cultural boundaries; and ‘the other wheel’ focuses on cultural 
understanding in countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries.  
 
The different geographical and cultural distances between China and the recipient 
countries, and the different media environments justify the different priorities. 
 
3) The government-led approach to implementing the CI is generating some side 
effects with its sponsorship, censorship and presence on the foreground.  
 
Such side effects appear to be shared concerns across different cultural boundaries.  
 
4) The globalised outreach of the CI is sustained by a centralised input with 
localised practices for more responsive interactions with different target 
audiences.  
 
Together these four statements constitute the prominent features of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the CI project. A clearly contrasting feature is shown in the first two 
statements between countries of relatively soft and hard cultural boundaries, while the 
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latter two aspects show similar features across different cultural boundaries. In 
comparison with the earlier four inductive statements presented in Chapter Two, clear 
and substantiated changes can be seen in the first two statements, that is because the 
multiple competing forces and different power relations in the terrain were teased out 
through the comparative case studies of the CI in this research. It shows the challenges 
of making this ‘cultural leap outward’ truly great, and suggests that China’s cultural 
diplomacy must differentiate its approaches and foci in the field as the terrain conditions 
vary substantially by region and countries, and its policy-making process needs to 
respond to both international and domestic contexts, which interact with each other.  
 
Although the thesis focuses on the CI, the above research findings can be related broadly 
to the features of China’s cultural diplomacy, especially statement one and three, which 
also applies to other forms and fronts, such as internationalisation of the Chinese media, 
sports and artistic exchanges to name a few. Different fronts will face different challenges 
and have different features, but it is the same contested terrain that China’s cultural 
diplomacy is launched into, and by similar government-led approach. The implications of 
these features on the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy will be discussed in the 




This chapter has built on the analysis and discussions of the previous chapters in 
presenting the four statements summarising the prominent features of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the CI project, from the four perspectives that framed the research 
questions at the very beginning: the different international and domestic contexts that 
define the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy; the vehicle of the CI that carries the 
shared mission but different priorities; the agent that drives the vehicle, fast yet with 
constraints; and the actual driving practice of the vehicle to suit different road conditions. 
A comparison of the East and West blocs in the global cultural terrain was carried out 
first by applying the cultural boundary theory and examining the roles played by media 
and nationalism to help sharpen the statements. Cross-case primary data was drown on 
to lend validity to the researching findings. 
 
The implications of each of the Chinese characteristics will be discussed in the last 
concluding chapter, with specific initiatives proposed for future practice. It will also point 











China’s expanding global presence goes hand in hand with its deeper engagement 
across cultural, economic, and diplomatic realms of international affairs. Amidst its 
growing influence, China has been trying to carve out a new identity in the global cultural 
terrain. The cultural diplomacy campaign was launched to fulfil this new mission. At the 
same time, when the China Dream of national rejuvenation is staged by President Xi 
Jinping, its push to regain the glory of Chinese culture has prompted both the Chinese 
society and China watchers to rethink China’s historical, ideological and cultural heritage.  
 
Academic interest in the study of China’s cultural diplomacy has only recently developed 
into a substantial body of research. However, its focus has almost been exclusively on 
how it is functioning as a tool to build China’s soft power. The aim of this thesis was 
neither to measure the soft power generated by China’s cultural diplomacy, nor to argue 
whether or not it has been successful. Instead, its point of departure was to show the 
limitations of applying the Western-defined narrative of ‘soft power’ in non-Western 
contexts, and why an alternative and more sophisticated theoretical framework is needed 
to look beyond and beneath it in order to illuminate the complex nature of China’s cultural 
diplomacy. Only by capturing the intricacies between the intertwined multiple contexts 
can we begin to acquire a deeper and more precise understanding of its Chinese 
characteristics.  
 
This thesis has organised its arguments around the purpose, vehicle, agent, and field 
practice of China’s cultural diplomacy. Chapter One of the Literature Review dealt with 
definitions and theoretical discussions. It re-conceptualised China’s cultural position in 
the world from the pre-modern period to contemporary times, and developed new lines 
of academic inquiry by critically reviewing the mainstream arguments and proposing an 
alternative analytical framework to investigate the hidden barriers to China’s cultural 
diplomacy, based on which the thesis research questions were specified and justified. 
The relevant literature review of the CI, which operates in a terrain of struggle in which 
China is ‘othered’ both culturally and ideologically, further elaborate the thesis’s critique 
of the concepts of soft power and nation branding as the analytical framework. Chapter 
Two explained the rationale and the actual design of ‘multiple triangulations’ employed 
to carry out this investigation. Chapter Three challenged the adequacy of the existing 
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lens of ‘soft power’ to view and analyse the very complex terrain conditions, and adopted 
the new analytical framework in surveying a three-dimensional global cultural terrain of 
struggle. Chapter Four applied the new lenses to examine the primary data through 
comparative case studies of the CIs to its Western counterparts, with a view to answering 
the research question of why China’s similar effort in launching the CI are perceived and 
received differently and encountered unexpected controversies; Chapter Five adopted 
yet another comparative lenses of ‘cultural boundary’ to refine and consolidate the 
research findings by comparing the CIs operating in East Asia to those in West Europe. 
The three key chapters demonstrated how China’s cultural diplomacy impacted upon 
both China’s interactions with the world in its ascent to global prominence, and the 
perception of its rise from the rest of the world situated within different geopolitical, 
ideological, cultural and historical contexts. They also identified the structural limits and 
operational challenges faced by the CI through analysing the rich empirical data, and 
pinpointed that the main challenge of China’s cultural diplomacy lied in how to counter 
the old perceptions of ‘otherness’ with China’s own self-representations, and how to 
nurture mutual understanding with the prevalent Western-defined assumptions and 
values. The concluding chapter also included some recommended initiatives that the 
Chinese state can take to fully utilise the efforts that it has made to advance the country’s 
cultural diplomacy. 
 
This thesis made an original contribution to the emerging study of China’s cultural 
diplomacy by taking an alternative approach to gaining insight into its Chinese 
characteristics. Transcending traditional disciplinary boundaries of international relations, 
cultural studies and communications, it argued that an accurate understanding of China’s 
new image needed to be framed in the historical, domestic and international contexts, 
which are constantly interacting with each other and cannot be looked at in isolation from 
one another. Both the internal dynamics of change and the external geopolitical and 
economic shifts of power, as well as the historical contexts, were examined in exploring 
how the old Chinese discourse of anti-imperialism has returned in the new discourse of 
anti-cultural hegemony, and how the formation of China’s international image was fused 
with the creation of new identities within China itself, whose vision today is shaped by its 
own historical experiences. Throughout the thesis, the alternative analytical frameworks 
have been employed to deepen and enrich our understandings of the four specific 
research questions by examining the relevant facets of China’s cultural diplomacy 
through a comparative case study of the CI. It then concluded with an exploration of what 
forms the prominent features of China’s unprecedented cultural leap outward. 
 




This research challenged the appropriateness of using ‘soft power’ to judge and analyse 
China’s cultural diplomacy and argued for a more sophisticated analytical framework. 
First of all, by comparison with the definition of cultural diplomacy, which is meant to be 
a plus sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and mutual respect between 
cultures, it is evident to see the ‘soft power’ concept still adopts a binary view of political 
cultures being incompatible with each other, thus tends to interpret cultural diplomacy as 
a zero sum game to win hearts and minds. Besides, the two separate sources of ‘soft 
power’ identified in Nye’s definition (2004), ‘culture’ and ‘political values’, have become 
increasingly overlapping, to the extent that the boundary between the two has blurred. 
As long as China maintains that the values of its political system are fundamentally 
different from those of the modern Western world, its soft power would be considered 
lame, thus the impact produced by cultural diplomacy would be very limited if examined 
through this lens.  
 
Secondly, the concept of ‘soft power’ is inadequate as the main analytical tool because 
it has not engaged with any historical analysis of the legacies of cultural hegemony, 
knowledge-power nexus and Orientalism, which formed the interwoven foundation of the 
current global cultural terrain, rather, it applied the same lens to look at China as other 
Western countries and failed to recognise the unequal power positions associated with 
culture and ideology.  
 
Thirdly, it did not address the domestic context either where nationalism is a driving force 
for China to launch cultural diplomacy, it converges state nationalism and popular 
nationalism in that “nationalism as a shared value between the Chinese state and 
Chinese populace has played an increasingly important role in shaping the trajectory of 
China’s rise” (Zhao, 2013:553). Therefore, it is not only inadequate but also inappropriate 
to use ‘soft power’ to explain and examine the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy. 
 
After challenging ‘soft power’ as the mainstream theoretical premise by exposing its 
inadequacies, this research proposed alternative perspectives of using cultural 
hegemony, Orientalism and nationalism as the new frameworks of analysis to look both 
beyond and beneath the old frameworks for a broader and deeper understanding of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. It has found that both culture and ideology helped draw the 
line between the two sides of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the global cultural 
terrain of struggle. Compared with the line of ‘cultural superiority and inferiority’ carved 
by Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or enemies’ were created by anti-
Communism, and China’s attempt at gaining more power of discourse was accused of 
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‘ideological infiltration’ by the hegemonic side. This supported the finding from the 
Literature Review that ideology is the new form of ‘otherness’. 
 
These new frameworks revealed a three-dimensional picture of an uneven global cultural 
terrain, both in terms of unbalanced powers with hidden barriers for the counter-
hegemonic side, and also hierarchical barriers influencing the interactions among 
various players in this terrain. The comparative case studies of the Confucius Institutes 
- both between the CI and its Western counterparts, and between CIs in South Korea 
and those in the UK - drove the differences from the surface to the very core. The most 
fundamental difference lies in the terrain conditions: it was the different power position 
in the terrain, not the actual location of where the CI is based, that lied at the root of the 
perceived differences in its intentions and government involvement. While differences in 
operating model were certainly a major source for setting the CI apart from its Western 
counterparts, it was an over-simplified explanation that did not challenge the Orientalist 
grounds or the ‘positional superiority’ held by the hegemonic side in this terrain of 
struggle. Rather, the difference of the CI’s location on campus was magnified under 
‘ideological spectacles’, and tied to the above two perceived ‘differences’ in the CI’s 
purpose and government background, to the extent of negating the comparability of the 
CI to its Western counterparts.  
 
However, no matter which lens was adopted, it all pointed to one shared finding 
regarding the Chinese government’s presence: both ‘behind the stage’ and ‘on the stage’ 
of cultural diplomacy, which was arguably counterproductive as a major source for 
attracting scepticisms. Enough evidence has shown that the government-led approach 
in implementing cultural diplomacy was generating some side effects from its 
sponsorship, censorship and presence on the ‘foreground’. This thesis argued that there 
are better ways of utilising government input to move the CI’s model to a more 
constructive collaboration and equal partnership by engaging the host institutions.  
 
In the next level of comparison, this thesis examined how countries in East Asia where 
shared cultural roots underpinned the relatively soft cultural boundaries, sought to shore 
up the national identities through nationalism; whereas in Western countries with 
relatively hard cultural boundaries to China, the disputes that the CIs caused served as 
a reminder that language teaching and cultural activities can be politically charged. Soft 
or hard, cultural diplomacy does not necessarily cross cultural boundaries intact, but has 
the potential to soften hard boundaries. The analytical angle of cultural boundary showed 
us that on the one hand, “the normal response to foreign influence is to build walls” (Pool, 
1990:66), so boundaries do exist, and disputes over and about them involve sovereignty 
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and nationalism, often resulting in conflicts. On the other hand, we now live in an age 
where human movements across national borders are happening on an unprecedented 
scale, delivering new conflicts and new anxieties, but also new knowledge and new 
communities. This would allow cultural diplomacy to play a more conducive role in 
facilitating flows of people, ideas, and cultures between China and the rest of the world. 
 
Finally, developed from and sharpened by the analysis and discussions of the previous 
chapters, four statements summarising the prominent features of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the CI project were put forward from the four perspectives that framed 
the research questions at the very beginning: the different historical, international and 
domestic contexts combined with different cultural boundaries interweave the complex 
backgrounds for China’s cultural diplomacy; meaning that the vehicle of the CI needs to 
carry the shared mission but deliver different priorities in different parts of the cultural 
terrain; the government as the agent should not just focus on speed but needs to be 
aware of the side effects produced by government sponsorship and censorship; and the 
actual driving practice of the vehicle also needs to be adapted to suit different road 
conditions.  
 
In summary, this thesis combined the richness of critical literature review and 
contemporary scholarly debates with new insights developed in conceptualising China’s 
cultural diplomacy from multiple theoretical perspectives. Its Chinese characteristics 
were both established from an extensive review of the growing literature and grounded 
in substantiate field studies that explore trans-regional and trans-national cultural 
encounters and interactions. Its central argument is that China’s cultural diplomacy, as 
a political response and even a moral claim on cultural pluralism, has to be understood 
from crossovers of historical grandeur of Chinese culture, Western cultural hegemony in 
modern history, China’s recent economic rise accompanying global power shift, and the 
undercurrents of nationalism at home. Therefore, posing China’s cultural diplomacy as 
a projection of soft power is highly charged and oversimplified at the same time. The new 
analytical frameworks allowed us to see a much more sophisticated discourse on China’s 
cultural diplomacy. Under these multiple intertwined contexts, there is a non-alignment 
between the vision shown through the lens of ‘soft power’ and the empirical reality 
constructed through my field study. Under the new perspectives, cultural diplomacy is 
not just an articulation of the Chinese soft power, but rather, a grand strategy to bring 
these contexts together in realising China’s ‘national rejuvenation’ politically, 




However, there are multiple challenges in realising this grand strategy and in making this 
‘leap outward’ truly ‘great’: the challenges lie in the long-term nature of this contested 
terrain of struggle and the current position of Chinese culture, therefore the greatness 
needs to be measured not just by how big the stride is or how extensive the footprints 
are, but more importantly, by measuring how deep the footprints are and how long-lasting 
the impact is. It is a ‘Great Leap Outward’ only if the leap is well landed and well received.  
 
Of course, the above findings should be treated with a degree of caution because it was 
largely based on the case study of the CI. However, it is believed that the study was of a 
sufficient scale and depth to yield results that could apply as general features of China’s 
cultural diplomacy. Each of the Chinese characteristics will also have implications on the 
general practice of China’s cultural diplomacy, which will be discussed in the section 
below in the same order as the four statements.  
 
6.2 Implications of the prominent features on the practice of China’s cultural 
diplomacy and the CI 
 
Now that the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project have 
been refined based on the gathering and analysis of the primary and secondary data of 
this search, it is hoped to shed light on the actual practice in the field: How can China 
better translate its cultural resources into desired policy outcomes? How can the side 
effects produced by China’s ‘prescription’ of cultural diplomacy be managed? And how 
can the ‘China Model’ of cultural diplomacy be improved? This section will look at the 
number of implications that emerged following the findings, and what initiatives can be 
taken to bring about changes in a positive and coherent way. These changes should aim 
at elevating the subtleness and sophistication of cultural diplomacy in practice. 
 
6.2.1 Purpose: understanding the target audience better 
 
The current thinking of projecting soft power means the approach to cultural diplomacy 
tends to be Sino-centric and not focus enough on the target audience living within distinct 
political, social and cultural contexts. The analysis of the different terrain conditions in 
Statement 1) suggests that China’s cultural diplomacy must recalibrate itself carefully 
against the cultural boundaries with the recipient countries, and aim at long-term effects 
rather than short-term results. To achieve its stated purpose of promoting cultural 
pluralism, number and speed driven mentality must be reverted as it can be 
counterproductive in many ways and attract scepticism, especially when they are 
achieved through free language classes and CI events at the government funding. 
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Cultural diplomacy can only work the magic like a drip feeding, slower but going deeper 
with longer effects.  
 
As argued by Rawnsley (2013), audiences for international communications and cultural 
flows decide whether and how they will accept, internalise and act upon the message, 
and this decision may depend on a range of other internal and external influences, such 
as education, family, media and travelling that affects and determines their responses. 
Therefore, more effective cultural diplomacy has to aim at achieving a balance of the 
variables that best frame the production of knowledge and understanding of China for 
the target audiences, and more importantly, not treating them as passive audiences who 
receive messages but stakeholders with whom to engage.  
 
For example, in Western countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries with China, 
more focus can be put on showcasing the sophistication of Chinese culture, to help dispel 
Orientalist misconceptions on the one hand, and better understand Chinese cultural DNA 
as a peace-loving nation on the other hand, that a stronger China is not a threat as the 
China Dream aims at reinstating the ultimate goal of creating a harmonious world through 
the Confucian ideal of ‘harmony with diversity’. In terms of content delivery in the 
classroom, more debates can be held in Western universities as debating is a much 
more welcomed culture than one-way input. Both sides’ arguments can be heard and 
students can be exposed to alternative views to those dominating their own education 
and media environment while finding the process intellectually stimulating.  
 
In Asian countries where their cultural understanding of traditional China is a lot better, 
more focus can be put on showcasing the opportunities provided by contemporary China, 
while more sensitivity should be given to recipient countries’ national cultural identity, 
especially those who were tributary states to China in history. The promotion of Chinese 
language and culture should aim at celebrating cultural differences and compatibilities. 
People-to-people interaction should play a bigger role in enhancing mutual 
understandings. 
 
6.2.2 Vehicle: promoting Chinese culture as an internalising process rather than 
an uniform product 
 
The ‘culturetainment’ trend of reducing the diversity of Chinese culture to a uniform 
commodity discussed in 4.3.1 needs to be addressed. Again, as an organization 
promoting culture, the CI ought not treat its target audience just as an ‘audience’ to 
impress, but as individuals to interact and engage with, by offering what caters to their 
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interests and needs, not simply giving a ready-made uniform product as a fit-for-all. This 
is what Statement 2) implies in practice. 
 
For example, Hanban sponsors tours of university art troupes all over the world. In Asian 
countries that are much more familiar with Chinese folk dance, such university-standard 
tours can be reduced and redirect the fund for more activities engaging the target 
audiences while enabling internalisation of cultural appreciation. For example, using the 
fund as awards to students’ competitions, such as Chinese writing, photography, video 
or drama, that students are the main participants and active creators; the awards can be 
trips to China or scholarships to study in China.  
 
The other example of uniform practice is that Hanban would allocate a large number of 
teaching materials and textbooks to each CI (3000 volumes as specified in most of the 
agreements), but as discussed in 4.4.2, they were often used as evidence of government 
control in some host counties even if only 12.5% of the institutes used textbooks 
published in China according to Xu Lin, as this is not a mandate from Hanban. Therefore, 
the choice of not using Hanban-sanctioned textbooks can be used as a strong counter-
argument to those ungrounded accusations, and such wasteful donations can stop going 
to those countries as they were gathering dust on the shelf or being left in a warehouse. 
(Of course, such practice can continue in other parts of the world where the donated 
books are more needed and actually used). Instead, the funding can be offered through 
a bidding process that the host university can bid for with their expected outputs, this 
would be a much more effective way of utilising the fund, by again engaging the receiver 
as the stakeholder and active participant.  
 
Just like the metaphor used in Section 5.1.2, the vehicle must adapt itself to different 
driving practices in left-driving and right-driving countries, and make necessary changes 
to its configuration to suit different road conditions. Most important of all, the vehicle of 
cultural diplomacy is supposed to provide a long-lasting journey of ‘fostering mutual 
understanding’ by bringing the two sides together, not like a high speed rail that may 
impress people and attract them for a free ride at first, but may lose passengers after 
they have experienced the standard ‘product’.  
 
6.2.3 Agent: playing down the roles and presence of the government  
 
As argued throughout Chapters Three to Four, in the prescription of cultural diplomacy, 
the dose of government defining, planning, funding and leading is one of the ingredients 
that are causing side effects, particularly for China, whose identity as a polity reduces 
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the cultural appeal of its identity as a civilisation. The authoritarian nature of the Chinese 
government may cause its challenge to Western cultural hegemony to rebound as being 
challenged. Many criticisms of the CI are not about what CIs did, but about what the 
Chinese government did not allow them to do, resulting in a least desirable outcome: the 
negative perception based on what did not happen could wipe out the positive effects of 
what did happen. Therefore, the implied advice from Statement 3) is to play down the 
roles and the presence of Chinese government. This can be done by putting the two 
partner institutions more in the limelight for CI events, especially for academic 
conferences and forums, Hanban can continue with the role of ‘helping build the stage’ 
with funding support, but not as actors appearing on the stage as well, nor as producers 
making decisions on the lines of the play. More trust and autonomy should be delegated 
to the two partner institutions, and less government presence should be made in CI 
opening ceremonies and major events. The roles played by the Board of Advisors should 
be made more visible through media communications and more voices should be given 
to people-in-the-know who can offer substantial counter-evidence and more convincing 
counter-arguments than government defence. 
 
It is commendable to see a number of very responsive and pro-active new practices were 
initiated and auctioned by Hanban such as those outlined in 3.5.2, however, there are 
also other measures in store that may reap some ‘side effects’ while only addressing the 
‘symptom’ of teacher shortage problem. For example, according to the MOD, some 
embassies have now proposed to allow spouses of diplomats to fill in positions of the CI 
teachers through competitive examinations. This only applies to CIs that are close 
enough to Embassies and mostly located in non-English speaking counties that suffer 
from a more serious teacher shortage. The benefits are to help with teacher supply and 
offer job opportunities for embassy staff’s spouses at the same time, but the drawbacks 
are obviously stronger government colour attached to the CI, which may override the 
benefits.  
 
Apart from reducing government presence, a more important change should be made to 
its role in implementing cultural diplomacy. As argued by Seiichi (2008: 191) in the 
Literature Review, the government role should be more of a “network hub”, focusing on 
low-visibility efforts to create a fertile environment that enables cross fertilisation between 
cultures. For example, Hanban can create a bidding system with transparent procedures 
that is open to any organization - regardless of whether it is privately or government 
owned, Chinese or foreign, as long as the bidding party can come up with an initiative 
that serves the purpose of promoting Chinese language and cultural and enhancing 
mutual understanding, it can get government support to generate the desired output. The 
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CI may continue to be the ‘flagship project’, but more initiatives should be created. As 
argued in the Literature Review, the multi-agent view represents the future development 
of cultural diplomacy, as it can mobilise and unleash more nodes to activate a whole 
network. When a government is functioning just like a major node in this network, the 
desired elevation of subtleness and sophistication in cultural diplomacy can be achieved.  
 
6.2.4 Implementation: involving both partners equally as stakeholders  
 
The analysis and discussions of the few cases of CI closures in Chapter Four suggest 
that the CIs are more likely to be controversial if the host university entirely relies on the 
CI to deliver the whole Chinese language and studies program. If the host university 
has their own course team or locally hired lecturers, and only use CI’s expertise on 
language teaching and cultural activities, the risk would be largely reduced and more 
manageable. If a lesson can be learned from reflecting on these closing-downs, the 
most important message is to respect the cooperation as an equal partnership by both 
sides. Mutual trust is at the core, and it can be built by working together. Specifically, I 
would suggest keeping the CI as a separate arm to the body of university offering with 
locally hired lecturers or researchers, rather than outsourcing the whole provision to the 
CI. It allows the host university to take advantage of Hanban’s generous support for 
expansion of the language program and enrichment of cultural activities, without 
restricting freedom of inquiry for students to investigate potentially sensitive topics, 
while adding the benefits for students to have access to diverse international points of 
view, including those sponsored by Hanban. Cooperation will surely be encouraged 
between the CI teachers and locally hired staff. This blend would help nurture a healthy 
balance and create a more ‘equal partnership’ that both parties can benefit from while 
minimising the worries and fears of reduced academic discourse on campus. 
 
If more adjustments can be made when considering new CI partnerships, it is highly 
advisable to choose a host university that already has its own course team or at least 
one staff in teaching Chinese and/or Chinese Studies; It is interesting to note that 
according to Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe, one of the criteria (point 10.3) 
is “the ratio of local Chinese teachers and secondees from China should reach 1:1” 
(Appendix 3). If the host university does not have its own course team/staff, then it is 
advisable to apply for setting up positions of CI head teachers to jointly deliver the 
teaching with the CI secondees.  
 
Localisation is another key word for implementation: Statements 1), 2) and 4) all suggest 
a strong need to localise the practice of the CI. As discussed in 4.2.4 and 4.3.1, flexibility 
190 
 
is actually already a unique feature of the CI model and there is no standard formula 
prescribed for the CI provisions all over the world, but localisation needs to go a step 
further in offering an individualised diet that best matches each CI’s conditions and the 
needs of the target audiences; it can only work to its full effect with a better quality of CI 
provisions, and capacity building can help in this regard.   
 
Capacity building is a term created in the 1990s by UNDP, which defined it as a long-
term, continuing process, in which all stakeholders participate in “the creation of an 
enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal frameworks, institutional 
development, including community participation, human resources development and 
strengthening of managerial systems” (UNDP website). It has since become a 
conceptual approach to development that focuses on understanding the obstacles that 
inhibit organisations from realising their goals while enhancing the abilities that will allow 
them to survive, adapt, and thrive.  
 
As discussed in 4.2.2, a quality gap needs to be narrowed when compared the CI to its 
Western counterparts, which can be achieved through capacity building. Specifically, 
pre-job training provided by the host university should become systematic and 
mandatory before the CI teachers start teaching, to ensure quality and align the CI 
teachers with the academic standard required by the host university. This is of vital 
importance that I argue for it to be included in the CI agreement under the ‘Obligations 
of the Host University’. So far, there are only pre-departure trainings offered by Hanban 
before teachers leave China, usually they are very general in nature as it is the same 
training for teachers being sent to different countries, and the part of the training 
regarding how to handle politically sensitive issues was often cited as evidence of 
government control. Pre-job training in situ is currently not compulsory and very sporadic: 
by making it a compulsory duty of the host university, it would give the host institution the 
‘relational structures’ and ‘shared identity’ proposed by Zaharna (2014), making them 
feel like a stakeholder in a truly collaborative entity. It will benefit the tutors themselves, 
the student body and the CI as a whole.  
 
When we consider the initiatives mentioned in the above four aspects, we can see how 
they address the three extended questions added to Melissen’s (2005) model discussed 
in 2.4: apart from answering questions of what messages are sent under what 
circumstances, who received them, and how the messages are interpreted, this thesis 
proposed to also consider who sends the messages, how the messages are sent, and 
how these messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination. 
A common theme in making the above recommendations lies with engaging ‘the receiver’ 
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as a stakeholder rather than a passive receiving end or inactive nodes: from engaging 
the target audience, to engaging the host university and seconded staff from home 
university, and more non-state actors as agents of cultural diplomacy. The 
implementation of cultural diplomacy should evolve from a vertical approach that is 
government-centred to a horizontal one that is network-based, which can facilitate more 
collaborations and generate synergy.  
 
It is worth mentioning that Hanban has adopted a very positive learning attitude. In the 
9th CI Conference held in December 2014, one of the presidents’ forums’ was committed 
to discussing the CI function of cultural exchange and academic research, and this 
forum was chaired by Kahn-Ackermann, former Director of the Goethe-Institute (China) 
and currently senior consultant for the CI headquarters. The annual conference is a 
useful scheme for CIs all around the world to listen to each other and the advisors, to 
reflect and act on improvements.  
 
6.3 The road forward: some open issues  
 
Apart from shedding light on the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and 
the CI project, this research also provides a constructive foundation for future studies. 
China currently has 500 CIs all over the world, further research would be needed to 
explore more field-based issues, especially in North America and Africa where this 
research was not able to focus on due to its limited scope. In addition, new quantitative 
research is highly desirable to evaluate the impact of the CI program, as the one 
completed by Tao and Page (2013) was based on a statistical analysis of the data from 
the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey. They disproved the hypothesis that “the number 
of Confucius Institutes in a country should be positively related to favourable opinions 
about China among that country’s people”, and concluded that “the number of Confucius 
Institutes and classrooms appears to have no significant impact at all on foreign public’s 
perceptions of China”. In analysing the possible reasons for this “most disappointing 
finding”, one was “they are simply too new to show effects”, and the other was that “in a 
hasty pursuit of scale, these institutes might have sacrificed quality” (Tao & Page, 2013: 
863-864). Tao and Page also methodologically note that the CIs are more concentrated 
in Europe and North America where perceptions of China have been the most 
unfavourable. Even if the CIs have positive effects, “ordinary regression methods could 
produce a null or negative finding due to simultaneity bias” (2013: 864). Given that the 
first CI was only launched near the end of 2004, any conclusion drawn based on a 2007 
survey statistics could only be tentative. Now with over a decade to look back on, a more 
up-to-date quantitative research to evaluate the CI’s impact as well as the impact of the 
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Confucius Studies Program, especially from the alternative angles other than the ‘soft 
power’ lens would be highly valuable, so that some sort of answers can be provided to 
the question mark in this thesis title: is China’s cultural diplomacy a ‘Great Leap Outward’?  
 
More future research is also needed in taking a reflexive perspective in evaluating the 
CI’s impacts on the Chinese partners. For example, Paradise’s research (2009) found 
that people in the education field do not like the idea of ‘soft power’, believing that power 
per se is aggressive. They prefer instead to think of the CI as a vehicle for academic 
exchange and mutual understanding. Therefore, Paradise challenged the grounds of 
judgment, contending that the standpoint of expanding Chinese ‘soft power’ may be the 
wrong standard for measuring the CI’s success. Pan (2013) also argued for the 
increasing international students studying in China gain Chinese universities improved 
international image. Rather, as China attempts to bolster its innovation and scientific 
capability, increased communications and exchanges with foreign academic institutions 
facilitated by the CIs could be a huge benefit.  
 
I believe Paradise’s comments are extremely useful in evaluating the CI’s impact, as the 
endeavour of cultural diplomacy aims at “fostering mutual understanding” (Cummings, 
2009:1) by connecting the two sides through exchanges, its effects should also be 
evaluated from both sides. So far, very little evaluation has been done from the 
perspective of the Chinese side, and even from the receiving side, it has been limited to 
measuring the change of China’s national image or the success of building ‘soft power’. 
At least, one good positive output produced by expanding the CIs, as pointed out by Ren 
(2010:20), is “it stands as both an action for propagating Chinese culture and also a 
process for rediscovering it”. I would like to add, it is both an endeavour to reshape the 
image of China, and a process of self-development and learning from the collaboration. 
Adopting a new lens would allow one to see the effects in a different colour. For example, 
judging the CI according to how Chinese university administrators view them may 
produce a conclusion of a different sort. Questions such as how much the Chinese 
universities have benefited from their participations in the ventures, and how successful 
they have been in playing their roles as ‘cultural diplomats’ need to be answered. These 
questions may help open up a wider spectrum of research topics for the possibilities and 
limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy. At this stage, this thesis serves as a precursor 
to move scholarship in that direction.  
 
The other direction for future research could point to other endeavours of China’s cultural 
diplomacy, such as the China Cultural Centres (CCC) mentioned in Mr Anders’s 
interview. He made an interesting remark that the CI is indeed “not comparable” to the 
193 
 
GI, not because of its government connection, but because the GI’s official counterpart 
is actually the CCC in Berlin. CCCs were set up as government-sponsored cultural 
centres since the 1980s. By the end of 2016, a total of 30 centres have been established 
all over the world (Xinhua, 2016) through Agreement on Mutual Establishment of Cultural 
Centres between China and XXX (name of the host country), the ones set up in Berlin 
and Madrid have made it quite clear on their official websites that they are the 
counterparts of Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute respectively. They follow the 
same model and are all based in prime locations in the host country and fulfil similar 
functions, including holding cultural activities, teaching and training, and information 
services (CCC website). In a way, they are parallel organisations to the CIs: one is under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Education, and one is under the Ministry of Culture who 
appointed and expatriated CCC Directors.  
 
Though earlier in establishment, CCCs are much slower in global expansion with much 
lower visibility, thus causing very few disputes. There is currently very little research 
about the CCC, a comparative study exploring the different features and different models 
between the CCC and the CI would be very beneficial for providing answers to the 
question of how to make the ‘cultural leap outward’ great.  
 
Last but not least, the cultural boundary theory can be applied in further depth to 
generate a more detailed map of the global cultural terrain. When a culture meets a hard 
boundary with another culture that holds a hegemonic position, the chances of having a 
conflict are greater than two cultures sharing a soft boundary, and the roles played by 
ideology and nationalism in drawing such boundaries also need to be further elaborated. 
There is plenty of scope to refine the charting of the global cultural terrain of struggle.  
 
To conclude, this thesis has taken stock of what findings have been generated from the 
current body of literature; identified the gap or its limitations, then filled the gap by 
developing and employing a new analytical framework, and completed with pointing out 
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Appendix 1: Quantity, Distribution and Annual Growth of the Confucius Institute 





Number of countries 
孔子学院数 
Number of CIs 
亚洲  Asia   34 110 
非 洲  Africa  37 46 
欧洲  Europe 42 169 
美洲  America  20 157 
大洋洲  Oceania  3 18 
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Development Plan of Confucius 
Institutes (2012—2020) 
This Plan has been formulated in an effort to further develop the Confucius Institutes 
(CIS), promote educational exchange and cooperation between China and the 
world, utilize Cls as a comprehensive platform for cultural exchange, and showcase 
the Chinese culture to the world. 
 
I. Background 
Thanks to China's stunning economic and social development as well as its rising 
international prestige, an increasing number of countries seek to forge friendly 
relations with China, and the role of the Chinese language in international 
communication is more keenly felt. With the mission of promoting the Chinese 
language in the world, Cls have endeavored to build a global Chinese language and 
culture network. The past few years have witnessed the rapid expansion of CIS, 
both through the improvement of its academic quality, and the popularity of its brand 
projects. We have created a new model for language and cultural exchange 
between China and the world, chartered a new path for showcasing the Chinese 
culture, and achieved extraordinary development. As a model for Sino-foreign 
educational and cultural exchange and cooperation, Cls have contributed 
significantly to the promotion of Chinese language in the world, fostering of Sino-
foreign cultural exchange, and deepening of friendship with other peoples. By the 
end of 2011, 358 Cls and 500 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) have been established 
in 105 countries and regions around the world. The total number of registered 
students has reached over 500,000. Despite such growth, Cls have not been able 
to completely meet the rising demand of Chinese learning worldwide; highly 
qualified professional teachers are in short supply; textbooks that cater to different 
needs are not adequate; the academic quality could be further improved; and the 
resources call for better integration. 
 
In a globalized world, embracing the diversity of civilizations and enhancing 
cross-cultural understanding have become the common goal for many countries in 
their pursuit of further development. As China develops itself, more people in the world 
are attracted to the rich and vibrant Chinese culture, and more countries have 
integrated Chinese language teaching into their national education systems. Through 
learning the Chinese language and culture, overseas Chinese are bound even closer 
to their cultural roots. Against the background of an everincreasing demand for 
Chinese learning worldwide, further development of Cls will help promote Sino-foreign 
educational exchange, the internationalization of education, and the training of 
professionals needed for Sino-foreign cooperation in different fields. Further, by 
presenting a civilized, democratic, open and progressive country, Cls may help people 
around the world understand China better. Therefore, we should be keenly aware of 
our responsibility and take advantage of favorable conditions, so as to strengthen Cls 
and usher into a new chapter for their development. 
 
Il. General Requirements 
A. Guidelines 
We should, in response to the need of China's public diplomacy efforts and people-to-
people exchange, grasp the golden opportunity and strategically select the locations of 
Cls. The core task of Cls is to engage in Chinese language teaching and improve 
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academic quality. We aim at the best quality for every CI that we establish. As a 
comprehensive platform for cultural exchange, Cls should help promote the Chinese 
language worldwide, as well as the friendly relations between China and the rest of the 
world. 
 
B. Basic Principles 
Scientific positioning with unique characteristics. We should integrate Chinese 
language teaching and cultural exchange, offer courses according to local 
conditions and needs, and undertake cultural exchange with unique characteristics, 
so as to meet the diverse and multi-facet needs of Chinese learners worldwide. 
 
Government support and operation in civil sector. We should draft a general plan, 
improve policy measures, and stress the focus of Cls on public welfare and its non-
governmental nature so as to fully mobilize support from society stakeholders. 
 
Sino-foreign cooperation and indigenous development. We should adhere to the 
model of Sino-foreign joint programs run by schools, universities, enterprises and 
communities, and adopt a unified name and constitution. We should also leverage 
Chinese and foreign stakeholders, abide by the laws and regulations of Cl's host 
country, and respect local cultural traditions and customs, in order to achieve joint 
establishment and joint management. 
 
Serve the local people and achieve win-win. We should fully leverage Cls as a 
comprehensive cultural exchange platform, promote exchange among different 
peoples and civilizations, and strive to boost local economic, educational and 
cultural development. 
 
C. Development Objectives 
By 2015, we will have established 500 Cls and 1,000 CCs around the world. 
The total number of students will reach 1.5 million, among which I million will be 
registered at local Cls/CCs, and the remaining 500,000 will be registered at 
Confucius Institute Online. The number of qualified full-time and part-time teachers 
will reach 50,000, among which China-sent and locally recruited teachers will 
account for 20,000 and 30,000 respectively. We will also foster the development of 
Internet, radio and TV-based Confucius Institutes. 
 
By 2020, we will have established a global network of Cls that features unified 
quality standards, testing and accreditation, and selection and training of teachers. 
We will have a team of qualified full-time and part-time Chinese language teachers 
(of both Chinese and non-Chinese citizenship), who can meet the demand of 
Chinese learning. We will have compiled Chinese language textbooks in multiple 
languages, and with a broad coverage. We will have established a global 
communication system for the spread of Chinese language and culture, which 
possesses a wide range of functions and broad coverage. Collaboration between 
China and foreign countries, and that between the government and civil sector will 
be improved. Chinese will become a commonly learned and used language 
worldwide. 
111. Major Tasks 




We should have an overall plan for the selection of CI sites so as to establish a 
wide network of multi-tiered and diversified Cls. Taking into consideration the local 
conditions and requirements, we should build different types of Cls. Most Cls 
should identify Chinese language instruction as their main task, and striving to 
become, in their respective countries, centers of Chinese language teaching, local 
teacher training, and Chinese language testing and accreditation. We should 
support qualified Cls to offer advanced Chinese language teaching and conduct 
contemporary China studies, turning them into important academic platforms that 
enable a deeper understanding of China. In order to meet the diverse needs of 
learners around the world, we should encourage Cls to develop their own special 
features, such as a focus on business, traditional Chinese medicine, martial arts, 
culinary art, arts, and tourism among others. We should also encourage Cls in 
some countries to combine Chinese language teaching with cultural exchange and 
vocational training, so as to help students acquire not only proficiency in Chinese 
but also vocational skills. 
 
We should encourage combination of Cls/CCs with the national education system 
of host countries, career development prospect of local students, and programs for 
studying in China, which will improve the effectiveness and attractiveness of Cls. 
We should set up a comprehensive quality assessment system, and formulate 
rules regarding the exit mechanism of Cls. 
 
B. Set up teaching and human resources management systems 
Accelerate setting up a team of competent administrators. We should improve 
selection procedures for CI directors, and build up a qualified and committed team 
of full-time directors, who understand education and are adept in coordination and 
management. Most Chinese directors should be selected from mid- or senior-level 
officials of Chinese partner institutions. We should also enhance pre-service and 
in-service training of directors. 
 
Set up a team of professional teachers. We should formulate and issue the 
Standards for International Chinese Language Teachers, implement qualification 
certification for such teachers, and formulate measures for evaluating positions 
and professional titles of teachers in accordance with the characteristics of 
international Chinese language teaching. We should optimize the academic 
discipline of International Chinese Education, and train qualified teachers who 
meet different levels of teaching needs, with a particular focus on cultivating high 
caliber talents. The majority of teachers should be recommended by Chinese and 
international partner institutions of Cls. Any shortfall should be met by volunteers 
who recently graduated from Chinese universities, Chinese students studying in 
respective countries, and overseas Chinese. In the meantime, we should speed 
up our efforts to set up a highly qualified team of full-time and part-time teachers 
from China, who are committed to working in Cls for a long period of time or even 
for their entire professional career. We should step up support to cultivate and train 
local Chinese language teachers, increase the number of "Confucius Institute 
Scholarship", and recruit more international students to pursue a master's degree 
in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL). We should 
actively assist overseas Chinese-language schools in training teachers, support 
and encourage overseas Chinese to engage in Chinese language teaching. 
 
Increase the number of volunteers dispatched abroad. Most volunteers should be 
selected from the pool of college graduates, M.A. and Ph. D. students who major in 
humanities and social sciences. Improve benefits for volunteers. We should aim at 
selecting and cultivating full-time International Chinese teachers and administrators 




C. Set up international Chinese language textbook and teaching resources 
system 
Formulate Standards for International Chinese Language Education and Guidelines 
for the TCSOL Materials Development. By mobilizing Cls and other sectors, we should 
revise and compile a series of textbooks for Chinese language and culture that are 
informative, attractive, and suitable to different needs; compile and develop cultural 
readings, multimedia courseware, practical teaching aids and reference books; and 
assist Cls to compile a wide range of local textbooks and teaching resources that cater 
to the different levels and needs of preschool children, students at primary, secondary 
and tertiary level, as well as adults. Enhance the training of local Chinese language 
teachers on using textbooks. We should constantly seek reform and innovation in 
pedagogy, develop a database of teaching cases, integrate Chinese language 
teaching with local culture, and explore effective measures to break language/cultural 
barriers, and to teach Chinese and introduce China to foreigners. We should further 
develop the Confucius Institute Journal, by adding more editions in foreign languages, 
enriching the content, enhancing the quality and expand its readership base worldwide. 
 
D. Set up a Chinese proficiency testing service system 
Conduct marketing plans and operations, and provide a wide range of tests by 
learning from the marketing experiences and successful models of international 
testing services, and by relying on the strength of Cls. We should integrate testing 
with teaching, and offer paper-based, computer-based and Internet-based tests to 
cater to the diverse needs of Chinese learners of different age and different groups, 
in order to create a brand name that is recognized around the world. We should 
accredit large scale and high quality foreign Chinese proficiency tests, and build a 
global Chinese proficiency testing system. 
 
E. Conduct Sino-foreign cultural exchanges activities 
Deepen Sino-foreign cultural exchange and cooperation. We should, in accordance 
with local needs, assist Cls in setting up Chinese cultural display and experience 
corners and book shelves; promoting quality products that showcase the Chinese 
culture, conducting featured cultural events, and introducing Chinese history, 
culture and development cases. 
 
We should make full use of CIS' platform and draw upon the cultural achievements 
of other countries. 
IV. Key Projects 
—Set up bases to cultivate and train teachers. We should rely on Chinese 
universities to continue the development of Bases for International Chinese 
Education and Promotion, in order to improve the capacity for and quality of 
Chinese language teacher training. We should collaborate with foreign universities 
to set up university Major in Teaching Chinese, establish a series of teacher training 
bases, with particular emphasis on the training of local Chinese teachers. 
Set up a talent pool of volunteers. Universities should recruit more students 
majoring in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (TCFL) and foreign 
languages other than English; expand the scope of knowledge of TCFL students; 
add more courses in humanities, history, and philosophy; and encourage students 
majoring in humanities and social sciences to take courses on TCFL. We should 
recruit volunteers from more channels and develop a program of overseas 
internship for M.A. students majoring in International Chinese Education. 
 
—Implement the International Chinese Language Teaching Materials Project. We 
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should establish a Steering Committee and an International Expert Panel for 
International Chinese Teaching Materials. We should approach Chinese and 
foreign universities with a sound basis and high enthusiasm, and entrust them to 
develop regionally based Chinese Teaching Materials in multiple languages. We 
should, by working closely with Chinese and international publishing houses, 
create a vertical textbook supply chain from compilation to publishing and to 
distribution. We should set up a resource bank for International Chinese Teaching 
Materials so as to provide information service for pedagogy research and textbook 
compilation. 
—Further develop Confucius Institute Online. We should exploit more language 
versions and programs, and build an international digital platform for Chinese 
language and culture promotion, which enables Chinese language learners from 
around the world to log on the website using their mother tongues. We should 
also encourage and support Cls worldwide to conduct distance teaching and 
learning. 
—Conduct the "Confucius China Study Plan". We should sponsor outstanding 
young scholars from all over the world to visit China, to conduct research or 
pursue academic degrees. We should endeavor to set up Teaching Chair 
Positions for China Studies in internationally renowned universities, subsidize the 
publication and translation of valuable foreign works that introduce China, and 
support Cls to host symposiums on Chinese culture research. 
 Build Model Cls. We should build a number of Model Cls to play an 
exemplary role in terms of expanding the number of students, improving the 
academic quality and enhancing the social impact of Cls. 
—Organize CI Brand Projects. We should arrange lecture tours of experts, 
performance tours of college students, and Chinese Teaching Materials 
exhibitions. We should continue to hold "Chinese Bridge" 
 
Competitions for Foreign College Students and Secondary School Students. We 
should invite more foreign school principals to visit China and more foreign 
students to participate in summer (winter) camps in China. 
 
V. Safeguard Measures 
A. Provide more funding support 
Identify multiple sources of fundraising and set up a sound mechanism for funding 
Cls. We should seek to diversify the sources of fundraising, encourage and attract 
support from Chinese and international enterprises, individuals and other sectors. 
We should optimize the financial administration of CIS, step up our efforts for 
inspecting, auditing and assessing the performance of CI funding allocated by the 
Chinese side. 
 
B. Enhance coordination 
The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, as the highest decision-
making body, is responsible for formulating and amending the Constitution and By-
Laws of Confucius Institutes; examining and approving the development strategies and 
plans of global Cls; reviewing annual reports and work plans of the Headquarters; and 
discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Cls. The Executive 
Council Member agencies should consolidate all available resources, fulfil their 
respective duties, and support the development of Cls. The Confucius Institute 
Headquarters (Hanban), as the administrative body in charge of the daily affairs of the 
Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, should provide better service for and 
further enhance the administration of Cls. We should step up study on the sustainable 
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development of Cls. We should draft quality standards for international Chinese 
language teacher, teaching materials, courses, and tests. We should enhance the 
inspection and supervision of Cls. We should set up pilot Confucius Institute 
Headquarters Regional Service Centers, in order to provide more immediate 
information consulting and services, and promote the sharing of teaching resources 
among Cls within the region. 
 
C. Mobilize and involve all relevant stakeholders 
All local governments concerned should support primary, secondary schools and 
universities to take an active part in the development of Cls/CCs, by utilizing such 
mechanisms as Sino-foreign business cooperation, sister cities, and sister schools. 
The governments should, pursuant to the objectives and tasks set forth in this plan, 
draft feasible and practical supporting measures, and allocate and implement tasks 
accordingly. 
 
All universities concerned should play a leading role in the building and operation of 
Cls. They should incorporate the CI program into their own overall plan for 
development and core undertakings. Furthermore, the Universities should carefully 
plan and organize their respective CIS, and have dedicated personnel to oversee 
their operation. 
 
Chinese enterprises seeking to develop themselves in the international market should 
actively support Cls. We should encourage qualified enterprises to set up 
scholarships for CI students, and to give preferential recruitment to local candidates 
who have studied in Cls. We should encourage large-scale enterprises, which retain 
a large number of local employees and meet the necessary conditions, to establish 
Cls 
 
We should fully mobilize stakeholders from society. Through such policies as offering 
tax incentives according to the law, and providing guide fund, we should attract all 
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Methods of Evaluating a Model 
Confucius Institute in Europe 
(Draft) 
Foreword 
The Confucius Institute has completed its first decade since its establishment in 
2004. The first Confucius Institute in Europe was established in 2005, and 158 
Confucius Institutes have been successively set up in 38 European countries in the 
past ten years. With the spirit that "the Confucius Institute belongs to the whole 
world as well as to China", to run the Confucius Institute in a more scientific and 
better way in its second ten-year development, one of the most important plans is 
to select a certain proportion of outstanding Confucius Institutes as "Model 
Confucius Institutes", building up flagship Confucius Institutes in Europe to 
promote Chinese language teaching and spread Chinese culture there. 
The Criteria for Model Confucius Institute 
(I) Prerequisite Requirements (the necessary conditions for application) 
l. The Confucius Institute (hereafter referred as the CI) should have run for at least 
five years since its establishment; 
2. The CI should have been awarded the title of "Confucius Institute of the 
Year" for at least once; 
3. The CI should have served both the university and its local community in 
the following aspects: 
3.1 It should have offered credit courses and held at least 5 academic 
lectures for the university each year, and organized extracurricular 
activities all year round such as HSK tutorials, Q&A sessions, etc., 
    3.2 It should have played a leading and influential role by holding such 
activities as teacher training, academic lectures, teaching material 
recommendation, etc.; 
3.3 It should have established at least 3 Confucius Classrooms and 5 
Chinese language teaching sites; 
3.4 In terms of community service, it should have kept long-term 
cooperative relations with at least 5 local government institutions, 
enterprises and/or non-government organizations, and carried out such 
activities as Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange. 
4. The CI should have fixed office and teaching spaces; 
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4.1 It should have independent working and teaching space of at least 
400 square meters; 
4.2 It should have space of up to 1,000 square meters as shared space; 
5. There should be stable annual enrollment of at least 800 students; 
6. The Cl's HSK test site should cover all tests including HSK, HSKK, YCT 
and BCT, with an annual total of 1,000 test-takers; 
7. The CI should have held Board Meeting of the Confucius Institute 
annually, and kept close cooperation with its Chinese partner institution; 
8. The Chinese and local directors of the CI should have cooperated with 
each other harmoniously with a clear division of responsibility; 
9. The CI should have a five-year development plan with a full set of rules 
and regulations; 
10. The CI should have a certain number of Chinese and foreign staff: 
10.1 There should be at least 10 Chinese language teachers (including 
the Chinese director) and volunteers dispatched by the Headquarters, 
with appropriate placements at different levels; 
10.2 The host university (institution) should have offered at least 5 full-
time or part-time members of staff (including the local director); 
10.3 The ratio of local Chinese teachers and the teachers dispatched by 
the Chinese side should reach 1:1. 
(Il) Additional Conditions (the CI should meet at least ten of the following 
requirements) 
 
11. The program of the Confucius Institute Scholarship should be fruitful with 
at least 10 outstanding students recommended to study in China annually; 
12. The CI should keep good cooperative relations with the local government 
and civil organizations, and hold 5 large-scale cultural and academic activities 
each year; meanwhile it should cooperate well with local Chinese cultural 
communities to help with local Chinese education; 
13. The CI should be self-sufficient, able to pay for its local Chinese language 
teachers, compile teaching materials independently and organize teacher 
training; 
14. It should have held at least one international conference in the last 3 years; 




16. It should have undertaken at least one sub-program of the Confucius China 
Studies Program in the last 3 years; 
17. The Director of the CI should be a locally well-known sinologist or scholar 
with the professional title of associate professor and above, and should enjoy 
good academic relations with related academic institutions or organizations in 
China; 
18. The institute should be the centre of local Chinese language teacher 
development and the base for teaching material research and development with 
an influential radiating effect; it should also enjoy good cooperative relations 
with the local college or department (unit) to which it is affiliated; 
19. It should have held about 30 cultural activities annually in the last 3 years; 
20. It should have taken part in large-scale regional activities concerning 
exhibitions or artistic festivals at least once in the last three years; 
21. It should have held such programs as Summer Camps or Overseas 
Principals' Tour to China 3 times in the last 3 years; 
22. Its budget and final accounts and its implementation should be in good 
condition (with at least 30 budgeted projects each year; a completion rate of 
over 90%); 
23. The president of the host university (or local Chair of the Board) should 
have attended the global Confucius Institute Conference at least twice in the 
last three years; 
24. The president of the host university should be or should have been a 
member of the Council of Confucius Institute Headquarters, a senior 
consultant, a consultant or an expert by special appointment; 
25. The CI established Alumni Association or Fund, which should be working 
effectively and fruitfully; 
26. The institute or its directors should have won national level awards; 
27. Contestant(s) sent by the CI should have entered the top 30 in the "Chinese 
Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students, or its 
group contestant should have entered the top 16 in the "Chinese Bridge" 
Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign Secondary School Students; 
28. The HSK test centre of the Confucius Institute should have been awarded 
the title of Overseas Chinese Test Center of the Year granted by Hanban at 
least once; 
29. The income of the Confucius Institute from tuition fees and social 
donations, and its capability of raising fund from multiple channels should 
have increased gradually over the last three years; 




Il. The Selection and Verification 
(I) Composition of the Jury Committee and the Marking Standards 
1. Composition of the Jury Committee: 
The members of the Jury Committee consist of the representative of Confucius 
Institute Headquarters, Chinese and foreign experts, directors of Confucius 
Institutes outside Europe and the representatives from the Chinese partners of 
those Confucius 
Institutes. 
2. Grading Standards: 
Each of the "necessary conditions" accounts for 5 points, for a total of 50 points; 
each of the "additional conditions" accounts for 2.5 points, for a total of 50 points. 
The total score is 100 points. 
(Il) The Application and Verification Procedures 
1. Application: 
The CI needs to submit the application form to Confucius Institute Headquarters, 
which must be reviewed and approved by the Board of the CI and signed both by 
the 
Chinese and local Chairs of the Board. 
2. The frequency of selection and evaluation 
Once every two years. 
3. Verifying procedures: 
3.1 Preliminary evaluation: The Jury Committee selects 25% of the 
applying institutes for the second evaluation; 
3.2 Second evaluation: The selected institutes send representatives to take part 
in the defense meeting organized by the Jury Committee; 
3.3 Third evaluation: After the top 20 Confucius Institutes have been assessed 
on the spot by the Jury Committee, the Committee will submit its evaluation report 
to the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters for final approval; 
3.4 Final evaluation: The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters 
carries out the final evaluation and decides on 10 Confucius Institutes as the 
first group of Model Confucius Institutes in Europe. 
Ill. Conferring and Revoking the Title 
(I) The Conferring Institution and the Period of Validity 
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1. The title of Model Confucius Institute is conferred by the Confucius 
Institute 
Headquarters; 
2. The period of validity is 5 years, and this title can be retained only after 
passing the re-evaluation when its period of validity expires; 
(Il) Benefits and Privileges 
3. The CI will be presented with the nameplate of the Model Confucius 
Institute; 
4. In applying for the programs of Confucius Institute Headquarters, a Model 
Confucius Institute, under the same conditions, enjoys priority (for example, it 
may apply for an extra number of Confucius Institute Scholarship); 
5. The Model Confucius Institute may be provided with the Director 
Incentive Fund by the Confucius Institute Headquarters as the special budget 
for the director to hold intercultural communication activities; 
6. The Model Confucius Institute can apply for funding for developing the 
"hardware" of the Confucius Institute to improve its operating conditions; 
7. The Chinese partner of the institute may receive financial support for key 




8. The Model Confucius Institute should play a leading and model role in 
summing up and promoting its operational experience; 
9. The Model Confucius Institute should undertake the professional 
instruction task designated by Confucius Institute Headquarters concerning 
teacher training and answering questions from other Confucius Institutes; 
 
(IV) Revoking the Title 
 
10. The title will be revoked when the CI fails to play the role of a Model 
Confucius Institute; 
11. Or when the CI is involved in activities that has gone contrary to the 
constitution or principles of the Confucius Institute and has caused pernicious 
consequences; 
12. Or when any of its full-time staff have severely violated the regulations of 
the Confucius Institute; 





(V) Interpretation and Details 
 





15. The applying institution should provide detailed, full and accurate 
supporting materials (including data and hard evidence) in applying for the 
Model Confucius 
Institute; 
16. The requirements of a Model Confucius Institute with special 
characteristics will be adjusted by Confucius Institute Headquarters with 
reference to the above mentioned standards; 




































Appendix 4: University of Chicago Petition to the Committee of the Council 
 
We, the undersigned, having serious reservations about the presence of  
the Confucius Institute within the academic program of the University of  
Chicago, respectfully request that the Council of the Faculty Senate  
debate and decide whether to renew the contract this Fall with the Head  
Office of the Confucius Institutes, Beijing (Hanban). For reasons that  
follow, we believe that the Council has jurisdiction in this matter, and  
that terminating the relationship with the Confucius Institutes would be  
consistent with the intellectual principles and values of the University:  
 
--Although it is generally acknowledged that decisions concerning the  
establishment of entities with teaching responsibilities (“education”)  
fall within the purview of the Council for approval, and although the  
original Agreement with Hanban signed on 29 September 2009 prominently  
included such teaching, the creation of the Confucius Institute was not  
brought before the Council at that time. We believe it now falls to the  
Council to remedy that oversight with regard to a contract with Hanban  
which specifies: in Article 4, that the Confucius Institute will  
undertake the teaching of Chinese language, provide Chinese language  
teaching resources, and train Chinese language instructors; and in  
Article 6, that Hanban will provide 3000 volumes of Chinese books,  
teaching materials, and audio visual materials, as well as “send  
sufficient numbers of qualified instructors…and pay for their airfares  
and salaries.” (The Agreement of September, 2009 is appended to this email.)  
 
--The dubious practice of allowing an external institution to staff  
academic courses within the University is here exacerbated by the fact  
that Hanban is an agency of the Chinese government, and that the global  
agenda of Hanban, according to its own Constitution and ByLaws, is set  
by high officials of the Party-State, to whom the Head Office reports  
annually. It may also be noted that research proposals approved by the  
Chicago Confucius Institute are sent to Hanban for approval for funding.  
 
--Among the problems posed by Hanban’s control of the hiring and  
training of teachers is that that it thus subjects the University’s  
academic program to the political constraints on free speech and belief  
that are specific to the People’s Republic of China. The more so since  
the Hanban Constitution specifies that Chinese law applies to the  
activities of Confucius Institutes, and that the University of Chicago’s  
role in the hiring does not extend to the selection of the Hanban  
teachers. The University apparently reserves the right to refuse  
teachers proposed by Hanban, but that right has never been exercised.  
Among the unwanted effects, the University may well be complicit, then,  
in discriminatory hiring, as was exposed in the well-known case of  
McMaster University in 2011-12. A Hanban teacher was dismissed when it  
was revealed she was a follower of Falun Gong; and when the case was  
brought before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, McMaster was put in  
the position of defending itself against a charge of discriminatory  
hiring contrary to Canadian law and its own academic principles.  
McMaster thereupon did not renew its contract with Hanban. Indeed the  
Governing Council of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), 
representing some 68,000 teachers in more than 120 colleges and  
universities, recently passed a resolution “calling on universities and  
colleges in Canada which currently host Confucius Institutes on their  
campuses to cease doing so. And those contemplating such arrangements to pursue 
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them no further.” In an accompanying statement, the Executive  
Director observed that Canadian colleges and universities were  
compromising their own integrity by allowing Hanban ”to have a voice in  a number of 
academic matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of  
class discussions.”  
 
--It was established in the McMaster case and has since been  
corroborated as well in an American secondary school CI (“Confucius  
Classroom”) that the Hanban teachers are trained to ignore or divert  
questions on issues that are politically taboo in China, or indeed  
criminalized, such as the status of Taiwan, Tiananmen, the pro-Democracy  
movement, etc. These questions do arise in Chinese language classrooms,  
even as they may be prompted in videos or the history texts of advanced  
language courses. A petition submitted to the New South Wales Parliament  
in 2011, signed by some 10,000 citizens, called for the termination of  
CI Confucius Classrooms in the public secondary and primary schools of  
the province, on the grounds that “the NSW government has admitted that  
topics sensitive to the Chinese government including Taiwan, Tibet,  
Falun Gong, and human rights violations would not be included in these  
classes,” and that “Confucius classes are directly linked to and funded  
by the Chinese government.”  
 
--Although the University of Chicago has ignored the provisions in the  
Agreement specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials  
for Chinese language instruction, this is not the case in the numerous  
smaller colleges in the US and around the world, as well as in the  
hundreds of Confucius Classrooms in secondary and primary schools, that  
are not in a position to provide their own Chinese language curriculum.  
In Chicago public schools alone, there are 42 Confucius classrooms  
operating by Hanban rules.  
 
--Although as just noted, the University of Chicago is hosting a CI  
under privileges not available to many other schools, the effect is  
that, mindful only of its own welfare, the University is participating  
in a worldwide, politico-pedagogical project that is contrary in many  
respects to its own academic values. Indeed by lending its good name to  
the CI project, the University, nolens volens, is helping to promote an  
enterprise that compromises the academic integrity of many universities  
around the world even as it is inimical to its own.  
 
For these reasons, we urge the Council of the Senate to terminate the  
contract with the Confucius Institutes. 
 
(available at: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/29/chicago-faculty-object-
















Appendix 5: The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report 
     On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes 
 
This report was prepared by the Association’s Committee A on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure in June 2014. 
 
Globalization has brought new challenges for the protection of academic freedom 
and other faculty rights. In the operations of North American universities in other 
countries, administrators often refer to local customs, practices, and laws to justify 
practices that the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the 
Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) would not tolerate on North 
American campuses. In 2009, our two organizations adopted a joint statement—On 
Conditions of Employment at Overseas Campuses—setting forth appropriate 
employment standards for overseas campuses of North American universities and 
stating our commitment to see that those standards are met. 
 
Globalization has also meant that university administrators have welcomed 
involvement of foreign governments, corporations, foundations, and donors on 
campuses in North America. These relationships have often been beneficial. But 
occasionally university administrations have entered into partnerships that 
sacrificed the integrity of the university and its academic staff. Exemplifying the 
latter are Confucius Institutes, now established at some ninety colleges and 
universities in the United States and Canada.1  Confucius Institutes function as an 
arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom. Their 
academic activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency 
which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s 
Republic of China. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature 
nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and 
practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American universities 
permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control 
of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate. 
 
Confucius Institutes appear designed to emulate the cultural ambassadorship and 
programming associated with, for example, the British Council, the Goethe Institut, 
and L’Alliance Franςaise. These latter three entities are clearly connected to 
imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of “soft power,” but 
none of them is located on a university or college campus. Instead, their 
connections to national political agendas and interests require that they be 
established in sites where they can fulfil their mandates openly without threatening 
the independence and integrity of academic institutions in host countries. 
 
Allowing any third-party control of academic matters is inconsistent with principles 
of academic freedom, shared governance, and the institutional autonomy of 
colleges and universities. The AAUP joins CAUT in recommending that universities 
cease their involvement in Confucius Institutes unless the agreement between the 
university and Hanban is renegotiated so that (1) the university has unilateral control, 
consistent with principles articulated in the AAUP’s Statement on Government of 
Colleges and Universities, over all academic matters, including recruitment of 
teachers, determination of curriculum, and choice of texts; (2) the university affords 
Confucius Institute teachers the same academic freedom rights, as defined in 
the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, that it affords 
all other faculty in the university; and (3) the university-Hanban agreement is made 
available to all members of the university community. More generally, these 
conditions should apply to any partnerships or collaborations with foreign 
governments or foreign government-related agencies. 





Appendix 6: Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago 
 
 (available at: http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confucius-
institute-university-chicago, accessed on 8, June, 2015) 
 
The University of Chicago has informed Madame Xu Lin, director-general of 
Hanban and chief executive of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, of the 
University’s decision to suspend negotiations for the renewal of the agreement 
for a second term of the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago (CIUC). 
Since 2009 the University of Chicago and Hanban have worked in partnership 
to develop the CIUC, which has benefited research on China and collaboration 
between the University of Chicago and academic institutions in China. The 
University and Hanban have engaged in several months of good faith efforts 
and steady progress toward a new agreement. However, recently published 
comments about UChicago in an article about the director-general of Hanban 
are incompatible with a continued equal partnership. 
 
The University is therefore suspending negotiations for the renewal of the 
agreement at this time. The University of Chicago remains committed to 
supporting the strong connections and longstanding collaborations between 
University of Chicago faculty and students and Chinese scholars, students, and 
institutions. As always, the University is guided by its core values and faculty 
leadership in all matters of academic importance. 
 
The article mentioned in the statement was a report published on September 
19 by the state-backed Jiefang Daily, Ms. Xu appeared to have revealed details 
about her conversations with university administrators. The paper said that she 
wrote a letter to the college president containing one sentence: “If your school 
has made the decision to pull out, then I agree.” She said the same thing in a 
phone call to the university’s representative in Beijing. “That attitude of hers 
made the other side anxious, and they quickly replied that they’d continued to 
operate the Confucius Institute,” the report said.  
 
(the statement is available at: http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2014-
























Appendix 7 Four agreements between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China 
and XXX University on the Establishment of CIs 
 
7.1 UK Agreement, 2008 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS 
AND 
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE 
  FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE 
 
DEFINITIONS 
   In this Memorandum of Co-operation, unless the context otherwise requires: 
United Kingdom 
 'BISU Beijing International Studies University 
No 1 Dingfuzhuang Nanli, 
Chaoyang District, 
Beijing 100024, PR China 
In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and Britain, 
support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and 
increase mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Britain, the 
Confucius Institute Headquarters ("the Headquarters") and the University of 
Central Lancashire hereby agree as follows. 
Article 1 Purpose 
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the 
Headquarters and University of Central Lancashire in the establishment of the 
Confucius Institute at the University of Central Lancashire. 
'Headquarter' Confucius Institute Headquarters, Hanban The 
Office of Chinese Language Council 
International, 17th floor, 
Fangyuan Mansion B56 
Zhongguancun South St 
Beijing, 100044, PR China 
'UCLan 
University of Central Lancashire Preston, 
Lancashire, PRI 2HE 
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Article 2 Character 
The Confucius Institute at the University of Central Lancashire shall be a nonprofit 
institute with the purpose of enhancing intercultural understanding in 
Britain by promoting courses of Chinese language and culture. 
Article 3 Executive Institution 
Whereas, the University of Central Lancashire and Beijing International Studies 
University agree to work together and with the authorisation and appointment of 
the Headquarters, Beijing International Studies University will construct the 
Confucius Institute with the University of Central Lancashire as the executive 
institution. The two parties of cooperation can sign the supplementary agreement 
on the matters not settled by this Agreement. The supplementary agreement 
should be audited by the Headquarters before signing. 
Article 4 Scope of Activities 
The Confucius Institute at University of Central Lancashire can serve the 
following Chinese teaching courses and programs according to the local instance: 
1. Teach Chinese using a variety of methods including multimedia and the 
Internet; 
2. Train teachers to teach Chinese in primary schools, high schools, colleges, and 
Universities; 
3. Administer the Chinese Proficiency Test and tests to certify ability to teach Chinese 
as a foreign language; 
4. Teach Chinese courses of various types in various areas for all circles of person; 
5. Sponsor academic activities and Chinese competitions; 
6. Show Chinese movies and TV programs; 
7. Provide consulting services for individuals wishing to study in China• 
8. Provide reference materials for the educational and other professional individuals. 
Article 5 Organisation 
The Confucius Institute shall have a Board of Directors made up of 
representatives from UCLan and BISU. The Board of Directors shall have the 
responsibility for the operation of the Confucius Institute. 
Article 6 Obligations 
The obligations of the Headquarters: 
1. To authorize the use of the title "Confucius Institute", and provide logos and institute 
emblems. 
2. To provide multimedia coursewares and other teaching materials, supplementary 
materials, and audio-visual materials authorized by the Headquarters; and to 
authorize the use of online courses. 
3. To provide 50,000-100,000 US Dollars as a start-up fund, payable to the University 
of Central, Barclays Bank Account. 
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4. To provide 3,000 volumes of books, audio-visual, and multimedia materials. 
5. To send one or two Chinese instructors and pay for their air fares, accommodations 
and salaries.  
The obligations of the University of Central Lancashire 
1. To provide an appropriate site for the Confucius Institute to carry out its activities; 
to provide the necessary conditions and facilities to establish the Confucius 
Institute. 
2. To provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and 
provide the related payment and take charge setting and maintaining a cost 
centre for the Confucius Institute that will be audited on an annual basis. 
3. To provide necessary working conditions for the Chinese instructors. 
4. Assist the Chinese party at the Institute with all immigration procedures. 
5. Agree to discuss with the Headquarters any further requirements of the 
Confucius Institute. 
Article 7 Financial Support 
The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by University of Central Lancashire 
and the Headquarters, and it should finally assume sole responsibility for its 
profits or losses by charging language course fees and other programs. 
Article 8 Intellectual Property 
The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its 
related logo, and plaque (or badge) as its exclusive intellectual property. The 
University of Central Lancashire cannot continue to apply or transfer the title 
logo, and plaque (or badge) in any form, either directly or indirectly, after this 
agreement has been terminated. 
The provider owns intellectual property of the certain program. The two parties 
can consult the owner of the co-operated programs. In the events of any dispute, 
the two parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the 
jurisdictional organ according to the related laws and regulations. 
Article 9 Revision 
With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may from time to time be revised 
through a process of negotiation and discussion in a spirit of  cooperation and 
goodwill and any revisions will be made in writing, in both 
English and Chinese, and signed by authorized representatives of the parties. 
Article 10 Term 
The Agreement shall be effective on the date when the two parties sign below. 
The Agreement shall have a period of validity of 5 years. If, during the 90 days 
before the end of the Agreement, neither party notifies the other in writing that it 
wishes to terminate the Agreement, then it will automatically be extended for 
another 5 years. 
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Article 11 Force Majeure 
Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the 
event of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any 
other cause beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance 
of this agreement impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under 
the situation shall inform the other party so the program may be delayed or 
terminated in order to mitigate the loss of the other party. 
Article 12 Termination 
This Agreement shall be terminated in one of the following cases. 
1. Either party may terminate this Agreement upon giving written notice at least 
six months in advance of their intention to terminate. 
2. The two parties have no aspiration of cooperation at the expiration of the term. 
3. The Agreement can not go through or can not achieve the anticipated aim 
because of comedown of the condition. 
4. If the act of one party of tne Agreement severely harms' the image and 
reputation of the Confucius Institute, the other party will terminate the 
Agreement immediately and reserve the right of claiming. 
5. The Agreement can not go through because of force majeure. 
The termination of the Agreement can not affect some other agreement, contract 
and program between the two parties. 
Before the Agreement is terminated, all parties should make appropriate 
arrangements for the enrolled students and other works 
Article 13 Dispute Settlement 
In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult with each other 
friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ at the place this Agreement signed. 
Article 14 Agreement Language 
This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one 
copy in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The 
Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effect. 
Article 15 Other Terms 
Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, 
cooperative negotiations between the two parties. 
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The Confucius Institute 
Headquarters 
 
Date. 28th April, 2008 
University of Central Lancashire 
 
Dr Malcolm McVicar 
Vice Chancellor 





















7.2 UK Agreement, 2009 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS OF CHINA 
AND 
THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL 
In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and the United Kingdom 
(UK), support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and 
increase mutual understanding among people in China and in the UK, according to the 
Constitution and By-laws of Confucius Institutes, the Confucius Institute Headquarters 
of China ("the Headquarters") and the University of Liverpool, UK for the establishment 
of a Confucius Institute at the University of Liverpool (the 
Institute), hereby agree as follows: 
Article 1 Purpose 
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the 
Headquarters and the University of Liverpool in the establishment and management 
of the Institute. 
Article 2 Character 
The Institute shall be a non-profit educational institution. 
Article 3 Executive Institution 
The University of Liverpool is desirous of collaborating with the Xi'an Jiaotong 
University (XJTU). The Headquarters will authorize and appoint the XJTU to construct 
the Confucius Institute with the University of Liverpool as the Chinese executive 
institution. The two parties of cooperation will sign the supplementary agreement on 
detailed matters of the cooperation. The supplementary agreement should be audited 
by the 
Headquarters before signing. 
Article 4 Scope of Activities 
The Institute can serve the following activities according to the Constitution and By-
laws, and local instance: 
1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources; 
2. Training Chinese language instructors; 
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3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the 
Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers; 
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, 
culture, and so forth • 
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities; 
6. Other activities with authorization and by appointment of the 
Headquarters; 
Article 5 Organization 
1. The Institute at the University of Liverpool shall adopt a Director Responsibility 
System under the leadership of the Board of Directors. 
2. The Board of Directors is formed with members nominated from two parties, and 
its duties include: formulating and amending the Constitution of the Institute; formulating 
development plans for the Institute; decision-making on the significant issues including 
teaching, research and management; fund raising; appointing and dismissing Directors 
of the Institute; examining and approving the budget proposal and final financial 
accounts of the Institute; reporting to the two parties on the management status and 
significant issues. 
3. Two collaborating parties appoint one director respectively. 
4. The institute must accept the assessment of the Headquarters on the teaching 
quality. 
5. The Institute activities must be in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws, 
and also respect cultural custom, shall not contravene concerning the laws and 
regulations, both in the UK and China. 
Article 6 Obligations 
The obligations of the Headquarters: 
l . To authorize the use of the title "Confucius Institute", logos and institute emblems. 
2. To provide teaching materials, coursewares and other books according to the 
necessary, to authorize the use of online courses. To provide 3,000 volumes of 
Chinese books, teaching materials, and audio-visual materials for the first time. 
3. To provide the necessary start-up fund, and provide a set amount of annual fund 
according to needs. 
4. To send numbers of Chinese instructors based on the requirements of teaching, 
and pay for their air fares and salaries. 
The obligations of the University of Liverpool 
1. To provide a fixed office place and appropriate sites for teaching and other activities 
of the Confucius Institute; equipped with office and teaching facilities, and with 
responsibility for the setting, management and maintenance. 
2. To provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide 
the related payment; to provide necessary working facilities and life conveniences for 
the Chinese instructors. 
3. To assist the Chinese party on the visa application and residence procedures. 
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4. To open the special account for the Confucius Institute in the local 
Bank of China or other bank approved by the Headquarters. 
Article 7 Financial Support 
The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by the University of Liverpool and the 
Headquarters. In principle, it is not less than one half shared by the University of 
Liverpool. The Institute draws up annual budget proposals and final financial accounts 
independently. It should finally assume the sole responsibility for its profits or losses 
by charging language course fees and other programs. 
Article 8 Intellectual Property 
The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its related 
logo, and emblem as its exclusive intellectual property. The University of Liverpool 
cannot continue applying or transfer the title, logo, and emblem in any form, either 
directly or indirectly, after this agreement has been terminated. 
The provider owns intellectual property of the certain program. The two parties can 
consult the owner of the co-operated programs. In the events of any dispute, the two 
parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ 
according to the related laws and regulations. 
Article 9 Revision 
With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may be revised during its 
implementation and any revisions will be made in writing, both in English and Chinese, 
and will take effect as signed by authorized representatives of the parties. 
Article 10 Term 
The Agreement shall be in effect on the date when the two parties sign below. The 
Agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity. Either party, if it wishes to terminate 
the Agreement must notify the other in writing during the 90 days before the end of the 
Agreement, otherwise it will automatically continue thereafter unless and until it is 
terminated by either party giving to the other not less than 90 days written notice. 
Article 11 Force Majeure 
Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event 
of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause 
beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement 
impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform 
the other party in writing that the program may be delayed or terminated, and duly take 
the effective measures to mitigate the loss of the other party. 
Article 12 Termination 
This Agreement shall be terminated in one of the following cases: 
1. Either party intends to terminate this Agreement upon giving a written notice at 
least six months in advance of their intention to terminate. 
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2. The two parties have no aspiration of cooperation at the expiration of the term. 
3. The Agreement cannot go through or cannot achieve the anticipated aim because 
of comedown of the condition. 
4. If the act of one party of the Agreement severely harms the image and reputation 
of the Confucius Institute. 
5. The Agreement cannot go through because of force majeure. 
The termination of the Agreement cannot affect some other agreement, contract and 
program between the two parties. 
Before the Agreement is terminated, the University of Liverpool should make 
appropriate arrangements on the enrolled students and other workers. 
Article 13 Dispute Settlement 
In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult each other friendly or 
submit to the jurisdictional organ of which this Agreement falls within the competence. 
Article 14 Agreement Language 
This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy 
in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The Agreement, in both 
languages, shall have the same effectiveness. 
Article 15 Other Terms 
Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, 
cooperative negotiations between the two patties. 











7.3 US Agreement 2013 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS OF CHINA 
AND 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, USA 
ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE 
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT TEXAS UNIVERSITY 
In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and the United States, 
support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase 
mutual understanding among people in China and in the United States, the Confucius 
Institute Headquarters of China ("the Headquarters") and Texas A&M University, 
USA ("TAMU"), hereinafter jointly referred to as "the parties", for the purpose of 
continuing the Confucius Institute at Texas A&M 
University ("the Institute"), hereby agree as follows ("the Agreement"): 
Article I. Purpose 
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the 
Headquarters and TAMU in the continued management of the Institute. The 
Institute shall be an educational institution. 
Article 2. Scope of Activities 
The Institute will provide the following activities: 
I. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources; 
2. Training Chinese language instructors; 
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the 
Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers; 
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, 
culture, and so forth; 
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities; 
6. Other activities, as mutually agreed. 
Article 3. Organization 
l. The Institute at TAMU shall have a Director Responsibility System under the 
leadership of the Board of Advisors. 
2. The Board of Advisors is formed with eight members nominated from Ocean 
University of China (authorized by the Headquarters in written form) and TAMU, 
each party shall nominate four of them, and its duties include: maintaining and 
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amending the mission of the Institute; formulating development plans for the 
Institute; decision-making on the significant issues including teaching, 
management; fund raising; examining and approving the budget proposal and ; 
reporting to Ocean University of China and TAMU on the management status and 
significant issues. 
3. Ocean University of China and TAMU shall appoint their own Director. 
4. The institute will collaborate with the Headquarters on the assessment of teaching 
quality. 
5. The Institute activities must be in accordance with the mission of the Confucius 
Institute, respect cultural customs, and shall not contravene the laws and 
regulations, both in the USA and China. 
6. The Institute draws up annual budget proposals and final financial accounts 
independently. TAMU will be in charge of the Institute's daily operation and 
management. TAMU will be responsible for the fiscal management of funds. 
Article 4. Obligations 
The obligations of the Headquarters: 
l. To authorize TAMU to use the title "Confucius Institute", logos and institute emblems. 
2. To provide teaching materials, course texts and other books as necessary, to 
authorize the use of online courses and provide necessary audio-visual materials. 
3. Provide a mutually agreeable amount of annual funds. 
4. To send Chinese instructors to TAMU, and pay for their air fares, salaries, and living 
expenses. The Parties shall execute an Agreement regarding the obligations 
associated with the Provision of Chinese Language Teachers. 
The obligations of TAMU 
1. Provide a fixed office place and appropriate sites for teaching and other activities 
of the Confucius Institute; equipped with office and teaching facilities. TAMU will be 
responsible for the management and maintenance of facilities. 
2. Provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide their 
allotted salary. 
3. Assist in processing the visa applications and home locator service for Chinese 
instructors. 
4. Provide a set amount of annual funds, which should not be less than the amount 
provided by the Headquarters. 
Article 5. Financial Support 
TAMU acknowledges receipt of $43,126 in revenue from 2011 and $80,000 in 
payment for 2013, bringing the Year One (l) funding from the Headquarters to 
$123,126. 
Payment shall be made using the following information: 
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Financial Institution Information (ACH) 
Account Name: Texas A&M University Office of Sponsored Research 
Services 
City and State: College Station, Texas 
ACH Routing Number: 111900659 
Account Number: 6070982738 
Bank Name: Wells Fargo Bank N.A. 
Bank Address: San Francisco, CA 
ACH Contact Name: Annie Jackson 








Office of Sponsored 
International Swift Code.• WFBIUS6S 
Bank Name: Wells Fargo Bank N.A. 
Bank Address: San Francisco, CA 
Wire Contact Name: Annie Jackson 
Additional funding shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties based on a proposed 
budget for the subsequent year, submitted to the Headquarters, annually on September 
15 by TAMU. 
Article 6. Intellectual Property 
The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its related 
logo, and emblem as its exclusive intellectual property. The Headquarters grants 
TAMU a non-exclusive, royalty-free, non-transferable, right and license to use, 
reproduce, and display (to the extent not prohibited by applicable law) the name of the 
"Confucius Institute", and its related logo during the term of this Agreement. TAMU is 
not authorized to use or transfer or license others to use the name or logo, in any form, 
either directly or indirectly, after this Agreement has terminated. The Institute will follow 
the intellectual property policies of Texas A&M University in matters concerning 
intellectual property created by the Institute. 
Article 7. Publicity 
TAMU shall not use the name of The Headquarters, or the name of The Headquarters 
employees, in any advertising, promotional or sales literature without the prior written 
consent obtained from The Headquarters in each case. The Headquarters shall not 
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use the name of TAMU, or the names of TAMU employees, in any advertising, 
promotional or sales literature without prior written consent obtained from TAMU in 
each case. 
Article 8. Notices 
All notices or communications to either party by the other will be delivered personally 
or sent by express mail, postage prepaid, addressed to such party at the following 
respective addresses for each and will be deemed given on the date so delivered or so 
deposited in the mail unless otherwise provided herein. 
To TAMU: 
Technical: Kelly Kleinkott 
Assistant Director, Global Support Program 
Director, Confucius Institute 
3371 TAMU 
College Station, Texas 77843-3371 





Senior Contract Negotiator 
400 Harvey Mitchell Parkway South, Suite 300 
College Station, Texas 77845-4375 
Phone: (979) 845-4904 
Fax: (979) 862-3250 
Email: bmilam@tamus.edu 
To Headquarter: Chao Feng 
Assistant Director 
 129 Deshengmenwai Street, Xicheng District, Bejing 
100088, P.R.China 
Phone: +86 (0) 10 5859 5940 
Fax: +86 (0) 10 5859 5842 
Email: fengchao@hanban.org 
256 
Article 9. Export Administration 
It is understood that TAMU is subject to United States laws and regulations controlling 
the export of technical data, computer software, laboratory prototypes and other 
commodities, and that its obligations hereunder are contingent upon compliance with 
applicable United States export laws and regulations. Furthermore, it is understood that 
the transfer of certain technical data and commodities may require a license from one 
or more agencies of the United States Government. Each Party will comply with 
applicable U.S. export control laws including without limitation the Export 
Administration Regulations and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as 
currently codified or later amended. This section survives any termination of this 
Agreement. 
Article 10. Confidentiality 
To the extent authorized by the law, the parties may wish, in connection with work 
contemplated under this Agreement, to disclose confidential information to each other 
("Confidential Information"). Each party will use reasonable efforts to prevent the 
disclosure of any of the other party's Confidential Information to third parties for a period 
of three (3) years after the termination of this Agreement, provided that the recipient 
party's obligation shall not apply to information that: 
a) is not disclosed in writing or reduced to writing and so marked with as confidential 
within thirty (30) days of disclosure; 
b) is already in the recipient party's possession at the time of disclosure thereof; 
c) is or later becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the recipient party; 
d) is received from a third party having no obligations of confidentiality to the disclosing 
party; 
e) is independently developed by the recipient party; or 
f) is required by law or regulation to be disclosed. 
In the event that information is required to be disclosed pursuant to subsection f. and 
to the extent authorized by the law, the party required to make disclosure shall notify 
the other to allow that party to assert whatever exclusions or  exemptions may be 
available to it under such law or regulation. 
Article 11. Independent Contractor 
For the purposes of this Agreement and all activities conducted hereunder, the parties 
shall be, and shall be deemed to be, independent contractors and not agents of 
employees of the other party. Neither party shall have authority to make any statement, 
representations or commitments of any kind, or to take any action which shall be 
binding on the other party, except as may be explicitly provided for herein or authorized 
in writing. 
Article 12. Severability 
If any of the provisions of this Agreement or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance, is rendered or declared illegal for any reason, or shall be invalid or 
unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement and the application of such provision 
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby, but shall be enforced 
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to the greatest extent permitted by applicable law. 
Article 13. Revision 
With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may be revised during its term and 
any revisions will be made in writing, both in English and Chinese, and will take effect 
as signed by authorized representatives of the parties. 
Article 14. Term 
The Agreement shall be in effect on the date when the two parties sign below. The 
Agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity. The Agreement will be subject to 
renewal only by mutual written agreement of both parties. 
Article 15. Force Majeure 
Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event 
of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause 
beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement 
impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform 
the other party in writing that the program may be delayed or terminated, and duly take 
the effective measures to mitigate the loss of the other party. 
Article 16. Termination 
Either party may terminate this Agreement and terminate all of its obligations pursuant 
to this Agreement: 
1. If the other party fails to perform, keep and observe any terms or conditions 
required by this Agreement to be performed and fails to cure such default in accordance 
with the paragraph below, or 
2. For convenience with six (6) months written notice to the other party. In the event 
of termination for convenience, TAMU shall promptly reimburse The Headquarters for 
any excess funds advanced by The Headquarters under this Agreement, over and 
above non-cancellable commitments and costs incurred by TAMU as of the date of 
termination. 
In the event of a default, the non-defaulting party will give the defaulting party written 
notice, pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement, to correct such default. If the default 
continues for thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of such notice, the non-defaulting 
party may terminate this Agreement by written notice to the defaulting party sent 
pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement. 
The termination of the Agreement shall not infringe upon any other agreement between 
the two parties. 
In the event this Agreement is terminated, the parties agree to work together to make 
appropriate arrangements for the enrolled students and other work in progress. 
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Article 17. Dispute Resolution 
Any dispute, controversy or claim between the Parties that may arise out of this 
Agreement or in relation to this Agreement shall be settled amicably through cordial 
consultations between both Parties or submit to non-binding mediation  before a 
mediator mutually agreed by both parties. 
Article 18. Agreement Language 
This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy in 
Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The 
Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effectiveness. 
Article 19. Miscellaneous 
Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, 
cooperative negotiations between the two parties. 
Nothing in this Agreement constitutes or may be construed to be a waiver of the 
sovereign immunity of both parties. 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties relative to the 
subject matter, and may only be modified or amended by a written agreement signed 
by both parties. 
Confucius Institute Headquarters 
(HANBAN) 
Texas  University 
Chief Executive President 
 
 
XU Lin R. Bowen Loftin 
Date:  

































Appendix 8:  Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
        I’m a Senior Lecturer and Chinese Course Leader at the University of Central 
Lancashire, also a part-time PhD student conducting a research into Cultural Diplomacy 
with Chinese Characteristics----A Great Leap Outward? My study will focus on the 
distinctive features of China’s Cultural Diplomacy, and evaluate the series of factors 
affecting its impact through a comparative case study of Confucius Institutes in South 
Korea in Asia, where the very first CI in the world was set up; and UK with the most 
concentrated CIs in Europe; with a view to providing a contrasting angles between a 
generally East and West cultural perspectives, and contextualizing China’s 
contemporary global cultural footprints by looking at ‘why’ China wants to launch cultural 
diplomacy and the Confucius Institute, ‘what’ is the vehicle of the CI, ‘who’ is the agent, 
and ‘how’ it is carried out in the field.  
 
        This research involves interviews which might take about 45-60 minutes. As a 
Director/staff of the Confucius Institute, your views and experiences are invaluable for 
this study. I’m therefore seeking your help with the above research project by answering 
some interview questions. The information you provide will be used to write thesis and 
may be seen publicly if it leads to conference papers or publications, but it is assured 
that the information you provide will be anonymous; that is, your name will not be 
recorded anywhere and no personal information will be revealed from which you could 
be identified. You will receive a copy of the thesis and have access to any conference 
paper or publication arising from the research. 
 
       Your participation is voluntary and based on adequate understanding of both the 
proposed research and the implications of participation in it. If you wish to withdraw from 
the project, you may do so without question at any time, or even after the interview, you 
can just inform me by email. You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t 
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want to answer and still remain in the study.  If you have any questions or would like to 
receive further information about the project, you may contact me or my supervisors, Dr. 
Petra Bagley, Dr Jenny Clegg, and Dr. Anandi Ramamurthy at the details given below. 
If you are willing to participate, please sign the consent form. If you wish to receive a 
summary of the results by email, please leave your contact details on the consent form.  
 
        Please accept my deepest appreciation for your cooperation and time in 
advance. 
  
Researcher: Xin Liu 
Contact: xliu13@uclan.ac.uk 
Tel: 0044-1772 893121 
Supervisors: Dr. Petra Bagley 
Contact: PMBagley@uclan.ac.uk 
Dr. Jenny Clegg 
Contact: jclegg4@uclan.ac.uk 






CONSENT FORM  
 
The Consent Form is retained by the researcher for their records. The Information 
Sheet is kept by the participant. 
 
The participant may request a copy of their consent form. 
 
Title of research project: Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics----A Great 
Leap Outward?  
 
Name of researcher: Xin Liu  
 
Tick the box that applies, sign and date and give to the researcher 
 
I agree to take part in the research project specified above.          Yes  No  
 
I understand the information about my participation in the research project, which has been 
provided to me by the researcher.                                 Yes  No  
 
I agree to be interviewed by the researcher and allow the interview to be audio-taped.  
                                                               Yes  No  
 
I agree to make myself available for further interview if required.       Yes  No  
 
I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview before 
publication. (only applies to the CI Directors)                         Yes  No      
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I understand that I can cease my 
participation at any time.                                         Yes   No  
 
I understand that my participation in this research will be treated with confidentiality.   
                                                               Yes   No  
 
I understand that any information that may identify me will be de-identified at the time of 
analysis of any data.                                             Yes   No                                                               
 
I understand that no identifying information will be disclosed or published.  
                                                                Yes  No  
  
I am aware that I can contact the researchers at any time with any queries. Their contact 
details are provided to me.                                         Yes  No                                                         
 
I understand that this research project has been approved by the UCLAN BAHSS Ethics 






Participant’s name:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
 Please tick this box and provide your email or mail address below if you wish to receive 



















































电话: 0044-1772 893121 
博士导师: Dr. Petra Bagley 
联系方式: PMBagley@uclan.ac.uk 
博士导师: Dr. Jenny Clegg 
联系方式: jclegg4@uclan.ac.uk 















我同意参加上述研究课题                                       Yes No  
 
研究人向我介绍并提供了关于该研究课题的基本情况。             Yes No  
 
我同意接受采访，并允许对采访录音。                           Yes No  
 
我同意在后期有需求时接受进一步的采访。                       Yes No  
 
我清楚我有机会在论文发表之前看到采访记录。（仅限于孔院院长） Yes No                                                                                                                                                          
  
我清楚我的参与是自愿的，并可在任何时候选择退出。             Yes No  
  
我清楚任何会泄露我身份的信息会在数据分析时做模糊处理。       Yes No  
 
我清楚不会发布或发表任何有可能泄露我身份的信息。             Yes No  
  
我知道我可以就任何疑问随时联系研究人，她已提供给我联系方式。 Yes No  
  
我知道该研究课题已经过兰开夏中央大学职业道德委员会批准通过。 Yes No  
 
 
















Appendix 9:   Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
For CI Directors： 
针对英方院长： 
 
Warming up questions: 
1．How long have you worked at the CI? Is your role as CI Director a fulltime one or 
part-time? (What other roles you have?) 
请问您在孔院工作多久了？您做英方院长是专职还是兼职？  
 
2．Confucius Institute was regarded as the flagship of China’s Cultural Diplomacy, what 
is your understanding of its mission?   
孔子学院被称作是中国文化外交的旗帜, 您如何理解她被赋予的使命?  
Possible follow-up question: how do you see its role in the background of China’s 
recent rise and rejuvenation?  
您认为孔子学院在中国的崛起和复兴的背景下可以发挥哪些作用？ 
 
3. From your experience of handing daily affairs (day-to-day operation), what are the 
opportunities and challenges for CI to achieve these aims?  
从您的日常工作中，您认为孔院要实现这些意图面临哪些机遇和挑战？ 
Possible follow-up question: Do you feel cultural differences between East and 




4．Why do you think CI is based in overseas universities? What are the pros and cons 
compared with the models of its counterparts, such as the Cervantes/Goethe Institute 
that are based in city center? 
您觉得孔院为什么决定开在外方的大学校园里？同歌德和塞万提斯学院的方式相比，您
觉得孔院的方式有哪些利弊？    
 
5. Apart from language teaching, which aspects of Chinese culture is promoted through 
the CI activities? Which aspects of China is the general public most interested in learning? 
/What kind of questions are the most popular?  
除了语言教学外,孔子学院主要向所在国展现中国文化的哪些方面? 当地民众最感兴趣了
解中国的哪些方面？/他们最喜欢问的问题有哪些？ 
Possible follow-up question: in the process of interacting with local people, did 
you sense any common biases in their general perception of China? What can 




6. Could you tell me one most successful and one less successful event you’ve 
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organized so far?  
可否给我们分别介绍一个贵院认为开展得最为成功/最不成功的项目/活动？ 
Possible follow-up question: in the process of carrying out such activities, are 
there anything quite different from your expectations (for both successful and 




7. I noticed in the CI Constitution, among the five services it provides, the last one has 
been changed from ‘conducting research on contemporary China’ to ‘conducting 
language and cultural exchange activities’. According to you, what are the reasons 




8. What are your comments on the new ‘Confucius China Studies Program’? Is your 
institute involved in any way? 您对‘新汉学计划’有何评价？你们有哪些具体的参与吗？ 
 
9. As the sponsor, how does Hanban oversee the work of the CI? In what areas do they 
hold the decision power (have the say)?  
汉办作为出资方如何监管孔院的工作？他们在哪些事情上有决定权? 
Possible follow-up question: Has it ever occurred to your CI that a project budget 
was not approved by Hanban?  
你们有无碰到过项目报批没有通过的情况? 
 
10. The CI Constitution prescribes that Hanban will be responsible for the evaluation of 
CIs, could you tell me how this is done and what are the criteria?  
孔院章程中规定汉办负责对孔子学院的评估，可否介绍一下他们怎样评估和评估标准？ 
Possible follow-up question: Can you use examples to illustrate what kind of 
rewards and sanctions are in place?  
你可否举例说明具体有哪些奖惩措施？ 
 
11. Which aspects of the training provided by Hanban you find most useful?  
您觉得汉办提供的外方院长培训哪些内容最有用？ 
 
12. What areas are the local media interests in CI? Is there a channel that Hanban is 




13. Could you describe the relationship between the three parties - Chinese university, 
its host university, and Hanban? Can you use an example to illustrate the communication 






14. Do you think both sides of the partnership (Chinese home university and the 
overseas host university) share an unanimous understanding of the goals of the 
Confucius Institute? Could you elaborate with some examples? 
您觉得中外双方大学对设立孔子学院的目的的理解是否一致？可否举例说明？ 
 
15. What sorts of issues are of common concern on the CI Annual Conference organized 
by Hanban?  
每年的孔院大会上一般讨论哪些共同关心的话题？  
Possible follow-up question: When ‘model CIs’ share their experiences on this 
conference, do you feel if a replicable common model more encouraged by 
Hanban, or a more individulised/localised model? Compared with other CIs, What 




16. Are there any new offerings in your work plans next year? (finishing) Anything on 




For Chinese Co-Directors:  
针对中方院长: 
 
Warming up questions: 
1．How long have you worked at the CI?  
请问您在孔院工作多久了？ 
2. What are the biggest appeals/attractions of this position to you when you applied? 




(About the purpose of CI)  
same 
(About CI’s provision) 
Same  
(About the role of Chinese government and communication among the triangle)  
Same, with two extra questions:   
 
1．Could you please briefly describe the selection process and criteria for appointing the 
Co-Director of Confucius Institute representing the Chinese university?  
可否请您介绍一下中方院长的选拔过程和标准?  
 





For CI tutors (secondees):  
针对中方外派老师: 
 
Warming up questions: 
1．How long have you worked at the CI? Is this your first overseas posting?  
请问您在孔院工作多久了？这是您第一次外派工作吗？ 
 
2．What are the biggest appeals/attractions of this position to you when you applied?  
您申请这个职位对您最大的吸引力是什么?  
 
3. Compared with your previous job at the University, what are the differences, if there 




(About the purpose of CI)  
 
4. What do you think are the goals for the Confucius Institute? According to you, what 
role can CI play in the background of China’s rise and rejuvenation? 
您认为孔子学院的目标是什么? 它在中国的崛起和复兴的背景下可以发挥哪些作用？ 
 
5. Do you think both sides of the partnership (Chinese home university and the overseas  
host university) share an unanimous understanding of the goals of the Confucius  
Institute? Could you elaborate with some examples? 
您觉得中外双方大学对设立孔子学院的目的的理解是否一致？可否举例说明？ 
 
(About the provision of CI)  
 
6. Apart from language teaching, which aspects of Chinese culture is promoted through 
the CI activities? Which aspects of China is the general public most interested in learning?  
除了语言教学外,孔子学院主要向所在国展现中国文化的哪些方面? 当地民众最感兴趣了
解中国的哪些方面？ 
Possible follow-up question: in the process of interacting with local people, did 
you sense any common biases in their general perception of China? What can 




7. Could you tell me one most successful and one less successful event you’ve 
organized so far?  
可否给我们分别介绍一个贵院认为开展得最为成功/最不成功的项目/活动？ 
Possible follow-up question: in the process of carrying out such activities, are 
there anything quite different from your expectations (for both successful and 






8．What are the most popular/frequent questions you get asked by your students?  
学生最喜欢问什么样的问题? 
Possible follow-up question: How do you handle sensitive questions?  
碰到敏感问题你如何处理? 
 
9. Do you follow local/national media’s reports about China? What are your thoughts of 
those controversial or negative ones?  
您关心当地媒体对中国的报道吗? 你如何看待哪些有争议的或负面的报道? 
 
（about role of Chinese government） 
10. What kind of pre-departure training did you receive from Hanban? Which 
components have the most practical value according to you?  
您在国内赴任前接受过汉办安排的哪些培训? 您觉得最有用的是什么?  
Possible follow-up question: Any trainings after you arrive?  
赴任后呢? 
 
（about the love triangle）  
11. Could you describe the relationship between the three parties - Chinese university, 
its host university, and Hanban? Can you use an example to illustrate the communication 




12. During your overseas posting, who is responsible for your appraisal, could you tell 
me what are the criteria? 外派期间，谁负责对你工作的评估，可否介绍一下评估标准？ 
 
（finishing):   
13. Do you feel the two year term of service is too long, too short, or just right? Why?  
















Interview Questions for Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing: 
 
1. Hanban made it clear on its own website that “Benefiting from the UK, France, 
Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their national languages, China began its 
own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions with an aim to promote 
Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name 
of Confucius Institute.” It is almost a self-identification that Confucius Institute is the 
Chinese version of Goethe Institute, and comparisons are frequently made between CI 
and GI in media and academic literature. Do you agree or disagree on these 
comparisons? What are the major differences and similarities between these two 
organizations according to you? 
 
2. As you may know, CI is mostly based on overseas campus of the host university 
while GI is located in city center, what do you think are the pros and cons of CI’s 
operating model? 
 
3. Why, unlike its western counterparts, CI’s intentions were often questioned with 
suspicions of cultural invasion or ideological infiltration?  
 
4. Do you think it is a level playing field for every country that is engaged in culture 
diplomacy? 
 
5. What are the biggest challenges you face at work?  
 
6. You may have heard of the few cases of CIs being closed down recently, including 1 
in Russia, 1 in France, 1 in Canada, 2 in US and 1 in Sweden, any comments on the 





















Appendix 10 Interviewee Information Grid 
 
Code Role of the interviewee Nationality Date of 
interview 
Venue of interview Language of 
interview 
UKD1 CI Director from the British host 
university 
GB 03/07/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKD2 CI Director from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 27/06/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKD3 CI Director from the British host 
university 
GB 09/07/14 Host university in the UK English 
UKD4 CI Director from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 14/07/14 Home university in Beijing Chinese 
SKD1 CI Director from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 16/07/13 Home university in 
Shandong 
Chinese 
SKD2 CI Director from the South 
Korean host institution 
SK 22/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese; 
SKD3 CI Director from the South 
Korean host institution 
SK 22/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
SKD4 CI Director from the South 
Korean host university 
SK 23/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
UKSC1 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university  
CN 06/06/13 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 04/07/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 06/06/13 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKSC4 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 26/06/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKSC5 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university  
CN 23/06/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
 
SC1 
CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 22/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
SKSC2 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 23/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
SKSC3 CI secondee from the Chinese 
home university 
CN 23/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
UKLH1 CI administrator locally hired by 
the host university 
GB 26/06/14 Host university in the UK English 
UKLH2 CI administrator locally hired by 
the host university 
GB 03/07/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKLH3 CI teacher locally hired by the 
host university  
GB 23/06/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
UKLH4  CI teacher locally hired by the 
host university,  
CN 27/06/14 Host university in the UK Chinese 
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SKLH  CI teacher locally hired by the 
host institution  
SK 22/07/14 Host university in the SK Chinese 
FRD CI Director in France from the 
Chinese home university 
CN 28/07/13 
 
Home university in Beijing Chinese 
 
MOD CI Director in Morocco from the 
Chinese home university 
CN  
28/07/13 
Home university in Beijing Chinese 
MXD CI Director in Mexico from the 
Chinese home university 
CN 28/07/13 
 
Home university in Beijing Chinese 
Mr. 
Anders  
Director of Goethe Institute in 
Beijing, no code needed as he 
agreed to have his name 
revealed in the paper. 

























Appendix 11: Implementation Plan for the “Confucius Institute Head 
Teacher Position” 
 
With the purpose of further strengthening the building of Confucius Institutes’ teachers 
team，improving the teaching quality and level of Confucius Institutes and ensuring their 
sustainable development, the Confucius Institute Headquarters/ Hanban of 
China( hereinafter referred to as “Hanban”) has decided to cooperate with host 
universities of Confucius Institutes to set up the Head Teacher Position. 
 
I) Responsibilities of the Head Teacher 
A Head Teacher is a full-time employee who takes full responsibility for organizing 
and managing Chinese language teaching of Confucius Institutes under the leadership 
of the Institute Directors. Main responsibilities of the Head Teacher are as follows: to 
develop teaching plans based on the Chinese language needs of the host country, the 
host university and local community; to select teaching materials and formulate teaching 
outline based on actual needs; to train and guide teachers and volunteers of the 
Confucius Institute and carry out teaching assessments; to conduct Chinese language 
teaching; and to establish and manage the teaching archives of the Confucius Institute. 
 
II) Application for the Head Teacher Position 
The Head Teacher Position shall be set up by host universities on a voluntary basis. 
Each Institute can apply to set up one Head Teacher Position. The Institute that applies 
for such a position shall be running for at least two years, and have more than 200 
registered students. 
 
Application process: 1.The host university of Confucius Institutes that meet the 
requirements shall submit to the Confucius Institute Headquarters the Application Form 
for the Confucius Institute Head Teacher Position; 2.Confucius Institute Headquarters 
organizes experts to review and decide whether to approve the application; 3.Confucius 
Institute Headquarters signs the Agreement to Jointly Set Up the Confucius Institute 
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Head Teacher Position with the approved universities. 
 
III) Requirements for the Head Teacher 
The Head Teacher shall meet the following requirements: the Head Teacher shall 
be passionate about working in Confucius Institutes and abide by the laws of the host 
country and China, as well as the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes. 
The Head Teacher shall hold at least a master’s degree, be proficient in Chinese and the 
language of the host country, and possess strong overall capacities such as cross-
cultural communication and organizational skills. For Head Teachers who are native 
Chinese speakers, they shall attain at least Grade A (Level 2) in the Mandarin test held 
by China's State Language Work Committee. For Head Teachers who are non-native 
Chinese speakers, they shall attain new HSK level 6 in the Mandarin test. The Head 
Teacher shall have at least five years of Chinese language teaching experience or have 
taught for more than two years in Confucius Institutes. The Head Teacher shall meet 
relevant legal requirements of the host country; meet the health requirements as set out 
by the university hiring process; be citizens of the host country or have permanent 
residency, or shall at least have a work permit. 
 
IV) Process for the selection and recruitment of the Head Teacher 
Head Teachers will be selected based on open recruitment, expert review by 
Hanban and university appointment. The specific procedures are as follows: 1. The host 
university will conduct open recruitment around the world based on the requirements put 
forth in Section III of this plan. 2. The host university shall submit the Recommendation 
Form for the Confucius Institute Head Teacher Position along with the application letter 
of the candidate to Hanban. 3. Hanban reviews the application and gives an official 
response. 
 
Hanban shall reserve the right to recommend outstanding graduates of the Master's 
degree scholarship program in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages 






In principle, the salary of the Head Teacher shall be set in reference to the salary 
standard of teachers in local universities of the same condition. In case the standard is 
lower than that of Hanban sent teachers, the salary of the Head Teacher can apply 
Hanban’s standard. There are two modes of funding, from which one should be selected： 
1. Hanban shall be responsible for the full salary of the Head Teacher over the first 
5-year period and 50% of the salary over the second 5-year period. The host university 
shall be responsible for 50% of the salary over the second 5-year period, and the full 
salary starting from the third 5-year period. 
2. Hanban and the host university shall each be responsible for 50% of the Head 
Teacher’ salary over the first, second and third 5-year period. 
Hanban will fund the training of the Head Teacher in China or in the host country, 
and provide necessary teaching materials, reference books and teaching aid. 
 
VI) Program Management 
1. The host university should integrate the Head Teacher Position into the 
university’s employment position system, and pledge to maintain this position over the 
long-term. The host university, according to relevant university regulations, should 
provide the Head Teacher with benefits, medical insurance, pension and necessary office 
space and equipments. 
2. The host university, according to its relevant regulations, shall sign an 
employment contract with the Head Teacher With a trial period of one year. If the Head 
Teacher passes the annual assessment, his/her employment contract can be renewed. 
3. The host university is responsible for conducting the annual assessment of the 
Head Teacher based on the assessment criteria for Head Teachers and taking into 
account Hanban’s comments. For Head Teachers who fail the assessment, the host 
university may decide to terminate the employment contract, and immediately notify 
Hanban of such decision. 
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4. Over the program’s implementation period, if the host university undergoes one 
of the following situations, Hanban shall reserve the right to terminate the contract and 
put an end to funding: 
- Violation of the laws of the host country (region) or China; 
- Failure to fulfil the obligations as stipulated in the agreement or violation of the 
agreement terms; 
- The Head Teacher Position being vacant for one year or more; 
- The usage of funds for the Head Teacher Position violates the terms of the 
agreement. 
5. Over the program’s implementation period, if any program-related issue arises, 
both parties shall settle the issues through friendly consultations; and in case of failure 
to reach a consensus, neither party can unilaterally terminate the agreement. Either party, 
if it wishes to terminate the agreement, must notify the other in writing 3 months before 
the end of the agreement, and the agreement shall be terminated once a consensus is 


















Appendix 12: CI Conference Program and Executive Training Program 
The 8thConfucius Institute Conference Program, Dec, 2013 
Reflect Back, Look Forward (English version provided to the delegates) 
 
Day 1: Opening Ceremony  
Chaired by Yuan Guiren, Ministry of Education, Vice Chair of the Council of the Confucius 
Institute Headquarters 
Key note address by: Liu Yandong, Vice Premier, Chair of the Council of the Confucius 
Institute Headquarters 
Followed by speech by conference delegates 
Award ceremony of “Confucius Institutes (classroom) of the Year 2013”; “Confucius 
Institutes Individual Performance Excellence Award”; and “Outstanding Confucius 
Institute Chinese Partner”  
Confucius Institute Best Practices Forums 
Topic 1: Chinese Language Teaching 
Topic 2: Brand Cultural Activities with Special Feature 
Topic 3: Facilitate Primary and Secondary School Chinese Teachers to Acquire 
Certification 
Topic 4: Developing the Testing Market 
Topic 5: Improving the Teaching Conditions of Confucius Institute 
Topic 6: Development of Teaching Materials and Digital Resources 
Topic 7: Supporting the Development of Confucius Classrooms 
Topic 8: Confucius Institutes and “MOOC” 
 
Day 2: President’s Forum  
Topic 1: Confucius Institute Planning and University Development ---- Serve the colleges 
Topic 2: Confucius Institute Planning and University Development ---- Serve the 
community 
Topic 3: Confucius Institute Day (to be held globally on 27th Sep 2014 to commemorate 
CI’s 10-year anniversary)  
Topic 4: Implementation of the “Confucius Institute Studies Program’ 
Topic 5: Development of Local Majors in Teaching Chinese 
Topic 6: The Role of the “Head Teacher” Position 




Chinese Culture Lecture: Confucius in My Imagination 
Lecturer: Mr. Mo Yan, Nobel Laureate in Literature 2012, Renowned writer and  
professor of Beijing Normal University 
Closing Speech by: Xu Lin, Member of the CPPCC National Committee, Counsellor of  
the State Council, Chief Executive of Confucius Institute Headquarters and Director  
General of Hanban 
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Executive Training Program of Confucius Institute Directors 
 
The 2008 workshop only lasted for two days, following the 3-day Annual Conference in  
Beijing. According to the Program booklet: 
Goals: the workshop is designed to specify Confucius Institute’s mission, ideas,  
objectives and tasks, and further improve the managerial capacity of directors to ensure  
high teaching quality of Confucius Institute.  
 
Content: The workshop will feature seminars on ‘Comparison of Chinese and Foreign 
Cultures’ and the ‘The Chinese Economy in the International Arena’, discussion of the 
orientation and development of Confucius Institutes, their organization and management, 
quality of teaching faculty, curriculum design and teaching materials’ development, fund-
raising and financial management, implementation of special programs and so on.  
 
The 2013 workshop lasted for 8 days, with 6 days of full schedule, the keynote    
speeches are listed below: 
 
Speaker Title 
Prof. Xu Jialu, Vice Chairman of the 9th 
and 10th NPC Standing Committee  
An Introduction to Confucian Classics 
 
Dr. Tang Min, professor of the economics 
dept. of CPC Party School of the Central 
Committee 
New Policies of the New Chinese 
Government 
Zhao Qizheng, Dean, School of 
Journalism and Communication of 
Renmin Uni, Former Minister, State 
Council Information Office 
Public Diplomacy in the Modern Age 
Prof. Zhang Weiwei 
Director of the Institute of China Studies, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
The China Model and its Future: A Global 
Perspective  
Prof. Zhang Weiwei 
Director of the Institute of China Studies, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
How to Introduce China to the World 
Prof. David Gosset, Deputy Director for 
European Relations at China Europe 
International Business School (CEIBS) 
The Chinese Renaissance and Its Global 
Impact 
Prof. Zhou Ning, Xiamen University Western Images of China in the Last Century  
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Prof. Li Tiangang, head of the Religious 
Studies Department of the School of 
Philosophy at Fudan University 
Communication and Integration: Early 
Globalization Between China and West 
Prof. Ke Chuanren, Professor of Chinese 
and Second Language Acquisition at The 
University of Iowa, Confucius Institute 
Director  
Some Observations on the Difference 
between the U.S. and Chinese Discourse 
Systems 
Prof. Ding Chun, Center for World 
Economy Studies, Director of Centre for 
European Studies, Fudan University 
Economic and Social Development in China 
Since Reform: Performance, Problems and 
Challenges 
Prof. Wu Xinbo, Deputy director of 
Institute for International Studies, Director 
of Center for American Studies, Fudan 
University 
Peaceful Development and Win-Win 
Cooperation: A New Outlook of China’s 
Diplomacy 
Prof. Chen Hong, Director of Institute of 
Intercultural Communication, Nankai 
University 
Book of Changes –The Classic of Chinese 
Civilization 
Prof. Zhou Zhenhe, Institute of Chinese 
Historical Geography, Fudan University 
History of China: Territory and Culture 
Prof. Qian Xiaoyan, Xiamen University Experiencing Chinese Medicine: Meridians 
and Acupuncture 
Dr. Diarra Boubacar, China Primary 
Health Care Foundation  
Health Care on Traditional Chinese Medicine 
Prof. Xiong Qingnian, Director and 
Researcher of Center for Higher 
Education, Fudan University 
The Inheritance and Development of 
Cultural Tradition of Chinese Education  
Prof. Gong Ke, President of Nankai 
University 
China’s Higher Education: In a New Phase f 
Reform and Development 
Prof. Sun Tao, Nankai University China’s New Rural Development: 
Exemplified by Huaming Town 
Mr. Jiang Yuanxun, Jin Junmei Founder.  Chinese Tea and the World 
 
